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ABSTRACT 
Sacred sites form a vital component in manifesting the right to freedom of religion. They 
also function as identity icons for the religious communities in a multi-religious state like 
India. Protecting them therefore, from aggression, or demolition by states and non-state 
actors is fundamental to guaranteeing such freedom. The consequences of attacking a 
sacred site are obvious from the Ayodhya dispute, in which all three organs of the Indian 
state failed to protect the Babri Masjid from illegal demolition, and to prevent the 
subsequent nationwide riots. However, the legal failure of the judiciary is quite apparent 
from the fact that it could not adjudicate an ongoing dispute for more than forty-two years. 
This protracted delay helped the religious militant groups to transform a local issue into a 
national dispute which has affected the secular and democratic fabric of contemporary 
India. This presents a further challenge to the pluralistic nature of Indian society and 
threatens peace and security in the South Asian region. 
The inadequacy of domestic legal mechanisms to settle disputes and provide remedy for 
violation of human rights warrants intervention at the level of international law. The 
existing international law provisions, namely, the right to freedom of religion, rights of the 
minorities, right to property and protection of cultural rights, have failed to include the 
protection of sacred sites as a right to a religious community. The global human rights 
mechanisms are mostly monitoring bodies and lack the judicial power. In promoting and 
protecting human rights, the regional human rights mechanisms, particularly the regional 
courts, have made use of their ability to deliver binding decisions on member states. The 
inadequacies in international law are best addressed by a regional convention for the 
protection of sacred sites, embedded in the existing structures of SAARC. 
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GLOSSARY 
An important city in the state of Uttar Pradesh. It is the seat of the 
High Court of Uttar Pradesh. A Bench of the High Court of 
Allahabad has been set up at Lucknow 
One of the organisations representing the Muslim interest in the 
Ramjanmabhumi-babri Masjid dispute. 
City with a population of about 50,000. The birthplace of the Hindu 
god Ram according to the Ramayana, a Hindu epic. Situated in the 
state of Uttar Pradesh. 
One of the Hindu organisations in the forefront of the movement for 
constructing a temple at disputed site. 
Singing of Hindu devotional songs. 
A right wing Hindu nationalist party. It is the ruling party from 1999 
till May 2004, and main opposition party from 2004. 
A member of the upper caste, particularly priestly caste. 
Central Bureau of Investigation, the premier national investigating 
agency. 
A senior civil administrator of the state government. He/she is in 
charge of a division comprising 3-5 districts in a state. 
Ten million. 
'the downtrodden', a self-definition adopted by people of the 
scheduled caste (lower caste) origin. 
Gathering of Hindu priests or religious heads. 
Having a view of deities inside a Hindu temple or holy men/women. 
Appropriate moral and faith obligations. 
A territorial unit of civil administration. (Administration of a district 
comes under the respective state government). 
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District Magistrate 
Faizabad 
Hindu Rashtra 
Hindutva 
Inter State Council 
Janmastan 
Kar Seva 
Kar Sevak 
Lakh 
Lok Sabha 
Lucknow 
Mahant 
Mandir 
Masjid 
Maulvi 
National Integration 
Council (NIC) 
Nawab 
Nazul 
Pandit 
The head of the civil administration in a district. One of hislher 
important responsibilities is the maintenance of law and order. 
The district in which the town of Ayodhya is situated. The capital of 
Faizabad district is also known as Faizabad. 
The Hindu nation. 
The Hindu Nationalist movement for nationhood and the assertion of 
'majority' rule in contemporary India. 
A constitutional body for inquiring into and advising upon disputes 
between states in the Indian federal set-up. 
Literally 'the birth place'. In Ayodhya, it refers to the locality in 
which the disputed site is located. 
Means, 'voluntary labour'. Usually in pursuit of a religious objective 
such as the construction or renovation of a sacred site. 
One who does the Kar Seva. 
One hundred thousand. 
Lower house of the Indian Parliament. 
Capital city of the state of Uttar Pradesh. 
The head of a Hindu monastery or leader of a sect or a chief priest in 
a Hindu temple. 
Hindu Temple. 
Mosque. 
A Muslim scholar. 
A forum of leading personalities of the country including union 
ministers, chief ministers of all states, heads of the recognised 
political parties, prominent members of the parliament. Its 
membership presently numbers about 150. 
A vice-regent, equal to Viceroy in British India. 
A piece of land used only with the permission of the government. 
A learned Hindu Brahmin. (Brahmin is a member from upper cas~<y. 
Puja 
Puja 
Rajya Sabha 
Ram 
Ram Chaputra 
Ram lanmabhoomi or 
Ramjanmabhumi 
Rastriya Swayam Sevak 
Rath Yatra 
Sadhu 
Sakthi 
Sangh Parivar 
Shilanyas 
Tirtha 
Uttar Pradesh 
Vaishnavite 
Vishwa Hindu Parishad 
Waqf 
Offering worship to deities according to Hindu practices. 
The act of worship. 
Upper house of the Indian Parliament. 
Also called Rama, Shri Rama, Bhagavan Shri Ram, Ramachandra. 
According to Hindus, Ram was an incarnation of the god 'VISHNU'. 
He is worshipped as a human manifestation of God embodying the 
virtues of a noble human being and an ideal king. 
Literally 'The platform of Ram'. A rectangular platform which 
existed in the outer courtyard of the disputed structure. 
The name given to the disputed area in Ayodhya. Literally 'Ram's 
birth place'. 
An extreme right Hindu organisation. Literally means 
'National Volunteer Organisation'. 
Literally 'a chariot journey'. Name given by Indian politicians to 
journeys undertaken for mass contact and creating public opinion. 
The journey is undertaken in a vehicle called a 'Rath' (chariot). 
A Hindu monk, wanderer. 
A Hindu goddess worshipped all over India. 
'the Sangh family', a term used to refer to a number of RSS-
associated Hindu nationalist organisations. 
Laying of the foundation stone to a building. Normally it is a 
religious ritual. 
A place of pilgrimage. 
The most populous state of northern India where Ayodhya is situated. 
A devotee of the Hindu god Vishnu. 
Literally 'World Hindu Council'. It is the leading organization 
in the Ram temple construction movement guided by the RSS. 
The dedication by a Muslim of any property for any pious, religious 
or charitable purpose. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
This study has its moorings in the actual socio-political context of the Indian sub-continent, 
and carefully examines and analyses issues of human rights most particularly pertaining to 
the freedom of religion and the protection of sacred sites. 
The introductory chapter of this thesis outlines the central research argument, objectives 
envisaged, methodology adopted, research questions applied, chapter outline, significance 
and limitations of the study. 
1.1. My thesis 
It has now been established in many human rights treaties which exist internationally and 
regionally, that the right to freedom of religion is a human right and as such it requires all 
states in the international forum to ensure the peaceful enjoyment of that right for all its 
citizens. Consequently, this legal study analyses the scope of international human rights 
law in protecting sacred sites, which is an important component of the right to freedom of 
religion. 
The right to freedom of religion covers a variety of rights. Significant, not least because it is 
contested, is the right to worship individually orland as a community. Collective worship 
plays a pivotal role in expressing one's faith or belief. As a result, places or objects of 
worship, including temples, mosques and churches are gradually raised to iconic status. 
They become the focus of respect and veneration. Some of them even draw pilgrims. 
Devotees too place their trust in such objects and receive consolation, comfort and strength 
from them. Popular piety almost grants divine sanction to these objects and buildings. 
Selected sites and objects are thus considered sacred by almost all the religions because of 
the devotion they perpetuate. 
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Most of the religions, during the course of their history, have established sacred sites for 
their adherents to conduct worship or go to on a pilgrimage. Any number of examples can 
be cited from the beginning of recorded human history. However, sacred sites as visible 
symbols of a particular religious group or a specific belief system also remained vulnerable 
to attacks from intolerant states, co-religionists and non-state actors. 
Aggression of any kind on any of the sacred sites belonging to any religion amounted to 
gross human rights violations, not only because of the sacredness attached, but because of 
the identity and security it offered to a community. Hence, the right to protection of sacred 
sites, necessarily, includes other fundamental human rights such as minority rights, right to 
life, right to peaceful assembly, and right to freedom of thought and expression. 
Although the United Nations was established to protect the future world from the scourge 
of war and human rights abuses, its record in protecting the fundamental religious rights, 
especially the collective right to worship, does not match with other individual human 
rights mentioned in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR).l The turn of the 
twenty-first century has witnessed a number of attacks on sacred sites which deny the 
fundamental right of the people to hold fast, practice and live up to their faith. Besides, the 
rise of various extremist religious groups threaten not only religious freedom but also social 
pluralism and religious tolerance in many societies, hence demanding that the international 
community contemplate the establishment of radically new mechanisms based on new 
international legal provisions. 
To engage with these vital issues affecting any worshipping community, the Babri Masjid-
Ram Temple dispute in Ayodhya, in the state of Uttar Pradesh (UP) in India, is explored. 
Ayodhya, by all historical accounts a sacred site of the Muslims, became the target of 
attack by a section of a Hindu revival group. Naturally, two major religious communities 
were drawn into the dispute. What began historically as a property title dispute between 
two localised groups, later emerged as a dispute concerning a sacred site. Interestingly, 
Ayodhya became the symbol around which Hindu religious militant groups, supposedly 
I Universal Declaration of Human Rights (adopted 10 December 1948) UNGA Res 217 A(I1I). 
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belonging to the majority religious community, seemed to have built their identity to gain 
political power. 
The central argument of the study comprehensively delves into the legal tangle hold of the 
Ayodhya issue. What prompted the student to research this particular issue is the prolonged 
period of time required to settle an issue that began as a property title dispute, but was 
subject to such a delay that it took an unprecedented toll on human rights. 
F or more than forty-three years, the dispute could not find a legal settlement either from the 
lower or the higher courts in the country. The inadequacy of the prevailing Indian legal 
system was hence exposed in the demolition of the Babri Masjid on 6 January 1992, and 
the unprecedented violence that followed throughout the country. The demolition had effect 
beyond the territory of India and resulted in the demolition of temples and mosques in other 
countries in the region. This shows that dispute around a particular sacred site today has 
implications beyond the boundaries of anyone state and can acquire international character. 
Moreover, the central argument of the thesis lies also in ensuring effective remedies to 
these disputes from international human rights law. The role of an international legal 
instrument has become imperative in today's context for settling sacred site disputes. 
Therefore, this thesis analyses the need to construct new international human rights legal 
provisions for safeguarding sacred sites. This will be based on the understanding that a 
regional convention on protection of sacred sites is within the purview of the provisions of 
the international human rights law. Hence, the proposed regional model convention, which 
this research outlines, bridges the gap existing between the internal and international legal 
systems. The model convention, as a result, would also become legally resourceful III 
formulating and developing international human rights law to protect sacred sites. 
1.2. Scope of the study 
This section explains the key choices as to the substance of the thesis. Explanation of the 
choices is also helpful for understanding the key terms used. The study emphasises how 
timely and relevant it is, specifically for India. 
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As the title, "Sacred Sites and International Law: A Case Study of the Ayodhya Dispute". 
indicates, sacred sites and their protection fonn the nucleus of this research. Whenever 
sacred sites come under attack and the domestic judiciary fails to deliver justice in 
protecting such sites, the need for looking at international human rights law for an effective 
remedy is raised. Hence, a case study on the Ayodhya dispute explores the need for the 
creation of an international instrument to bring such remedy under international human 
rights law. 
Sacred sites are significant identity icons of any religious community. The right to freedom 
of religion includes the right to worship individually and/or in communion with others to 
exercise one's faith in a supernatural being or beings. In a pluralistic, specifically multi-
religious society, sacred sites have not only religious, but also socio-cultural significance. 
They become cultural as well as religious centres. Moreover, during disputes among 
various communities, sacred sites may be used for political mobilisation by the ethnic 
communities. To assert the existence and identity of a religious group, the members of 
these groups may struggle to protect such symbols at any cost. Wherever sacred sites are in 
dispute between a majority and a minority community, it may lead to massive human rights 
violations in a state. Precisely, this is what has happened in the case of Ayodhya. A section 
of a majority Hindu community had demolished the sacred site of the minority Muslim 
community. 
Moreover, sacred site disputes may have the potential to divide a civil society along 
religious lines which may affect the stability and rule of law in a state. In addition, since 
religious communities exist trans-boundary, any attack on their sacred site in one state, 
inevitably causes tension and sometimes violence in other states where such religious 
communities are present. This spill over effect of a religious dispute may affect peace and 
stability regionally and internationally. It might be taken into account, however, that the 
power of any sacred site dispute to divide a society along socio-cultural and political lines 
leaves deep hatred among the concerned communities, especially when such disputes are 
manipulated to gain political power or to achieve personal gains. Hence, this research 
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focuses on safeguarding all sacred sites as part of protecting and promoting right to 
freedom of religion and other fundamental human rights. The Ayodhya dispute vividly 
illustrates the significance of disputes over sacred sites, particularly how such disputes lead 
to considerable human rights violations. 
Ayodhya is a small town in the state of Uttar Pradesh (UP) in North India. According to the 
Hindu epic, Ramayana, Ayodhya is defined as the birthplace of the Hindu god, Ram. Since 
at least 1528, Muslims have been using the site as a mosque and conducting worship there. 
As early as 1885, conflicts between Muslims and Hindu communities about the use of the 
site entered the legal forum. The modem dispute dates back to the very beginning of the 
independent Indian state. In December 1949, the idols of Ram and Sita (Ram's wife) were 
placed inside the Babri Masjid, by a few members of the Hindu community. Instead of 
removing the idols at once and restoring the property to the Muslim community, the court 
through an order of interim injunction, locked the mosque denying the Muslims their right 
to worship. Subsequently, many suits were filed before the court from 1950. From the early 
1990's the Babri Masjid dispute had become the key theme around which public discourse 
operated. In 1986, the Faizabad court allowed Hindus to conduct their worship of their idols 
by opening the gates of the mosque while prohibiting the Muslims to enter the site. 
Subsequently, the dispute led to several communal riots resulting in egregious human rights 
violations. On 6 December 1992, the four hundred and fifty year old mosque was 
demolished by the Hindu militant forces. This led to the unprecedented violence and riots 
throughout India which claimed more than two thousand lives. Fifteen years following the 
demolition, the civil suits filed in 1950 and the criminal litigation against the perpetrators of 
the demolition of the mosque are still pending. The Ayodhya dispute remains a trigger 
point for major riots and pogroms. For example, in February 2002, in the state of Gujarat, 
more than two thousand Muslims were killed within three days in response to the killing of 
fifty-five Ram devotees returning from Ayodhya. 
The Ayodhya dispute, which began in 1950, remains still a central issue in Indian polity. It 
has intensified the growth of religious militant forces from the 1980's which has affected 
the democratic values and rule of law in the country. The civil society has been divided 
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along communal lines and the rights of minorities are under severe strain. The 
communalism of the majority has helped to construct minority communal forces affecting 
the secular nature of the country. It may be argued that the communalisation of politics has 
influenced the judiciary and other state organs in India. 
Moreover, the Ayodhya dispute has created tension in neighbouring countries, and led to 
attacks on lives and sacred sites of the minority Hindu population in Pakistan and 
Bangladesh. The religious disputes based on sacred sites, and attacks on the members of the 
minority community remain a cause of concern in South Asia, particularly between the two 
nuclear powers of India and Pakistan. Since the Ayodhya dispute has changed the socio-
cultural and political nature of India, it has been chosen as a case study. 
As seen above, any religious dispute has the potential to affect bilateral and multilateral 
relations between other countries. The trans-border spill over effect has been reported in 
several cases such as the Ayodhya dispute. Hindu-Muslim relationships in India have 
important implications for the future peace and security of South Asia. This concern 
emerges from the fact that India is strategically important within the South Asian region 
and any internal disputes have potential repercussions for all the subcontinent's minorities. 
The globalisation process has caused the migration from the subcontinent and Indian 
heritage religious communities exist throughout the world following everything that is 
happening in their home country. This shows that religious disputes in India have serious 
international repercussions. 
Every domestic judiciary has an important role in protecting the fundamental rights of 
citizens as guaranteed by the law of the land. By upholding the sanctity of constitutional 
rights, the judiciary assists other organs of the state in maintaining rule of law, public order, 
and peace in a given state. The failure or ineffectiveness of judiciary in adjudication of 
disputes may result in anarchy and violation of fundamental rights. Moreover, when the 
judiciary displays a biased attitude in favour of the majority community, it leads to the 
denial of the rights of minority communities to exercise their fundamental human rights. In 
the Ayodhya dispute, the Indian judiciary could not provide justice for the Muslim minority 
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community and religious bias of the judiciary was apparent which led to violence and riots 
and subsequent demolition of an ancient sacred site. 
The failure of the domestic judiciary to protect the religious rights of the people, 
particularly the minority communities, questions the role of international human rights law 
in protecting the fundamental rights of people in those countries where the judiciary has 
failed to provide adequate justice. Precisely, this becomes the focal point for the research to 
examine the protection offered by international human rights law in protecting sacred sites 
as part of fundamental right to freedom of religion. 
As the research advanced, the analysis of international human rights law and enforcement 
mechanisms revealed the gap in providing adequate remedy in disputes similar to the 
Ayodhya dispute. This void is filled by proposing a regional human rights convention for 
the South Asian region where religious disputes lead to massive human rights violations. 
Regional human rights systems operate under international human rights law and they have 
proved to have a greater efficiency in achieving the aim of protecting and promoting 
international human rights. Regional systems are not only inter-connected with each other 
but also with the large global system of which they are components.2 International human 
rights law has been developed through the growing jurisprudence and evolution of regional 
human rights systems,3 wherein the various systems reinforce international norms while 
responding to the particular problems of each region. The binding judicial decisions of 
human rights courts in the region create more obligations on the member states than an 
international mechanism such as the Human Rights Committee. Based on these reasons, a 
regional human rights convention on protection of sacred sites is proposed for South Asia. 
It would be fitting to point out at this juncture that this proposal is a significant 
development of the research and it has sharpened the focus of the study. 
2 See, D Shelton, 'The Promise of Regional Human Rights System' in BH Weston and SP Marks (eds), The 
Fuhlre of International Human Rights (Transnational, New York 1999) 351- 98. 
1 For instance, the ECHR, although a regional instrument, has had an impact upon the development of nonns 
in general international law. J Rehman, International Human Rights Law: A Practical Approach (Pearson. 
Harlow 2003) 138. . 
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1.3. Objectives 
The objectives envisaged by the research are enumerated as follows: 
1. To examine the possibility for a domestic legal settlement to resolve the Ayodhya 
dispute amicably, restoring harmony at the national level and peace in the region? 
2. To examIne the failure of the judiciary in protecting a significant sacred site 
belonging to a minority community; 
3. To evaluate the prevailing international law and institutions dealing with such 
disputes over sacred sites; and 
4. To propose necessary reforms to international laws, particularly proposmg a 
regional convention for bringing redress of disputes over sacred sites. 
1.4. Research Questions 
To further the objectives of the study, the following research questions were applied. 
1. Given the significance of a sacred site for the identity of a religious community in 
the multi-religious context of India, is there a possibility still for a legal settlement 
and will a legal settlement end the dispute amicably, restoring peace in the region 
and harmony at the national level? 
2. Since the dispute at Ayodhya has affected the contemporary polity of the Indian 
state, what significant changes has the dispute brought to the secular, democratic 
and social fabric of India? 
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3. According to the rights granted in the constitution, has the Indian judiciary taken 
necessary steps to protect the rights of a minority community in relation to the 
Ayodhya dispute? Is the delay in any way linked to the political process prevailing 
in the country, then and now? Does the Indian legal system contain enough 
provisions to arrest the rise of militant religious organisations which polarise civil 
society and incite violence? 
4. At the wake of failure from the domestic courts, can an international or regional 
legal mechanism step in to settle the disputes and mete out justice to the affected 
party? 
5. Can the Ayodhya dispute be a test case for formulating a regional convention that 
would be powerful enough to redress the disputes regarding the sacred sites of the 
region and set a model for settling similar disputes in other regions? 
Although answers to these research questions are woven within the text of the thesis, 
chapter 6 directly addresses these questions while dealing with the case study on the 
Ayodhya dispute. 
1.5. Methodology 
This section illustrates the methodology adopted to answer the above research questions. 
Keeping in line with the objectives proposed, the study uses doctrinal legal methodology to 
analyse Indian legislations and case law as well as international law. This methodology 
consists primarily of analysis of documentary sources which are available in the public 
domain. The principal documentary sources used for this study consist of published 
legislations, court judgements, international legal documents, treaties and decisions of 
international and regional human rights institutions. The secondary sources include legal 
texts. published books, archival and academic resource materials. A common approach to 
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documentary analysis IS content analysis, the quantitative analysis of what IS tn the 
document. 4 
The primary and secondary documentary sources are collected from the Bodleian Law 
library and the British library. In addition, basic legal sources, books and journals are 
collected from Oxford Brookes University. The sources related to the case study are 
collected from the Indian Institute library, Oxford, and the Islamic Studies library in 
Oxford. In addition, during a fieldwork trip to India, libraries in Delhi, Chennai and the 
Centre for Study of Society and Secularism, Mumbai were used. Many other sources are 
collected through inter-library loan from various other universities. Some of the 
international sources are drawn from the headquarters of UNESCO. 
The data is analysed using the quasi-judicial approach which combines features of judicial 
procedure and scientific method as a way of solving professional problems raised by the 
occurrence of actions and circumstances.5 It attempts to apply rigorous reasoning in the 
interpretation of empirical evidence collected systematically from the documents. The 
quasi-judicial method is used as an attempt to improve the scientific quality of studies of 
individual cases. 
This research is based on a case study method which is a well-established research strategy. 
Social scientists have widely used this qualitative research method to examine 
contemporary real-life situations. Case study facilitates an understanding of a complex 
issue and adds strength to what is already known through previous research. It focuses on a 
case and takes its context into account. Yin defines a case study in the following terms: 
Case study is a strategy for doing research which involves an empirical investigation of a 
particular contemporary phenomenon within its real life context using multiple sources of 
evidence. 
~ Content analysis is a research technique for making replicable and valid inference from data to their context. 
K Krippendorff. Content Ana(l'sis: An Introduction to its Methodology (Sage. Newbury Park. California 
1980) 21. 
S For details. see, DB Bromley, The Case-Study Method in Psychology and Related Disciplines (John Wiley 
& Sons. New York 1986) 
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One of the advantages of case study is that it involves multiple methods of data gathering. 
Fieldwork was also carried out to supplement the analysis of the documentary materials. To 
conduct the fieldwork, a three month trip was undertaken in 2005-2006 and the places 
visited include Delhi, Chennai, Mumbai, Lucknow and Ayodhya. Twenty semi-structured 
interviews and numerous oral testimonies in the form of personal dialogue and group 
discussions were conducted. The names and professions of the interviewees are given at the 
appendices 1 and 2. 
The locations covered rural villages in Uttar Pradesh, urban areas in Mumbai, Delhi and 
Chennai and research institutions in these places. The choice of interviewees included 
lawyers who conducted the cases relating to the dispute in the High Court in Lucknow and 
the Supreme Court in Delhi, renowned secular historians, and human rights activists like 
Asghar Ali Engineer and Ram Puniyani. These persons were chosen as they were directly 
involved in the Ayodhya dispute. 
Due to lack of personal contact in North India, access to these persons was obtained 
through human rights agencies working in those areas. Many of them were contacted 
through mail and phone calls and some of them failed to reply. Access to some of the 
interviewees had to be gained through teachers, staff in minority institutions, who acted as 
interpreters and also accompanied the visit to Ayodhya. 
The majority of the interviewees willingly expressed their consent to use their names. The 
interviews were semi-structured and were formal. Some of the interviews were informal 
during the group discussions. Often the background of the researcher was asked with 
suspicion and it was a struggle to prove the secular credential of the scholar. Some of the 
leaders from religious militant organisations were not willing to share their opinions 
because the student is a member of a Christian community and a priest. However, group 
discussion with human rights activists and academics sharpened the focus for the study and 
added strength to the proposed convention. Apart from the interviews, keen observation 
was used as a supplementary method to collect sufficient data. This complemented and 
helped to validate the information collected from the interviews. 
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It must be added that the personal visit undertaken to Ayodhya during the fieldwork, further 
enhanced any knowledge regarding the actual situation at the disputed site. Though the 
members of the Hindu militant groups had an aversion to the Muslims, the common feeling 
among both communities was interestingly cordial, both parties expressing a wish for an 
amicable and speedy legal settlement. 
Further fieldwork was conducted in 2007, when group discussions were held in five places 
in Tamil Nadu, India, details of which are included in Appendix 2. 
1.6. Contribution of the research 
1.6.1. Legal review of the dispute 
The Ayodhya dispute has been approached from many perspectives such as social, cultural, 
and economic failures in the country. Although these perspectives may be important to 
understand the case study, the approach of this thesis, the first one of its kind,6 is to review 
the complexities of the dispute from the legal perspective. 
1.6.2. Pointing out the failure of the legal system 
F or the Indian legal system, the research, as a detailed case study, points out the failure of 
the courts in protecting the religious rights of the Muslim minority community. By delaying 
to deliver justice in a property dispute between a few people from the Hindu and Muslim 
communities, the courts allowed a local dispute to become a national issue around which 
whole political discourse was built for the last two decades. 
The case study has revealed that to protect democratic values, particularly secular values, 
and rule of law in the country, the courts have to pay utmost attention to settling the dispute 
6 This research is the first one of its kind which studies the Ayodhya dispute from a legal perspective. 
although Stacey D Burlet has researched on Hindu-Muslim relations in India from 1977-1993. the period 
which is crucial to the Ayodhya dispute. for the purpose of understanding ethnic conflict. This is a Peace 
Research and sociological study. Stacey D Buriet, 'Challenging Ethnic Conflict: Hindu-Muslim Relations in 
India 1977-1993' (PhD Thesis. Department of Peace Studies, University of Bradford 1997). 
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at their earliest. So, the research has highlighted the inadequacy of the courts and the need 
for the judiciary to be independent and unbiased to be effective organs of a state. 
1.6.3. Responsibility of the international legal institutions 
In the context of international human rights law, the research has brought out the existing 
international human rights law and mechanisms that are insufficient to protect sacred sites 
when a dispute arises. When such disputes lead to massive human rights violations, the 
international reaction remains inadequate. As such, the rights of the individuals are upheld 
at the international level, but not the collective rights of a religious community. The 
research, therefore, establishes the gap existing between the individual right to freedom of 
religion and collective right to protection of sacred sites. 
1.6.4. Need for regional convention 
In protecting and promoting human rights, the regional human rights mechanisms seem to 
have more effect than the international mechanisms. The existence of various regional 
human rights courts created by regional human rights conventions adjudicate disputes and 
deliver judgements with binding obligations among member states. However, such a 
regional human rights treaty or human rights court does not exist in the South Asian region 
where human rights violations based on religious disputes are egregious. This research 
proposes a regional human rights convention among the SAARC (South Asian Association 
for Regional Co-operation) countries, to protect sacred sites as protection of fundamental 
right to freedom of religion and other human rights. 
This convention, if adopted and carried out in good faith, will assist in restraining growing 
militancy among various religions in South Asia. The proposed regional human rights court 
will be a mechanism which may be used to deliver a speedy justice in an impartial manner. 
These regional human rights instruments may pave the way to the creation of a fully-
pledged treaty covering various fundamental human rights and the proposed court may 
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become an important instrument In protecting and promoting human rights under 
international law . 
A model regional convention as proposed by the thesis stands as an important contribution 
around which the entire research revolves. 
1.6.5. Shrinking secular space 
From the 1980s the Ayodhya dispute took centre-stage in Indian politics and a phase of 
communalisation of the civil society has begun. One of the reasons is that the Indian 
National Congress party, with secular credentials, started overtly adopting religious 
favouritism in favour of the majority Hindu religion and also appeasing the religious 
minorities. In this process, Congress also used religious symbols. Additionally, the left-
oriented political parties also failed to occupy the secular space. A vacuum was created. 
Simultaneously, the growing social unrest due to increasing poverty, unemployment, and 
illiteracy further widened the vacuum. This space was used by the militant religious 
organisations. Ayodhya became a useful tool for their nefarious activities. Hence, this 
research can shed new light on the predicaments secularism in India faces today and can 
provide legal means to redress the onslaught. 
1.6.6. Communalisation of civil society 
The recent religious revivalism across the globe has brought religion once again to the 
centre stage in many societies. Factors such as poverty, marginalisation and ethnic disputes 
have also intensified the resurgence of religious extremism leading to violation of human 
rights in recent decades. Hence, sacred sites have become the target of attack by various 
conflicting communities/ especially in a multi-religious state like India. 
7 For instance, the claim 'religion as a cultural phenomenon continues to manifest as a force for social and 
political conflict, violence and repression', by Liam Gearon. 'General Introduction' in Liam Gearon (ed). 
Human Rights & Religion: A Reader (Sussex Academic Press, Brighton 2002) 5. 
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Similarly, unfounded suspicion and consideration of other communities as enemies are the 
primary cause for any crisis in the nation, and nefarious tactics follow to alienate one 
another from the mainstream of civil society. This has polarised the Indian society on 
communal lines and threatens social cohesion and religious harmony. 
Though the focus of the study mainly hinges from a legal perspective, efforts taken to view 
the dispute from a wider perspective of communalisation and the proposal to build up the 
secular civil society for the implementation of the proposed model convention is another 
contribution the study makes. 
1.6.7. Research from the field for the field 
Moreover, this academic search emerges from the concern of the researcher as a human 
rights lawyer and as a member of the religious personnel of a minority religious 
community, interested in protecting and promoting human rights in India and in South 
Asia. 
The entire process of the research is an outcome of the confidence the scholar has placed in 
the legal norms and systems at national and international levels in protecting the rights of 
the people within a particular state boundary. 
The personal concern, interest and commitment of the researcher raise the study to a life-
long search rather than to limit itself to mere academic exercise. It may be rightly viewed 
as an ongoing human rights exercise which will be useful in bringing justice to the poor 
victims of the communal riots in India and in other parts of the world. 
The scholar has seen with his own eyes the plight of the victims of communal frenzy. 
Those who suffer at the height of a dispute that spills over into violations of human rights, 
are the poor, those who live at the hem of society, and the vulnerable sections. especially 
women, children, Dalits (members of lower castes) and the Tribals. As a person privileged 
to have known the legal system and its tangles in India, the scholar sees this research as a 
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step forward in clarifying the priorities and deepening the commitment for human right 
Issues. 
The realisation in the course of the research trips that the proposed convention can only be 
collectively realised and that too not from above as an institutional system but from the 
grassroots by networking with committed persons, groups and movements, is yet another 
vital point that the research underlines. 
1. 7. Reservations on the research findings 
In spite of the significance and the contribution that the research tries to make, at the close 
of this legal search, the researcher found the following reservations. Although they do not 
undennine the quality of the research, they actually open up further vistas of the academic 
search undertaken. They are enumerated as follows: 
1.7.1. Need for a wider legal outlook 
Very rightly, the study is preoccupied with the legal system operating in India. It aimed to 
reveal how the legal system in India has failed to mete out justice to a minority community 
by unduly prolonging a dispute relating to one of their sacred sites. A critical look at the 
background of the legal tangle would indicate how the present state of affairs is linked to 
several factors at work. Definitely, the research has pointed out some of them, like growing 
economic disparity, communalisation of Indian polity, the shrinking of the secular space, 
and so on. However, as the study has limited itself to legal implications, a much wider 
outlook on the realities operating in India would have placed the research in a broader 
perspective. As it only points at the failure of the legal system, it lacks the critical analysis 
of the impacts of socio-political spheres on the judiciary. 
Obviously, fundamental human rights are linked to livelihood issues. Unless a legal or 
political system addresses itself to such vital issues affecting people living at the lower hem 
of affairs, no legal tangle hold can be settled, especially the one this research undertakes. as 
the victims involved are mostly living below the poverty line. Above anything else. what 
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needs to be tackled is the youth, particularly belonging to the middle class, who are so 
willing to rally around the communal forces, who are working overtime to impede legal 
procedures. 
1.7.2. An ambitious proposal 
Secondly, the proposed regional convention looks like a fond and djstant dream, a vision, 
whose actualisation still remains to be seen. It revolves around a vital question involving 
bilateral relations between at least two major political powers in South Asia, viz., India and 
Pakistan. However, recent developments among SAARC countries instil hope that human 
rights considerations are given importance in their mutual relations. Besides, there are a 
number of human rights organisations already operating on a South Asian level, which give 
the hope that such a dream is possible and quite necessary for building up the region, free 
from religious discord. 
1.7.3. Considering democratic forms of Government 
The model convention also takes into consideration the existence of democratic forms of 
government in the region. Although in reality all the SAARC countries are not fully 
democratic, there are already signs that they would all aspire to be so because of the 
happenings within and the political compulsions from outside, especially South Asian Free 
Trade Area (SAFT A) that envisages democratic forms of governments. The proposed 
Buddhist pilgrim route, university, and the rail link between the regions among SAARC 
member states is sure to strengthen democratic set up and bilateral relations. The Ayodhya 
dispute certainly has affected relations with the neighbouring states and their minority 
religious communities. Their sacred sites too came under attack. Hence, a peaceful zone 
founded on democratic principles is not a far- fetched dream. If there is a political will, 
which the proposed convention envisages, stable democratic forms of governance will be 
established. 
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1.8. Overview of the thesis 
The findings of this research are presented in six chapters. They are enumerated as follows: 
1. Introduction 
2. Research context 
3. Case study of Ayodhya dispute 
4. Sacred sites and intemationallaw 
5. Proposed regional convention 
6. Conclusion 
1.8.1. Introductory chapter 
As seen, the introductory chapter has briefly outlined the significance of the study, 
objectives, research questions, case study as its methodology, salient contributions it makes 
and the limitations. The structural presentation of the thesis introduces to the main content, 
major arguments or the findings. 
1.8.2. Research Context 
Chapter 2, entitled, 'The Research Context', delineates the context to understand the case 
study chapter that follows in Chapter 3. This examines the three organs of the Indian state, 
namely, the Parliament, the Executive and the Judiciary, their structure and functions as 
defined in the Indian constitution. These institutions have the responsibility to protect and 
promote human rights in the country when they are violated by state, non-state actors and 
other individuals. 
It also exammes the characteristics of Hinduism and Islam. two important religions 
involved in the case-study. This is necessary to understand the case study, predicated upon 
the decision that it is not possible to properly understand the application of law to a 
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particular religion without fIrst being able to reflect upon what that religion is. How sacred 
sites are constructed in these religions and why they are important in expressing their faith 
are evaluated in its context to explain why the sacred site dispute has become a national 
issue affecting the plural nature of the Indian society. 
The growth of militant religious organisations is covered briefly to highlight the fact that a 
sacred site dispute is not only a religious issue but also part of wider socio-political issues. 
Although the Ayodhya dispute is basically a religious dispute, it was later used by the 
militant organisations to establish their dominance in Indian polity. 
Chapter 2 is concluded with a discussion of broader intellectual themes, such as an analysis 
of sacred sites with a working definition and understanding of conflicts between different 
religious groups in India. 
1.8.3. Case study 
The dispute between Hindus and Muslims over a sacred site in Ayodhya is illustrated in 
Chapter 3. This chapter gives a brief overview of the dispute to explain its historical 
background. A short history of the site covers a period from 1528 until 2007. Subsection 2 
of the same chapter covers various litigations relating to the site from 1885 until 2007. In 
pre-independent India, the suits were filed to build a small temple over a Chaputra which 
some Hindus claimed was the birthplace of Ram. This Chaputra remained outside the Babri 
Masjid compound wall. The suits were dismissed and it was established that the petitioner 
did not have the right to property. In independent India, the dispute assumed a new phase 
with the placing of the idols of Ram and Sita by a few Hindus inside the mosque. The title 
dispute to the site started in 1950 through various court cases and the cases remain in the 
courts without any final adjudication. These cases are examined in detail and the failure of 
the courts in this dispute has been established. 
The third chapter also highlights the failure of the courts through judicial delays, 
prevarication, avoidance and complicity. Although it failed to deliv~r a final judgment. the 
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court, through interim injunctions, asked the parties to maintain status quo. Even this 
minimal 'status quo' order was not enforced by the state executive body when the Hindu 
militant party Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) came to power in the state of UP which led to 
the demolition of the sacred site, belonging to the minority Muslim community. The 
obvious failure of the executive became apparent when riots broke out during the post-
demolition period and then there may not be any precedent in independent India with 
regard to the loss of lives and damage to the properties including sacred sites belonging to 
minority communities. 
Illustration of the case study also revealed the failure of the union government to take a 
firm action when the state government failed to check the militant forces from demolishing 
the sacred site. Although the Indian constitution empowers the union government to take 
necessary action when the state government fails to maintain public order and protect the 
fundamental rights of people who live within the state, the union government chose not to 
act until the militant forces achieved their aim of demolition of the sacred site, and built a 
make-shift temple on the site where the destroyed mosque had stood for more than four 
centuries. 
Finally, this chapter also describes the failure of the courts in punishing the persons 
responsible for the demolition, although the demolition took place in 1992. In protecting 
and promoting human rights, particularly rights of minorities, the courts have not acted in 
an impartial manner. By delaying the delivery of justice for more than four decades, the 
judiciary seem to have exhibited its majority religious bias, and this may affect the lives of 
minorities in a pluralistic society. Moreover, by failing to give a final verdict on the dispute 
in a reasonable time, the courts have undeniably contributed to the intensive campaign of 
the Sangh parivar in magnifying a local dispute into a national issue. The riots and violence 
from 1984, when Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP) came to the scene, have claimed more 
than a few thousands and divided the Indian civil society along communal lines. 
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1.8.4. Sacred sites and international law 
Chapter four examines the existing international human rights law provisions in protecting 
sacred sites. As an essential component of the right to religious freedom, sacred sites need 
to be protected from attacks as well as from limiting a religious community. through 
various methods, to enter into and exercise their faith through worship at the site. This 
chapter approaches protection of sacred sites from four areas which are set out in the 
international treaties and declarations. The areas include right to freedom of religion. 
minority rights, property rights and cultural rights. Protection of sacred sites could be 
covered under these rights. However, in-depth analysis has exposed the inadequacy of 
existing international human rights law to protect sacred sites. 
1.8.5. Proposed regional convention 
Chapter five evaluates the existing regional human rights mechanisms in Africa, inter-
Americas and in Europe. Compared to the international mechanisms, the regional human 
rights mechanisms could be more effective, as highlighted by Europe. Based on these 
findings, the fifth chapter proceeds to propose a regional human rights convention for South 
Asia. For this, the nature of South Asian countries is examined and the regional 
organisation, South Asian Association for Regional Co-operation (SAARC) is evaluated. 
Although there exist religious differences galore in South Asian bilateral relations, 
particularly between the two major powers of India and Pakistan, the recent developments 
in building up a strong relationship among SAARC nations supports the argument that a 
convention for protection of sacred sites will facilitate the protection and promotion of 
human rights in this region. 
1.8.6. Conclusion 
The final chapter brings the thesis to a conclusion. This summarises the key themes, and 
assesses the contribution to the Indian legal system and international human rights law. The 
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conclusion also opens new avenues for further research on the topic, both from legal as well 
as from related dimensions. 
The above structural presentation of the thesis is arranged in a way to cogently present the 
underpinnings of the research. After the introductory chapter, the research context sets out 
the various contexts for a better understanding of the case study. Familiarity with Hinduism 
and Islam in India, and their construction and understanding of sacred sites, enables 
recognition of why two communities are ready to attack and kill each other and continue 
conflicts for a sacred site. Presentation of the demography of Hindus and Muslims and the 
majority-minority struggles are vital to realise the significance of the Ayodhya dispute. The 
nuances of caste system, dominance of upper castes, construction of a 'syndicate 
Hinduism', are some of the characteristics of modern-day Hinduism. 
Equally important is to understand the power and role of the judiciary in the Indian political 
system for the case analysis. The judiciary has failed to fulfil the aspirations of many 
marginalised, poor and minority communities. Its religious bias has been quite prominent. 
Communalisation of the state organs, and hence their loss of credibility to be impartial to 
protect and promote the rights of the common people in the civil society, go well with the 
deeper analysis of the case. 
After the presentation of the research context, the case study follows. It illustrates the 
failure of the judiciary, and other organs of the state, to bring a remedy to a disputed sacred 
site and protect people from communal riots and human rights violations. The regional and 
international reaction to the destruction of a sacred site, and the subsequent riots, are 
presented to review the capacity of the international human rights mechanisms to protect 
sacred sites under the protection of right to freedom of religion and protection of religious 
minorities. 
The chapter assessing the existing international human rights law reveals the inadequacy of 
existing mechanisms to protect sacred sites. However, the analysis of the regional human 
rights mechanisms highlights the fact that these are more effective with their adjudicatory 
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mechanisms, namely, regional human rights commissions and human rights courts. Hence a 
proposal for a regional model convention on protection of sacred sites is made in Chapter 5. 
The ensuing chapter will present the research context, examining the three organs of Indian 
state, namely, the Parliament, the Executive and the Judiciary. It also examines the 
characteristics of Hinduism and Islam, two important religions involved in the case-study. 
How sacred sites are constructed in these religions and why they are important in 
expressing their faith are evaluated. The growth of militant religious organisations is 
covered to highlight that a sacred site dispute is not only a religious issue but also forms 
part of the wider socio-political context. It will be concluded with a working definition and 
understanding of conflicts between two major religious groups, Hindus and Muslims, in 
India. 
-l9 
CHAPTER 2 
THE RESEARCH CONTEXT 
2.1. Introduction 
The research context systematically presents the literature available on the central 
arguments of the study. As pointed out at the end of the previous chapter, a methodical 
presentation of the resource material enables clarification of the research context, viz., the 
sacred site dispute at Ayodhya. Outlining of the legal as well as historical, primary and 
secondary documentary sources definitely enhances the understanding of the case in point, 
the international legal instruments on sacred site disputes, the involvement of the Indian 
legal system for settling the dispute, historical background of the religious groups directly 
engaged in the dispute and the model convention proposed. 
Structurally, this chapter on the research context has four main sections. It starts with the 
scientific definition of the sacred site in the first section. The second section reviews the 
international legal instruments available to settle sacred site disputes. What follows in the 
third section is a brief expose of the judicial system operating in India. The final section 
explains the religious groups involved in the dispute, viz., Hinduism and Islam. It must be 
noted here that this presentation only details the aspects of Hinduism and Islam that are 
essential to situate the importance of the sacred site in both the religious traditions. 
2.2. Definition of sacred space, place and site 
The word 'sacred' stems from the Latin word sacer, which means 'to make holy'. 1 In 
essence, 'that which is set apart from the ordinary world'. 2 According to Tuan, the true 
meaning of 'sacred' goes beyond stereotypical images of temples and shrines, because at 
the level of experience, sacred phenomena are those that stand out from the commonplace. 
1M Eliade, The Encyclopaedia a/Religion (Macmillan. New York 1987) Vol 12. 511. 
2 'Sacred Spaces and Sacred Places' Course 559V <http://www.ualberta.calST.STEPHENSlsw-559V.htm> 
accessed 28 June 2005. 
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and interrupt routine. The emphasis on qualities such as apartness, othelWorldliness, 
orderliness and wholeness mark his defmition of sacred. 3 
Sacred seems to be the essence of religion, according to Durkheim: 
All known religious beliefs, whether simple or complex, present one common 
characteristic: they presuppose a classification of all things, real and ideal of which men 
think, generally designated by two distinct terms which are translated well enough by the 
words profane and sacred.4 
Definitions on the sacred are mostly related to the 'consecrated'S and 'inviolable'. They 
suggest that someone does the consecration. Besides, sacred incorporates a notion of 
power, and efficacy, and sanctity. It expresses the virtue and strength which accompany 
certain beings, certain things and certain places.6 Sacred also implies restrictions and 
prohibitions on human behaviour. Irrespective of the differences in various cultures, an 
observed common feature is that a sacred site is set apart, and different rules of behaviour 
apply in the observance of such a site, in order to show its significance.7 A secular 
landscape is one concerned with everyday life like home, field, and industry, while the 
sacred would be identifiable as containing special places, for example, sites for ceremony 
and ritual, including tombs.8 However, the experience of sacredness does not just focus on 
the extraordinary experiences alone, but also has relevance for the ordinary day-to-day 
experiences of individuals and their social life. 9 
J YF Tuan, 'Sacred Space: Exploration of an Idea' in KW Butzer (ed), Dimensions of Human Geography 
(University of Chicago, Chicago 1978) 186. 
4 RA Jones, Emile Durkheim: An Introduction to Four Major Works (Sage, Beverly Hills, CA 1986) 124. 
S For instance, the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary defmes the word 'sacred' thus: consecrated to; 
esteemed; especially dear or acceptable to some religious purpose; made holy by association with a god or 
other object of worship. WR Trumple and others, The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary (5th edn OUP, 
Oxford 2002) 1871. 
6 C Radimilahy, 'Sacred Sites in Madagascar' in DL Carmichael and others (eds), Sacred Sites, Sacred Places 
~Routledge, London 1994) 82. 
J Hubert, 'Sacred Beliefs and Beliefs of Sacredness' in DL Carmichael and others (eds), Sacred Sites, 
Sacred Places (Routledge. London 1994) 11. 
S G Cooney. 'Sacred and Secular Neolithic landscapes in Ireland' in DL Carmichael and others (eds), Sacred 
Sites, Sacred Places (Routledge. London 1994) 33. 
9 P Byrne, 'Religion and Religions' in S Sutherland and others (eds), The World's Religions (Routledge, 
London 1988) 24-6. 
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The meaning of 'space, place and site' needs further scrutiny as these terms usually overlap 
with each other in ordinary usage. Moriarty understands these terms as, 
The meaning of place, space, site, and locality are conflated in everyday understanding 
though there are significant differences between them. On the one hand, place can be taken 
as a location of shelter, security, groundedness, memory, and dwelling and it can inspire 
wonder. On the other hand, space can be taken as a location of exposure, freedom, and 
openness and it can inspire amazement.' 0 
Tuan highlights the difference between space and place which require each other for their 
definition. The difference could be summed up thus: space is abstract, it has the idea of 
openness and movement and offers freedom; whereas place suggests a concrete centre in 
which there are felt values and it is endowed with the idea of security and stability. I I To 
identify a place, Edge argues that it must have boundaries in physical space. The law has an 
easier engagement with places that have concrete boundaries rather than those whose 
boundaries are less clearly delineated. 12 
Jackson and Henrie state that, 'sacred space does not exist naturally but is assigned sanctity 
as humanity defines, limits and characterises it through their culture, experience and 
goals' .13 Eliade suggests that a sacred place is a 'microcosm' of the whole; because they are 
centres of the world. They 'stand out at the very heart of the universe and constitute an 
imago mundi.' 14 It means that sacred places are not only ancient places, but are also modem 
places as claimed by Roman Catholicism and Mormonism in the late nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries. IS Therefore, sacred places are not necessarily the preserve of antiquity 
but they can continually be constructed. 
'0 G Moriarty, (1999) cited in PW Edge, 'The Construction of Sacred Places in English Law' (2002) 14 
Journal of Environmental Law161, 163. 
II YF Tuan, Space and Place: The Perspective of Experience (Edward Arnold, London 1977) 6. 
11 D Cooper, 'Talmudic Territory? Space, Law and Modernist Discourse' (1996) cited in PW Edge, 'The 
Construction of Sacred Places in English Law' (2002) 14 Journal of Environmental Law 161, 163. 
Il Jackson and Henrie (1983) cited in CC Park, Sacred Worlds: An Introduction to Geography and Religion 
(Routledge, London 1994) 94. 
14 M Eliade, Pal1erns in Comparative Religion (Sheed and Ward, London 1958) 271. 
15 D Davies. 'Introduction: Raising the Issues' in J Holm and J Bowker (eds), Sacred Place (Pinter, London 
1994) 4. 
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For our purpose, the definition of 'site' gains importance in understanding the Ayodhya 
dispute. Therefore, the subsequent paragraphs will attempt to define what a site and a 
sacred site would mean. 
The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary defines 'site' as an area of ground upon which a 
building ... has been built or which is set apart for some purpose.1 6 Site, then, seems to 
have a pennanent geographical nexus and has a consistent use within the wider landscape 
and community. However, site is a tenn which has been subject to legal discussion. The 
Metropolis Management Act 1878, defines the tenn site 'in relation to a house, building, or 
other erection shall mean the whole space to be occupied by such house, building or other 
erection, between the level of the bottom of the foundations and the level of the base of the 
walls' . 17 In a significant case, site is defined as, 'a specific area of land set aside for 
operations such as building and general development' .18 
From the above definitions, one can infer that 'site' is a place where a building was, is, or 
will be situated. It significantly differs from the defmitions of space and place. Site, 
therefore, adds the idea of a human construction. 
Jane Hubert observes that defining 'sacred site' among different peoples and in varying 
contexts is difficult, but when the land comes under threat, then, sacred sites, and sites of 
special significance, become identifiable, and the communities concerned will fight to 
preserve and protect them from disturbance, interference or destruction:9 Finally, the 
definition given by Cannichael in Sacred Sites and Sacred Places, 'a sacred site is an area 
with its buildings, set apart, consecrated, and reserved for religious and ceremonial 
functions hence not to be violated, ,20 seems comprehensive. 
16 CT Onions (ed), The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary on Historical Principles (3rd edn Clarendon Press, 
Oxford 1973) 1993. 
17 The Metropolis Management and Buildings Acts Amendment Act 1878 (C 32) s 14. 
18 Barking and Dagenham LBC v Mills & Allen Ltd (1997) 3 PLR 1. In this case, to define a site, the judge 
~uoted Regulation 2 from the Town and Country Planning (Control of Advertisements) Regulations 1989 .. 
I J Hubert, 'Sacred Beliefs and Beliefs of Sacredness' in DL Cannichael and others (eds), Sacred Sites. 
Sacred Places (Routledge, London 1994) 18. 
20 GHO Abungu, 'Islam on the Kenyan Coast: An Overview of Kenyan Coastal Sacred Sites' in DL 
Cannichael and others (eds), Sacred Sites, Sacred Places (Routledge, London 1994) 152. 
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Based on the above analysis, this thesis proposes that a sacred site refers to a specific 
geographical area with religiously significant buildings or structures, consecrated, and 
holding regular religious and ceremonial functions. 
2.3. International legal system 
Religion remains a significant factor in human history. Studies show a religious resurgence 
in the last two decades.21 Religious revival also suggests a growing relationship between 
religion and politics. In addition, the surging immigration in a globalised world has 
transformed the monolithic nature of many states into religiously plural societies. 
Consequently, major religions have international presence. They are no longer restricted to 
a particular region or country, although some religions have more geographical and 
historical affiliations.22 Hence, granting freedom of religion to various communities has 
become a matter of concern for the international law . 
In the developing world, the divide between the rich and poor has provoked the 
unemployed youth to take shelter in militant religious organisations, as is the case in the 
Ayodhya dispute. And, in cases where the state identifies itself with a majority community 
or follows the dictates of a state religion, the rights of religious minorities are jeopardised. 
Furthermore, if any existing religious disputes are fused with politics or used to enhance 
political power, it threatens the democratic and pluralistic foundations of a society. 
During religious conflicts, sacred sites of religious communities become the target of 
attack. The spill over effect often invokes internal tension and international discord. Hence 
the need to look into the international human rights law provisions, to examine whether 
there is adequate protection offered for sacred sites from attacks such as desecration, 
defilement and destruction. 
21 For details. J Casanova, Public Religions in the Modern World (Chicago University Press, Chicago 1994); J 
Haynes, Religion in Global Politics (Longman, Harlow 1998). . 
22 L Gearon. 'General Introduction' in L Gearon (ed), Human Rights & Religion: A Reader (Sussex AcademiC 
Press. Brighton 2002) 3. 
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The fundamental right to freedom of religion is set out in declarations such as the Universal 
Declaration on Human Rights (UDHR)23, 1981 Declaration on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Intolerance and Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief (1981 Declaration on 
Religious Intolerance i4 and guaranteed in the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (ICCPR)25. The right to freedom of religion positively includes the right to manifest 
one's faith in worship 'alone or in community'. However, this 'worship' may be conducted 
in a definite place which is considered sacred to the followers of a particular religion. The 
UDHR and the 1981 Declaration on Religious Intolerance are non-binding documents and 
only the ICCPR has binding obligations on the states. Although apparently, protection of 
sacred sites is not covered in the ICCPR, the General Comment No. 22 on freedom of 
religion issued by the Human Rights Committee refers to 'the concept of worship ... 
including the building of places of worship' .26 
An analysis of the 1981 Declaration on Religious Intolerance shows that it is a major 
development in codifying religious rights at the international level.27 Article VI, a 
significant article in the 1981 Declaration, includes the right to worship and assemble and 
'to establish and maintain places for these purposes,?8 It may be argued that the words 'to 
establish and maintain' incorporate the idea of protection of sacred sites in a wider 
perspective. However, if this clause is applied as a narrow definition by states during times 
of disputes, it may deny the protection to such sites. To avoid such ambiguous language, 
the Declaration could have included protection of sacred sites in unequivocal terms. The 
analysis includes the reports of the Special Rapporteurs on freedom of religion or belief 
which highlight the attacks on sacred sites in many states, and records related human rights 
violations of a religious community. 
:!J Universal Declaration of Human Rights (adopted 10 December 1948) UNGA Res 217 A(III) (UDHR). 
24 United Nations Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and Discrimination based on 
Religion or Belief, UNGA Res 36/55 (25 November 1981) UN Doc AlRES/36/55. 
25 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (adopted 16 December 1966, entered into force 23 
March 1976) 999 UNTS 171 (ICCPR). 
26 UNCHR 'General Comment 22 in 'Note by the Secretariat, Compilation of General Comments and General 
Recommendations adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies' (1994) UN Doc HRl/GENII/Rev.7 [4]. 
27 OJ Sullivan, 'Advancing the Freedom of Religion or Belief through the UN Declaration on the Elimination 
of Religious Intolerance and Discrimination' (1998) 82 AJlL 487. 488. 
28 S Liskofsky. Eliminating Intolerance and Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief The C.V Roll'. 
Reports on tire Foreign Scene. No.8 (American Jewish Committee, New York 1968) 468. 
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With regard to the regional human rights treaties, the European Convention on Human 
Rights (ECHR)29, the American Convention on Human Rights (ACHRio, and the African 
Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights3] also cover religious freedom as a fundamental 
human right. Nevertheless, they have no such provisions to protect sacred sites during times 
of disputes. Although there is an increasing awareness among various states to protect the 
indigenous sacred sites in their respective countries, sacred sites such as churches, 
mosques, and temples of established religions do not seem to enjoy any protection under 
international human rights law. Since most of the human rights treaties grant and promote 
individual rights rather than collective rights, the protection of sacred sites may not have 
found a place in these treaties. However, the research highlights the fact that collective right 
of protection of sacred sites is significant for the individual and group to exercise their faith 
in worship. 
Another area the research incorporates is the protection of religious minority rights for 
protecting sacred sites. As seen earlier, minorities have become significant in a globalised 
world and sacred sites often play the role of identity icons. When tension arises due to 
socio-political and economic reasons, these religious symbols become easy targets of attack 
from the state, non-state actors and co-religionists. Therefore, the analysis of international 
and regional human rights instruments cover Article 27 of the ICCPR, the UN Declaration 
on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic 
Minorities 199232 (hereafter the 1992 Declaration), the Framework European Convention 
for the Protection of National Minorities 199533 and the OSCE High Commissioner on 
29 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (European Convention on 
Human Rights, as amended) (adopted 4 November 1950, entered into force 3 September 1953) 213 UNTS 
221 (ECHR). 
30 American Convention on Human Rights (ACHR) (adopted 22 November 1969, entered into force 18 July 
1978) OAS Treaty Series No 36 at 1 (1969) reprinted in Basic Documents Pertaining to Human Rights in the 
Inter-American System OEAlSer L V 111.23 Doc 21 Rev 6 (1979). 
31 The African Charter on Human and peoples' Rights (adopted 27 June 1981, entered into force 210ctober 
1986) OAU Doc CAB/LEG/67/3 Rev 5 (1982) 211LM 58 (African Charter). 
<http://www.achpr.orglenglish!_info/charter_en.html> accessed 10 March 2007. 
32 United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic. Religious and 
Linguistic Minorities (adopted 18 December 1992) UNGA Res 47/135. 
)) Framework European Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (Strasbourg 1.11.1995) ETS No 
157 <http://conventions.coe.intlTreaty/enffreatiesIWordlI57.doc> accessed 24 May 2007. 
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National Minorities,34 becomes vital in protecting sacred sites as part of the rights of 
minorities to freedom of religion. 
The UDHR does not contain any provision for the protection of minority rights. The phrase 
'religious minority' applies to any group adhering to a defined set of religious beliefs.35 
Religious minorities are those groups that profess and practice a religion that differs from 
that of the majority of the population. It is an established fact that the rights of minorities 
have a collective dimension36 and Dinstein observes that 'without the collective element, 
the individuals rights could easily become devoid of any substance,.37 Article 27 of the 
ICCPR creates an obligation for state parties not to deny persons belonging to minorities 
the common 'practice of their religion' because 'minority rights enrich the fabric of society 
as a whole' .38 
F or the religious minorities, sacred sites provide identity and become a sign of their 
presence in a particular area, surrounded by many other religious communities. However, 
the rights granted under Article 27 of the ICCPR to religious minorities do not cover 
protection of their sacred sites. Moreover, the right covered under Article 27 is only 
'persons belonging to such minorities' and not to a 'minority group as such'. This will be 
examined further in chapter four. 
The UN addressed the issues of minorities through a special human rights instrument called 
the 1992 UN Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, 
Religious, or Linguistic Minorities. Although the aim of the 1992 Declaration on Minorities 
is establishing 'equality' by prohibiting 'discrimination', as a UN General Assembly 
34 CSCE Helsinki Decisions (1992) 35 ILM 1385 <http://www.osce.org/hcnm/> accessed 4 June 2006. 
3S Y Dinstein, 'Freedom of ReIigion and the Protection of Religious Minorities' in DA Reidy and MNS Sellers 
(eds) Universal Human Rights: Moral Order in a Divided World (Rowman & Littlefield, New York, 2005) 
147-9. 
36 P Thornberry, International Law and Rights of Minorities (Clarendon Press, Oxford 1991) 57. 
37 Y Dinstein, 'Collective Human Rights of Peoples and Minorities' (1976) 25 ICLQ 102.102. 
38 UNCHR 'General Comment 23 in 'Note by the Secretariat~ Compilation of General Comments and General 
Recommendations adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies' (1994) UN Doc HRl/GENllfRev.7 [I] states 
that the protection of minority rights is directed towards ensuring the survival and continued development of 
the cultural, religious. and social identity of the minorities concerned, thus enriching the fabric of society as a 
whole. 
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Resolution, its achievement is limited.39 The rights of religious minorities are not 
delineated in the declaration and it fails to include a right to establish, maintain and protect 
sacred sites. Hence, it does not set out any new rights other than those protected in Article 
27 of the ICCPR. 
As an attempt to attend to the needs of religious minorities in the European region, a 
regional Framework Convention is adopted by the Council of Europe. This prohibits 
discrimination on the 'grounds of belonging to a national minority'. Although Article 8 of 
the Framework Convention sets out the right to manifest one's religion or belief, this 
convention is limited in protecting sacred sites since the state parties undertake only 'to 
recognise' the right and do not undertake 'to protect' this right. Moreover, Article 6(2) 
emphasises the protection only to 'persons' and not to their 'institutions' .40 Non-
recognition of 'collective rights' does not guarantee the rights for religious minorities to 
establish, maintain, and protect their sacred sites when they come under attack. 
A further area of question is that of property rights. Generally, sacred sites are owned by 
religious communities and any limitations on the use of such sites are considered as an 
infringement of property rights as set out in human rights law. Moreover, any attacks on 
them violate the right of enjoyment free from any interference from others. Hence, sacred 
sites, like any other property, call for protection from the state and its authorities. 
Right to property is stated as a fundamental right only under the UN Declaration, the 
UDHR.41 Property right as a fundamental right has failed to find a place in the international 
human rights covenants such as the ICCPR and the ICESCR42. This is due to the failure 
among the state parties to reach any agreement on an acceptable text.43 However, the 
39 J Rehman, International Human Rights Law: A Practical Approach (Pearson, Harlow 2003) 316. 
40 Framework European Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (n 33) art 6(2): The Parties 
undertake to take appropriate measures to protect persons who may be subject to threats or acts of 
discrimination, hostility or violence as a result of their ethnic. cultural, linguistic or religious identity. 
41 UDHR (n 23) art 17: (1) Everyone has the right to own property alone as well as in association with others 
(2) No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property. . 
42 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (adopted 16 December 1966, entered mto 
force 3 January 1976) 993 UNTS 3 (ICESCR). 
43 UNGA 'Report of the Secretary-General' 2929 (1955) UN Doc Al2929, 65-67. 
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regional human rights treaties44 have incorporated the right to property as a fundamental 
right without any unjust interference from the state as to its use. 
Sacred sites as property owned by a religious community often suffer intrusion from the 
state authorities. States impose restraints such as restrictions on planning permission and 
registration of sacred sites. This curtails access to sacred sites for adherents of a particular 
religion, and in many states these procedures are used to restrict the structural aspects of 
religious practice.45 Many examples are recorded by the Special Rapporteurs on Freedom 
of Religion or Belier6 to show how states use planning permission and registration 
procedures to limit the free exercise of religious faith through worship on sacred sites.47 
The reports highlight the limitations imposed on sacred sites and demonstrate that states 
and non-state actors do limit the right to freedom of religion through restrictive practices 
related to the establishment, maintenance, access and protection of sacred sites. 
Finally, since sacred sites are also perceived as cultural properties of humanity, whether 
international covenants on rights to cultural properties during times of armed conflict cover 
protection of sacred sites is examined. During war and armed conflicts, sacred sites, 
belonging to an enemy state, become the target of attacks. This became a significant 
concern of the states during the 19th century. The insolent destruction of sacred sites and 
other significant monuments during the two World Wars led the world community to adopt 
conventions to protect cultural properties from the scourge ofwar.48 
44 For instance, Article 1 of the First Protocol to the ECHR, Article 21 in the ACHR and Article 14 in the 
AFCHPR cover the protection of rights to proerty. 
45 PM Taylor, Freedom of Religion: UN and European Human Rights Law and Practice (CUP, Cambridge 
2005) 242. 
46 Until 2005, they were known as Special Rapporteurs on Religious Intolerance. This 'Thematic Mandate' is 
established by UNCHR Res 1986/20. The present Special Rapporteur is Ms Asma Jahangir. 
47 UNCHR 'Reports of Special Rapporteurs on freedom of Religion or Belief UN Doc ElCN.4/1988/45; 
ElCN.4/1989/44; E/CN.4/1990/46; E/CN.4/1991156; ElCN.41l992/52; ElCN.4/1993/62; ElCN.4/1994179; 
ElCN.4/1995191; ElCN.4/19951911Add.l (Reports on specific incidents on various countries); 
ElCN.4/1996/95; ElCN.4/1997/91; E/CN.4/1998/6; E/CN.4/1999/58; ElCN.4/2000/65; ElCNA/2001/63; 
ElCN.412002173; ElCN.4/2003/66; ElCN.4/2004/63; ElCN.4/2005161; EICN.4/2oo6/5; and AlHRC/4/21. 
48 Among the international legal instruments, 1977 Protocol I Relating to the Protection of Victims of 
International Armed Conflicts (adopted 8 June 1977, entered into force 7 December 1979) 1125 UNTS J and 
Protocol II Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (adopted 8 June 1977. 
entered into force 7 December 1979) 1125 UNTS 609 of the 1949 Geneva Convention relative to the 
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War and Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural property 
in the Event of Armed Conflict (adopted 14 May 1954, entered into force 7 August 1956) 249 L'~TS 2.$0 
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However, this protection is extended only during times of war or armed conflict. During 
peacetime, there seems to be no provision to protect such sacred sites and the above-
mentioned conventions are also not helpful in protecting sacred sites from attacks at all 
times. The inadequacy of these conventions and protocols was exposed during the conflicts 
of the Iran-Iraq War, the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq, Yugoslavia, particularly the Bosnia 
and Herzegovina conflicts and the destruction of the Bamiyan Buddha statues in 
Afghanistan. In a subsequent UNESCO general conference, it was accepted that the 
international system of safeguards of the world cultural heritage did not appear to be 
satisfactory.49 Various efforts have been taken in the last ten years to protect the significant 
sites during times of war or armed conflict. 
The international conventions and declarations contain hardly any prOVISIons to offer 
protection to sacred sites during times of peace. Although a fully-fledged conventional war 
among states may have become a distant reality, conflicts within a state have increased in 
recent decades. When such conflicts assume religious character, the attacks over sacred 
sites may be inevitable and religious sentiments over sacred sites lead to spiralling violence 
for decades. In such moments, the existing international law to protect sacred sites as 
cultural properties seem to be insufficient and this gap needs to be covered to protect sacred 
sites of all communities at all times. 
Regional human rights treaties are a development of international human rights law in 
protecting and promoting human rights across the world. Their significance in protecting 
such rights is owed to the binding obligations on member states imposed by the regional 
human rights courts. Hence, this study proposes a regional human rights treaty, including a 
human rights court, to protect sacred sites for the South Asian region. 
2.4. Indian Legal System 
Before a detailed discussion on the present Indian legal context, it is necessary to consider 
the constitutional and historical background against which the Indian legal system has 
(1954 Hague Convention on Cultural Property) are significant in offering protection to significant places of 
worship during armed conflicts. 
49 Roger O'Keefe, The Protection o/Cultural Property in Armed Conflict (CUP. Cambridge 2(06) 237. 
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developed. R.K. Agrawala suggests that 'a legal system is the locale. The past explains i~ 
and it foretells the future' .50 Though India's indigenous legal tradition existed for 
approximately two thousand years, its present form has inherited little from the past Hindu 
and Muslim rules. The present system is based on the British legal system which existed in 
parts of India for two hundred years before independence in 1947. 
2.4.1. Development of the Indian Constitutional and Legal Order 
The Mughal rule in India was established by Babar in 1526, and it deteriorated after the 
death of Aurangazeb in 1707.51 When Mughal emperors ruled India, at the close of the 
sixteenth century, a few merchants from London resolved to forge trade links with India. 
On 24 September 1599, they formed the 'East India Company'. Based on their application 
for the grant of royal recognition, on 31 December 1600, Queen Elizabeth I granted the first 
Royal Charter52 which conferred certain legislative powers on the company to make, 
ordain, and constitute as many reasonable laws as necessary to solve their disputes. 53 
British traders, with the permission of the respective Indian governments, had settled in 
different parts of the country. 54 Disputes among the British in these early settlements were, 
with the permission of the local governments, adjudicated by English law and the British 
were allowed by the rulers to have their own administration in their settlement area. 55 
Initially, the courts and the legislature were intermixed with the executive. The executive 
was the governor and his council appointed by the company for each settlement. 56 
50 RK Agrawala, 'History of Courts and Legislatures' in J Minattur (ed), The Indian Legal System (Oceana, 
New York 1978) 103. 
51 Ibid 105. 
52 AB Keith, A Constitutional History of India (Methuen & Co, London 1936) 1. According to the tenns of 
the first Charter, the Company had a democratic constitution. All the members of the Company constituted 
the General Body which elected annually, a Governor and twenty-four Directors of the Company. in whom 
the government of the Company was vested. 
~l CP llbert. The Government of India (Clarendon Press, Oxford 1915) 3 10. 
54 For instance, the traders settled in Surat (1612), Bombay (1668), Madras (1639) and Calcutta ( 1690). 
RM Jois, Legal and Conslihltional History of India (Tripatby. Bombay 1984) Vol II, 247. 
55 RK Agrawala. 'History of Courts and Legislatures' in J Minattur (ed), The Indian Legal System (Oceana, 
New York 1978) 103. 
S6 Ibid 105. Though not legal specialists. these Englishmen were generally acquainted with their own legal 
system. The Englishmen were forced to fonnulate a process of law and order which they were familiar with 
due to the weakness of operating an indigenous legal system. 
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Subsequently, another charter was issued by Charles II in 166157 which authorised the 
governor and council to function as a court for all civil, criminal and other matters for their 
employees. 58 
In 1726, George I issued a further charter, which endowed the three principal settlements or 
presidency towns, of Madras, Bombay and Calcutta with a Mayor's Court. 59 The governor 
and council of each presidency town were given legislative power.60 Since the 1726 Charter 
could not lend sufficient power to the growing authority of the company, and also owing to 
its malpractices, in 1773 the British Government intervened in Indian affairs with the 
Regulating ACt.61 This Act replaced the Mayor's Courts with a Supreme Court through a 
royal charter,62 and placed an independent judiciary under the control of the Crown rather 
than of the company. 63 These judges appointed by the Crown, exercised jurisdiction over 
civil, criminal, admiralty and ecclesiastical matters,64 and established their own rules of 
procedure.65 Outside of the presidency areas, however, the company continued to exercise 
jurisdiction through civil and criminal COurtS.66 The collector of the district, an Englishman, 
presided over the former and supervised the latter, which had mostly Muslim officers.67 
Later, the Charter Act of 183368 defined the power of the East India Company to be 
continued until 30 April 1854. 
Following the mutiny of Indian soldiers in 1857, India was declared to be a British 
Dependency in 1858.69 In 1861, the passing of the Indian High Courts Aceo abolished the 
57 Charter issued by Charles II on 3 April 1961. 
S8 AB Keith, A Constitutional History of India (Methuen & Co, London 1936) 7-9. 
S9 CP libert, The Government of India (Clarendon Press, Oxford 1915) 31-2. 
60 RM Jois, Legal and Constitutional History of India (NM Tripathi, Bombay 1984) Vol II. 248. 
61 Regulating Act 1773 (13 Geo III c 63). 
62 A Charter was issued on 26 March 1774 by King George III. 
63 AB Keith, A Constitutional History of India (Methuen & Co London, 1936) 71 3; CP llbert, The 
Government of India (Clarendon Press, Oxford 1915) 40-50. 
64 Regulating Act 1773 s 13. See, RM Jois, Legal and Constitutional History of India (NM Tripathi, Bombay 
1984) Vol II, 123. 
6S Ibid. 
66 The judicial organization provided by the Company in the 'mofilssils' was called the adalat system. adalat 
means 'court' in Ambic. 
67 BP Mishra. The Judicial Administration of the East India Company in Bengal (Motilal Banarsidas, Delhi 
1947) 168-82. 
68 3&4 Will IV C 85. 
69 The Government of India Act 1858 (21 & 22 Viet c 106). 
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supreme courts and lower courts and established in their place a High Court of Judicature 
for each presidency. The creation of the High Court was a significant attempt in developing 
a unified system of law and administration of justice in the country with appellate authority 
to the Privy Council. 
In 1935, as an attempt to commence federal polity in India, the British parliament framed 
the Government of India Act. The Act considered setting up a federation consisting of 
British Indian provinces and native states.71 Legislative powers of the federation and the 
component units were demarcated through three lists, which are accommodated in the 
Indian Constitution. The three lists, each with added items, are the Union List, State List 
and Concurrent List, which delineate the powers of the federal government. 72 
In 1937, a federal court was established to try disputes between the federation and the 
provincial units and disputes arising between provincial units.73 It enjoyed appellate 
jurisdiction over the High COurtS,74 but was subject to the appellate authority of the Privy 
Council. 75 In its advisory jurisdiction it could render advice to the governor general on any 
legal matter of public importance.76 As we will see later, this federal court was a major 
precursor of the modem Supreme Court of India.77 
When the British Government unilaterally involved India in the Second World War in 
1939, as a reaction to this imperialistic action, the Congress78 ministers resigned and in 
1942, Gandhi79 launched the 'Quit India" movement, which sparked off anti-British 
sentiments throughout the country. In the post-war period, as a first step towards 
70 The Indian High Courts Act 1861 (24 & 25 Viet c 104). 
71 Native States were territories ruled by independent kings during British rule. During independence. 
approximately 600 such states existed in India. 
7_ Article 246 of the Indian Constitution (Seventh Schedule) contains the three lists. 
7J Government of India Act 1935 s 200. The federal court was established in India on 6 December 1937. See, 
RM Jois, Legal and Constitutional History of India (NM Tripathi, Bombay 1984) Vol II. 217. 
74 Government of India Act 1935 s 207. 
75 Government of India Act 1935 s 212. 
76 Ibid. 
77 For a general understanding of history of courts and legislatures in India, refer. R.K Agrawala, 'History of 
Courts and Legislatures' in J Minattur (ed), The Indian Legal System (Oceana, New York 1978) 103-132. 
78 Indian National Congress Party which headed most of the provincial governments during 1935-1947. 
79 Gandhi led the freedom struggle against British rule from 1915 until 1947. 
63 
independence, the British Government proposed a constituent assembly represented by all 
major political and religious groups in India. The responsibility of the Constituent 
Assembly was the creation of a new constitution for an independent India for which 
members were elected by the provincial legislatures during the winter of 1945-'46. 
When the Muslim League80 under the leadership of Jinnah chose not to participate in the 
Constituent Assembly, the proposal for the partition of the country became inevitable.81 On 
3 June 1947, Mountbatten, Viceroy since March, explained to the leaders of the Muslim 
League and the Indian National Congress about the plan for the partition and fixed 15 
August 1947 as the date of transfer of power. The British parliament passed the Indian 
Independence Act 1947 giving legal sanction for partition of India into India and 
Pakistan.82 The passing of the act marked the end of British rule in India and the division of 
India into two sovereign nations.83 
After independence, the Constituent Assembly accelerated its activities to create a 
constitution for the independent India. The framers of the Indian constitution drew 
inspiration from three main sources.84 The first source was the Government of India Act 
1935, which provided the basis for national and provincial government until the newly 
framed constitution replaced it in 1950. The second source was the Objectives Resolution 
adopted during the December 194685 Assembly session which called for adequate 
safeguards for minorities, depressed and backward classes, and also for underdeveloped 
and tribal areas.86 The third source was other constitutions of countries like the United 
80 Muslim League is a political party established in 1906 to protect the interests of Muslims. 
81 BR Nanda, 'Nehru, The Indian National Congress and the Partition of India, 1953-47' in CH Philips and 
MD Wainwright (eds) The Partition of India: Policies and Perspectives 1935-1947 (George Allen and 
Unwin, London 1970) 187. 
82 S Rao, The Framing of India's Constitution (The Indian Institute of Public Administration, New Delhi 
1968) Vol I, 529-30. 
83 Indian Independence Act 1947 s 1 provided 'setting up of two independent dominions named as India and 
Pakistan with effect from 15 August 1947'. 
M G Austin, Working a Democratic Constitution: A History of the Indian Experience (OUP, Delhi 1999) 4. 
85 Nehru drafted these resolutions stating that the Indian Union, whose integrity was to be maintained. derived 
its authority and power from the Indian people. It declared that there should be secured to all the people, 
justice - social. economic. and political; equality of status and of opportunity. and before the law. freedom of 
thought, expression. belief. worship. vocation. association, and action. subject to law and public morality. For 
details of Objectives Resolution. see. Constituent Assembly Debates Vol I. No 5. 59. 
86 Ibid. 
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Kingdom, Ireland, USSR, and the USA, for the sections dealing with fundamental rights. 
and directive principles of state policy. 
When the members of the Constituent Assembly met to draft the constitution, they 
encountered a number of problems. Firstly, they realised that it was a formidable task to 
construct a uniform system of governance in a nation known for its economic, social and 
religious diversity. 87 Austin argues that the Indian constitution was predominantly a social 
document seeking to change traditional social beliefs and practices. The members were 
aware that the document had to be contextualised in relation to the challenges that the 
country faced. 88 McHugh states that the meticulous attention paid to each article was the 
result of the tumultuous political and social context surrounding the constituent assembly. 89 
Secondly, the framers of the Indian constitution were conSCIOUS of the religious strife 
dividing the nation at the time of independence. As was noted previously, India's 
independence was accompanied by the partition of the country into Muslim majority 
Pakistan and Hindu majority India.9o This partition led to a massive loss of lives and forced 
millions to evacuate their lands. Most of the provinces in northern India were engulfed in 
an orgy of violence for months preceding and after independence.91 The partition promoted 
more religious hatred and violence. Bloodshed, upheaval and migration were, therefore, the 
structural legacies of partition.92 The assassination of Gandhi by Naturam Godse, member 
of a Hindu militant organisation, gave more reason for the framers to concentrate on 
bringing more amity between the religious communities through various provisions in the 
constitution. 
87 S Parikh, 'Enshrining a Secular Idol: A Judicial Response to the Violent Aftennath of Ayodhya' (2005) 37 
Case W Res J InCI L 85, 90. 
88 G Austin, The Indian Constitution: Cornerstone of a Nation (OUP, Oxford 1966) 50. 
89 JT McHugh, Comparative Constitutional Traditions (Peter Lang, Oxford 2002) 103. 
90 DS Burlet, 'Challenging Ethnic Conflict: Hindu-Muslims Relations in India 1977-1993' (PhD Thesis, 
Department of Peace Studies, University of Bradford 1997) 79. 
91 B Graham, Hindu Nationalism and Indian Politics: The Origins and Development of the Bharathiya Jalla 
Sangh (CUP, Cambridge 1990) 1. Bruce Graham observes that 'people looked forward to the creation of a 
new political order, one in which the problems and conflicts associated with the British Raj would vanish like 
the morning mist. Instead the nation found itself exposed to a high degree of stress and instability ... the 
communal rioting which had accompanied partition threatened to undennine it'. 
92 DS Burlet. 'Challenging Ethnic Conflict: Hindu-Muslims Relations in India 1977-1993' (PhD Thesis. 
Department of Peace Studies, University of Bradford 1997) 78. 
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Finally, traditional Indian society was based on a hierarchical caste system which had 
within it many inequalities. 'Caste is based on classification of people through attribution 
of specific social ranks determined by descent' observes Siraj Sait.93 The framers of the 
constitution strove to create a fundamentally different, more egalitarian, Indian society, all 
of which called for a revolutionary document. 94 The result was that the framers of the 
constitution established a democratic form of government based on secular principles. 
The Constitution of India is divided into 22 Parts and 12 Schedules. Part III includes 
explicit safeguards for individual liberties, modelled on the US Bill of Rights.95 These 
protections are referred to as the "Fundamental Rights" provisions. They incorporate the 
guarantee of equality before the law and the right of equal protection of the laws;96 
protection from discrimination;97 the right to speech and assembly;98 the right to life and 
liberty;99 the right to freedom of religion; protection of minority interests lOO and also the 
right to judicial enforcement of the Fundamental Rights protection. 101 The details of the 
Fundamental Rights, as interpreted by the courts, will be dealt with later in this chapter. 
The constitution defines India as a union of states, and therefore states play a fundamental 
role in India's federal set-up,102 and as such they are specified in the First Schedule of the 
Constitution. Before independence, they were known as provinces and in every province, 
there existed several languages. The States Reorganisation Commission was formed in 
1953 to study the problems involved in redrawing state boundaries. As to the State 
93 M Siraj Sait, Inheriting a Life without Dignity: A Call to the United Nations to Address Caste-based 
Discrimination (Minority Rights Group International, London 2001) I. 
94 MC Vandennay, 'The Role of the Judiciary in India's Constitutional Democracy' (1996) 20 Hastings InCI 
& Comp L Rev 103, 103. 
9S US Constitutional Amendments I-X. 
96 Indian Constitution art 14. 
97 Indian Constitution art 15-16. 
98 Indian Constitution art 19. 
99 Indian Constitution art 21. 
100 Indian Constitution art 25-30. 
101 Indian Constitution art 32. 
102 Indian Constitution art 1 (1). 
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R .. A 103 . eorganlsatlon ct 1956, the states boundaries were redrawn and at present, India has 
twenty-eight states and seven union territories. 
2.4.2. Separation of Powers 
A key feature in understanding the Ayodhya dispute is the interaction between federal and 
state authorities, as well as between legislature, executive, and judiciary. This section 
considers both the federal system of India, and the relationship between the executive and 
the legislature. Because of the central importance of the judiciary to the dispute, the 
judiciary is considered separately, in the following section. 
2.4.2.1. Federal nature of the Indian state 
The Indian constitution, which took effect on 26 January 1950, created a federal 
government combining elements of the British parliamentary and US constitutional 
models. 104 The constitution of India declared the country to be a 'sovereign socialist 
secularlos democratic republic' .106 The Indian constitution is a combination of federal and 
unitary models; though essentially federal in character, the union has been given the power 
to encroach upon the field reserved for states in certain contingencies, for instance, in case 
of emergencies. lo7 The reason behind this is that until independence, India was never a 
single political unit and it had always been a multi-religious, multi racial, multi-lingual, and 
plural society. lOS 
Moreover, while gathering together to frame a constitution for independent India in the 
aftermath of the religious strife which existed in the country after partition, the framers had 
103 The Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956 with effect from 1 November 1956. 
104 G Austin. The Indian Constitution: Cornerstone of a Nation (OUP, Oxford 1966) 34. 
lOS The words 'socialist and secular' were added to the Preamble of the Constitution by the Constitution 
(Forty-second Amendment) Act 1976. 
106 The Preamble of the Indian Constitution. 
107 Part XVIII of the Constitution (articles 352-360) explains the emergency provisions: a threat by war or 
external aggression or by internal disturbances; a failure of constitutional machinery in the country or in a 
state; and a threat to the financial security. Under the first two categories, the fundamental rights. with the 
exception of protection of life and personal liberty , may be suspended. . . 
108 SC Kashyap. 'Executive-Legislature Interface in the Indian Polity' (2004) 10 The Journal of LeglsJatl\e 
Studies 278, 278. 
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to make difficult decisions concerning the political structure of India. It was decided that 
India was to be governed by a federal system which had at its centre a strong union 
government compared with the weaker, individual component states. Kachwaha argues that 
to avoid the risk of disintegration, a strong union government was required to administer 
such a large and diverse nation. I09 In the words of AmbedkarllO 'our constitution would be 
both unitary as well as federal according to the requirements of time and circumstances. ' 111 
In a federal set-up, delineation of power between the umon and the states is very 
significant. Regarding legislative power, it is vested mostly with the parliament and state 
legislatures, though occasionally other bodies or organs are pennitted to legislate at local 
levels. 112 The subject matter of legislation is clearly distributed between the two as laid 
down in three lists, 113 which are mainly based on the pattern under the Government of India 
Act 1935. The three lists are the Union, the State, and the Concurrent. 
Parliament has exclusive authority to legislate on any of the ninety-seven items on the 
union list, while the state list includes sixty-six items that are under the exclusive 
jurisdiction of state legislatures. The union government and state governments exercise 
concurrent jurisdiction over forty-seven items on the concurrent list for the purpose of 
securing legal and administrative unity throughout the country. It is important that the laws 
passed by the parliament relevant to concurrent list areas take precedence over laws passed 
by state legislatures. I 14 The concurrent list includes the Criminal Law, which includes all 
matters in the Indian Penal Code, (including religious offences), and religious personal 
laws. 
109 M Kachwaha, The Judiciary in India: Determinants of its Independence and Impartiality (PlOOM and 
CIJL, Leiden 1998) 14. 
110 Ambedkar is known as 'the Father of the Constitution'. On 29 August, 1947, the Constituent Assembly set 
up a Drafting Committee under the Cbainnansbip of BR Ambedkar to prepare a Draft Constitution for 
independent India. <http://parliamentofindia.nic.inlls/debateslfacts.htm> accessed I March 2006. 
III Constituent Assembly Debates Vol VII part I, 34. 
112 These local bodies include the Panchayats (Indian Constitution articles 243, 243A - 2430) and the 
Municipalities (articles 243P - 243ZG). 
III Indian Constitution art 246. 
114 Indian Constitution art 249. 
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For effective functioning of the federal system, the Indian Constitution empowers the union 
to give directions to the states. I IS Where a state fails to comply with union directions, the 
president can lawfully hold that the government of the state cannot be carried on in 
accordance with the provisions of the Constitution. I 16 The consequences of such a situation 
are dealt with in article 356 which contains provisions for failure of constitutional 
machinery in the state. I 17 However, this power to implement President's Rule in a state is 
subject to judicial review. For instance, in the Bommajl18 case, the Supreme Court struck 
down a proclamation made by the President of India under Article 356. 
A significant provision in the constitution is Article 355. Article 355 overrides all state laws 
to the extent that they conflict with, or hamper the discharge of, the duty imposed on the 
union by that article which falls into two parts. The first part runs, 'it shall be the duty of 
the union to protect every state against external aggression and internal disturbance', and 
the second part runs, 'and to ensure that the government of every state is carried on in 
accordance with the provisions of this constitution'. It shows clearly that when the union is 
apprised of a situation in which internal peace is threatened, it must take all necessary steps, 
including the use of armed force, to prevent internal disturbance. I 19 
2.4.2.2. Organisation of Parliament 
The constitution has adopted a bicameral legislature based on the Westminster Model. I2o 
The Union Parliament comprises of the President, the Council of States (Rajya Sabha) and 
the House of the People (Lok Sabha).121 Rajya Sabha, which is also known as the upper 
house, is elected from the legislatures of state and union territories and the Vice-President 
liS Indian Constitution art 256, 257, 339(2), 350A, 353(a) and 360(3). 
116 Indian Constitution art 365. 
117 SC Kashyap, Union-State Relations in India (The Institute of Constitutional and Parliamentary Studies, 
New Delhi 1969) 12. 
118 SR Bommai v Union of India (1994) 2 SCR 165. This case is a landmark case in defining 'secularism' as a 
basic feature of the Indian Constitution. 
119 Government of India, Report of the Commission on Centre-State Relations - Part I (GOI. New Delhi 
1988) 165-69. 
120 M Kachwaha, The Judiciary in India: Determinants of its Independence and Impartiality (PlOOM and 
CULt Leiden 1998) 17. 
I~I Indian Constitution art 79. 
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of India is its ex-officio chairman.122 Lok Sabha, which is also known as the lower house. 
normally continues for a period of five years but is subject to earlier dissolution. 123 The 
members of Lok Sabha are directly elected by the voters in the states. In a caste-ridden 
Indian society, to ensure the participation of lower castes and tribes, seats are reserved for 
the Scheduled Castes (approximately 15%) and Scheduled Tribes (approximately 5%) in 
the Lok Sabha. 124 This reservation policy is expected to cease after sixty years. 125 
The legislative power given to parliament and state legislatures are not without limitations. 
According to the Constitution, the Indian Parliament or the state legislatures cannot pass a 
law violating the fundamental rights,126 or one which violates the distribution of powers 
between the union and the states. Although the amending power of Parliament is affirmed 
after some contentious judicial pronouncements, certain provisions are possible only 
through a special majority in Parliament, whereas some others can be amended only 
through a further concurrence of at least half of the state legislatures, for example, federal 
provisions. 127 The amending power of Parliament over fundamental rights was a matter of 
dispute between the parliament and the judiciary for a few decades after independence. 
Although the amending power of Parliament is affirmed after some contentious judicial 
pronouncements,128 it has no power to alter the 'basic structure' of the Constitution, a fact 
which was clearly established by a majority judgement of the Supreme Court in 1973 in the 
Kesavananda case. 129 
122 Indian Constitution art 64. 
123 Indian Constitution art 83. 
124 Indian Constitution art 330. 
125 Indian Constitution art 334: Reservation of seats and special representation to cease after sixty-years from 
the commencement of the Constitution. This 'sixty-years' substituted by the Constitution (seventy-ninth 
amendment) Act, 1999 for 'fifty-years' with effect from 25 January 2000. 
126 Indian Constitution art 13. 
127 Indian Constitution art 368. 
128 Go/ak Nath \' State of Punjab AIR 1967 SC 1643; Kesavananda Bharathi v State of Kerala AIR 1971 SC 
530; Minerva Mills v Union of India AIR 1980 SC 1789. 
129 Kesavananda Bharathi v State of Kerala AIR 1971 SC 530. In Kesavananda, the Supreme Court 
introduced the 'basic structure' doctrine and laid down a bold ruling stating that Article 368 does not enable 
parliament to alter its basic structure or the framework of the Constitution. 
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2.4.2.3. Role and powers of President and Governors 
The Constituent Assembly opted for the parliamentary system of government because it 
preferred to have an executive that was answerable to the popularly elected legislature. 13o 
The term 'Executive' in the Indian polity covers the formal head of the executive. (the 
President), the real executive, (the Council of Ministers), and the permanent administration, 
the civil services.131 As a republic, India has an elected President as its head.132 The role of 
the President of India is conceived as that of a constitutional or formal executive and also 
head of state. The President acts only with the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers in 
the discharge of all his functions. I33 The Supreme Court through various decisions has 
upheld the position that the President is a constitutional head who must act on the advice of 
the Council of Ministers and that the real executive power in the Indian system is vested in 
the Council of Ministers. J 34 
With regard to the powers, the President invites the leader of the party or parties who in 
hislher judgement is likely to command enough support to form the government. 135 In the 
absence of any session in both houses and where circumstances warrant an immediate 
action, the President, is empowered to legislate by ordinance. J 36 The President can 
approach the Supreme Court for their opinion when a question of law or fact has arisen 
which is of national public importance. 137 Equally, he can refer a dispute to the Supreme 
Court for their opinion as for example the reference of the Ayodhya Dispute in 1993.138 
Another vital power of the President is declaring emergency in three circumstances.139 
130 SC Kashyap, Our Constitution - An Introduction to India's Constitution and Constitutional Law (National 
Book Trust, New Delhi 2001) 46, 49. 
131 SC Kashyap, 'Executive-Legislature Interface in the Indian Polity' (2004) 10 The Journal of Legislative 
Studies 278, 279. 
m Indian Constitution art 52. 
J33 Indian Constitution art 74. 
134 Samsher Singh v State of Punjab AIR 1974 SC 2192; Rao v Union of India AIR 1971 SC 1002; Ram 
Jawaya v State of Punjab AIR 1955 SC 544. 
J3S Indian Constitution art 75. 
136 Indian Constitution art 123. 
m Indian Constitution art 143 (1). 
138 Indian Constitution art 143 (2). 
1)9 Indian Constitution art 352-360 
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Similarly, a Governor's relationship with the state legislature is similar to those of the 
President with Parliament. l40 Normally, the Governor discharges his responsibilities with 
the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers in a state,141 except in respect of matters 
where one can act in their discretion under the constitution.142 This power includes 
choosing the Chief Minister of the state, assenting bills,143 reserving bills for the President's 
consideration, and informing the President of a constitutional crisis arising in the state, or in 
requiring the dissolution of the Legislative Assembly and calling for President's rule. l44 
2.4.2.4. Role and powers of Prime Minister and Cabinet 
The Constitution of India represents a real mixture of the highest executive and legislative 
authorities. The relationship between the executive and the legislature is one that is friendly 
and they are not seen as competing centres of power but as inseparable partners in the 
business of government. 145 
The Cabinet, which is the Council of Ministers, with the Prime Minister at the head, is 
charged with the responsibility of governance on behalf of Parliament. 146 The Cabinet has 
unlimited right to initiate and formulate legislative and financial proposals before 
Parliament and to give effect to approved policies unfettered by Parliament. In tum, 
Parliament has unlimited power to call for information, to discuss, to scrutinise and to put 
the seal of popular approval on proposals made by the executive. The Cabinet governs 
while the role of the Parliament is to deliberate, discuss, legislate, advise, criticise and 
ventilate public grievances. 147 
140 Indian Constitution art 153. 
141 Indian Constitution art 163. 
142 Indian Constitution art 160. 
14) Indian Constitution art 200. 
144 Indian Constitution art 356. 
14S SC Kashyap. 'Executive-Legislature Interface in the Indian Polity' (2004) 10 The Journal of Legislative 
Studies 278, 280. 
146 Indian Constitution art 74. 
147 SC Kashyap. Parliamentary Procedure. Law. Privileges. Practice & Precedents (lJni\'crsal Law 
Publishing Co. New Delhi 2000) Vol I. 81-2. 
72 
The Cabinet, being the political executive,148 is responsible to Parliament. Though the 
Cabinet is drawn from the legislature, it has a separate and independent domain of its own 
with distinct status, powers and functions ordained by the constitution itself.149 The two 
main functions of Parliament in the context of its relationship with the Cabinet are, firstly, 
to ensure that the government remains responsible to the House of the People, ISO and 
secondly, to exercise surveillance over the administration and secure its accountability to 
parliamentary institutions. 
The Constitution provides only for the collective responsibility of the Cabinet. lSI If the 
ruling party or coalition 152 loses the confidence of the majority of the members of the 
house, its government has to resign. 153 The ministerial responsibility to the lower house of 
Parliament flows from India's written constitution and the rules of parliamentary 
procedure. 154 Likewise, the day-to-day administration is carried out by the administrative 
bodies that are accountable to Parliament. Though Parliament does not interfere with 
everyday administration, it does exercise surveillance and oversees the administration. 
Ministerial responsibility and administrative accountability are ensured through procedural 
devices like private members' bills, question hour, various kinds of motions, and committee 
scrutiny. 155 On an institutional level, another method of ensuring administrative 
accountability to Parliament is through various parliamentary committees. 
With regard to the administration of states, the Chief Minister, the Cabinet and the state 
administrative bodies are accountable to the State Legislature. In this way, it simulates the 
practice of the union government. 
148 People elect the legislature which forms the Cabinet. Individual Ministers are in charge of departments and 
assisted by Civil servants. 
149 Chapters 1 and 2 of Part V of the Indian Constitution clearly delineate the structures and powers of Union 
Executive and Parliament, respectively. 
ISO Indian Constitution art 75, 114-116 and 265. 
lSI Indian Constitution art 75(3). 
IS2 The first coalition government in independent India (1977-1979) collapsed due to internal differences. In 
1989 a non-Congress coalition government fell after two years. From 1996 on. it is coalition rule in Ind~a. . 
15.1 SC Kashyap, 'Executive-Legislature Interface in the Indian Polity' (2004) 10 The Journal of Legislative 
Studies 278, 282. 
154 Ibid. 
ISS SL Shakdher. Glimpses of the Working of Parliament (Metropolitan, New Delhi (977) 186-87. 
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2.4.3. Place of Judiciary in the Constitution 
This sub-section examines the key concepts governing the position, role and powers of the 
Indian Judiciary which includes the Supreme Court, the High Courts in the states and the 
lower judiciary. It also further analyses the relationship between the executive and the 
judiciary. 
2.4.3.1. Structure and powers of the Supreme Court 
The Supreme Court of India interprets and enforces the world's lengthiest, most complex 
constitution, with more than 444 articles with multiple schedules, numerous lists, and 
ninety-two amendments. IS6 It sits at the apex of a judicial system that serves the world's 
most populous democracy, a nation with more than one thousand one hundred million 
people. IS7 
With reference to its powers, the Supreme Court has original and exclusive jurisdiction in 
any dispute (a) between the Union Government and one or more states; or (b) between the 
Union Government and any state or states on one side and one or more other states on the 
other side or between two or more states. ISS It has a wide appellate jurisdiction in 
constitutional, civil, criminal and other matters. IS9 Normally a decision of the High Court is 
only appealed when the High Court certifies that the case satisfies the conditions prescribed 
for appeal in the Constitution. 16o But the Supreme Court enjoys further overriding 
discretion to grant special leave to appeal from any judgement, decree, determination, 
sentence or order in any cause or matter made by any court or tribunal in the country.161 
Law declared by the Supreme Court is constitutionally binding in all the courts in India. 162 
156 Constitution of India <http://www.answers.comltopic/constitution-of-india> accessed 10 May 2006. 
IS? As per 2001 Census, the population stood at 1028 million. 
<http://www.censusindia.netlresultslpopulation.html> accessed 24 March 2007. Recent surveys show that it 
has crossed 1100 million. <https:llwww.cia.govllibrary/publications/the-world-factbooklgeoslin.html> 
accessed 15 August 2007. 
158 Indian Constitution art 131. 
159 Indian Constitution art 132-136. 
160 Indian Constitution art 134A. 
161 Indian Constitution art 136. 
162 Indian Constitution art 141. 
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According to Article 137, the court itself is free to change its views by overruling its earlier 
decision in subsequent cases. From the 1980's onwards in its 'epistolary jurisdiction,' the 
court treated letters, and even newspaper articles, under Article 32 as petitions for the 
protection of Fundamental Rights. 163 
The Indian Constitution established the Supreme Court of India as the custodian of 
Fundamental Rights to bring about the changes which the framers of the Constitution 
envisaged. In order to create a nation based on values consisting of equality, secularism and 
democracy, a powerful, independent jUdiciary was essential, and this was a paramount 
concern of the framers. Rudolph defines the Indian Constitution as a hybrid system that 
joins the Parliamentary sovereignty of the British model with the judicial review of the US 
model. l64 The Supreme Court jurisdiction is reinforced by an explicit grant of power under 
Article 13, to invalidate any law that contravenes any specified Fundamental Right in part 
III of the Constitution. Another important power of the Supreme Court is its original 
jurisdiction to issue writs in defence of these fundamental rights. 165 
Since the Indian system does not emphasise an equal separation of powers to the same 
extent as the US model, the Indian Supreme Court was not always successful in exerting its 
authority. The government of Indira Gandhi declared a state of emergencyl66 in 1975, 
alleging that the internal security of the nation was under threat. 167 When the state of 
emergency was declared, access to the courts was suspended and freedom of speech and 
163 Mumbai Kamgar Sabha v Abdul Bhai Faizal Bha; 1976 (3) SCC 832; Sunil Batra v Delhi Administration 
1980 (3) SCC 488; Upendra boxi v State of Uttar Pradesh 1983 (2) SCC 308; Khetri v State of Bihar AIR 
1981 SC 928 (Known as Bhagalpur Under Trial Blinding Case); SP Gupta v Union of India 1981 Supp see 
87; Sudipt Majumdar v State of Madhya Pradesh 1983 2 SCC 258; Bandhu Mukti Morcha v State of Haryana 
AIR 1984 SCC 802; and MC Mehta v Union of India AIR 1996 SC 1977. 
164 LI Rudolph and SH Rudolph, 'Redoing the Constitutional Design: From an Interventionist to a Regulatory 
State' in A Kohli (ed), The Success of India's Democracy (CUP, Cambridge 2001) 132. 
16S Indian Constitution art 32: Remedies for enforcement of rights conferred by this Part Ill: (1) The right to 
move the Supreme Court by appropriate proceedings for the enforcement of the rights conferred by this Part is 
guaranteed. (2) The Supreme Court shall have power to issue directions or orders or Writs, including writs in 
the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari. whichever may be 
a1!propriate, for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part III. 
I See n 106, below. 
167 Venkat Iyer, States ofEmergenty (Butterworths. New Delhi 2000) 152-60. 
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· . h d 168 Th S press was exhnguls e . e upreme Court was unwilling to oppose these measures. In 
1976, the 42nd Amendment declared that the Supreme Court has no power to invalidate 
any parliamentary acts that were intended to further any of the Constitution's Directive 
Principles defined in Part IV of the Constitution.169 
After lifting the state of emergency in 1977, the court realised its failure to uphold the 
fundamental rights, and asserted its supremacy over Parliament in subsequent cases. 170 In a 
decisive step, some provisions of the 42nd Amendment were struck down by the Supreme 
Court in the Minerva Mills casel71 in which the Supreme Court emphasised the importance 
of judicial review. With this case, the survival of judicial review, particularly in relation to 
government action affecting fundamental rights, was confirmed. 
A significant factor is the 'equality' provisions. l72 Inspired by the 14th Amendment to the 
US Constitution, Article 15 of the Indian Constitution states that 'the State shall not 
discriminate against any citizen on grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex, place of birth, 
or anyone of them'. 173 These provisions are aimed at eradicating inequalities in Indian 
social life. 174 The framers of the constitution, therefore, saw the caste system as the main 
impediment to achieving equality. Consequently, union and state governments introduced a 
reservation policy for the Backward Castes,175 the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled 
168 B Neuborne, 'Constitutional Court Profile: The Supreme Court of India' (2003) 1 International Journal of 
Constitutional Law 478, 488-92. 
169 Constitution (Forty-Second) Amendment Act of the Indian Parliament, 18 December 1976. 
170 Minerva Mills v Union of India AIR 1980 SC 1789; Waman Rao v Union of India AIR 1981 SC 271; 
Srinivasa v State of Kamataka AIR 1987 SC 1518. 
171 Minerva Mills v Union of India AIR 1980 SC 1789. In this case, the Supreme Court held that the 
amendment was a violation of the basic structure doctrine as it sought to insulate statutes from judicial 
review, and that constitutional amendments affecting the basic structure of the constitution may not be placed 
beyond judicial review. 
172 Indian Constitution art 14 and 15. 
17.1 SP Sathe, Judicial Activism in India (OUP, New Delhi 2002) 165. 
174 Ibid. India had a long history of social discrimination emanating from the Hindu caste system, affecting 
both employment and educational opportunities. Hence, providing equal protection alone is insufficient. 
Affirmative action on the side of the state is essential to weed out the past vestiges of inequality. 
How even after sixty years of independence, India is far behind in achieving this goal, see National. 
'NDTV Poll: Icons from Mahatma Gandhi to Sachin' The Hindu (New Delhi 12 August 2007) 
<http://www.hindu.coml2007/08/121storiesl2oo70812556712oo.htm> accessed 13 August 2007. 
175 Backward castes fall between upper (forward) and lower or schedule castes. Other Backward Classes 
(OBCs) refer to castes officially recognized as having been traditionally subjected to marginalisaiton. 
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T 'b 176 R ' I' n es, eservatlon pO ICY came to the fore during the Babri MasjidIRam temple dispute 
when upper caste leaders objected to the implementation of the Mandai Commission 
reportl77 by the V,P, Singh Government. 
2.4.3.2. Structure and Powers of High Courts 
The Indian judicial structure is materially the same as that left by the British. It is a 
hierarchical system with the Supreme Court at the top. The immediate successive rung is 
the High Courts, one for each state, At the state level, the High Court is the highest forum 
of appeal and revision for both civil and criminal matters. The High Courts, like the 
Supreme Court, are vested with extra-ordinary original jurisdiction through prerogative 
writs for enforcement of rights given to individuals under the constitution and the laws. 
Under the Government of India Act, 1935, the constitution and organisation of the High 
Courts was vested in the provincial legislature while in the Indian constitution the subject 
and organisation of the High Courts was included in entry 78 of the union list. This change 
in the constitution had the objective of uniformity in the formation and organisation of all 
the High Courts in India. This suggests that in the Constitution, the High Courts occupy a 
very important position. 
Certain jurisdiction and powers considered vital for rule of law were conferred on the High 
Courts by the constitutional provisions. These powers include, power to punish for 
contempt of itself,178 the Writ jurisdiction which entrusts power to issue writs or orders for 
enforcement of Fundamental Rights and legal rights,179 supervisory jurisdiction over 
subordinate courts and tribunals in the concerned state,180 power to withdraw cases 
involving interpretation of constitution from the subordinate courts,181 administrative 
176 Indian Constitution art 342( 1). 
177 For an analytical study of the Mandai report. M Desai, • A Justification of Reservations and Aftinnative 
Action for Backward Castes in India' (1991) 11 South Asia Bulletin 110-30. 
178 Indian Constitution art 215. 
179 Indian Constitution art 226. 
1110 Indian Constitution art 227. 
181 Indian Constitution art 228. 
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control over the staff of the High COurtl82 and general power to regulate the subordinate 
judiciary. 183 
Since most of the Indian states are linguistically established, High Courts play a vital role 
in administering justice at the state level. Distance and ignorance both of English and 
Hindi, keep the poor away from the Supreme Court. Hence, High Courts are vital within 
the Indian judicial structure, as is their supervisory jurisdiction over subordinate courts as 
these courts are prone to bias and pressure. 
2.4.3.3. Structure and powers of lower courts 
Since the lowest rung of the judiciary plays a crucial role in delivering justice on a daily 
basis to the common man, the Supreme Court observed in the Chandra Mohan case that the 
interests of the lower court must be given superiority in the dispensation of justice.184 This 
places an enormous responsibility on the lower courts to deliver a fair, unbiased judgement. 
The lower courts are divided in their dealings between civil and criminal matters. Each 
state has the power to constitute and organise its own judicial structure but there is a similar 
three tiered set up in all the states,185 apart from the city civil courts. 186 
On the civil side, the District Court, the top of the hierarchy of lower courts, exercises 
original and/or appellate jurisdiction. Immediately below the District court, is the Civil 
Judges' Court which has original or appellate jurisdiction and the lowest in the hierarchy is 
the Court of Munshiffs which have only original jurisdiction. As far as the civil appellate 
jurisdiction is concerned, the first appeal goes to the prescribed courtl87 both on question of 
182 Indian Constitution art 229. 
183 Indian Constitution art 233-235. 
1114 Chandra Mohan v State o/Uttar Pradesh AIR 1966 SC 1987. 
185 RM Jois, Legal and Constitutional History 0/ India (NM Tripathi, Bombay 1984) Vol II. 236. 
186 In several Metropolitan cities having due regard to its special requirements, City Civil Courts are 
constituted under special enactments by the appropriate State Legislatures, to try all civil cases except those 
falling within the jurisdiction of the court of Small Causes. Appeals from decisions of City Civil Courts to the 
High Court. thereby avoid one appeal. 
187 Code of Civil Procedure 1908 (Act No 5 of 1908) s 96. 
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fact and law. When the first appeal is to a court lower than the High Court, a second appeal 
goes to the High Court 1 88 only on a question of law. 
With regard to the criminal courts, the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) 1973 189 Section 
6190 provides for the establishment of various grades of criminal courts, which includes 
Courts of Session, Judicial Magistrates of the first class and second class and Executive 
Magistrates l91 • Any appeal against an order of conviction from the Magistrate Court 
follows the legal process of going firstly to the Sessions Court, then the High Court and 
finally to the Supreme Court. 192 An appeal against an order of conviction based on a plea of 
guilt l93 and appeals against orders in petty cases l94 are barred. The state is empowered to 
prefer an appeal against inadequacy of sentence 1 95 and against an order of acquittal. 196 
However, it is important to note that Section 397 of CrPC confers power on the High Court 
and Sessions Court to call for and examine the correctness, legality or propriety of any 
finding, sentence or order made by any court subordinate thereto and to pass appropriate 
orders. This provision is vital to remedy any miscarriage of justice by lower courts, 
something which was not done in the Ayodhya dispute. 
188 Ibid s 100. 
189 Code of Criminal Procedure 1973 (Act No 2 of 1974) (CrPC). 
190 CrPC (n 188) s 6: Besides the High Courts and the Courts constituted under any law, other than this Code, 
there shall be, in every state, the following classes of criminal courts, namely: i) Courts of Session, ii) Judicial 
Magistrates of the first class and in any Metropolitan areas Metropolitan Magistrates, iii) Judicial magistrates 
of the second class, and iv) Executive Magistrates. 
191 An Executive Magistrate is an officer of the Executive branch (as opposed to the judicial branch) who is 
invested with specific powers under both the CrPC and the Indian Penal Code (lPC). The Executive 
Magistrates alone are authorized to use force against people. They can direct the police about the manner of 
force (baton charge/ tear gaslblank fire/ firing) and also how much force should be used. They can also take 
the assistance of the Armed Forces to quell a riot. 
192 CrPC (n 188) s 374 provides that 'an appeal goes to the Supreme Court against an order of conviction 
made by the High Court and against an order of conviction made by the Court of Session to the High Court, 
and made by a Magistrate to the Court of Session' . 
193 Ibid s 375. 
19-C Ibid s 376. 
195 Ibid s 377. 
196 Ibid s 378. 
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2.4.3.4. Limitations encountered by the judiciary 
The role of the independent judiciary is to deliver justice and to establish the rule of law. 
However, the legal system has certain inherent limitations. They need to be mentioned to 
comprehend the Ayodhya dispute. 
Firstly, Indian society in general and the legal system in particular, seems to be dominated 
by caste considerations.197 It can be elaborated by reviewing the history of the courts and 
judges. Statistics show that judges serving at the Supreme Court as well as High Courts 
often belonged to the upper castes. Lower castes and minorities were not adequately 
represented. 198 
Secondly, in a multi-religious country like India, upholding secularism and protecting 
minority rights are the responsibility of an independent and impartial jUdiciary. But recent 
court judgements199 seem to favour Hindu militant organisations which threaten secular 
principles. For instance, by defining Hindutva as a Hindu way of life, the courts have 
endorsed the views of the Sangh Pariva?OO which advocates India as a Hindu state. In the 
Manohar Joshi case,20J the Supreme Court found several of the accused, including the Siva 
Sena202 leader, Bal Thackeray, one of the militant anti-Muslim voices within the Hindu 
militant groups in India, responsible for both promoting religious enmity and hatred by 
appealing to religion to gain votes. However, the Court held that 'Hindutva', the ideological 
linchpin of Hindu militant groups, simply represented 'a way of life in the sub-continent' 
197 BV Rao, Crisis in Indian Judiciary (Legal Aid Centre, Hyderabad 2001) 153-54. 
198 B Neuborne, 'Constitutional Court Profile: The Supreme Court of India' (2003) 1 International Journal of 
Constitutional Law 478, 482-3. He proves this by pointing out that as of 2001, 136 judges had served as 
justices of the Supreme Court: 115 Hindus (24 identified as Brahmins, with only two from scheduled castes), 
13 Muslims, 4 Christians, 2 Sikhs and 2 Parsis. Two have been women. No member of a Scheduled Caste or 
Tribe sat on the Supreme Court until 2000. 
199 Manohar Joshi v Nithin Bhaurao Pati! AIR 1996 SC 796 and eleven other cases are collectively known as 
'Hindutva cases'. In these cases, the Supreme Court pronounced judgement on 11 December 1995. The 
!udgement included the definition of 'Hindu tva , . 
00 Sangh means organizations and Parivar means family. Sangh Par;var means 'Family of Hindu Nationalist 
Organizations' which is an umbrella organization of Hindu militant groups. 
201 Manohar Joshi v Nilin Bhaurao Pati! AIR 1996 SC 796. 
202 Siva Sena is a Hindu militant organization and a political party headed by Bal Thackeray. Its main base is 
the State of Maharastra which includes Mumbai, the economic capital of India. 
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and was not a violation of the Representation of the People Act, 1951. This judgement was 
acclaimed by the Sangh Parivar as a victory to their vision of Hindutva. 203 
Thirdly, as seen earlier, using English and Hindi languages as the medium in the Supreme 
Court and in the High Courts stands as an obstacle for the vast majority of uneducated 
people. Rakshit observed that 'often the law does not seem to be Indian in spirit, form, 
content and even in language' .204 Even in lower courts, though the vernacular is allowed, 
English dominates in the arguments and court proceedings. The clients become mute 
spectators. The lack of legal knowledge of the ordinary people discourages the instigation 
of court proceedings, and many lawyers have the tendency to misuse the poor, illiterate 
litigants. 205 Delays, cases pending, worthless decisions and allegations of corruption all 
serve to damage their credibility. 206 
Fourthly, the tendency of those in power is to use the judicial process to settle political 
issues. The people in power as well as those who are in opposition bring issues to courts 
that belong to the political domain. This poses serious threat to judicial independence. From 
the interview, it became clear that there is a trend to pass on purely executive decision 
making functions to the judiciary.207 It has become convenient for the executive to refer all 
politically controversial issues to the Supreme Court under Article 143 of the Constitution. 
For instance, the Ayodhya Dispute was sent to the courts asking them to adjudicate on 
grounds whether the Ram temple existed before 1528.208 
Fifthly, the failure of the Executive in providing adequate facilities and funds has led to a 
lack of judges, which has resulted in cases piling up in the courts, which in tum, has 
203 B Cossman and R Kapur, Secularism's Last Sigh?: Hindutva and the (Mis)Rule of Law (OUP, New Delhi 
1999) 26-52. 
204 B Rakshit, 'Right to Constitutional Remedy: Significance of Article 32' (21-28 August 1999) XXXIV 
Economic and Political Weekly 2381-2383. 
205 R Moog, 'The Significance of Lower Courts in the Judicial process' in Veena Das (ed), The Oxford India 
Companion to Sociology and Social Anthropology (OUP, New Delhi 2(03) 1393. 
106 Interview with lawyers, People's Watch-Human Rights Organization, Madurai (India 14 July 2(07). 
207 Interview with Arul Raj, Retired Judge of the City Civil Court ofChennai (India 4 February 2(06). 
208 M Kachwaha, The Judiciary in India: Determinants of its Independence and Impartiality (PlOOM and 
CUL, Leiden 1998) 99. 
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provoked frustration amongst litigants, lawyers and judges.209 The number of unresolved 
court cases has grown since 1950 and now stands at over thirty million cases. ~ 10 In 1971 
itself, the Indian Law Commission pointed out that nearly thirty-six percent of cases 
available for disposal during a year remained unresolved; the slow movement caused an 
accumulation of arrears, causing further delay, producing a snowball effect. ~ II 
The final limitation concerns the implementation of the judgements. The Constitution 
obliges civil and judicial authorities to act in aid of the Supreme COurt.212 It may award 
exemplary costs against any defaulting Govemment.213 Similarly, the orders of the High 
Court and lower judiciary have to be implemented by the state executives and 
administrative authorities. In reality, they act only to oblige the political party in power.214 
Needless to say, the judicial authority is threatened, weakening further any democracy and 
the rule of law in the country. 
2.4.4. Indian State and religious communities 
This sub-section analyses the secular nature of the Indian state which includes equal 
protection to all religions, the constitutional guarantees for the religious communities and 
the provisions of criminal law protecting religious places and worship. 
2.4.4.1. Secularism and the Indian Constitution 
209 KN Singh in 'The Obstacles to the Independence of the Judiciary' in The Independence of the Judiciary in 
India (Seminar Report, New Delhi 1990) 25-26, criticizes the inertia of the Executive and Parliament for 
solving the plagues which haunt the judiciary. He came heavily on them for taking no step for several years to 
fill even the existing vacancies of judges which has resulted in huge arrears. 
210 Ibid 26. Singh pointed out that there were 97,943 cases pending before the courts of the Chief and 
Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrates and 235,033 cases pending before other magistrates. 
211 B Rakshit, 'Right to Constitutional Remedy: Significance of Article 32' (21-28 August 1999) XXXIV 
Economic and Political Weekly 2381, 2382. 
212 Indian Constitution art 144. 
213 Dinesh v Moti/al Nehro Medical College (1990) 4 SCC 627. 
214 Human Rights Watch. "We Have No Orders to Save You': State Participation and Complicity in 
Communal Violence in Gujarat' in John Dayal (ed), Gujarat 2002: Untold and Re-Told Stories of the 
Hindutva Lab (Media House. Delhi 2003) Vol I, 350-52. Mohit Bhattacharya, 'Bureaucracy and Politics in 
India' in B Chakrabarty and M Bhattacharya (eds), Public Administration: A Reader (OUP. New Delhi 2(03) 
327. Bhattacharya states that 'in reality. far from being. neutral and rule-bound. bureaucracy bends the rules 
with alacrity to serve the 'vested interests'. which is a way of serving its own interests. 
Secularism, a 'basic structure,215 in the Indian Constitution, defines no separation between 
religion and state, but rather commands an equal treatment of all religions, with the state 
not identifying with or submitting to any particular religion. Further, no discrimination 
between members of different religious communities shall be carried out by the state. 
Particularly, constitutional secularism provides every citizen with equal rights to enter any 
office under the state.216 This may be seen as an attempt to ameliorate traditional sources of 
conflicts and discrimination. It establishes a constitutional scheme to protect minority 
interests. 
Since secularism gives equal protection to all religions, it also cov.ers religious freedom. It 
may be argued that the Constitution is underpinned by an ethos of secularism. lacobsohn 
uses the term "ameliorative secularism" to describe the paradigm of the Indian 
Constitution. He believes 'it seeks to mitigate the social condition of people long burdened 
by the inequities of religiously based hierarchies' .217 Beteille observes that affirmative or 
positive discrimination has been written into the Indian Constitution itself as it focuses not 
only on equality as a right available to all citizens, but puts its stress on 'equality as a policy 
aimed at changing the structure of the society' .218 
Indian secularism is not anti-god or anti-religion. It means equal respect for all faiths219 
implying exercise of religious freedom and tolerance, and the rejection of discrimination 
based on religious belief. Hence, any communal conflict is considered as an attack on the 
secular ethos of the Indian state and its democratic values. 
21S SR Bommai v Union of India AIR 1994 SC 1918. 
216 Indian Constitution art 16. 
217 GJ Jacobsobn, The Wheel of Law: India's Secularism in Comparative Constitutional Context (Princeton 
University Press, Princeton 2003) 94. 
218 A Beteille Socief\' and Politics in India: Essays in a Comparative Perspective (Athlone. London 1991) , . 
206-7. 
219 PB Gajendragadkar. Secularism and the Constitution of India (Bombay University, Bombay 1971) 53. 
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2.4.4.2. Constitutional provisions on freedom of religion 
Religious identity is central to the many hundreds of millions of Indian citizens.22o The 
Constitution too guarantees religious freedom for approximately 830 million Hindus, and 
about 140 million Muslims, apart from the Christian, Sikh, and Parsi communities.221 Since 
the research focuses on sacred sites as an important component of religious freedom, it is 
apt to review the protection of religious freedom under the Indian Constitution. 
The framers of the Constitution were aware of the religious and economic inequalities in 
India. They aimed to promote equality by integrating specific provisions into the 
Constitution for all the groups. Fundamental Rights222 and the Directive Principles of State 
Polic~23 are relevant in securing social justice and creating a unified country.224 
The explicit prohibition of religious discrimination in the text of the Constitution expressed 
the seriousness of religious inequality at the time of independence.225 Article 15 (1) of the 
Constitution provides that 'the state shall not discriminate against any citizen on grounds 
only of religion, race, caste, sex, place of birth or any of them,' while 15 (2) prohibits 
discrimination even by the private sector where this concerns public accommodation or 
funds provided by a state bursary. Besides, equal opportunity in all spheres of public 
employment is guaranteed.226 
Article 17 specifically addresses the problem of untouchability, a practice commonly found 
in pre-independent India which is part of a religion-based caste system. It states that 
untouchability be abolished, and its practice in any fonn is forbidden. The enforcement of 
any disability arising out of untouchability shall be an offence punishable in accordance 
220 AA Engineer, Secularism in India - PartlJ < http://www.csss-isla.com!archive.php> accessed 30 
November 2006. 
m Census ofIndia 2001, 'Data on Religion' <http://www.censusindia.netlreligiondatalindex.html> accessed 
18 October 2006. 
222 Part III of the Indian Constitution. 
223 Part IV of the Indian Constitution. 
224 PB Gajendragadkar, The Constitution of India: Its Philosophy and Basic Postulates (OUP. Oxford 1969) 
19 
225 RCS Sarkar. The Constitution of India (National, New Delhi 1991) 26. 
226 Indian Constitution art 16. 
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with law. Although the courts have taken steps to implement the provisions of the 
Constitution when religious belief interfered with the efforts to end untouchability,:!:!7 
crimes of such nature are reported every day. 
Though Articles 15-17 have clear implications for the rights of members of minorities, the 
framers considered them insufficient to protect them. So, Articles 25- 30 were included to 
more specifically address the freedom of religion and rights of minorities. 
Article 25228 guarantees to every person freedom of conscience and the right to freely 
profess, practise, and propagate any religion. Article 26229 flows from Article 25 and deals 
with the freedom of every religious denomination to establish and maintain institutions for 
religious and charitable purposes and to manage its own affairs in matters of religion. 
Articles 25 and 26 can be described as the nucleus of the doctrine of religious freedom. 
Though the Constitution guarantees freedom of religion, the state can exercise its power 
within the restrictions imposed by the respective articles to carry on its secular activities.23o 
While freedom of conscience is absolute, freedom of practice is subject to restrictions such 
as maintenance of public order, morality and health, and provisions guaranteeing other 
227 Shastri Yagnapurushdasji v Muldas Bhundaras Vaishya AIR 1966 SC 1119. 
228 Indian Constitution art 25: that Freedom of conscience and free profession, practice and propagation of 
religion -
(1) Subject to public order, morality and health and to the other provisions of this Part (part III - Fundamental 
Rights), all Persons are equally entitled to freedom of conscience and the right to freely profess, practice and 
propagate religion. 
(2) Nothing in this article shall affect the operation of any existing law or prevent the State from making any 
law - (a) regulating or restricting any economic, financial, political or other secular activity which may be 
associated with religious practice; (b) providing for social welfare and reform or the throwing open of Hindu 
religious institutions of a public character to all classes and sections of Hindus. 
Explanation I: The wearing and carrying of Kirpans shall be deemed to be included in the profession of the 
Sikh religion. Explanation II: In sub-clause (b) of clause (2), the reference to Hindus shall be construed as 
including a reference to persons professing the Sikh, Jaina or Buddhist religion, and the reference to Hindu 
religious institutions shall be construed accordingly. 
229 Indian Constitution art 26: Freedom to manage religious affairs:- Subject to public order. morality and 
health, every religious denomination or any section thereof shall have the right -
(a) to establish and maintain institutions for religious and charitable purpose; 
(b) to manage its own affairs in matters of religion: 
(c) to own and acquire movable and immovable property; and 
(d) to administer such property in accordance with law. 
230 ReS Sarkar, rhe Constitution of India (National, New Delhi 1991) 136. 
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basic rightS.231 In case of any conflict between religious rights and their restrictions, 
religion has to yield. It should be noted that in many cases,232 the Supreme Court gives 
priority to public order over freedom of religion. These restrictions play a crucial role in 
shaping the practice of the religion. For instance, one cannot claim an absolute right to hold 
a religious gathering or a procession and such a right will have to be regulated by the state 
in the interest of maintaining public order. In addition, there cannot be any freedom of 
religion insofar as it encroaches on the exercise of other Fundamental Rights, such as the 
right to equality or the right to speech and expression or to the right to personal liberty. 
The expressions 'religion' and 'matters of religion' used in Articles 25 and 26 have not 
been defined in the Constitution although several suits have sought to give a definition to 
these expressions. In one such case, the Supreme Court gave a wide meaning to the word 
'religion' and held that a person has a right to practice and propagate not only matters of 
faith and belief but also rituals and observances, ceremonies and modes of worship which 
are regarded as integral parts of religion.233 Therefore the state cannot interfere with any 
practice which is essentially religious.234 This division is very difficult to apply in the 
Indian situation since religious and secular practices are so entwined in Hinduism and 
Islam. Religious practices are essential to one's faith, but in India, it is the courts who are 
the final arbiters of what constitutes essential practice.235 
Article 27236 provides that no person shall be compelled to pay taxes for the promotion or 
maintenance of any particular religion. Article 28 prohibits any religious instruction in 
state-owned educational institutions. However, although it is not totally prohibited in other 
educational institutions, no person can be compelled to participate without their consent. 
231 SP Sathe, Judicial Activism in India (OUP, New Delhi 2002) 167. 
232 Virendra v State of Punjab AIR 1957 SC 896; Dalbir v State of Punjab AIR 1962 SC 1106; 
Madhu Limaye v State of Punjab AIR 1962 SC 1106. 
233 Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowment v Lakshmindra 1954 SCR 1005; Ratilal v State of Bombay 
1954 SCR 1005; Durgah Committee v Muldas AIR 1966 SC 1119. 1127. 
234 Saifuddin v State of Bombay AIR 1962 SC 853. 
23S Quareshi v State of Bihar 1959 SCR 629; Mittal v Union of India AIR 1983 SC 1.. . . 
236 Indian Constitution art 27: Freedom as to payment of taxes for promotion of any partIcular religion: No 
person shall be compelled to pay any taxes, the proceeds of which are specifically appropriated in payment of 
expenses for the promotion or maintenance of any particular religion or religious denomination. 
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Articles 29 and 30 guarantee certain cultural and educational rights to not only religious 
minorities, but also the cultural and linguistic minorities. 
These special provisions guaranteeing religious rights for minorities were disputed as they 
contradict the constitutional goal of secularism. Pylee observes that the framers decided 
that the meaning of secularism, as envisaged by the Constitution, did not separate religion 
from the state, rather the state provided enough protection which adds a sense of religious 
harmony.237 Therefore, the Constitution has set out specific provisions which endeavour to 
make India a more equal and secular state, but it is the task of the Indian judiciary to apply 
those constitutional provisions. 
2.4.4.3. Criminal law and protection of sacred site 
The Indian Penal Code 1973 defines a range of crimes including those relating to matters of 
religion. Under the Constitution, criminal jurisdiction belongs concurrently to the union 
government and to the states. Existing laws on crime prevention and punishment are 
embodied in two principal statutes: the Indian Penal Code (IPC) of 1860 and CrPC of 1973. 
These statutes cannot be altered since they take precedence over state legislations. 
Constitutional guarantees of protection to the accused238 were embodied in the CrPC. 
Chapter XV of the Indian Penal Code explains the offences relating to religion.239 These 
provisions define the scope, characteristics, and essence of these offences. According to the 
IPC section 295/40 whoever destroys, damages or defiles any place of worship, with the 
intention of insulting any person or group, shall be punished under die law. Section 295A241 
states that whoever, with deliberate and malicious intention of outraging the religious 
feelings of any class of citizen of India, by words/42 either spoken or written, or by signs, 
237 MV Pylee, India's Constitution (Asia Publishing House, Bombay 1967) 120. 
238 Indian Constitution art 20 and 22. 
239 Indian Penal Code (Act No 45 of 1860) ss 295-98. 
240 IPC s 295: whoever destroys, damages or defiles any place of worship. with the intention of insulting any 
person of group. or any object held sacred by any class of persons with the intention of t,hereby insulting ~he 
religion of any class of persons ... shall be punished with imprisonment of either descriptIOn for a term which 
may extend to two years. or with fine, or with both·. 
241 Instituted by Act 25 of 1927 s 2. 
242 Substituted by Act 41 of 1961 s 3 for 'certain words'. 
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by visible representations or otherwise, insults or attempts to insult the religion or the 
religious beliefs of that class, shall be punished.243 
It is very important to establish that malice is one of the important factors of the offence 
under section 295A and it is necessary for the prosecution to establish that element by 
evidence. If a person with intent offends the religious faith of others, it would be difficult to 
hold that hislher act was done bona fide and without malice.244 The malicious intention has 
to be ascertained primarily from the language used by the accused. The truth of the 
allegations cannot be an effective defence to a charge under this section.245 Having regard 
to the ingredients of the offence created by section 295A, there cannot be any possibility of 
those laws being applied for a purpose not sanctioned by the Constitution.246 
According to section 296, whoever voluntarily causes disturbance. to any assembly lawfully 
engaged in the performance of religious worship, or religious ceremonies, shall be punished 
with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to one year, or with 
fine, or with both. According to section 297, whoever with the intention of wounding the 
feelings of any person, or of insulting the religion of any person, ... commits any trespass 
in any place of worship or on any place of sculpture, any place set apart for the 
performance of funeral rites or as a depository for the remains of the dead, or offers any 
indignity to any human corpse, or causes disturbance to any person assembled for the 
performance of funeral ceremonies, shall be punished. 
Section 298 states that whoever, with the deliberate intention of wounding the religious 
feelings of any person, utters any word or makes any sound in the hearing of that person or 
makes any gesture in the sight of that person or places any object in the sight of that person, 
shall be punished. 
243 Substituted by Act 41 of 1961 s 3 for 'two years'. 
1« In Re P Ramaswamy (1962) 2 Criminal Law Journal 146 Madras. 
245 State of Mysore v Henry Rodrigues (1962) 2 Criminal Law Journal 564 Mysore. 
246 Ranjit Lal Modi v Stale of Ultar Pradesh AIR 1957 SC 620 Criminal law Journal 1306. 
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The above analysis suggests that there are laws to guarantee the freedom of religion and for 
protecting sacred sites of religious communities. Moreover, union government and state 
governments are allowed to adopt new legislations if the situation warrants it. 
2.S. Indian Social and Cultural Context 
India enjoys a rich cultural diversity. The land of India spans an area of 3,287,263 square 
kilometres, which includes dry desert areas, evergreen forests, snowy Himalayas, and also a 
long coast, and fertile plains. The total population of India on 1 March 2001 stood at 
1,027,015,247 comprising approximately one-sixth of the world's population. With this, 
India became only the second country in the world, after China, to cross the one billion 
mark. 247 This population is remarkably diverse, having more than two thousand ethnic 
groups. Almost 40 percent of Indians are younger than 15 years of age.248 More than 70 
percent of the people live in more than 550,000 villages, and the remainder in more than 
200 towns and cities.249 
The government has recognized 22 languages as officia1.25o Hindi is the official language of 
the union251 and the most widely spoken. India also has the third largest number of English 
speakers in the world next to the USA and the UK.252 In India, the total literacy rate is 
estimated as 65.38 percent.253 
247 Government of India, 'Provisional Population of India 2001' 
<http://www.censusindia.netlresults/resultsmain.html> accessed 20 November 2006. 
248 Government of India, 'India at a Glance: Broad Age Groups' <http://www.censusindia.netlbroad.html> 
accessed 26 November 2006. 
249 Government of India, 'India at a Glance: Administrative Divisions' 
<http://www.censusindia.netlbroad.html> accessed 26 November 2006. 
2S0 Eighth Schedule of the Indian Constitution contains the list of official languages. Until 1992, only 18 
languages were recognized as official languages and through the Constitution (Ninety-second Amendment) 
Act 2003 four more languages were added in the list. http://indiacode.nic.in/coiweb/amend/amend92.htm> 
accessed 24 November 2006. 
2S1 Indian Constitution art 343: The official language of the Union shall be Hindi in Devanagari script. 
252 Annika Hohenthal, 'English in India - and Who Speaks English to Whom and When' (Department of 
English, University of Turku, Finland) <http://www.thecore.nus.edu.sglpostlindialhohenthaIl5.2.html> 
accessed 21 November 2006. See also, BB Kachru, The Alchemy of English: The Spread, Functions and 
Models of Non-native Englishes (English in the International Context Series. Pergamon Institute of English. 
Oxford 1986). 
2S) Government of India. 'Census of India 200 I: Number of Literates and Literary Rate by sex' 
<http://www.censusindia.netlt_00_006.html> accessed 20 November 2006. 
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Every world religion is represented in India. Although 82 percent of the people are Hindus, 
India is also home to the third-largest Muslim population in the world (13.1 %) behind 
Indonesia and Pakistan. India contains the majority of the world's Zorastrians (0.01 %) and 
other religious groups include Christians (2.3%), Sikhs (1.94%), Buddhists (0.76%), Jains 
(0.40%), Jews and Bahais?54 Apart from these established religions, approximately 8% of 
the population is indigenous people255 who have their own religious practices. These 
people, known as 'tribals', have their own gods, their own rituals and taboos. The tribals 
have a 'culture' and though they are not literate, they have a rich oral culture.256 
Religion, caste, and language are major determinants of social and political organization in 
India today. Particularly, the caste system reflects Indian occupational and socio-religiously 
defined hierarchies. Despite economic modernization and laws countering discrimination 
against the lower end of the class structure, the caste system remains an important source of 
social identification for most Hindus and many non-Hindus as well. It is this extremely 
wide and often volatile diversity of culture within India which has created great difficulties 
in forging coherent values and traditions that could be defined in the law. This diversity has 
been blended into and is reflected by India's legal structure.257 
Religious and cultural diversity in India underscores the relationships between various faith 
communities, and sacred sites are a key element of those relationships. The Ayodhya 
dispute is a sacred site issue based on the allegations of some militant Hindu organisations 
that the Muslims built Babri Masjid over what was formerly a temple of the Hindu god 
Ram. For the purpose of our case study, it is pertinent to understand the religious 
characteristics of Hinduism and Islam, the manner in which these religions established 
2S4 Government of India, 'Census of India 200 I: Data on Religion' 
<http://www.censusindia.netlreligiondatalindex.html> accessed 20 November 2006. 
2S5 Government of India, 'India at a Glance: Scheduled Cates & Scheduled Tribes Population' 
<http://www.censusindia.netiscst.htm1> accessed 21 November 2006. . 
256 S J8Oah, The Tribals o/India: Through the Lens o/Sunil Janah (OUP, Calcutta 1993) 13. For a detailed 
study, see, Virginius Xaxa, 'Tribes in India' in Veena Das (ed), The Oxford India Companion to Sociology 
and Social Anthropology (OUP. New Delhi 2(03) 373-408. . 
257 AM Smith, 'Making Itselfat Home: Understanding Foreign Law in Domestic Jurisprudence: The Indian 
Case' (2005) 24 Berkeley J Int'l L 218. 232. 
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sacred sites, and also their central beliefs, all of which will be analysed in the ensuing 
section. 
2.S.1. Hinduism in India 
Th d 'H' d· ,. E 1· h 258 e wor In ulsm In ng IS was fIrst used in 1829. Hinduism denotes a complex 
religious tradition. It has evolved over thousands of years. Today it has more than 800 
million adherents in India and several million in the Diaspora. Hinduism also stands for the 
civilization of the inhabitants of Hindustan which literally means the land surrounding the 
Indus River, referred to by the ancient Persians as Hindu.259 Hinduism is a mosaic of many 
different beliefs and practices, values and morals, culminating in a way of life.260 Although 
Hinduism is made up of a vast number of cults and sects, Saivic,261 Vaishnavite262 and 
Sakthl63 worship are three prominent sects whose followers are found throughout India. It 
is an ethnic religion of a single cultural unit which does not try to attract converts from 
outside the unit. 264 
Hinduism does not conform to the idea of a religion in the western sense since it has no 
founder, nor is it prophetic. It is not governed by any particular creed or dogma, and the 
concept of one god is not central to it. There is no specific scripture or work regarded as 
being uniquely authoritative. Also, it is not sustained by any ecclesiastical organization.265 
However, from the beginning of the 20th century, the Sangh Parivar projects a monolithic 
religious version of Hinduism. Initially this idea was promoted by members of upper castes, 
the Brahmin community. Thapar names this Brahminic Hinduism as 'syndicated 
Hinduism' .266 According to Gail Omvedt, the material base of the Brahminic Hinduism is 
2S8 JS Hawley, 'Naming Hinduism' (Summer 1991) 15 The Wilson Quarterly 20, 22. 
2S9 H Elgood, Hinduism and the Religious Arts (Cassell, London 1999) 2. 
260 AR Choudhury, 'Hinduism' in J Holm and J Bowker (eels), Sacred Place (Pinter, London 1994) 62. 
261 Shiva is one of the three major gods of Hinduism. The followers of Shiva are known as Saivic sect. 
262 Another major god in Hinduism is Vishnu. The followers of Vishnu are known as Vaishnava sect. 
263 Sakthi is a major female goddess in Hinduism. The followers of Sakthi are known as Saktha sect. 
264 R Colledge. Mastering World Religions, (Macmillan, London 1999) 155. 
26S Ibid 156. 
266 Romila Thapar argues that the Sangh Parivar propagates 'syndicated Hinduism' and claims to be re-
establishing the Hinduism of pre-modem times; in fact it is only re-establishing its Brahminic (upper caste 
dominance) system and in the process distorting the historical and cultural dimensions of indigenous religions 
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the caste structure of Indian society.267 By maintaining the caste system, the Sangh Parivar 
attempts to construct Hinduism as a homogeneous religion. The evolution of nationalist 
Hinduism has mainly been defined in opposition to the Muslim 'other' .268 This will assist in 
understanding the confrontation between a section of Hindus and the Muslims in the 
Ayodhya dispute. 
To provide a positivist, legal answer to 'who is a Hindu', the Indian Constitution states 
'the reference to Hindus shall be construed as including a reference to persons professing 
the Sikh, Jain, or Buddhist religion, and the reference to Hindu religious institutions shall 
be construed accordingly' .269 Baird claims that this explanation is a constitutional 
admission of two things. Firstly, it admits that there is a difference between the "Hindu 
religion" and "Hindu" as a legal category. Secondly, it suggests that the Sikh, Buddhist, or 
Jain are distinguishable from "Hinduism" as a religion, but that before the law they are to 
be embraced within the category of "Hindu".27o There was no self-evident and universally 
acceptable answer but only multiple and overlapping ones.271 
Hindu Acts, such as the Hindu Succession Act of 1956, the Hindu Marriage Act,272 the 
Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act,273 and the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Acr74 
use almost identical language. These Acts make it clear that the term 'Hindu' means that 
one could be an atheist, reject caste laws, reject the Vedas (Sacred Books of most of the 
Hindus), renounce Hinduism as a religion and still be considered a 'Hindu' for legal 
and divesting them of the nuances and variety which was a major source of their enrichment. See, R Thapar. 
Cultural pasts: Essays in Early Indian History (OUP, New Delhi 2000). 
267 Gail Omvedt, Dalit Visions (Tract for the times 8, Orient Longman, New Delhi 1995) 7-12. 
268 Ram Puniyani, Hindu Extreme Right-Wing Groups: Ideology & Consequences (Media House, Delhi 2004) 
23. 
269 Explanation II of Article 25 [2] [b] in the Indian Constitution. .. . 
270 RD Baird, 'On Defining 'Hinduism' as a Religious and Legal Category' in RD Baird (ed). ReligIOn and 
Law in Independent India (Manohar. New Delhi 1993) 41-2. .. 
271 A Vanaik. Communalism Contested: Religion. Modernity and Secularism (Vlstaar. Delhi 1997) 150. 
272 Hindu Marriage Act of 1955 [Act No 25, dated 18 May 1955] s 2. 
273 Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act of 1956 [Act No 78, dated 21 December 1956] s 2. 
274 Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act of 1956 [Act No 32, dated 25 August 1956] s 3. 
92 
purposes?7S According to Tahir Mahmood, 'Hindu law is not the law of Hindus. Hindus are 
only one of those communities governed by this law'.276 
From the above presentation, one can understand that 'Hinduism' is an umbrella term 
which refers to various sects, beliefs and practices of the Indian subcontinent, and that this 
pluralism is recognised by the Indian legal system itself. 
2.S.1.1. History and Characteristics of Hinduism 
As far as Hinduism is concerned, the popular belief among Hindus is that it has no origin 
and it was there from the beginning of the world. The ten centuries from about 500 Be to 
500 AD are the period of classical Hinduism called the Epic period. Two great epics, the 
Ramayana277 and Mahabharathd 78 are rich encyclopaedic sources of this period. During 
this period the Dharma Shastras,279 which define the structure of Hindu society and how 
Hindus should live within that structure were codified. However, the essential concept was 
Varnashrama Dharma280 that interprets the four castes of society. This period also gave 
rise to new forms of worship, often performed in front of an image in a temple.281 
Two gods, Vishnu and Shiva became pre-eminent during this period although many other 
gods were also worshipped. In North India, Vishnu emerged as a benevolent god, who 
periodically descends to the world in various forms to restore righteousness and there are 
believed to be ten such incarnations. The most important incarnations in terms of devotion 
are Krishna and Rama. According to the Hindu belief, Rama, a prince, ruled Ayodhya, 
restored righteousness to the earth by destroying the king Ravana282 who had abducted his 
:m RD Baird, 'On Defining "Hinduism" as a Religious and Legal Category' in RD Baird (ed), Religion and 
Law in Independent India (Manohar, New Delhi 1993) 41-2. 
276 T Mahmood, Studies in Hindu law (2nd edn Law Book Co, Allahabad 1986) xlii; JDM Derrett. 
Introduction to Modem Hindu Law (OUP, Bombay 1963) 18-21. 
277 Ramayana narrates about Hindu god Ram and his rule in Ayodhya. 
278 Mahabharatha narrates the war between Gallravas and Pandavas and Lord Krishna's role in the war. 
279 Dharma Shastra is the "science of dharma" and is a set of texts which teach the eternal immutable dhanna 
found in the Vedas. Dharma means • the principle of law that orders the universe'. 
<http://philtar.ucsm.ac.uklencyclopedialhindulascetic/dhanna.html> accessed 20 November 2006. 
280 Varnashrama Dharma explains the four castes in Indian society. 
281 H Elgood, Hinduism and the Religious Arts (Cassell, London 1999) 5-8 
282 Ravana, a king. ruled Sri Lanka according to the epic Ramayana. 
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wlie Ita. evotlon to Rama found powerful expression in the Ramacarithamanas of 
Tulsidas284 and the cult of Rama became popular in North India from the eighteenth 
century, especially in the state of Uttar Pradesh.285 
There is an abundance of beliefs and teachings in Hinduism but only four major beliefs, 
Samsara,286 Karma,287 Dharm~88 and Varunadharma,289 command universal 
acceptance.290 Although Hindus believe in thirty-three million deities, belief in Brahman, 
the Supreme Being, or Absolute One, is also found among many.291 Hindus essentially 
believe in rebirth and the Law of Karma, which refers to a system of cause and effect that 
may span several lifetimes. 292 
2.S.1.2. Worship in temples and establishing Tirtha293 
F or the Hindus, India is a sacred land. Places that are considered sacred are often closely 
associated with religious worship. Sacred sites, which abound in Hindu India, are not 
necessarily confined to religious buildings alone, but can also be discovered in the context 
of worship of the nature of the ancient Hindu.294 Most of the prominent sacred sites are 
associated with legends and myths. For example, Ayodhya is considered by Hindus as the 
birthplace of Ram, who is believed to be an incarnation of the god Vishnu295. 
283 Sila is wife of Rama. 
284 Tulsidas wrote Ramacarilhamanas, story about Rama and his rule, in the sixteenth century. 
285 Uttar Pradesh is a North Indian State where Ayodhya is situated. 
286 Samsara means the cycle of birth and rebirth. 
287 Karma means action; the law of causation applied to the moral realm showing that all actions have 
inevitable moral consequences in this life or the next. 
288 Dharma means righteousness, duty, law; the path which a man should follow on accordance with his 
nature and his station in life; one of the four ends of man. 
289 Varunadharma means the duties and obligations of the four social orders; also used in the sense of the 
body of rules governing the caste system. 
290 DS Sharma, 'The Nature and History of Hinduism' in KW Morgan, (ed), The Religion of the Hindus (The 
Ronald Press Company, New York 1953) 13-23. . 
291 S Weightman, 'Hinduism' in JR Hinnells, (ed), The New Penguin Handbook of Living Religions (Penguin 
Books, London 1997) 283. Weightman observes that Hindus see this Brahman in their favourite gods which 
may include people of great sanctity, in animals such as the cow, in certain trees, rivers and mountains, and in 
countless sacred sites. 
292 V Narayanan, Understanding Hinduism (Duncan Baird, London 2004) 67-91. 
29) Tirtha literally means 'ford or place of crossing'. Here it is used in the sense of place of pilgrimage which 
is conceived by the Hindus as a place of crossing from this birth to another birth. 
294 AR Choudhury, 'Hinduism' in J Holm and J Bowker (eds), Sacred Place (Pinter, London 1994) 62. 
195 See n 262, below. 
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Temples play a pivotal role because they perform a vital socio-religious purpose within 
Hindu society. Temples are built at sacred places to gain the full benefit of resident 
auspicious deities. When the temple is completed and consecrated, the potential sacredness 
of the site manifests itself.296 
The Hindu term for a temple is 'Mandir' which literally means 'an abode', 'a dwelling 
place' wherein the deity resides. A temple is a place where devotees come to pay their 
homage to the deity at hislher home at any time of the day they wish.297 For the Hindus, 
there are four important centres of worship. They are home-shrines, roadside shrines, big 
temples and places of pilgrimage. Though worship in temples is a widely known and 
accepted practice, it is wholly optional. Hindus do not need to go to temples because the 
home-shrine is considered the most sacred site for a Hindu family.298 
Bhardwaj observes that Hindu sacred sites are not the focal points for the 'propagation' of 
religious ideas, per se, because they are purely sacred foci without being organisational 
centres.299 The Hindu temples have a public purpose too. Asserting the public nature of the 
temples, justices in the Supreme Court of India stated that the participation of the members 
of the public in the Darshan300 in the temple, and in the daily acts of worship, or in the 
elaborations of festival occasions may be a very important factor to consider in determining 
the character of the temple.30t When a dispute arose as to whether a temple was public or 
private in nature, the court concluded that the institution in the suit will be a temple if two 
conditions are satisfied. The first condition is that it is a place of public religious worship 
and the other is that it is dedicated to, or is for the benefit of, or is used as of right by, the 
Hindu community, or any section thereof, as a place of religious worship.302 
296 G Michael, The Hindu Temple: An Introduction to its Meaning and Forms (Harper & Row, New York 
1977) 68. 
297 AR Choudhury 'Hinduism' in J Holm and J Bowker (eds), Sacred Place (Pinter, London 1994) 77. 
298 Ibid 84-5. 
299 SM Bhardwaj, Hindu Places of Pilgrimage in India (University of California Press, London 1983) 20 I. 
300 Darshan is the act of seeing the enshrined deity in the temple or in front of any sacred image. 
301 Shri GovindlalJi and Others v Stale of Rajasthan AIR 1963 SC 1638. 
302 PF Sadavarthy v Commissionn' of H R & C E 1963, SC 510. 
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As regards the place of pilgrimage or tirtha, the sacred sites are seen as a "port of transit", a 
place from where human beings may "cross over" the ocean of life and death.303 In fact, 
many temples and sacred sites are also located near the sea, a lake, a river, or a spring. For 
instance, Ayodhya is situated on the banks of the river Sarayu.304 In Hinduism, pilgrimage 
is not a basic duty but it is an optional practice which is exercised by many Hindus,305 
explaining why there are many pilgrim centres all over India. So, pilgrimages, together with 
the ceremonial bathing in sacred rivers or temple tanks are considered symbolic of the 
individual soul's pilgrimage to the Supreme One and of its purification from all sins.306 It is 
realisation of the sanctity of a place that motivates the building of a temple, which becomes 
the focus of religious activities, and also a meeting place for devotees. In its turn the temple 
helps to attract pilgrims from far and wide, making the region into a thriving tirtha.307 From 
the beginning of the eighteenth century, Ayodhya became an important pilgrim centre.30S 
2.5.1.3. Growth of Hindu communalism 
To understand the Ayodhya dispute, it is essential to know about the Hindu communal 
organisations in India. From the beginning of the 1980s, one can see the rise of Hindutva309 
movements urging India to be the land of the Hindus. The construction of Hindutva is to be 
seen against the backdrop of the emergence of Hinduism as a homogenous religion at the 
end of the nineteenth century. Multiple religious revivalist movements ranging from the 
Arya Sarna} to the Hindu Mahasabha emerged as the champions of the Hindus. Its political 
translation began mainly with BG Tilak (1856-1920) who used Hindu festivals to organise 
303 For a pious Hindu, to live in such places, or to undertake a pilgrimage to one of them, is enough to destroy 
one's sins and assist in the attainment of liberation from the cycle of life, death and rebirth. See, AE Morinis, 
Pilgrimage in the Hindu Tradition: A case-study of West Bengal (OUP, Delhi 1984) 4-46. 
304 H Elgood, Hinduism and the Religious Arts (Cassell, London 1999) 95. 
30S The practice of pilgrimage is one activity traditional in every part of India. The goal of pilgrimage is 
mostly to do with healing, and even if this is not achieved people feel improved in the process. SM Bhardwaj. 
Hindu Places of Pilgrimage in India (University of California Press, London 1983) 102. 
306 DS Sharma, 'The Nature and History of Hinduism' in KW Morgan (ed), The Religion of the Hindus (The 
Ronald Press Company. New York 1953) 25. 
307 AR Choudhury 'Hinduism' in J Holm and J Bowker (eds), Sacred Place (Pinter, London 1994) 69. 
308 RS Shamla and others, 'Ramjanmabhumi- Babri Masjid: A Historians' Report to the Nation' in AG 
Noornni, Babri Masjid Question 1528-2003 (Tulika Books, New Delhi 2003) Vol I, 45-6. 
309 Hindutl'Q means 'politics of the Hindu elite, constructed around upper caste Hinduism, asserting India to 
be the land of the Hindus, where Muslims, Christians and others are foreign races'. R Puniyani. Hindu 
Extreme Right-Wing Groups: Ideology and Consequences (South Asian History Academic Papers. Leicester 
2002) 44. 
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the Hindus, and anti-Muslim rhetoric was consistently used.3JO At the same time, Ram was 
popularised as a symbol of moral power, along with Hanuman (a monkey god) symbolising 
masculine strength. The first exponent of Hindutva was V D Savarkar (1883-1966) who 
mixed Brahminic Hinduism311 with nationalism reflecting the interests of upper castes. His 
work on Hindutvcl 12 became and remains the basic text defining this political concept, and 
influenced subsequent Hindu militant organisations.313 According to Savarkar, only those 
who regard India as their motherland and holy land are truly Hindu and this is interpreted 
such that Christians and Muslims, whose holy places are in Jerusalem and Mecca, are not 
equal with the Hindus.314 
Hindu militant organisations together are known as the Sangh Parivar, the 'family of the 
Hindu national organizations,.315 In 1925, Hedgewar floated the organization Rastriya 
Swayam Sevak Sangh (RSS - National Volunteer Corps), on the holy day of Vijaya Dasami 
(the triumphant tenth day) in Nagpur, India. The RSS began as an explicitly upper-caste 
Hindu organization, working for the achievement of a Hindu nation. This is a parent 
organisation for all other Hindu militant organisations. 
In reaction to the growth of communism in certain areas of India, RSS started its first 
organisation in July 1948 Akhil Bharatiya Vidyarthi Parish ad (ABVP - All India Students 
Organization). Among the first components of the Sangh Parivar was a political party. 
Until the 1950s, the RSS leaders had all preferred to remain aloof from politics, since they 
claimed to be a cultural organisation. After 1950, the RSS leaders wanted to reach out into 
politics. Hence Bharatiya Jana Sangh (BJS) was established just before the first general 
election in 1951. 
310 Ram Puniyani, Hindu Extreme Right-Wing Groups: Jde%gy & Consequences (Media House, Delhi 2004) 
23. 
311 Brahminic Hinduism is dominated by the upper caste Hindus. 
312 VD Savarkar, Hindutva: Who is a Hindu? (Swatantrayaveer Savarkar Rashtriya Smarak., Mumbai 1999) 
313 WK Andersen and SD Damle, The Brotherhood in Saffron: The Rastriya Swayamsevak and Hindu 
Revivalism (Vistaar, Delhi 1987) 33. 
314 Ram Puniyani. Hindu Extreme Right-Wing Groups: Ide%gy & Consequences (Media House, Delhi 2004) 
25-6. 
lIS Sangh means organizations and Parivar means family. Sangh Parivar means 'Family of Hindu Nationalist 
Organizations' which is an umbrella organization of Hindu militant groups. 
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In 1952, the Vanavasi Kalyan Ashram (VKA - Centre for Tribal Welfare), was founded to 
counter the growing influence of the Christian missionaries among the tribal communities. 
The main objective of the VKA was to reconvert those who had become Christians.316 In 
1955, another component of the Sangh Parivar, the Bharatiya Mazdoor Sangh (BMS), a 
trade union, was founded to check the growth of 'leftist' labour unions. The BMS became 
the largest labour union and in 2000 it had about 3400 unions with a 4.5 million 
membership across the country.317 
The major component of Sangh Parivar, which is vital for our case study, Vishwa Hindu 
Parishad (VHP) was founded in 1964.318 In Hinduism, there existed several sects which 
represented innumerable rival schools of thought and this division was perceived as the root 
causes for the weaknesses of Hinduism. The VHP was therefore created to endow 
Hinduism with a church-like centralized structure and to use this new ecclesiastical 
apparatus to counter Christian proselyte activities. VHP worked in close association with 
former rulers, businessmen, respectable politicians and the religious heads of several Hindu 
sects and monasteries. From 1984, VHP conducted campaigns to liberate sacred sites where 
Muslim mosques were built in the previous centuries. Particularly, they took up the Babri 
Masjid -Ramjanmabhumi dispute and claimed the ownership of it to build a Ram temple in 
its place. For this purpose, in 1986, VHP created a trained youth-wing called Bajrang Dal, 
which was involved in violent activities before and after the demolition of the Babri 
mosque in 1992. 
In 1980, the political party BJS became Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and contested 
elections. In the 1990s BJP became the largest party in the Parliament and formed the 
government in 1998 with the support of other small parties. Now, the BJP is the main 
opposition party in Indian political life. Together these Hindu militant organisations are 
316 Vanvasi kalian Parishad <http://vanvasikalyanparishad.orglhome.hbn> accessed 16 November 200S. 
317Bharatiya Mazdoor Sangh <http://www.bms.org.in/home.htm> accessed 16 November 200S. 
318 The Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP) was established in 29/30 August 1964 under the auspices of the RSS 
as a reaction to the activities of the Christian Missionaries. See, SS Apte. 'Why Vishwa Hindu Parishad' 
Orgal1iser (New Delhi, Diwali Special Issue 1964) IS. Vishwa Hindu Parishad <http:;/www.\,hp.orgl> 
accessed 17 November 200S. 
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called'Sangh Parivar' .319 Outside the Sangh Parivar, Shiv Sena (Anny of Shivaji, a Hindu 
King who ruled Maharastra), is a major militant organization and a political party. These 
organizations campaign for declaring India as a Hindu state and to be ruled by a Hindu 
Constitution. 
To recapitulate, Hinduism is very eclectic and has been able to accommodate various 
beliefs and practices for the past thousands of years. Although there is a lack of an 
ecclesiastical authority, the Hindu moral code and basic beliefs in Dharma, help the Hindu 
community to move forward as a living religion. Central to the faith have been the temples, 
which played a major role in keeping the Hindu community together for so long. Though 
worship for a Hindu is a private affair, temples are significant in a Hindu's life for his 
spiritual as well as his social life. Pilgrimage to temples built upon sacred sites like 
Ayodhya, Kasi, Madura, to mention a few, gain prime importance for every Hindu for their 
liberation from rebirth. These sacred sites have become tools for communal organisations 
to mobilise the majority Hindus to declare India as a Hindu State. 
2.5.2. Islam in India 
Islam is both a religion and a complete way of life for a fifth of the world's population.32o 
Islam literally means 'submission' (to God), in Arabic. Islam is a religious faith which sets 
out a codified way of living for its adherents in areas such as personal hygiene, business, 
food, dress, family life, and civil and criminallaw.321 Muslims claim that Islam is not a new 
religion, but is the same truth that Allah revealed through all his prophets to every people 
from the time of the first prophet Adam322 onwards. Although the whole world is 
considered as a place of worship, Islam has established its own sacred sites. This section 
analyses the characteristic of Islam, its sacred sites and worship. 
319 C Jaffrelot. The Sangh Parivar: A Reader (OUP. New Delhi 2005) 1-22. 
320 'Islam _ Facts One Must Know' <http://www.alinaam.org.za!library/islamf.htm> accessed 20 November 
2006. 
321 JR Hinnells, Living Religions (Penguin books, London 1997) 162. . 
322 Muslims, Jews and Christians believe that Adam and Eve were the first family in the human history. 
99 
2.S.2.1. History and Characteristics of Islam 
Though belief in one God was known and flourished in the Arabian Peninsula for centuries , 
due to the teachings of Judaism and Christianity, the inhabitants of Mecca and the 
surrounding areas were followers of polytheism. In the sixth century, Mecca became a 
prosperous commercial centre, which resulted in the unequal distribution of wealth amongst 
a people which previously had lived according to the traditional system of Arab tribal 
values. It was during this time and in this social environment that the Prophet Muhammad 
preached the message of the Quran, which formed the basis of Islam, calling all to return to 
the worship of the one true god and a socially just society. 323 
Fearing the economIc repercussIons of Muhammad's preaching against the deities 
worshipped by the pilgrims at Mecca's central shrine, the Kaba, the leading families of the 
city persecuted Muhammad and his followers. In 622 AD, Muhammad and his followers 
made the hijrah324 to Medina where within the short period of ten years, Muhammad, the 
religious leader of a small band of emigrants, rose to become the political and religious 
leader of virtually all of central and western Arabia.325 
After Muhammad's death in 632 AD, the political and spiritual leadership of the Muslim 
community was assumed by a succession of caliphs326 or 'deputies' of the prophet, who 
ruled Islam in all aspects, except as prophet. After the death of the fourth caliph, Ali327 (661 
AD), the Muslim community split, the majority later being called Sunnis. 328 The largest 
minority group, the Shias, take their name from their identification as the 'party of Ali,.329 
32J JL Esposito, Whal Everyone Needs 10 Know aboullSLAM (OUP, Oxford 2002) 7. 
J24 In 622 AD, the Muslim year during which the Hijra occurred was designated the first year of the Islamic 
calendar by Umar in 638. (anno hegirae = 'in the year of the hijra'). Hijrah means 'migration'. 
J25 JR Hinnells, Living Religions (Penguin books, London 1997) 166-67. 
J26 The first caliph was Abu Baker who served from 632-634. The second Caliph was Umar who was 
considered one of the greatest military leaders and extended the frontiers of Islam beyond Egypt. The third 
Caliph was Ulman and during his period the Quran was collected and put into an authorized recession, thus 
preserving intact the precious message and averting serious dissensions among Muslim groups. 
127 Ali was Muhammad's cousin and son-in law. 
328 JR Hinnells, Living Religions (Penguin books. London 1997) 167. 
329 Ibid 206. 
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Islam came to India when Muslims arrived in Sindh330 in 712, Punjab in 1027 and Delhi in 
1206.331 From 1206, Muslims established themselves at Delhi and Islam became an 
inseparable life of India. 
Among the many works in classical Arabic, the one that many people consider to be the 
first source for Islamic belief and practice is the Muslim's sacred scripture, the Quran, 
which means 'recitation'. Next to the Quran stands the multi-volume collection of accounts 
called Hadith, which means tradition, that report or allege to report, sayings and deeds of 
the Prophet Muhammad and his companions.332 
Five fundamental rituals, called the 'pillars of Islam' are regarded as essential public signs 
of a Muslim's submission to God and identity with the Muslim community.333 The five 
pillars are Shahada334 Salat335 Zahar36 Sawn337 and Hajj. 338 The pillars of Islam and other 
rituals eventually came to be regulated in detail by Islamic law. Muslims worldwide 
celebrate two major festivals, the Id-al-Fitr (the feast of the breaking of the fast) and the Jd-
al-Adha (the feast of the sacrifice) which commemorates Abraham's faith by his 
willingness to sacrifice his son.339 All Muslims share certain beliefs and practices, such as 
belief in one God, the Quran, Muhammad, and the five Pillars of Islam. 
330 Sindh was a North Indian kingdom. 
331 K.A Faruqi, 'Impact of Hindu Society on Indian Muslims' in Christian W Troll (ed), Islam in India: 
Studies and Commentaries (Vikas, New Delhi 1985) 4-5. 
332 FM Denny, An Introduction to Islam (Macmillan, New York 1994) 159. 
333 AS Ahmad, Living Islam: From Samarlwnd to Stomaway (BBC Books, London 1993) 12-39. 
334 Shahada means a simple statement declaring belief and bearing witness in the one God and accepting 
Muhammad as the messenger. Muslims believe this declaration allows a person to enter Islam. 
335 Salat means prayer. Muslims must pray five times a day and each prayer takes about five to ten minutes. 
336 Zahat means giving alms. 
337 Sawn means t.he habit of fasting. 
338 Hajj means pilgrimage. The fifth pillar of Islam is the Great Pilgrimage or Hajj. which consist~ of a 
number of rituals performed at sacred monuments in and near Mecca. The Hajj is required of all Mushms at 
least once in a lifetime if they are physically able to make the trip and can afford it. 
339 Abraham is venerated by Jews, Christians. and Muslims as the 'father of the faith·. They all trace their 
traditions back to him. 
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2.5.2.2. Islamic Worship and establishing sacred sites 
The English word, mosque, is a corruption of the Arabic word 'masjid' which means a 
'place of prostration' .340 The mosque is the central site to the Muslim way of life, because it 
is the location where communal activities take place, but more importantly it is the area in 
which Muslims say their prayers. The mosque is a sacred place where the faithful perform 
their devotions, their five daily prayers, without any distinction being made of caste, creed, 
or colour.341 
The genesis of the mosque, according to the tradition, is to be found in the house erected by 
the Prophet in Medina immediately after his safe arrival from Mecca. The structure was 
completed in the first months of the new.Islamic era marked by the hijrah (11622).342 
Because Allah has ordained it, (Quran: Sura 62:9), Friday prayers are the most significant 
for the Muslim community343 and as such the prayers are led by a religious leader who is a 
Quranic scholar, in a mosque or in some other suitable place.344 
Hence, mosque is a place where the faithful, either as individual or as a community, 
continually gather to worship. From any mosque, the Muslim is aware of being part of a 
divinely centred and guided community. A Muslim's experience of faith is based on the 
Quran and the mosque is the place where public witness is given to that experience. 
However, the term mosque is a universal term, which means that the whole earth or 
anywhere on earth becomes a 'principal mosque,345 where Muslims can worship. 
This now leads us on to how the concept of sacred sites is constructed within Islam. 
Whereas other religions such as Hinduism or Christianity believe that a sacred site is 
blessed with the presence of god or gods, in Islam, it is the continued worship which 
constructs sacred sites.346 This view is shared by Gilsenan who stated, 'whether a mosque 
340 K Cragg, The Call o/the MlNARET(William Collins Sons & Co, London 1986) 99. 
341 AS Ahmad, Living Islam: From Samarkand to Stomaway (BBC Books, London 1993) 210. 
3<42 0 Waines, An Introduction to Islam (CUP. Cambridge 1995) 196. 
3<43 A Tayob, Islam: A Short Introduction (One world Publications, Oxford 1999) 62. 
344 M Forward. 'Islam' in J Holm and J Bowker (eds), Worship (Pinter. London 1994) 101-2. 
3<45 SH Nasr, Traditional Islam in the Modem World (K Paul International, London 1990) 10. 
146 A Tayob, Islam: A Short Introduction (One world Publications, Oxford 1999) 59. 
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exists or not, a Muslim can construct a sacred space set apart for prayer in any place - in his 
own or another's house, or outside in the streets if he wishes' .347 Islam extends the sacred 
into the secular by its use of worship, architecture and traditional city planning, thereby 
sanctifying the place.348 
As with other religions, Islam also has distinguished places which are accorded special 
significance, due to their historical and ritual importance within Islam which gives them a 
degree of eminence.349 The process of establishing a sacred place includes that of a place 
where Muhammad lived, or visited, a mosque where Muslims have prayed for centuries, 
(for example, the Babri mosque) and a place where a holy man has lived and died. 
2.5.2.3. Muslim communal organisations 
At the close of the ninteenth century, when the Indian National Congress was formed, a few 
Muslim leaders feared that in a majoritarian Hindu India their interests would be 
threatened. That is the reason why the All India Muslim League was founded at Dhaka 
(now in Pakistan) in 1906. It was a political party in British India, and was the driving force 
behind the creation of Pakistan as a Muslim state from the Indian subcontinent. After the 
independence of India and Pakistan, the Muslim League continued as a minor party in 
India.3so Now it is known as the Indian Union Muslim League (lUML) and the chief 
support base of the party is in Kerala. IUML was founded on March 10, 1948 and claims to 
be the political organization of all Indian Muslims, but only a fraction of the Muslim 
masses of the country supports the party. 
The Jamaat-e-Islami was formed in Lahore (now in Pakistan) by Maulana Maududi in 
1941. After the partition of India, Maududi moved to Pakistan but a small group of Jamaat 
activists remained in India to preserve the Jamaat organisation. While the Jamaat in 
Pakistan and Bangladesh are influential and active political parties, the Jamaat-e-Islami 
3<47 M Gilsenan, Recognizing Islam (IB Tauris, London 1990) 179. 
348 C Bennett, 'Islam' in J Holm and J Bowker (eds) Sacred Place (Pinter. London 1994) 88-112. 
3<49 Ibid 61. There is three sites which have the highest acclaim of every Muslim: the Sacred Mosque in Mecca. 
to which all Muslims tum in worship; Medina the Prophet Muhammad himself established his community 
there; AI-Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem because it was the home of the previous prophets. 
3S0 Indian Union Muslim League <http://www.indianunionmuslimleague.com!> accessed 22 July 2006. 
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Hind does not exercise much influence on the political situation in Indi~ nor does it 
participate in elections. However, it remains one of the foremost Islamic political 
organisations in the country. The Jamaat seeks to establish an Islamic state in India, which 
it advocates as the only solution to India's social and economic problems. It advocates the 
abolishment of secularism and democracy and the imposition of Shariah Islamic law. It 
often leads political agitation on the cause of Islamic law and other issues of the Muslim 
communities. 351 
The Students Islamic Movement of India (SIMI) was formed in Aligarh, Uttar Pradesh 
state, in April 1977. The stated mission of SIMI is the 'liberation of India' from western 
materialistic cultural influence and to convert it into a spiritual society. This organization is 
believed by many, including the Government of India, to be involved in terrorism. It was 
outlawed by the Indian Government in 2002, and fears exist in government circles that it 
has been penetrated by AI-Queda. SIMI originally emerged as a student wing of the 
Jamaat-e-Islami HInd (JIH), and identifies the Hindu population and Hindu organizations 
such as the Sangh Parivar as enemies of Islam. SIMI organized violent protest against the 
demolition of the Babri Mosque, in the nationwide violence that followed the demolitions, 
and clashed with police and the Sangh Parivar. The Government of India, Ministry of 
Home Affairs by notification dated 08-02-2006 has banned Students Islamic Movement of 
India (SIMI) for the third time.352 
Islam Sevak Sangh (ISS), which means organization of servants of Islam, was founded by 
A.N. Madani in 1990, in Kerala, India. Islam Sevak Sangh is a reactionary development of 
the Hindu communal organization RSS. Soon after the Babri Masjid demolition, Madani 
disbanded the ISS and formed the People's Democratic Party (PDP) to forge a broad 
Muslim-dalit-backward caste alliance and started fielding candidates in elections. 
The All India Babri Masjid Action Committee (AlB MAC) was formed in February 1986 as 
a reaction to the court order on I February 1986 to open the locks of Babri Mosque to the 
lSI Jamaat-e-Islami Hind <http://www.jamaateislamihind.org/> accessed 22 July 2006. 
lS2 'Students Islamic Movement of India' 
<http://www.satp.orgisatporgtp/countriesiindiaiterroristoutfitsisimLhtm#> accessed 20 July 2006. 
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Hindus for the worship of idols. AlB MAC launched a movement for the liberation of their 
ancient mosque, and is involved in democratic means to establish their claim over the Babri 
Masjid site. The All India Babri Masjid Coordination Committee (AIBMCC) is another 
movement involved in the Babri Masjid restoration process. 
To sum up, Islam as a universal religion represents a basic unity of belief within a varied 
cultural diversity. In Islam everything that exists is sacred, and a sacred site in Islam fulfils 
a 'making-one' function as an earthly manifestation of divine.353 They are not only places 
of worship, but also engage the social and political life of the Muslim community. Mosques 
are necessary for Friday prayers and for other community functions like education, 
marriage, feasts and funerals. These suggest that mosques are also the centre of social life 
in every Muslim community. 
2.6. Conflict between religious groups 
Religion is at the heart of the complex social web of India, and as such religion cannot be 
seen merely as a theological and metaphysical force alone but as central to the socio-
political debate.354 There have been an increasing number of religious conflicts from the 
close of nineteenth century onwards, with the main source of conflict being between the 
Muslims and the Hindus.355 In India, as Paul Brass has noted, both Hindu and Muslim 
communities have a tendency to define themselves and act as political constituencies.356 
Caste and communal problems have become intertwined in Indian politics.357 In their 
struggle for power and hegemony, the Hindus and also the Muslims use religion and thus 
3S3 C Bennett, 'Islam' in J Holm and J Bowker (eds), Sacred Place (Pinter, London 1994) 112. 
3S4 AA Engineer, Politics o/Confrontation: The Babri- Masjid Ramjanmabhumi Controversy Runs Riot 
(Ajanta, Delhi 1992) xii. 
35S Human Rights Watch, Playing the Communal Card: Communal Violence and Human Rights (Human 
Rights Watch, London 1995) 19. 
356 PR Brass, 'Introduction: Discourses of Ethnicity, Communalism and Violence' in PR Brass (ed), Riots and 
Pogroms (Macmillan, London 1996) x. 
357 For instance, when the VP Singh government implemented the Mandai Commission Report which gave 
more advantage to the Other Backward castes through reservation policy, LK Advani converted it into a 
communal problem by declaring a chariot procession to build Ram temple in Ayodhya. DS Burlet, 
'Challenging Ethnic Conflict: Hindu-Muslims Relations in India 1977-1993' (PhD Thesis, Department of 
Peace Studies, University of Bradford 1997) 194. 
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reinforce each other's communalism. Politicians appeal to communities based on their caste 
and religion in order to gamer votes, knowing that every caste and community guards its 
identity.358 Such use of identity brings confrontation and leads to inter-caste and inter-
communal violence.359 
Hindus see the Muslims as alien rulers who never assimilated with the Indian cultural 
ethos. Not only are Muslims looked upon as essentially 'foreign', but also as demolishers 
of Hindu temples.360 This viewpoint is encapsulated by the following slogan, '0 Babar 
progeny, go to Pakistan or cemetery' .361 The Babri Masjid - Ramjanmabhumi controversy 
and its emotional potential has to be seen in this perspective. 
Violent conflicts on religious lines in India seem to be the result of using religion as an 
ideological tool for defining identity and then contesting for power. Hindu militant forces 
and Islamic communal forces both have used religion as an ideological too1.362 However, it 
has to be noted that still only a sizable and vocal minority from these communities support 
these militant organisations and the majority of people remain outside their influence. It 
suggests that the language used to define communal conflicts has to be refined as such not 
to hold responsible a whole community as a communal outfit. 
While describing the growth of communal organisations, many condemn the political 
parties and the executive machinery and highlight the impoverishment of socio-economic 
factors in the country.363 For instance, Ashutosh Varshney points out three factors namely, 
a) rise of separatist movements in the 1980s which threatened the nation b) institutional 
decay of the Congress Party and of an absence of other centrist alternatives and c) an 
3S8 AG Noorani, Babri Masjid Question 1528-2003 (Tulika Books, New Delhi 2003) Vol I, xxi. 
359 A Chase, 'Pakistan or the Cemetery!: Muslim Minority Rights in Contemporary India' (1996) 16 B C 
Third World L J 35, 35. 
360 PJ Patel, 'Communal Riots in Contemporary India: Towards a Sociological Explanation' in U Baxi and 
Parekh (eds), Crisis and Change in Contemporary India (Sage, London 1995) 370-73. 
361 A Chase, 'Pakistan or the Cemetery!: Muslim Minority Rights in Contemporary India' (1996) 16 B C 
Third World L J 35. 35. 
362 AA Engineer. Politics of Confrontation: The Babri- Masjid Ramjanmabhumi Control'ersy Runs Riot 
(Ajanta, Delhi 1992) xiii. . 
363 P Heehs. Nationalism, Terrorism, Communalism: Essays in Modern History (OUP. Delhi 1998) 125. 
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opportunistic twisting of secular principles in Indian politics.364 Although to a certain extent 
this is true, the role of judiciary has been continuously neglected in their argument against 
communal organisations. The Constitution and other domestic laws have empowered the 
courts to protect values such as democracy, the rule of law, and secularism from the 
onslaught of communal outfits from any religious community either majority or minority. 
As seen in the section on Indian judiciary, the courts are the custodians of fundamental 
rights. This suggests that if the courts remain impartial and challenge the communal forces 
based on the values enshrined in the Constitution, religious militant organisations may be 
controlled. After many communal riots, the role of the judiciary is far from satisfactory 
including the Ayodhya dispute.365 
Analysis of communal conflicts illustrates that the secular forces have become the target of 
continuous attacks from religious militant groups. In a religiously divided State, the 
judiciary will be able to protect the rights of such groups which are necessary to build up a 
strong civil society. Hence, to effectively limit and control the communal conflicts, an 
active, impartial, and independent judiciary becomes necessary. 
2.7. Concluding Observations 
The research context presented above has defined the meaning and importance of the 
sacred sites in any religion and how attack of any kind on them goes against the 
fundamental religious right of a faith community. Against this backdrop, the review of 
international legal instruments has brought to the fore how the available laws are 
insufficient to settle the disputes relating to a sacred site. Obviously, a model convention to 
intervene for the protection of the disputed site and the promotion of human rights is found 
imperative. 
364 Ashutosh Varshney. Ethnic Conflict and Cil'ic Life: Hindus and Muslims in India (Yale University Press. 
New haven 2002) 72. 
365 C Jaffrelot. The Hind" Nationalist Movement and Politics 1925 to the 1990s (Hurst & Co. London \996) 
469. 
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The Indian legal system as it is today seems complacent and inefficient to settle a dispute of 
the magnitude and proportion of Ayodhya. Therefore, the historical necessity for evolving a 
regional convention which can be both powerful and prompt is felt to be obvious. 
Sacred sites in virtually all religions have not only spiritual but also socio-political, cultural 
significance, and hence, they need legal protection. This is not just the case for Hinduism 
and Islam, the religious groups at dispute in Ayodhya. Dispute over sacred sites can occur 
any where at any time. Since, the religious claims are profound claims, when disputes 
based on a sacred site arise between two different faiths who claim the same site as their 
own, the claim becomes incompatible. These competing claims over a sacred site if not 
settled legally, fairly and as speedily as possible, can create more tension between those 
religious groups and over time, this tension increases considerably leading to egregious 
human rights violations. In settling these disputes, the state and the judiciary should be seen 
to play an impartial role in protecting the rights of religious communities because any 
discrimination on their part leads to the violation of human rights of one religious 
community against the other. 
Moreover, when these claims become entrenched with power politics, such claims might 
exacerbate communal conflicts and the denial of human rights to the minority religious 
communities. So protecting them by the legal instruments of the domestic and international 
communities seems obligatory. A quick and impartial remedy to sacred site disputes by the 
proposed regional court in the Model Convention would resolve the claims of competing 
religious groups promptly and prevent further communal conflicts and violation of human 
rights. These themes are more fully developed in the following chapter on the case study, 
the Ayodhya dispute. 
108 
CHAPTER 3 
THE BABRI MASJID-RAM TEMPLE DISPUTE 
3.1. Introduction 
This chapter presents a case study on Ayodhya: the Babri Masjid-Ram temple dispute. It is 
divided into four sections. It begins with a historical overview of the legal dispute, from the 
pivotal period of the late nineteenth to the early twenty-first centuries. The second section 
focuses on the litigation and state action in both pre-independent as well as post-
independent India. The third analyses the role of various organs of the Indian state in 
settling the dispute, and the fourth brings out the conclusions emerging from the case study. 
3.2. Historical overview of the dispute 
This historical overvIew is from an alternate and secular narrative. A brief history of 
disputes between 1856 till 1946 will be followed by a more extensive examination of the 
events which led to the demolition of the mosque in 1992 and conclude with an analysis of 
the aftermath of the demolition. 
3.2.1. Significance of Ayodhya 
Ayodhya is a North Indian town situated in the Faizabad district in the state of Uttar 
Pradesh (UP). Panikkar sees Ayodhya having some connection with all major religions in 
India. 1 For instance, in relation to the Buddhists2, Chinese pilgrim Hsuan Tsang (627-643) 
mentions that when he visited Ayodhya, there were some three thousand Buddhist monks 
I KN Panikkar, 'A Historical Overview' in S Gopal (ed), Anatomy of a Confrontation: The Babri Masjid-
Ramjanmabhumi Issue (Viking, New Delhi 1991) 25-6. 
2 Buddhism, founded by Buddh~ the 'enlightened one', lived approximately between 566-486 BCE. Buddha, 
previously known as Siddhartha, son of a Chief of Sakya clan, left his comfortable life to seek enlightenment. 
He attained enlightenment at Bodh Gaya~ now in Bihar at the age of thirty-five and was addressed as Buddha. 
He taught his Way or Dhamma to his disciples. See, AL Basham, The Wonder that was India (Sidgwick & 
Jackson Great Civilizations Series, 31d rev edn, Sidgwick & Jackson. London 1967) 256-87; P Heehs (ed), 
Indian Religions: A Historical Reader of Spirihlal Expression and Experience (Hurst & Co. London 2002) 
103-30. 
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living in approximately one hundred Buddhist monasteries and a large temple.3 It is also a 
holy city for Jains4. Five Jain Tirthankars5 or religious teachers were born in Ayodhya. 
Ayodhya is a sacred site too for the Sikhs.6 It is widely believed that their founder, Guru 
Nanak Dev, visited and lived in Ayodhya c1557. However, the important point to note is 
the religious affiliation that the Hindus and Muslims have with the place.7 
3.2.2. Significance of Ayodhya to Hindus 
Ayodhya is considered an auspicious site by the Hindus. It is located on the banks of the 
river Sarayu, and so it is considered as a tirtha8 for pilgrims. Although Ayodhya existed as 
a Saivic9 centre for many centuries, only in the eighteenth century, it became a dominant 
Vaishnavite10 centre. 11 Significantly, Ayodhya is seen by Hindus as the birthplace of Ram. 
A key source is the Ramayana, which claims to be a biographical account of the life of 
3 Hans Bakker, Ayodhya (Institute of Indian Studies, Groningen 1984) 38. 
4 Jainism was founded by Vardhamana, later called Mahavira, son of a chieftain, born in 599 BCE near Patna 
in Bihar. He renounced the world at the age of thirty. After thirteen years of asceticism, he won over the lower 
principle of existence and so called as Jina, or 'Victor'. Known as Mahavira, 'Great Hero', those who follow 
his path of Jina are known as Jains. See, P Heehs (ed), Indian Religions: A Historical Reader 0/ Spiritual 
Expression and Experience (Hurst & Co, London 2002) 89-102; AL Basham, The Wonder that was India 
~Sidgwick & Jackson Great Civilizations Series, 3rd rev edn, Sidgwick & Jackson, London 1967) 287-97. 
For Jains, Mahavira was the twenty-fourth and last Jina of the present world cycle. The twenty-third was 
Parshvanatha, whose historicity is generally acknowledged. The others said to have lived thousands of years 
ago who were called Nirgranthas (free from bonds). These twenty four Great Teachers are called 
Tirthankaras, means 'ford-makers'. See, P Heehs (ed), Indian Religions: A Historical Reader of Spiritual 
Expression and Experience (Hurst & Co, London 2002) 90; AL Basham, The Wonder that was India 
~Sidgwick & Jackson Great Civilizations Series, 3rd rev edn, Sidgwick & Jackson, London 1967) 288. 
Sikhism is an Indian religion founded by Guru Nanak (1469-1539). The followers and his nine successor 
Gurus are called 'Sikhs' or 'disciples'. The system of belief and practice based on the teachings of the Sikh 
Gurus is known as Sikhism. P Heehs (ed), Indian Religions: A Historical Reader o/Spiritual Expression and 
Experience (Hurst & Co, London 2002) 375-97. 
7 For more information on Ayodhya, see S Gopal (ed), Anatomy 0/ Confrontation: Ayodhya and the Rise of 
Communal Politics in India (Zed, London 1993) and for a contrasting view, K Elst, Ram Janmabhoomi vs 
Babri Masjid (Voice of India, New Delhi 1990). 
8 Text to n 292 in chapter 2. 
9 There are three major sects in Hinduism namely, Saivism, Vaishnavism and Sakthi worship. The worshippers 
of Lord Siva are called Saiva and their tradition is called Saivic tradition. 
10 A major sect in Hinduism is called Vaishnavism who worship Lord Vishnu. The popular Vaishnal'ite belief 
is that Vishnu took ten incarnations (Avathars) including incarnation of god Rama, Prince of Ayodhya and 
hero of Ij'ic Ramayana. AL Basham, The Wonder thaI was India (Sidgwick & Jackson Great Civilizations 
Series, 3 rev edn, Sidgwick & Jackson. London 1967) 300-303. 
II S Gopal and others, 'The Political Abuse of History: Babri Masjid-Ramjanmabhumi Dispute - An Analysis 
by Twenty-Five Historians' in AG Noorani (ed). The Babri }.(asjid Question 1528-~003: 'A matter of 
National Honour' (Tulika Books. New Delhi 2003) Vol 1.30. 
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Ram, ruler of the Ayodhya kingdom. Having fought to save the world from the power of 
demons, Ram ruled Ayodhya, exemplified in prosperity, caste purity, and happiness. I:! 
Ramayana places these events in the age of Treda,13 in the distant past. According to Hindu 
belief, Ayodhya then disappeared, at the end of the second of four world periods within 
Hindu cosmology. The rediscovery of Ayodhya took place in the present age by king 
Vikramaditya. 14 The king located the site through meditation and at least within Hindu 
traditional accounts, he constructed a huge temple on the birth site of Ram. The 
archaeological and historical evidence does not seem to support the existence of such a 
structure, but this does not affect its significance in Hindu views of the site, and the 
subsequent dispute. ls The Sangh Parivar16 argue that the temple built by king Vikramaditya 
was later destroyed to allow construction of Babri Masjid in 1528, thus giving Hindu 
claims over the site temporal priority.17 
When Ramanandhis came and settled in large numbers in Ayodhya from the eighteenth 
century, Ayodhya was established as a major pilgrim centre in North India. 18 According to 
Bawa, in 1991 the estimated number of Hindu temples was six thousand, and most of the 
12 Peter van der Veer, 'Riots and Rituals: The Construction of Violence and Public Space in Hindu 
Nationalism' in PR Brass (ed), Riots and Pogroms (Macmillan, London 1996) 160. 
13 In Hindu cosmology, cosmos passes through cycles within cycles for eternity. The basic cycle is the Ka/pa. 
fonned by a thousand Mahayugas. Each Mahayuga is divided into four yugas or ages called Krta. Treta. 
Dvapara and Kali. Their lengths are respectively 4,800, 3,600, 2,400 and 1,200 'years of the Gods', and each 
year equals 360 human years. According to Hindu mythology, Rama spent his youth in Ayodhya and was 
king during the Treta-yuga, thousands of years before our present age, the Kali-yuga. For details, see, AL 
Basham, The Wonder that was India (Sidgwick & Jackson Great Civilizations Series, 3rd rev edn, Sidgwick & 
Jackson, London 1967) 320-21. 
14 A Copley, 'Indian Secularism Reconsidered: From Gandhi to Ayodhya' (1993) 2 Contemporary south Asia 
47,57. 
IS R Friedland and R Hecht, 'The Bodies of Nations: A Comparative Study of Religious Violence in 
Jerusalem and Ayodhya' (1998) 38 History of Religions 101, 106. 
16 Sangh Parivar means 'family of Hindu organisations'. a tenn used to refer to a number of RSS-associated 
Hindu militant organisations. 
17 P van der Veer, 'God Must be Liberated!: A Hindu Liberation Movement in Ayodhya' (1987) 21 Modem 
Asian Studies 285-6; Vishwa Hindu Parishad Publication, New Delhi 
<http://www.vhp.orgiengiishsite/e.SpeciaI_MovementsldRanjanambhumi%20Mutilhistorical_legalperspectiv 
e.htm> accessed 08 June 2006. 
18 P van der Veer. Gods on Earth: The Management of Religious Experience and Identity in a North Indian 
Pilgrimage Centre (Athlone. London 1988) 36. 
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trade and employment opportunities relied upon the pilgrims. 19 By this time, Ayodhya had 
become a significant sacred site for Hindus all over India. 
3.2.3. Significance of Ayodhya to the Muslims 
As with the Hindu narrative, the Islamic narrative of the history of Ayodhya stresses the 
antiquity of the connection between religion and the site, long before conventional history 
would do so. ,Muslims argue that their attachment to Ayodhya dates back to the pre-Islamic 
period. According to the Quran, Adam and Eve were the first human persons on earth and 
one of their sons was Seth. According to Muslims, Seth was buried in Ayodhya and people 
still go and visit that tomb in Ayodhya. Equally important to Muslims is the tomb of 
Noah.20 It is not known when these traditions were established. Although this claim was 
refuted by the great Muslim scholar of the sixteenth century, Abul Fazl,21 when the 
researcher visited these sites, it is clear that both the locations continue to attract a 
substantial number of Islamic pilgrims.22 
The early settlement of Muslims in Ayodhya suggests that the first Muslim invasion of 
Avadh, present day Ayodhya, occurred before 1030 AD. Within two centuries, Ayodhya 
became the headquarters of a Muslim province in the Delhi Sultanate before becoming part 
of the Mughal Empire. The first Mughal Emperor Babar defeated the ruler of Ayodhya in a 
battle and appointed Mir Bagi Tashqandi as the governor of Ayodhya region. During his 
rule, Mir Bagi built a mosque in Ayodhya in 1528.23 From 1528 until the British period, 
Ayodhya was under Islamic rule. 
Ayodhya is considered a 'Khurd Mecca' (small Mecca), because of the large number of 
Muslim holy persons who are believed to be buried there and in the vicinity. Today the 
19 M Bawa, 'Scenes From Ayodhya' The Sunday Times o/India (New Delhi 3 November 1991) 18. 
20 MJ Akhtar, Babri Masjid: A Tale Untold (Genuine, New Delhi 1997)10. 
21 In his A'in-i-Akbari, the author Abul Fazl, refutes these beliefs by stating that 'near the city (Ayodhya) 
stand two considerable tombs of six, seven yards respectively. The vulgar [sic] believe them to be the resting 
places of Seth and prophet Job [sic]. and extraordinary tales are belted of them'. See, MJ Akhtar. Babr; 
Masjid: A Tale Untold (Genuine. New Delhi 1997) 82. 
22 T Mahmood. 'Ayodhya. Ram and Islam' in VN Mishra (ed), Ramjanambhoomi Babri Masjid: Historical 
documents, Legal opinions and Judgements (The Bar Council of India Trust. New Delhi 1991) 24-25. 
23 MJ Akhtar. Bohri Mosjid: A Tale Untold (Genuine, New Delhi 1997) II. 
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ruins of hundreds of old tombs, and scores of crumbling mosques and Sufi Khangahs14 lie 
scattered around Ayodhya, mainly in a state of complete neglect. There are more than fifty 
Dargahl-
s 
in Ayodhya. According to revenue records half of Ayodhya is covered with 
Muslim mosques, (approximately one hundred) and Muslim graveyards (more than one 
hundred). Hence, Muslims assert that they have strong claims over Ayodhya.26 
3.2.4. Early history of the site: 1528-1857 
As shown previously, early history of the site, to some extent, is peculiar to both the 
religious communities. The events which traditionally gave the site an ancient connection 
to both the Hindu and Islamic communities are difficult to corroborate with conventional 
history or through archaeology. From 1528, however, it becomes possible to present a 
history of the site which would, to some extent, receive broad support from the principal 
religious communities in dispute. The early history, however, remains contentious between 
the religious communities. 
The origin of the Babri Masjid-Ram Temple dispute is obscure and tied closely to the 
current religious-political dispute. Hindu Source, Sangh Parivar alleges that Babar, the 
first Mughal Emperor, destroyed a magnificent and ancient Ram temple in order to build 
his Babri Masjid. The report of RS Sharma, and other historians, endorses the Muslim view 
that the mosque was built on an empty space, and that there was no evidence of the 
demolition of a Hindu temple.27 European scholars, considering the issue during the British 
rule, give mixed views, but may have been in part motivated by a colonial policy of divide 
24 Khangah is an abode of a Sufi saint. Sufism, a sect in Islam, may be described as a mystical practice that 
emphasizes certain unique rituals for guiding spiritual seekers into a direct encounter with God. 
Sufism - Mystic <http://www.allaboutreligion.org/sufism.htm> accessed 12 August 2006. 
25 Dargah is an Islamic shrine built over the grave of a revered religious figure, often a Sufi saint. Local 
Muslims perform pilgrimages to these shrines. They often include a mosque, a meeting room, schools 
(madrassas), residence for a teacher or caretaker, hospitals and other building for community purposes. The 
term is derived from a Persian word meaning 'portal' or a 'threshold'. Many Muslims believe that Dargahs 
are portals by which they can invoke the deceased saint's intercession and blessings. Martin Forward. 'Islam' 
in J Holm and J Bowker (eds), Worship (Pinter, London 1994) 113-4. 
26 Interview with Khaliq Ahmed Khan, Chairman of 'Ayodhya Faizabad Study & Research Centre' Faizabad 
(Faizabad 10 February 2006). 
27 RS Sharma and others, Ramjanmabhumi-Babari Masjid: A Historians Report to the .Vation (People's 
Publishing House, New Delhi 1991) 6-7. 
113 
and rule, which might encourage dispute and division, rather than its resolution.28 A brief 
review of the debate is necessary for an in-depth case analysis. 
The first European source to link the site of Babri Masjid with Ram's birthplace IS 
Tieffenthaler, a Jesuit priest. Writing in 1788 he noted that an earlier fortress, called 
Ramcot, had been demolished and replaced with an Islamic temple with three cupolas.29 
Later European sources similarly note the Hindu attribution of the destruction of a Hindu 
temple to Aurengzeb,30 with Buchanan adding that 'the tradition seems very ill-founded'/I 
while Beveridge on the other hand thought that '[presumably] the order for building the 
mosque was given during Babar's stay inAud (Ayodhya) in 934 AH.,32 
Perhaps one reason for the wide divergence of opinion by the early European writers is the 
silence of contemporary, or near contemporary, accounts on whether any temple was 
demolished in the process of building the mosque. The mosque itself includes an 
inscription claiming that Mir Bagi, a noble of Babar, had erected the masjid. There is 
nothing in the inscription to indicate that the masjid had been built on the site of a previous 
temple.33 Hindu sources might be expected to be more forthcoming, but Ramcharitmanasa, 
Hindi translation of the epic Ramayana by the poet Valmiki, composed by Tulsidas during 
28 M Shakir, State and Politics in Contemporary India (Ajanta, Delhi 1986) 164. The author has quoted the 
words of Charles Wood to the viceroy in 1862: 'if all India was to unite against us how long could we 
maintain ourselves'; S Srivastava, 'How the British Saw the Issue', in S Gopal (ed), Anatomy of a 
Confrontation: The Babri Masjid - Ramjanmabhumi Issue (Viking, Delhi 1991) 38-57. 
29 RS Sharma and others, Ramjanmabhumi-Babri Masjid: A Historians Report to the Nation (People's 
Publishing House, New Delhi 1991) 19. Sharma cites from Tieffenthaler's original work Description 
historique et geographique de l'Inde published by Johann Barnoulli from Berlin in 1788. 
30 AG Noorani (ed), The Babri Masjid Question 1528-2003: A Matter of National Honour (Tulika Books, 
New Delhi 2003) Vol I, 55-6. 
31 RS Sharma and others, 'Ramjanmabhurni-Babri Masjid: A Historians' Report to the Nation' (People's 
Publishing House, New Delhi 1991) 20; For more details, see, Buchanan's Surveys edited and printed by 
Montgomery Martin, The History. Antiquities, Topography and Statistics of Eastern India (Wm HAllen & 
Co, London 1838) Vol II. 333-36. 
32 AG Noorani (ed), The Babri Masjid Question 1528-2003: A Matter of National Honour (Tulika Books, 
New Delhi 2003) Vol I, 56-8. Beveridge presumes that the order for building the mosque was given during 
Babar's stay in Aud (Ayodhya) in 934 AH, at which time he would be impressed by the dignity and sancti~y 
of the ancient Hindu shrine. (at least in part) displaced and like obedient follower of Muhammad. he was, In 
intolerance of another Faith, regarded substituting a temple by a mosque as dutiful and worthy. 
33 There are examples where Hindu temples were destroyed and Mosque was built at that site. To cite one 
such example, K Eist points out Gyanl'api mosque was built after many Hindu temples destroyed including 
the old Kashi Visvanath temple. one of the most sacred places of Hindus. Koenraad Elst. Ayodhya: A Case 
against the Temple (Voice of India. New Delhi 2002) 78-80. 
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1575-76, does not mention a Ram Temple at all - despite being composed within fifty 
years of the construction of the Babri Masjid.34 
It is important to note that differing viewpoints existed on the dispute site. The Hindu 
community held that an ancient temple to Ram existed before the mosque was built and the 
Muslim community believed that no such temple existed before the mosque was built. 
Leaving aside the question of the foundation of the mosque, we enter a period where there 
is greater consensus over the history of the area. When the Mughal Empire became weak, 
after the death of Emperor Aurangazep (1618-1707), the different provinces of the Mughal 
Empire came under the authority of local rulers called Nawabs. Ayodhya also came under 
the Nawabs until the British army took control in 1856.35 Some writers argue that the 
transfer of Nawab administration from Ayodhya36 to Faizabad should be seen as 'the 
liberation of a Hindu sacred site ,37 since religious activities such as building new temples 
increased from the nineteenth century onwards in Ayodhya.38 
3.2.5. Intra and inter-religious disputes: 1857-1946 
In 1856, when power in India shifted from the East India Company to the British queen, 
Ayodhya too came under British forces. It is against this backdrop of radical political 
change that there is seen the first properly recorded dispute near the Babri Masjid. The 
dispute did not involve Hindus claiming the site as Ram's birthplace, but rather Muslims 
claiming a Hindu temple as a mosque. 
As recounted by Panikkar,39 Muslims under the leadership of Shah Gulam Hussein claimed 
that a mosque had earlier existed in the place where the Hanumangarghi temple is now 
34 KN Panikkar, 'A Historical Overview' in S Gopal (ed), Anatomy of a Confrontation: The Babri Masjid-
Ramjanmabhumi Issue (Viking, New Delhi 1991) 28-9. 
3S MJ Akhtar, Babri Masjid: A Tale Untold (Genuine, New Delhi 1997) 12-5. 
36 R Barnett, North India Between Empires: Awadh, the Mughals, and the British 1720-1801 (Berkley, 
London 1980) 12-4; Hans Bakker, Ayodhya: The History of Ayodhya from the 1h Century to the Middle of the 
18''' century (Groningen Oriental Studies, Brussels 1986). 
37 Peter van der Veer, 'The Construction of Violence and Public Space in Hindu Nationalism' in PR Brass 
(ed), Riots and Pogroms (Macmillan, London 1996) 161. 
38 KK Sinha, 'Towards Pluralist Society' cited in P van der Veer. Gods on Earth: The Managemelll of 
Religiolls Experience and identity in a North Indian Pilgrimage Centre (Athlone, London 1988) 37. 
39 KN Panikkar, . A Historical Overview' in S Gopal (ed), Anatomy of a Confrontation (Viking. Delhi 1992) 
31-3. 
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situated. Hussein led a party of his followers to oust the Hindus from the temple but the 
occupants of the temple and their supporters outnumbered the Muslims, many of whom 
were killed, some inside the Babri Masjid itself. Though a communal clash appeared to be 
impending, the timely intervention of British forces prevented such a situation. 
Although this dispute had no direct impact on the Babri Masjid, it paved the way for 
Hindus to organise themselves to protect their sacred sites and to assert their religious 
rights.40 In 1857, the mahanf1 took a part of the Babri Masjid compound and constructed a 
chabutra.42 This was opposed by local Muslims and they made a petition to the local 
magistrate on 30 November 1858 objecting to the construction of a clay chabutra. In 1857, 
the dispute was resolved by agreeing to raise a wall between the mosque and the chabutra. 
Meanwhile the Babri Masjid was officially registered in 1860 as a place of worship.43 In 
1885, the mahant filed a suit to gain the legal title to the land and permission to construct a 
roof over the chabutra to protect it from the vagaries of nature. This was the first legal suit 
filed by Hindus within the first 350 years of the Babri Masjid's existence.44 The suit was 
dismissed. 
After the legal battle however, there seems to be no evidence of further claims or counter-
claims until 1934 when a riot broke out near Babri Masjid owing to the slaughter of a cow 
in the village of Shajahanpur, near Ayodhya, on 27 March 1934 on the eve of Bakr-Id, a 
major Muslim festival. It should be noted, however, that this riot was unconnected with the 
claims concerning the birth-place of Ram. During the riots, several Muslim houses, and 
eventually the Babri Masjid came under attack.45 
Subsequently, there arose a dispute between the two major factions of Muslims, Shia and 
Sunni, regarding the ownership of the Babri Masjid. The civil judge of Faizabad in a 
regular suit No 29 of 1945, authenticated that although the Masjid was used by Shia and 
40 Ibid 32. 
41 Mahant means a Hindu priest belonging to certain Hindu Priests organisations. 
42 A Chabutra is a raised platform to keep the idols of Hindu gods for worship. 
43 MJ Akhtar Babr; Masjid: A Tale Untold (Genuine, New Delhi 1997) 181 . 
.... SK Tripati, 'One Hundred Years of Litigation' in AA Engineer (ed), Babr; A-lasjidlRamjanmabhoomi 
Controversy (Ajanta. New Delhi 1990) 17. 
45 Ibid 19 .. 
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Sunni sects of Muslims, it was to be owned and managed by the Sunni Central Board of 
Waqf, UP,46 which will be dealt with later. 
Two pertinent points are to be noted at this point of the case study. Firstly, the dispute was 
resolved purely as an internal, Islamic, dispute. There was no strong intervention - either 
legally or politically - by Hindus claiming control of the site. Not only was Ayodhya a 
local dispute in this period, but it was not exclusively an inter-religious dispute, even at the 
local level. Secondly, this internal dispute was speedily resolved by the courts, in marked 
contrast to the later dispute that evolved into a national, inter-communal, flashpoint. 
3.2.6. Inter-Religious dispute: 1947-1992 
When India became independent, the most populous and biggest province was the Northern 
Province which later became the state of Uttar Pradesh, where Ayodhya is located. During 
the first provincial election, the Congress party won the majority of seats and formed the 
government. 
On 22 December 1949, a few members of the Hindu majority community from Ayodhya 
placed the idols of Rama and others inside the Babri Masjid, after breaking the locks of the 
gate. This created tension between the two communities and subsequently the Masjid was 
locked, denying entry to both Muslims and Hindus. Shortly thereafter, suits were filed on 
behalf of the Hindus for worship of the Hindu deity, which was permitted by the court 
through an interim injunction. When the matter was before the court, the initial tension 
receded. 
Until 1970, religious riots were not a significant element in Indian life. In 1971, Indira 
Gandhi won a landslide victory in the parliamentary elections. For the previous few years, 
the country was not doing well in terms of economic growth and social unrest was 
prevalent in many states. The opposition parties intensified their protests against the ruling 
party. As an immediate reason, on 12 June 1975. Justice Jagmogan Lal Sinha voided the 
Prime Minister's election because she was guilty of 'corrupt practices' .47 Indira Gandhi, 
46 Judgement of Civil Judge, Faizabad, dated 30 March 1946 in Suit no 29 of 1945. 
47 G Austin. Working a Democratic Constittltion: The Indian Experience (OUP. New Delhi 1999) 298-309. 
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then Prime Minister declared a state of emergency48 on 26 June 1975 on the grounds that 
the security of India was threatened by internal disturbances. It was lifted on 18 January 
1977 and was followed by general elections for Parliament in March 1977 which resulted in 
a non-Congress coalition government coming to power in New Delhi for the first time. The 
election defeat led In4ira to tum to religious issues, rather than rely upon her previous 
staunch secularism, to increase her level of support. As Vanaik noted, 'after the Bangladesh 
war, Indira made more conscious efforts to woo the 'Hindu vote' by much publicized visits 
to temples, to talk of the rights and fears of the 'majority community" .49 The non-Congress 
government could not complete its term due to inner strife between various alliance 
partners, especially with the Hindu nationalist party Bharathiya Jana Sangh, which 
subsequently became BJP. 50 In 1980 Indira Gandhi became Prime Minister once again. But 
most of her former secular values were replaced by religious sentiments.51 
In May 1983, D.D. Khanna, a former minister in the Congress government of UP, wrote to 
Indira Gandhi, then Prime Minister of India, demanding the restoration of the temples at the 
places Ayodhya, Kasi52 and Mathura,53 allegedly destroyed by Muslims where three 
famous mosques exist. 54 At about the same time, the Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP)55 took 
48 The Indian Constitution pennits the President to impose emergency in three situations. Articles 352-360 of 
the Indian Constitution delineate when and how the President can impose emergencies. Three types of 
emergency include: (a) war or external aggression (351-354), (b) internal disturbance or failure of 
constitutional democracy in a State (355-359), and (c) financial emergencies (360). Perhaps the most 
controversial and frequently used in this context is Article 356, which confers powers on the President to 
dismiss a State government if he/she is satisfied 'on receipt of a report from the Governor of a State or 
otherwise' that there is a breakdown of constitutional machinery in the State. During the emergency, the 
State's legislative powers will be exercised by the Parliament. By declaring emergency, the President can 
assume all of the executive powers of that State, and may also suspend any or all parts of the Constitution 
afplicable to that State except those pertaining to the High Court. 
4 A Vanaik, 'Communalism and Our Foreign Policy' (October 1990) Seminar (No 374) 18. 
50 In 1951, a Hindu political party, Bharathiya Jana Sangh (BJS), came into being with close ideological 
linkages with the RSS. It means 'Indian People's Union'. It was launched to challenge the secular ideology of 
Congress. In the first five Parliamentary elections held in 1952, 1957, 1962, 1967 and 1971 the party's 
popular votes never reached two-digit percentage points. In 1977 elections, it allied with other non-Congress 
parties and shared the power in the Union government. PS Ghosh, BJP and the Evolution of Hindu 
Nationalism: From Periphery to Centre (Manohar, New Delhi 1999) 82-6. 
51 Ibid 83-4. 
52 For Saivists. those who worship Lord Siva. Kasi is a very important sacred site. 
53 In Vaishnavism, Lord Vishnu is the major God who is believed to have taken nine incarnations and the 
tenth one is yet to come and expected at the end of the present age. One of the important incarnations is 
Krishna and Mathura is a significant sacred site attached to Krishna. 
54 K Prasad and others, Report: Citizell's Tribullal on Ayodhya (The Secretariat, New Delhi 1993) 27. 
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up the Ramjanmabhumi issue to organize the Hindu public in favour of a Ram temple. 
Subsequently, on 27 July 1984, a Hindu organization,56 mainly controlled by the VHP, was 
fonned with the sole aim of liberating Ram's birthplace (Ram Janmastan) in Ayodhya. 
From the moment of its creation, the organisation relentlessly worked to propagate the 
liberation of the Ram Janmastan site from the Muslims. On 15 October 1984 a ratha, (a 
vehicle converted in the form of a chariot), resumed its tour of the main UP towns in order 
to mobilize public opinion and administer the Ram Janmastan liberation pledge to the 
general public. 
Seeing no tangible result from this, the Hindu nationalist forces then gave a deadline to the 
government, resolving that if the locks in the mosque placed after the court orders in 1950 
were not removed by 6 March 1986, then 'open the lock', agitation would tum into 'break 
the lock' agitation. Meantime, in order to lend active support to the movement, the VHP 
created a volunteer corps named Bajrang Dal with the motto of 'Rest not before Ram's 
work is done'. 57 On 14 October 1984, VHP passed a resolution at Lucknow58 which 
demanded that the government immediately hand over all the mosques which stood on 
destroyed Hindu temples.59 
In a sudden development, the Prime Minister, Indira Gandhi, was assassinated by Sikh 
militants in 1984,60 and her son, Rajiv Gandhi, was made Prime Minister of India. At this 
55 The Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP) was established in 29/30 August 1964 under the auspices of the RSS as 
a reaction to the activities of the Christian Missionaries. See, SS Apte, 'Why Vishwa Hindu Parish ad , 
Organiser (Diwali Special Issue, New Delhi 1964) 15. <http://www.vhp.org/> accessed 12 March 2006. 
56 Sri Ramjanmabhumi Mukti Yagna Samiti, (Ramjanmabhumi Liberation Struggle Committee) a Hindu 
Organisation was formed on 27 July 1984, with the sole aim of liberating the disputed site from Muslims. SP 
Udayakumar, Historicizing Myth and Mythologizing History: The Violent 'Ram Temple' Drama in SP 
Udayakumar (ed), Handcuffed to History: Narratives, pathologies, and Violence in South Asia (Praeger, 
Westport 2001) 83. 
57 A Vishwa Hindu Parishad UP (East) Publication 1985 cited in AA Engineer (ed), Babri-Masjid-Ramjanam 
Bhoomi Controversy (Ajanta, Delhi 1990) 230. 
S8 Lucknow is the Capital of the State of UP. 
59 Ashok Singhal, 'The Struggle for Liberation of Sri Ram -Janamabhoorni' 
<http://www.vhp.org/englishsite/e.Special_Movements/dRanjanambhumi%20Mutiithestruggle.htm> accessed 
10 October 2006. 
Wrhe assassination of Indira Gandhi was associated with religious disputes between the minority Sikh 
religious community and the majority Hindu community. For Sikhs all over the world, the Golden Temple. 
situated at Arnritsar in the state of Punjab, is the most significant sacred site. In the early 1980s, militants 
under the leadership of Sant Bindranwale took refuge in the Golden Temple and carried out attacks on Hindus 
in the state. Indira Gandhi ordered the Indian military to flush out Sikh militants from the sacred site and 
accordingly they attacked the Golden Temple and its precincts on 5 June 1984. In this process, tanks and 
artillery were used to destroy a sacred site of the Sikh religious community. Later, that year Indira Gandhi 
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time the VHP intensified its protests and a district court order led to the opening of the 
locks of the Babri Masjid to the Hindus in March 1986,61 whereas entry to the Muslims 
continued to be denied. Following the unlocking of the Masjid and the establishment of the 
Babri Masjid Action Committee (BMAC) , 62 the frequency and intensity of protests by a 
section of the Muslim community increased, the dispute escalated and moved to Delhi, 
beyond the borders of UP. 
In early 1987, during a rally, some Muslim leaders in Delhi protested against the unlocking 
of the Babri Masjid, and demanded their right to pray there. At the same time the VHP 
organized rath yatras and expanded their campaign over large parts of the country. On the 
one hand, many petitions were filed in the courts against the order of unlocking, which 
opened the mosque for Hindus to worship, and on the other hand, Muslim organizations 
intensified their protests throughout India. 
After the 1989 Parliamentary elections, the Janatha Dal Party formed the government with 
the outside support of the Bharathiya Janatha Party (BJP) and V.P. Singh became Prime 
Minister. It is significant that the support of the BlP was crucial for the survival of the 
Janatha Dal Government. 
The Ramjanmabhumi issue moved centre stage in the political battle for power and was 
pushed up to a feverish pitch by L.K. Advani, the BlP president,63 after the policy of job 
reservations for backward castes was announced by V.P. Singh. The Sangh Parivar 
foresaw the danger it would cause to the Hindu electoral support they had nurtured so far. 
was assassinated by her Sikh bodyguards. In the subsequent riots nearly three thousand Sikhs were massacred 
and several million dollars worth of properties were destroyed including sacred sites belonging to the Sikh 
community. Patwant Singh. 'The Sikhs and the Challenge of the Eighties' in Joseph T. O·Connell. Milton 
Israel and Willard G. Oxtoby (eds), Sikh History and Religion in the Twentieth Century (University of 
Toronto Centre for South Asian Studies. Toronto 1988) 414-16. 
61 Text to n 128. above. 
62 In February 1986. followed by the opening of the locks. prominent Muslim leaders decided to form the 
Babri Masjid Action Committee to protect the Babri Masjid. 'DATELINE: Babri MasjidlRam-Janam-Bhoomi 
Dispute' <http://muslimsonline.comlbabrilbabridat.htrn> accessed 15 March 2007. 
63 LK Advani became the president of BJP in 1986. He reaffirmed that India should be a Hindu Slate. Along 
with other Sangh Parivar organisations. BJP adopted various slogans which highlighted Hindu Nationalism. 
So the controversy over the ownership of the Babri Mosque was a godsend for the BJP. PS Ghosh, BJP and 
the Evolution a/Hindu Nationalism: From Periphery to Celltre (Manohar, ~ew Delhi 1999) 89-92. 
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L.K. Advani launched a rath yatrcf4 across the country, to end at Ayodhya. where building 
work (lear seva) was to take place to build a Ram temple in place of the Babri Masjid. The 
public order situation in certain areas of the country deteriorated, predominantly along the 
route of the Rath Yatra. At the end of October 1990, demands to stop the yarra were 
strongly voiced within Parliament. When Advani was arrested in Bihar. a clash between 
BJP supporters and the police took place on the Sarayu river bridge in Ayodhya. The 
government had to use force to clear the Babri Masjid area and some /car sevaks were killed 
and many were injured.65 The ashes of the /car sevaks who were killed were sent in twenty-
two urns to different parts of the country by the Sangh Par;var which created more tension. 
and several places witnessed riots and violence.66When Advani was arrested. BJP withdrew 
its support for the government resulting in the failure of V.P. Singh's government to retain 
its majority in Parliament. As a result, the government lost its power. 
Elections were called in June 1991 for the Lok Sabha, and also for the UP Assembly. After 
the elections, the Congress party emerged as the single largest party in the Parliament. 
Although it did not command a majority, it formed the government under the leadership of 
Narashima Rao since Rajiv Gandhi was assassinated during the election campaign. The 
BJP gained the majority of seats and formed the government in UP state. This BJP 
leadership at UP played a crucial role in the Ayodhya Dispute, especially during the 
demolition of the Babri Masjid on the 6 December 1992. 
3.2.7. From demolition to the present day: 1992-
The Sangh Par;var declared 6 December as the day for beginning to build (Kar seva)67 the 
new Ram temple. From 1 December 1992 kar sevaks from many parts of India gathered in 
Ayodhya. It was estimated that on the demolition day, there were more than two hundred 
thousand kar sevaks ready to perform construction work. On 6 December 1992, at about 
M Rath Yatra means 'travel by a chariot'. During Rath Yalra. then BJP President l.K. Advani travelled in a 
Toyota car converted into a chariot. See. PS Ghosh. BJP and the Em/lltion of Hindu Nationalism: From 
Periphery to CC/llre (Manohar. New Delhi .1999). 94. . ... . . 
r.~ OS Burlet, 'Challenging Ethnic Conflict: HlIldu-Mushms Relations III India 1977-1993 (PhD ThesiS, 
Department of Peace Studies. University of Bradford 1997) 195-99. '. . 
M K Prasad and others. Rt'!X)rt: Citi::en's Trih,ma/ on Ayodhya (The Secretanat. ~ew Delhi 1993) 12. 
r.7 Kar st!\'a means 'voluntary work at temples'. A lor semk means 'a volunteer who has dedicated to and 
actively supported the building of Ram's Temple at Ayodhya. 
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11.00 am, as people gathered in front of the platform adjacent to the disputed area to listen 
to speeches, kar sevaks breached the cordon formed by the RSS volunteers, entered the 
disputed area, and began stoning the mosque as well as the police guarding it. Ropes were 
used to clamber on to the domes, which were then dismantled with iron rods. Journalists 
who took pictures were attacked. The PAC, the para-military unit from the UP state, which 
was stationed in the immediate vicinity of the Babri Masjid, failed to intervene and the 
Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF), which was originally stationed inside, quickly left 
the scene. Around 12.45 pm, the idols, collection boxes, and the portraits of Ram and 
others were carried from the building. The left dome caved in at 2.55 pm, the right 
collapsed at 4.35 pm and the central one fifteen minutes later. Before that, the Muslims 
were attacked in Ayodhya town and many houses were set ablaze.68 
The demolition of the Babri Masjid led to the resignation of the UP state government and 
the imposition of President's rule under Article 356. The neighbouring three BJP state 
governments were dismissed on the basis of abetting the crime of demolition of the 
Masjid.69 During the demolition of the Masjid, at 17.15 hours, a Ram idol was installed in 
the debris of the demolished shrine. On 7 December from 01.00 hours until 10.00 hours the 
debris was cleared and a small makeshift temple was constructed where the idols were 
installed.70 Subsequently, on the morning of 8 December the site came under the para-
military forces and no kar sevaks were allowed to stay inside the temple. 
The makeshift temple contained idols of Ram and his wife Sita and worship was conducted 
in the make-shift temple with the permission of the High Court, Allahabad. The Hindu 
communal organizations RSS, VHP and Bajrang Dal were banned 71 along with two 
68 C laffrelot, The Hindu Nationalist Movement and Politics 1925 to the 1990s (Hurst & Co, London 1996) 
455. For detailed demolition narratives, AK. Sahay, The Republic Besmirched (SAHMA T. New Delhi 1993). 
69 PS Ghosh, BlP and the Evolution of Hindu Nationalism: From Periphery to Centre (Manohar. New Delhi 
1999) 99. 
70 C laffrelot, The Hindu Nationalist Movement and Politics 1925 to the 1990s (Hurst & Co, London 1996) 
455. 
71 Four organizations - the RSS, the VHP, the Islamic Sevak Sangh and the Bajrang Dal- were banned under 
the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act 1967 (Act No 37 of 1967) for 'promoting dishannony of feelings of 
enmity. hatred or ill-will between different religious communities'. as was the lamaat-i-Islami for preaching 
secession. See, DS Burlet, 'Challenging Ethnic Conflict: Hindu-Muslims Relations in India 1977-1993' (PhD 
Thesis, Department of Peace Studies, University of Bradford 1997) 214. 
122 
Muslim organisations Jamait-e-Islami and Islamic Sevak Sangh.72 On 13 December 1992, 
the Central Government ordered a CBe3 inquiry relating to the demolition. A Notification74 
was issued by the union government for setting up a judicial commission 75 under a High 
Court judge to inqu~re into the circumstances relating to the events in Ayodhya on 6 
December 1992, and Justice Liberhan was appointed as the head of the Commission. The 
inquiry has not finished after fourteen years. 
Several criminal suits were filed in the courts after the demolition which will be dealt with 
in detail in the ensuing litigation section. On 7 January 1993 the union government 
acquired sixty-seven acres of land in and around the demolished Babri Masjid complex 
through the Acquisition of Certain Areas at Ayodhya Act 1993. The government set up a 
trust for the construction of the temple which failed due to political and religious 
differences. A twenty one member 'apolitical' trust was then established which was called 
'Ramjanmabhumi Ramalaya Nyas,.76 
On 7 January 1993, the President of India requested the Supreme Court to answer the 
Special Reference under Article 143( 1) of the Constitution of India. The content of the 
Reference was the seeking of the opinion of the Supreme Court as to whether a Hindu 
temple existed prior to the construction of the Babri Masjid. On 24 October 1994, the 
Supreme Court unanimously declined77 to give its opinion on the one-point Presidential 
Reference on the Ayodhya issue 78 and this will be analysed in a later section. 
In the 1996 Parliamentary elections, the Congress party failed to secure a majority, while 
due to the Babri Masjid/Ram temple dispute, the BJP gained more seats and emerged as the 
single largest party though it was short of a majority.79 BJP leader, Vajpayee, became the 
72 M Godbole, Unfinished Innings: Recollections and Reflections of a Civil Servant (Orient Longman. New 
Delhi 1996) 394. 
73 Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) is the federal investigative agency which comes under the Ministry 
of Home Affairs, New Delhi. 
74 Notification from Ministry of Home Affairs, No N-71 0 13/27/92/ A Y -I (New Delhi 16 December 1992). 
7S Under the Commission of Inquiry Act. 1952. 
76 PS Ghosh, BJP and the Evolution of Hindu Nationalism: From Periphery to Centre (Manohar. New Delhi 
1999) 264. 
77 See n 170, above. 
78 Special Correspondent, 'On Ayodhya' The Hindu (New Delhi. 25 October 1994) 1. 
79 PK Kantha. 'General Elections 1996: BJP Politics - Looking Beyond the Impasse' (29 November 1997) 
Economic and Political Weekly 3096. For more details, SI Wilkinson. J 'oles and J °iolence: Electoral 
Competition and Communal Riots in India (CUP. Cambridge 2004). 
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Prime Minister and many of those accused in the demolition of the Babri Masjid case 
became union Cabinet ministers. 
However, within thirteen days of taking office the BJP government resigned after a defeat 
in a no-confidence motion.80 In the 1998 general elections, the BJP put forward the 
construction of a Ram temple at the site of the demolished Babri Masjid81 as its main 
campaign promise and gained more seats though they once again fell short of a majority. 
Vajpayee became Prime Minister for the second time as the head of the single largest party 
in Parliament. This BJP government too did not last long due to its inner conflicts and its 
alliance partners withdrew their support after thirteen months in power, resulting in another 
general election. 
In the 1999 general elections, the BJP campaigned for a clear mandate from the people with 
a comfortable majority in Parliament so that it could fulfil its electoral promise of 
constructing a Ram temple at Ayodhya. Despite the hard work done by BJP, it could win 
only 180 seats in a House of 545 members to become the single largest party. With its 
alliance partners it achieved a majority and BJP leader, Vajpayee, became Prime Minister 
for the third time and L.K. Advani, one of the main accused in the demolition case, became 
Deputy Prime Minister. However, this time the BJP completed its five year term and an 
election was announced in 2004. Once again BJP went to the people with the appeal for a 
majority to fulfil its electoral promise of constructing the Ram temple at Ayodhya. In an 
unexpected turn of events, the Congress Party emerged as the single largest party and 
Manmohan Singh became the Prime Minister with the outside support of left wing parties 
coming together on the secular platform. 
Two later incidents need to be mentioned here relating to the Ayodhya dispute. Firstly, in 
2002, the VHP announced a deadline for the construction of the Ram temple for which the 
Supreme Court clearly denied permission and directed the government to maintain the 
status quO.82 In a subsequent move, the High Court at Lucknow, on 5 March 2003 ordered 
80 S Trivedi, '1995-1997: A Chronology' in M Bouton and P Oldenburg (eds), India Briefing: A 
Trans/ormative Fifty years (Asia Society, New York 1999) 241-94. 
81 From BJP Election Manifesto 1998. Chapter 2 'Our National Identity' states that 'the BJP is committed to 
facilitate the construction of a magnificent Shr; Ram Mandir at Ram Janmastan in Ayodhya where a 
makeshift temple already exists'. <http://www.bjp.orglmanifeslmanifes.htm> accessed 10 March 2006. 
82 Order in Writ petition (Civil) No 16012002, dated 13 March 2002. 
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archaeological
83 
excavation to verify whether any Hindu temple existed before the Babri 
Masjid was built. 
Secondly, in February 2002, some Ram devotees returning from Ayodhya in a train were 
burnt alive when some men torched one of the train compartments. This incident led to 
massive riots in the state of Gujarat, governed by the BJP, and within three days more than 
2000 people, mainly from the minority Muslim community were killed and hundreds of 
rapes were reported. 84 
This overview summarises the development of the Ayodhya dispute in the Indian political 
context and shows how the suits which began in 1950 were still pending before the courts 
for fifty-six years. Also, it can be seen how this dispute was used by the religious militants 
for upsetting the social fabric of democratic India. 
3.3. Babri Masjid and the Indian state 
This section examines the interaction between the various state actors in the Ayodhya 
dispute, it analyses how the governments, both union and state, and the judiciary handled 
the dispute and covers all the litigations from 1885 to 2007. 
3.3.1. Litigation and state action from before Independence until 1947 
After the 1855 clash,85 Hindus continued to worship in a small clay chabutra outside the 
Babri Masjid in spite of Muslim objections. Ayodhya at that time contained hundreds of 
Hindu temples and pilgrims used to visit as many as possible during their visit. 
The first legal battle started when the priest of Janmastan86 temple, Raghubar Das, filed a 
petition before the Deputy Commissioner of Faizabad in 1883 seeking permission to erect a 
83 It is relevant to refer to the order of the court dated 5 March 2003, archaeological excavations at the site of 
the Babri Masjid had been conducted from 12 March to 7 August 2003 and the report was filed on 22 August 
2003. Four sets of objections were filed by the Muslims against the aforesaid ASI (Archaeological Survey of 
India) report and after hearing lengthy arguments in this respect. the court passed an order on 3 February 
2005. The court declared that the ASI report as well as objections against the report would be considered at 
the time of final decision of the case, in the light of the evidence which had already been produced by the 
parties or which might be produced. 
a.. AA Engineer, Communal Riots After Independence: A Comprehensive Account (Shipra. ~ew Delhi 2004) 
188. 
85 See n 39, below. 
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small temple over the chabutra, of which he claimed the ownership, to protect the idols and 
the devotees from the vagaries of nature. Permission was denied. Consequently, Raghubar 
Das filed a suit at the Faizabad sub-judge's court seeking permission to build a roof over 
the chabutra.87 The plaintiff s contention was that the chabutra was in his possession as a 
Mahant of the Janmastan and that it was necessary to construct a temple for him and for 
the worshippers.88 However, the significant factor to consider is that the plea was not 
against the mosque, but for the erection of a wall and sheds to save the idols from the 
vagaries of nature. The sub-judge Hari Kishan, however, on December 24 dismissed the 
plea, saying that the awarding of permission to construct the temple at this juncture would 
be laying the foundation for riots and murders between the Hindus and the Muslims.89 
However, to decide the issue of ownership, the judge decided in favour of the plaintiff 
Raghubar Das. 
Against the above order, Raghubar Das filed an appeal90 in the District court which was 
dismissed by the District Judge Col. F .E.A. Chamier. In his dismissal order, the judge 
recorded the reasons as follows. Firstly, it was unfortunate that a Masjid had been built on 
land specially held sacred by the Hindus, but as the event occurred 356 years ago it was too 
late to remedy the grievance. Secondly, any change could cause more harm and 
derangement of order than benefit, hence the maintenance of status quo was ordered. 
Finally, the order of the sub-judge declaring the right of property to rest in plaintiff was 
cancelled since there were no documents to support the claim of the mahant as its 
propri etor. 91 
A subsequent second appeal92 was also finally dismissed by the Judicial Commissioner of 
Avadh, W Young, who had the power of the High Court. In his judgement dated 1 
86 Janmastan means 'birth place'. 
87 Para 4 from the Plaint of Mahant Raghubar Das dated 29 January 1885 cited in AG Noorani (ed), The 
Babri Masjid Question 1528-2003: A Matter of National Honour (Tulika Books, New Delhi 2(03) Vol I, 175-
76. 
88 Ibid. 
89 Mahant Raghubar Das. Mahant of Janmastan. Ayodhya v The Secretary of State for India in Cou~cil, 
Plaint dated 29 January 1885 - no 61/280 of 1885 cited in MJ Akhtar. Babri Masjid: A Tale Untold (Genu me. 
New Delhi 1997) 55-61. 
90 Civil Appeal no 27 of 1886 instituted on 9 January 1886. 
91 Judgement by FEA Chamier. District J~dge •. Faizabad dat~ 26 March 188~. .. ._ 
92 Second Civil Appeal no 122 of 1886 Cited In AG Noorani (ed), The Babn .\!asjld Question 1_' 28-2003: A 
Matter of National Honour (TuJika Books. New Delhi 2(03) Vol I. 186-88 
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November 1886, the Judicial Commissioner noted that it was a very wise and proper 
procedure on the part of the executive and the Civil Courts to have promptly dismissed the 
plaintiff s claim. The pleas on appeal were wholly unsupported by the facts in the case or 
by any arguments that appear to be weighty. In addition, there was nothing whatever on the 
record to show that the plaintiff was in any sense the proprietor of the land in question. 
Hence the appeal was dismissed.93 
With the above dismissal, the first litigation in the nineteenth century between Hindus and 
Muslims came to an end. By this time it was clearly established that the property rights 
claimed by the mahant were not sustainable by law. Though the right to worship was 
allowed near the chabutra, both parties were requested by the court of law to maintain the 
'status quo'. This shows that the courts had acted swiftly to dispense justice which thus 
prevented further riots or violence in Ayodhya based on the place of worship. 
In 1943, the Commissioner of Waqfs set up an enquiry, under section 4 of Uttar Pradesh 
Muslim Waqfs Act,94 into the ownership of the Babri Masjid. The enquiry found that the 
Babri Masjid was built in 1528 by Babar who was a Sunni Muslim.95 Later in a suit96 
between the Shia and Sunni communities, the Civil Judge of Faizabad confirmed the fact 
that the Babri Masjid was in the use of Shia and Sunni sects of the Muslims. However, the 
Civil Judge held it to be a Sunni Waqfproperty.97 
The Judge came to this conclusion based on the following evidence. Firstly, there was 
evidence found in the history of the mosque in the Faizabad Gazetteer, of the settlement 
report which affirmed the visit of Babar to Ayodhya in 1528 AD. Secondly, one of the 
inscriptions in the mosque clearly stated that Babar had ordered the building of the mosque 
as stated in the Gazetteer and the settlement report. Thirdly, records prove that Babar had 
made a grant for the upkeep of the mosque. Finally, there is the admitted fact that within 
living memory of the imams, the muezzins in the mosque have been Sunnis and they were 
93 Judgement by Judicial Commissioner W Young, Oudh. dated 1 November 1886 in no 1221.1<11886 cited in 
AG Noorani (ed), The Babri Masjid Question J 528-2003: A Malter of National Honour (Tulika Books, New 
Delhi 2003) Vol I, 188. 
94 UP Muslim Waqfs Act (Act No XIII of 1936). 
9S The report of Faizabad District WaqfCommissioner. dated 8 February 1941. 
96 Suit no 29 of 1945. 
97 SMa Ce11tral Board of UP Waqfv Sr",,,; Central Board of UP Waqf( 1945) Regular Suit no 29. 1945. 
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paid by Mutttawallis who had always been Shiites. Based on those reasons, the judge 
declared Babri Masjid as a Sunni Waqfproperty. 
From the above discussion, it became clear that from 1885 until 1946, the suits were settled 
as soon as possible in the courts without delay. The executive authorities followed the court 
orders effectively. The speedy remedy prevented further riots based on Babri Masjid 
disputes. 
3.3.2. Litigation and State Action: 1947-1985 
In 1949, the controversy took a new tum with the placing of idols of Ram and others inside 
the mosque which had been used by the Muslims for worship for the past 421 years that 
forms the nucleus of the whole dispute. During the final months of 1949 a group of sadhus 
occupied a Muslim cemetery near the mosque, and ignited sacred fires to emphasize their 
claim that the area was originally a Hindu religious site.98 Some days later, however, idols 
of Ram, Lakshman,99 and Sita,100 were discovered inside the mosque which Hindus claimed 
was a miraculous event. 101 
There are multiple versions as to how this occurred. However, Gould observes that 'this 
miracle story created a local sensation. Hindus and Muslims flocked to the Janmastan, the 
former to bear witness to the miracle, the latter to defend the Babri Masjid against 
desecration and seizure by the Hindus'. 102 However, the District Magistrate K.K. Nayar 
seems not to have accepted this miracle story in his radio message. 103 
98 C Jaffrelot, The Hindu Nationalist Movement and Politics 1925 to the 1990s (Hurst & Co, London 1996) 
93. 
99 Lakshman is brother of Hindu god Ram. 
100 Sita is wife of Hindu god Ram. 
101 However, the First Information Report stated: At about 9.00 in the morning around fifty to sixty persons 
entered the Babri Masjid after breaking open the 10cks. IOI They did not care when Hans Raj. the constable No 
70, stopped them from entering. Provincial Armed Constabulary (PAC) guards were called for help but by 
then the mob had already entered the masjid. Regarding the offenders, Mata Prasad points out that 'Ram Das, 
Shukla Das, Sudharsan Das with 50 to 60 persons desecrated the mosque by trespassing the mosque through 
rioting and placing idols in it. AG Noorani, 'Legal Aspects to the Issue' in S Gopal (ed), Anatomy of a 
Confrontation: The Babri Masjid-Ramjanmabhumi Issue (Viking, New Delhi 1991) 70-1. 
102 HA Gould, Grass Roots Politics in India: A Century of Political Evoilition in Faizabad District (IBH 
Publishing Co, Oxford 1994) 181-96. 
10J A Radio Message sent at 10.30 am on 23ni December 1949. by District Magistrate K.K. :'\ayar to the Chief 
Minister. Chief Secretary and Home Secretary stated that 'a few Hindus entered Babri Mosque at night when 
the Mosque was deserted and installed a deity there. A Police picket of 15 persons was on duty at night but 
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When the dispute escalated local tension, additional city Magistrate, Markandey Singh, 
ordered the gates of Babri Masjid to be locked104 and prohibited both communities from its 
use. The order stated: 
I order to lock the building a~er being fully satisfied from information received from police 
sources and from other credIble sources that a dispute between Hindus and Muslims of 
Ay?dhya over th~ ques~~on of rights of proprietorship and worship in the building claimed 
vanously as Babn MasJld and Janmabhumi Mandir (temple), within the local limits of my 
jurisdiction, is likely to lead to a breach of the peace. 105 
The Magistrate appointed Priya Dutt Ram, Chainnan, Municipal Board, Faizabad-cum-
Ayodhya, as 'receiver' to arrange for the care of the property in dispute on 29 December 
1949. The receiver took charge of the disputed property on 5 January 1950 and submitted a 
scheme as specified in the additional city Magistrate's order. 106 
After the mosque was attachedI07 and a receiver was appointed, the first suit was filed on 
16 January 1950 by Gopa/ Singh Visharad, a mahant from Ayodhya. The Plaintiffs108 
did not act. Situation is under control. MJ Akhtar, Babri Masjid: A Tale Untold (Genuine, New Delhi 1997) 
51. 
104 Criminal Procedure Code 1973 (CrPC) (Act No 2 of 1974) s 145 contains an entire chapter on 'disputes as 
to immovable property'. It reads: (1) whenever a District Magistrate, Sub-Divisional Magistrate or Magistrate 
of the first class is satisfied from a police-report or other information that a dispute likely to cause a breach of 
the peace exists concerning any land or water or the boundaries thereof, within the local limits of is 
jurisdiction, he shall make an order in writing, stating the grounds of his being so satisfied, and requiring the 
parties concerned in such dispute to attend his court in person or by pleader, within a time to be fixed by such 
Magistrate, and to put in written statements of their respective claims as respects the fact of actual possession 
of the subject of dispute, and further requiring them to put in such documents, or to adduce by putting in 
affidavits, the evidence of such persons, as they rely upon in support of such claims. 
Provided further that, if it appears to the Magistrate that any party has within two months next before the date 
of such order been forcibly and wrongfully dispossessed, he may treat the party so dispossessed as if he had 
been in possession at such date, 
Provided also that, if the Magistrate considers the case one of emergency, he may at any time attach the 
subject of dispute, pending his decision under this section 
lOS SK Tripati 'One Hundred Years of Litigation' in AA Engineer (ed), Babri MasjidlRamjanmabhoomi 
Controversy (Ajanta, New Delhi 1990) 20-1. 
106 Ibid 22. 
107 CrPC (n 103) s 146: Power to attach subject of dispute and to appoint receiver - (1) If the Magistrate at any 
time after making the order under sub-section (I) of section 145 considers the case to be one of emergency, or 
if he decides that none of the parties was then in such possession as is referred to in section 145, or if he is 
unable to satisfy himself as to which of them was then in such possession of the subject of dispute. he may 
attach the subject of dispute until a competent Court has determined the rights of the parties thereto with 
regard to the person entitled to the possession thereof: 
Provided that such Magistrate may withdraw the attachment at any time if he is satisfied that there is no 
longer any likelihood of breach of the peace with regard to the subject of dispute. 
(2) When the Magistrate attaches the subject of dispute. he may. if no receiver in relation to such subject of 
dispute has been appointed by any Civil Court. make such aIT'dngements as he considers proper for looking 
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claimed two remedies which included the right to darshan J09 and worship without any 
interference from the defendants, and a pennanent prohibitory order against the defendants 
and their legal representatives not to remove the idols from the Janmastan. The Civil Judge 
N.N. Chadha passed an interim injunction order to allow worship by a Hindu priest and the 
non-removal of the idols. Once again the order dated 16 January 1950 was modified on 19 
January 1950.])0 
The new Deputy Commissioner of Faizabad, IN. Ugra, filed a reply in title suit No 2 of 
1950 in which he denied that the plaintiff was entitled to get any relief as prayed for by him 
and further stated that the property in suit was known as Babri Masjid and it had been used 
for the purpose of worship by the Muslims for a long period. It was not in use as a Ram 
temple. I II He categorically stated in his written statement that 'on the night of the 22 
December 1949 the idols of Ram and others were surreptitiously and wrongly put inside 
it'.112 
Later the interim injunction order was confinned by the Civil Judge, Faizabad in his order 
dated 3 March 1951. He ordered that the interim injunction remain in force until the suit be 
disposed of. This order of interim injunction may not be legally tenable. The reason is, in 
his order, the Civil Judge made mention of affidavits of certain Muslim residents of 
Ayodhya. The arguments on merits were heard and concluded by the court on 17 February 
1951 and the interim order was passed on 3 March 1951. In the intervening period, the 
judge allowed those 'affidavits' to be filed by unknown people. In addition, no opportunity 
after the property or if he thinks fit, appoint a receiver thereof, who shall have, subject to the control of the 
Magistrate, all the powers of a receiver appointed under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908: Provided that in 
the event of a receiver being subsequently appointed in relation to the subject of dispute by any Civil Court, 
the Magistrate- (a) shall order the receiver appointed by him to hand over the possession of the subject of 
dispute to the receiver appointed by the Civil Court and shall thereafter discharge the receiver appointed by 
him~ (b) may make such other incidental or consequential orders as may be just. 
108 Gopa/ Singh Visharad and others v Zahoor Ahmad and others, Suit no 2 of 1950. 
109 Darshan means 'to see' the idols of Hindu gods installed in temples as part of worship. 
110 This order, dated on 19 January 1950, was passed by Bir Singh, Civil Judge, Faizabad. The order dated 16 
January 1950 was modified on 19 Janu~ 1950 as f~llows: ~e o~posite ~arties are her~by. res~ained by 
means of temporary injunction to restram from removmg the Idols m question from the site m dispute and 
from interfering with puja etc as 'at present carried on'. The order dated 16 January 1950 stands modified 
accordingly. 
III Para 12 from the written statement of Deputy Commissioner Ugra in the Court of Munsif Sadar, Faizabad 
in Suit no 2 of 1950. 
112 Para 13 from the written statement of Deputy Commissioner Ugra in the Court of Munsif Sadar. F aizabad 
in Suit no 2 of 1950. SK Tripati, 'One Hundred Years of Litigation' in AA Engineer (ed), Babr; 
MasjidlRamjanmabhoom; Controversy (Ajanta, New Delhi 1990) 23. 
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was given to the Muslim defendants or the state to file counter affidavits. I 13 Hence, these 
affidavits were not legally maintainable. 
The civil judge confirmed the interim order on three grounds. Firstly, that the existence of 
the idols and worship was being conducted in a limited way in the mosque. This, coupled 
with the affidavits, made out a prima facie case in favour of the plaintiff. Secondly, 
vacating the interim injunction would result in depriving the plaintiff of the right to worship 
claimed by him. And fmally, there were other mosques in the area and the local Muslims 
would not be put into much inconvenience during the pendency of the case. 
Against this order, a first appeal was filed in the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad. 
Chief Justice O.H. Mootham and Justice R. Dayal dismissed the appeal and confirmed the 
interim injunction, though their order recognised the 'error' made by the Civil Judge by 
placing the reliance on the affidavits. After evaluating the lower court's decision, the High 
Court commented that the lower court judge ought not to have treated those documents as 
evidence without notice to the appellants and affording them an opportunity of filing 
counter affidavits, and if necessary, of hearing counsel further thereon. 114 However, the 
High Court observed that granting an interim injunction is a matter of discretion 115 and 
unless the court is satisfied that the judge has acted in an arbitrary manner it will not 
interfere with the order which he has made. With that order by the High Court, the suit 
came back to the Civil Court at Faizabad for disposal. 
Meantime, a second suitll6 was filed for the same relief by another Hindu priest called 
Paramhansa Ramachandra Das. On 1 February 1951, the civil judge of Faizabad 
consolidated the two suits. A third suitl17 was filed on 17 December 1959 in the Court of 
Civil Judge by Nirmohi Akhara (a congregation of Hindu Priests) through its chief priest 
against the Receiver, Priya Dutt Ram, and seven other defendants, including the State of 
113 MJ Akhtar, Bahri Masjid: A Tale Untold (Genuine, New Delhi 1997) 62. 
114 High Court's order dated on 26 April 1955 in Suit no 2 of 1950. 
lIS Civil Procedure Code 1908 (Act No 5 of 1908) (CPC) s 94(c): 'in order to prevent the ends of justice being 
defeated, the court may grant a temporary injunction'. 
116 Suit no 25 of 1950 was filed in the Court of Civil Judge, Faizabad. In this suit, Paramhansa Ramachandra 
Das. who was a priest from Nirmoki Akhara, and others were plaintiffs against nine defendants including the 
State of Uttar Pradesh. Relief claimed were similar to the first suit which included a declaration to entitle the 
Plaintiff to worship without any check, obstruction or interference, and prohibiting the defendants or their 
Je,al representatives not to interfere in exercising his right to worship. 
II Suit no 26/1959 of the Court of Civil Judge, Faizabad, now registered as Other Original Suit no 3 of 1989 
in the High Court. 
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UP. The relief claimed was the removal of the Receiver from management and charge of 
the temple of Ram Janmastan, and the delivery of the site to the plaintiffs. 
For the first time the Muslims filed a suit in 1961. The Sunni Central Board ofWaqfs, UP, 
filed a suit against Gopa/ Singh Visharad and other plaintiffs in the first suit, for declaration 
and recovery of possession of the mosque and graveyard after removing the idols and other 
articles. I 18 
In 1964, all the four suits were consolidated I 19 and the Waqf suit was made the leading suit. 
In all these suits a date was fixed for the final hearing, but the death of the Receiver in 1970 
created a fresh dispute which paved the way for proliferation of suits. This delayed the 
final hearing of title suits since the Receiver was one of the main defendants in those suits. 
This receivership dispute was finally settled by the High Court on 23 July 1987 after 
pending for twelve years. 120 During these years, the files of the title suits remained before 
the High Court and in the final order in 1987, the High Court directed the District Judge to 
dispose of the original suits as early as possible. 
3.3.3. Litigation and State action 1985-1992 
Between 1951 and 1985 Faizabad and Ayodhya remained mostly calm and the dispute was 
contested through the courts. In 1984, VHP initiated a movement to 'liberate' the Ram 
Janmabhumi and the rebuilding of a magnificent Ram temple at Ayodhya. As the VHP 
carried out its campaign to op~n the locks, another issue, the Shah Bano judgement, began 
to attract the attention of the whole nation. Secular historians like Panikkar, Gopal and 
especially Engineerl21 allege that it had some influence on subsequent events which 
heightened the Ayodhya dispute to a new level. According to Neerja Chowdhury,122 there is 
118 Regular Suit no 12 of 1961 in the Court of Civil Judge, Faizabad. 
119 Order IV -A of the Civil procedure code 1908, under the title of 'Consolidation of Cases' states: When two 
or more suits or proceedings are pending in the same Court, and the Court is of opinion that it is expedient in 
the interest of justice, it may by order direct their joint trial, where upon all such suits and proceedings may be 
decided upon the evidence in all or any of such suits or proceedings. 
120 From the averments of Writ Petition no 746/86 in the Allahabad High Court. For more details, K Prasad 
and others, Report: Citizen's Tribunal on Ayodhya (The Secretariat, New Delhi 1993) 97-8. 
121 AA Engineer. 'Introduction' in AA Engineer (ed), The Shah Bano Controversy (Orient Longman, 
Hlderabad, India 1987) I. 
12 Neerja Chowdhury details that there was strong opposition from the All India Muslim Personal Law Board 
to the Shah Bano judgement and that Rajiv Gandhi, then Prime Minister, promised Muslim leaders an 
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evidence of a connection between the opening of the disputed Babri masjid in Ayodhya and 
the introduction of the Muslim Women Bill in Parliament. Hence a brief account is given 
here about this judgement and the subsequent Bill brought by the union government to 
defeat this judgement. 
Shah Bano was married to Mohammad Ahmad Khan, an advocate from the State of 
Madhya Pradesh in 1932. In 1946, Khan married a second wife and denied Shah Bano her 
basic amenities. In 1975 Khan drove Shah Bano out of the house. When Shah Bano 
approached the first class judicial magistrate, Indore, asking for maintenance 123 from her 
husband at the rate of Rupees 500 per month, Khan divorced Shah Bano by a so- called 
'irrevocable' triple talaq pronounced in a single breath on 6 November 1978. 
Before the Indore Magistrate, and throughout subsequent proceedings, right up to the 
Supreme Court, Khan insisted that Shah Bano had ceased to be his wife and he was under 
no obligation to provide maintenance for her beyond what he had already paid her. The 
magistrate, however, directed Khan to pay 25 rupees 124 per month. Shah Bano appealed to 
the Madhya Pradesh High Court which increased the amount of maintenance to 179.20 
rupees. Against this order, Khan appealed to the Supreme Court where his appeal was 
dismissed and the High Court judgement was confirmed. 
The Shah Bano judgement created a public outcry among the Muslim men. The All India 
Muslim Personal Law Board (AIMPLB) protested against the judgment and organised 
Muslims against the union government which created unrest throughout the country. The 
demonstrations finally came to an end only when the union government under Rajiv 
Gandhi pre-empted the judgement by introducing the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights 
on Divorce) Bill on 25 February 1986 which exempted Muslim women from the purview 
of Sections 125 and 127 of CrPC. Therefore the Muslim women were denied the protection 
ordinance to over-ride the effects of the judgement by the Supreme Court. The Bill was introduced in 
Parliament on 25 February and became an Act. Thus the Muslim leaders have been silent on the opening of 
the Babri Masjid. except for sporadic agitations. because they do not want to do anything to jeopardize the 
Muslim Women's Bill. Neerja Chowdhury. 'Short sighted Move to Appease Communities' The Statesman 
(New Delhi 1 May 1986) cited in AG Noorani (ed), The Babri Masjid Question /528-2003: 'A malter of 
National Honour' (Tulika Books, New Delhi 2003) Vol 1,264-66. 
123 CrPC (n 103) s 125. 
124 Rupee is the currency used in India and some other South Asian countries. 
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of national secular law, and once again from the legal standpoint came under the Muslim 
personal law . 
Perceiving the vulnerability of the Prime Minister, the Sangh Parivar intensified its 
demand for opening the locks in Babri Masjid/Ram Janmabhumi. Ghosh pointed out that 
the supplanting of the Supreme Court judgement in the Shah Bano case by the Muslim 
Women's Bill charged the sentiments of the BJP further and it took full advantage of the 
situation and completely identified itself with the entire pan-Hindu forces'. 125 
Returning from this context to our dispute, a major turning point came on the 25 January 
1986, when Umesh Pandey, an advocate from Ayodhya, moved an application126 in the 
Magistrate Court of H.S. Dubey, Faizabad, seeking directions that the locks on the doors of 
the Ramjanmabhumi temple should be opened for Hindus to allow free offering of prayers. 
But the Magistrate did not pass .any order because the main suit for the title was pending in 
the High Court. Expressing his inability to dispose of the application, he felt he could not 
pass an order without the records of the main SUit. 127 
Umesh Pandey, who was not a party in any main suits, filed an appeal l28, against the order 
of the Magistrate in the Court of the District Judge, Faizabad, in which he stated that the 
order amounted to a refusal of his prayer. His prayer was 'for allowing free entry into the 
building for worship and darshan' which was restricted by the district authorities as per the 
interim order passed in 1950. 
The appeal was admitted by the District Judge K.M. Pandey on 31 January 1986 and 
disallowed the applications for impleadment of Muslims and allowed Umesh Pandey's plea 
for the opening of the locks. In his order, Judge K.M. Pandey stated: 
After having heard the parties it is clear that the members of the other community, namely 
Muslims, are not going to be affected by any stretch of imagination if the locks of the gates are 
opened and the idols inside the premises are allowed to be seen and worshipped by pilgrims and 
devotees. It is an undisputed fact that the premises are presently in the Court's possession and 
for the last 35 years Hindus have an unrestricted right of worship as a result of the Court orders 
125 PS Ghosh, BJP and the Evoilition of Hindu Nationalism: From Periphery to Centre (Manohar, New Delhi 
1999) 90. 
126 Application 4221C in Regular Suit no 2 of 1950. 
127 Order dated 28 January 1986. 
128 Civil Appeal no 66/198, dated on 30 January 1986. The appellant included only the State Government and 
other district authorities as respondents in the appeal. and not any Muslim defendants including the Sunni 
Central Board of Waqfs. since he alleged that be did not want any relief against them. 
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of 1950 and 1951 (19.1.50 and 3.3 .51). The District Magistrate has stated before me today that 
members of the Muslim community are not allowed to offer any prayer at the disputed site. If 
this is the state of affairs, then there is no occasion for law and order problem arising as a result 
of the removal of locks. It is absolutely an affair inside the premises. 129 
Based on the above reasons, and the assurances from the DM and the SSP that law and 
order could be maintained, the judge directed the defendants to open the locks and not to 
impose any restriction or hurdle in the darshan and worship of the applicant and other 
members of the Hindu community. 
There are certain legal issues arising from this order. Firstly, the applicant Umesh Pandey 
who moved the application in question was not a party to any of the suits related to the 
Babri Masjid and as such he had no locus-standi. Secondly, the Muslims who were parties 
in the original suits were not allowed to plead. Thirdly, the statements were never recorded 
in appeals. Finally, the appeal was heard by the District Judge without any records, which 
were pending before the High Court to decide the 'Receiver' dispute. 
It is significant, however, that throughout the years of the Ayodhya dispute, this was the 
only time the court and the state authorities acted swiftly in such an unprecedented manner. 
The order was complied with within forty minutes of it being delivered by the authorities. 
The lock was being broken at 5.19 pm in Ayodhya, seven kilometres away from Faizabad, 
and the state administration had made all arrangements against any untoward incident. In 
this hasty process, the Receiver, appointed by the court to look after the disputed property 
and in whose possession the key of the lock remained, was not informed about the order. 130 
Consequently, the lock had to be broken which fulfilled the wish of the Sangh Parivar's 
'break the locks' campaign. 
This order violated the fundamental religious rights of the Muslim minority community. 
Mohammad Hashim, a resident of Ayodhya, filed a Writ of Certiorari and Mandamus 
against the District Court's order which removed the locks. 131 Justice Brijesh Kumar of the 
129 Umesh Chandra Pandey v State of UP and Others (1986) Civil Appeal no 66/1986. 
IlO Interview with Z Jilani, Member of All India Muslim Personal Law Board (AIMPLB), Advocate. 
Lucknow High Court (Lucknow 9 February 2006). 
III Indian Constitution art 32: when a judgment was made against natural justice, mala tide or perver.;e, a Writ 
of Certiorari may be issued. For the same reason, for the infringement of a right in breach of natural justice 
principle, a Writ of Mandamus may be issued. 
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High Court issued notice to the opposing party but chose to pass a status quo order132 thus 
confirming the rights of the Hindus to continue worshipping the idols and by his order 
justified the 'error' made by the civil Judge. 133 
Following the opening of the locks, Muslim organisations such as the All India Babri 
Masjid Action Committee (AI,BMAC), Babri Masjid Action Committee (BMAC), and All 
India Muslim Personal law Board (AIMPLB) intensified their protest to safeguard the 
Babri Masjid. This in a way worsened the communal situation throughout the country. 
The campaign of the Sangh Parivar to build a Ram Temple in Ayodhya apparently divided 
the society along communal lines and thereafter the dispute assumed a national character, I 34 
in which the role of the media was vital since it gave wide publicity to the dispute. 135 
Anticipating the danger ahead, on 10 December 1987, an application was filed at the 
Lucknow Bench of the Allahabad High Court by the UP State government for the 
withdrawal of the four title suits for hearing by the High Court to expedite its disposal and 
also for deferring the hearing of the two Writ Petitions Nos. 746 and 3106 of 1986 filed 
against the unlocking order. A Division Bench of the High Court allowed the transfer of all 
the four pending suits from the District Court to the branch of Allahabad High Court at 
Lucknow for speedy trial. 136 In addition, the state requested the court to pass an order that 
both parties should maintain the status quo in the disputed property which the court duly 
complied with. 
Thereafter, the Sangh Parivar held a nationwide blessing service for the bricks to be used 
for the construction of the new Ram temple (Shila Pujan), which were brought in 
procession to Ayodhya, which resulted in communal violence in many parts of the 
country.137 When the suits were pending before the High Court Bench, the Sangh Parivar 
declared 9 November 1989 as Shilanyas (laying the foundation ceremony) day. The Sangh 
Parivar chose plot no. 586 for the Shilanyas, which was contested by the Muslims as 
132 In his order, Justice Brijesh Kumar mentioned 'until further order, the nature of the property in question as 
existing today shall not be changed' in Writ Petition no 746 of 1986. 
133 Allahabad High Court's order dated on 3 February 1986 on WP no 746 of 1986. . 
13 .. DS Burlet, 'Challenging Ethnic Conflict: Hindu-Muslims Relations in India 1977-1993' (PhD ThesIs. 
Department of Peace Studies, University of Bradford 1997) 191. 
m K Prasad and others, Report: Citizen's Tribunal on A)'odhya (The Secretariat, New Delhi 1993) 303-4. 
136 Order dated on 10 July 1989 in Suit no 2 of 1950. 
1.\7 A Nandy and others, Creating a Nationality: The Ramjanmabhumi Mon!nlent and Fear o/Ihe Sel/(OUP. 
Oxford 1995) 108. 
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within the disputed area.138 Despite the prohibitory court order, the Sangh Parivar went 
ahead with its plan of Shilanyas in the disputed plot. 139 
In the subsequent elections, BJP fonned the government in UP in 1991 and pledged to 
build the Ram temple in Ayodhya. This made it easier for the Sangh Parivar to change an 
almost non-existent 'local' issue into one of 'national pride' 140 and importance. 
The BJP Government from the beginning of its rule acted in a partisan manner which 
showed it would fulfil its electoral promise to construct a magnificent Ram temple in 
Ayodhya. 141 On 7 October 1991, the UP State government through a notification142 
acquired 2.77 acres 143 of disputed land. The main argument of the government was that it 
acquired this land for the public purpose of developing tourism and providing amenities to 
pilgrims at Ayodhya. Immediately, in a writ petition;44 Mohammad Hashim contested the 
validity of the said acquisition in the High Court Bench, Lucknow, and requested the court 
to stay the acquisition. More writ petitions were filed both in the High Court and the 
Supreme COurt. 145 The challenges were mainly based on two grounds. Firstly, that the 
notified land was Waqf property and that such property could not be acquired under the 
Land Acquisition Act. And secondly, the exercise of power by the state government was 
138 The Government of UP made a Civil Miscellaneous Application no 48 of 1989 to the Allahabad High 
Court, for clarification under Section 151 CPC. In the application, the Court was requested to declare that the 
words 'property in question' mentioned in the interim order dated 14 August 1989 refer to the property 
including plot no 586 as one of the plots in dispute in the suit. In its order, the Court stated emphatically that 
'We clarify that the order dated 14 August 1989, was in respect of the entire property mentioned in the suit, 
including plot no 586'. 
139 K Prasad and others, Report: Citizen IS Tribunal on Ayodhya (The Secretariat, New Delhi 1993) 29; Sudesh 
Vaid, Cry the Beloved Country (People's Union for democratic Rights, New Delhi 1992) 10. 
140 The resolution adopted by the National Executive of the SJP at its emergent meeting. quoted in Indian 
Express (Bombay, India 18 October 1990). 
141 The day after his swearing in ceremony, 25 June 1991. the Chief Minister Kalyan Singh led his cabinet in a 
caravan to Ayodhya for a darshan and declared that Ram temple will be constructed at this disputed site. See 
MJ Akhtar, Babri Masjid: A Tale Untold (Genuine, New Delhi 1997) 23. 
142 Vide Notification No 3814/XLI-33-86. 
143 Under Sub-section (I) of Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (Act No 1 of 1894). . . 
1~ Writ Petition no 3540 (M/B) of 1991 (Civil Miscellaneous Application no 22799 (W) of 1991 and Cl\ll 
Miscellaneous Application no 22810 (W) 1991. 
145 Panch Ramanandi Nirmohi Akhara, Ayodhya and Olhers WP no 3541 (MB). Jamiatul {,'Imui Hind WP no 
4201 (MB) were tiled in the Allahabad High Court and three Writ petitions were filed in Supreme Court of 
India, Naveed Yar Khan no 4000/91, Mohammad Aslam WP (C) no 977 and 972 of 1991. 
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colourablel46 in as much as the real purpose of acquisition was to destroy the mosque and to 
transfer the land to some Hindu organization to construct a temple thereon. 
The High Court Bench in an interim order declared that the State may take possession of 
the notified land, but no permanent structure shall be put up although a structure of 
temporary nature could be erected. In addition, the possession shall be subject to further 
order of the Court and the acquired land shall not be transferred to any party. However, 
through a Deed of Lease on 20 March 1992 between the State government and the Shr; 
Ramjanmabhumi Trust, the land was transferred to the said trust against the order of the 
High Court. 
In defiance of the court order, the kar sevaks started building a platform on the acquired 
land, after demolishing existing buildings and temples which clearly violated the status quo 
order. This was challenged by the Muslims before the court and on 15 July 1992, the 
Lucknow Bench passed an order stopping any construction activity on the disputed site. On 
16 July 1992, the Chief Secretary directed the OM and SSP to ensure compliance with the 
High Court orders. However, the VHP leaders and priests declared that they would not 
allow anyone seeking to implement the court orders to enter the area. This proved that the 
will and capacity of the State Government to enforce the orders of the highest court of the 
land were put to test and were found to be totally lacking. 147 
Due to the increasing communal tension, on 10 September 1991, the Lok Sabha148 passed 
the Places of Worship (Special Provisions) Bill149 which prohibited conversion of any place 
of worship, and made their request to maintain the religious character of any place of 
146 Justice Krishna Iyer defines colourable legislation as: In the jurisprudence of power, colourable exercise of 
or fraud on legislative power or, more frightfully, fraud on the Constitution, are expressions whi,ch merely 
mean that the legislature is incompetent to enact a particular law, although the label of competency IS stuck on 
it, and then it is colourable legislation. RS Joshi and others v Ajit Mills Ltd and another: RS Joshi and others \' 
Idar Taluka Sahakari and others (Civil Appeals no 533, 1004, 1410 and 1671-1685 of 1975) AIR 1977 SC 
2279. 
147 K Prasad and others, Report: Citizen's Tribunal on Ayodhya (The Secretariat, New Delhi 1993) 62. 
148 Lok Sabha is the lower house of the Parliament like the House of Commons in Britain, 
149 Places of Worship (Special Provisions) Act (Act No 42 of 1991). 
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worship as it existed on the 15 August, 1947, the day India became an independent state. 
However, the Babri Mosque was excluded from its purview. ISO 
On 31 October 1992, the Daram Sansad, a religious Parliament of Hindu priests, 
announced the resumption of kar seva from 6 December 1992.151 The Prime Minister tried 
to counter the increasing communal tension by making an appeal to the Supreme Court to 
intervene. IS2 Subsequently, on 27 November, through an affidavit, the UP State 
Government assured the Court, that they would protect the mosque. The High Court 
appointed Tej Shankar, a District Judge, as an observer who would report periodically.153 
Despite objections by opposing counsel, the Supreme Court in its order of 28 November 
1992 permitted Kar Seva as 'a symbolic occasion' and disallowed any construction work 
on the acquired 2.77 acres of land. 
On 30 November 1992, the Supreme Court asked the UP State Government to improve the 
inadequate security arrangements. However, despite all the assurances from the state 
government, the Babri Mosque was demolished by the Sangh Parivar on 6 December 1992 
as is discussed in the overview. 
3.3.4. Litigation and State action, 1992-
After the demolition, in reply to the six writ petitions l54 filed against the acquisition of the 
land by the UP Government, the first judicial verdict came on 11 December 1992 in the 
form of striking down the Acquisition of the Land Act 1991. This Act was challenged on 
ISO Ibid s 5 :'Nothing contained in this Act shall apply to the place or place of worship commonly known as 
Ram lanmabhumi-Babri Masjid situated in Ayodhya, UP to any suit, appeal or other proceeding to the said 
~Iace or place of worship' . 
SI 'Nothing Can Stop Kar Seva' The Hindu (New Delhi 1 November 1992). 
IS2 'Ayodhya: PM Favours Court Arbitration' The Hindu (New Delhi IS November 1992). 
IS) 'Observer for Ayodhya' The Hindu (New Delhi 30 November 1992). 
154 (I) Mohammad Hashim v State of UP and others Writ Petition no 3540 (MB) Of 1991 
(2) Panch Ramanandi Nirmohi Akhara v State of UP and others Writ Petition no 354 t (MB) of 1991 
(3) Mohammad As/am @ Bhure v Union of India and others Writ Petition no 4 t 83 (MB) of 1991 
(4) Mohammad As/am @ Bhure v Union of India and others Writ Petition no 4184 of 1991 
(5) Naveed Yar Khan v State of UP and others Writ Petition no 4185 (MB) of 1991 and .. 
(6) Jamaat-e-Is/ami Hind v State of UP and others Writ Petition no 4201 (MB) of 1991. These SIX WnlS 
together are known as, 'Acquisition of the Land Case'. 
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the following broad grounds - (1) Malafide, (2) Violation of Articles 25, 26, 15 and 14 of 
the Constitution, and (3) Non-application of mind by the state to the material facts in 
respect of public purpose.I55 Considering the importance of the judgement which explained 
the varying stances of the state government, it merits the following detailed examination. 
In its order, the Court observed that the petitioners were justified in alleging that the 
acquired land covered a substantial part of the property under litigation. Following 
acquisition of the land, the state government gave advantage to one party in litigation over 
the other and gave favourable treatment to one religious group of its choice over the other. 
The first action violated Article 14 of the Constitution being discriminatory as well as 
arbitrary, and the second violated Article 15( 1) which mandates that 'the state shall not 
discriminate against any citizens on grounds only of religion'. In a private dispute, the state 
is required to observe neutrality; the impugned action lacked the neutrality hence the 
acquisition was constitutionally invalid. 156 
On the mala-fide intention of the state, Justice Mathur held that the Ramjanmabhumi Nyas 
Trust deed was executed on 18 December 1985. The deed says that the first objective of the 
trust is to reconstruct the temple of Sri Ramjanmabhumi and the beautification of the spot 
all around. The rest of the objectives are connected with the reconstruction of the temple 
and re-installation of deities. From the deed, it became very clear that the granting of the 
acquired land 157 to the said trust was not for a public purpose, but rather it favoured one 
side over the other in the litigation. 
Regarding the allegation of colourable exercise of power, Justice Mathur remarked that the 
land had been handed over to a trust whose aims and objectives are religious and whose 
trust board is dominated by members of the VHP. This confirmed the fear of the minority 
ISS The petitioners challenged the dispensing with the enquiry under Section 5-A ~hearing of obje~tions .i.n 
land disputes) of the Land Acquisition Act 1894 (Act No 1 of 1894). AG Noorani (ed). The Babn Masjld 
f?!'estion /528-2003: 'A mattero/National Honour' (Tulika Books, New Delhi 2003) Vol II. 75. 
I 6 Judgement dated on 11 December 1992 in • Acquisition of the Land Case'. 
IS7 The background of 1991 acquisition needs mentioning here. Some 55.674 acres ofland, w~1I beyond the 
Babri Mosque. were acquired on 20 and 23 January 1989 and on 27 September 1989. for laymg out a Ram 
Katha Park by the previous government. This land coupled with the land ac.quired by the SJ.p Go~·~mment .on 
7 October 1991 was given to the Shri Ramjanmabhumi Trust. AG NooranI (ed). The Babn .\/asjlJ Que"'tlOIl 
J 528-2003: 'A matter 0/ National Honour' (Tulika Books, New Delhi 2003) Vol I. 359. 
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community that the state had acquired the land with the colourable exercise of power. I S8 
The notification and subsequent handing over of the land to Ramjanmabhumi Nyas was a 
colourable exercise of power, since it was a disguised attempt to support the demolition of 
the Babri Masjid with the intent of building the Ram temple. 
Though the arguments were concluded on 4 November 1992, the judgement was only 
delivered on 11 December 1992, which was after the demolition of the Babri Masjid. The 
BJP alleged that if the judgement had been delivered before the demolition, the structure 
might have been saved.159 To this allegation of delay, the judges replied that 'the present 
writ petitions have nothing to do with the roofed structure which has been demolished' .160 
Different stands of state governments of UP from 1950 until 1991 was explained in a 
separate opinion by Justice S.H.A. Raza. 161 This judgement shows the inequitable 
acquisition of the land by the state government. 
After the demolition, a Writ Petition was filed before the High Court by a less known 
forum called the World Hindu Lawyers Association praying for the darshan of the deity in 
the makeshift Hindu temple. 162 They requested the court to allow them to exercise their 
constitutional right to worship163 and to remove the hurdles for darshan and worship. In 
their judgment, Justices H.N. Tilhari and A.N. Gupta ordered the relaxation of the orders 
ISS In Federation o/Hotel and Restaurant v Union o/India (AIR 1990 SC 1637), the Supreme Court held that 
'in a federal constitution, transgression of its limits of power by a legislature may be (i) open, direct and overt, 
or (ii) disguised, indirect and covert'. The latter is an example of 'colourable legislation'. 
IS9 Bharatiya Janata party, 'Chpater IX in BJP's White Paper on Ayodhya and the Ram Temple Movement' 
<http://www.hvk.org/specialrepo/bjpwp/index.html> accessed on 10 February 2006. 
160 AG Noorani (ed), The Bahri Masjid Question 1528-2003: 'A matter 0/ National Honour' (Tulika Books. 
New Delhi 2003) Vol 11,81. 
161 Justice Raza observed that 'it is necessary to point out the vacillating, wavering and ever-changing stand of 
the State Government. From the order sheets of the suit filed from 16 January 1950 to 25 November 1961 the 
District Government counsel has put in his appearance. On 23 May 1962 an application was moved by 
District Government Officer (Civil) in Regular Suit No 12/61 filed by Sunni Board of Waqfs stating that the 
government was not interested in the property in suit and as such it did not propose to contest the suit. ... This 
application was allowed and an order proceeding ex parte against the State and its officers was passed. 
However, suddenly after 1 June 1991 the stand of the State Government underwent a complete change. The 
Government identified itself with one community against another. ... The events that led to demolition of the 
shrine and the inaction of the State Government proved beyond any shadow of doubt, that the State 
Government was an accomplice of that shameful and dastardly act, which has desecrated the democratic and 
secular character of Indian Constitution'. AG Noorani (ed), The Babri Masjid Question 1528-2003: • A matter 
of National Honour' (Tulika Books. New Delhi 2003) Vol II, 81-85. 
162 See n 69, below. 
163 Indian Constitution art 25. 
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which were imposed under Section 144 CrPCI64 after the demolition. The judges also 
directed through the issuance of a Writ of Mandamus that the state officials allow the 
petitioners, the Hindus and devotees of Ram to have darshan in the makeshift temple at 
Ayodhya. 165 The judges made their decision in part because an illustrated copy of the 
Constitution signed by members of India's Constituent Assembly in 1949 contained a 
picture of the Hindu God Ram. 166 The judges found that Ram was therefore 'a 
constitutional entity' and a 'figure constitutionally accepted as the Lord by the builders of 
this nation and its culture' .167 The High Court's darshan order was challenged in the 
Supreme Court which refused to pass any order on the pleas of Muslim organizations to 
stay the High Court order and directed maintenance of the status quO. 168 
The union government, after the demolition, through the Acquisition of Certain Areas at 
Ayodhya Act169 acquired 67.03 acres of land in and around the Babri Masjid complex. This 
led to the filing of a Writ Petition in the Supreme Court by Ismail Faruqui against the union 
government. 170 The union government also approached the Supreme Court through the 
Special Reference No.1 of the President of India171 under Article 143(1)172 of the 
Constitution, which was also challenged in the same petition by Ismail Faruqui. 
164 CrPC (n 103) s 144 grants power to a Magistrate to issue order in urgent cases of nuisance or apprehended 
danger to life, health or safety, or a disturbance of the public tranquillity, a riot, or an affray. 
16S Judgement delivered on 1 January 1993 by Justice HN Tilhari and AN Gupta in Vishwa Hindu Parishad v 
Union 0/ India case cited in AG Noorani (ed), The Babri Masjid Question 1528-2003: 'A matter 0/ National 
Honour' (Tulika Books, New Delhi 2003) Vol II, 247-48. 
166 H McDonald, 'India: Backlash in Bombay' (January 1993) 21 Far Eastern Economic Review 16, 18. 
167 MJ Akhtar, Babri Masjid: A Tale Untold (Genuine, New Delhi 1997) 173. 
168 S Ahmad, 'Judicial Complicity with Communal Violence in India' (1996) 17 Nw J Int'l L & Bus 320, 334. 
169 Act No 33 of 1993. 
170 Ismail Faruqui v Union o/India AIR 1995 SC 605. 
171 On 7 January 1993, the President of India requested the Supreme Court to answer the Special Reference 
under Article 143 (1) of the Constitution of India. It reads thus: 'Whereas a dispute has arisen whether a 
Hindu temple or any Hindu religious structure existed prior to the construction of the structure (including the 
premises of the inner and outer courtyards of such structure, commonly known as the Ramjanmabhumi-Babri 
Masjid), in the area in which the structure stood in Village Kot Ramchandra in Ayodhya, in Pargana Haveli 
Avadh, in Tahsil Faizabad Sadar, in the District of Faizabad of the State of Uttar Pradesh; Now, therefore, in 
exercise of powers conferred upon me by clause (1) of Article 143 of the Constitution of India, I, Shankar 
Dayal Sharma, President of India, hereby refer the following question to the Supreme Court of India for 
consideration and opinion thereon, namely: Whether a Hindu Temple or any Hindu religious structure existed 
prior to the constitution of the Ramjanmabhumi-Babri Masjid (including the premises of the inner and outer 
courtyards of such structure) in the area on which the structure stood?'. AG Noorani (ed), The Babri .\fosjid 
~estion 1528-2003: 'A Matter o/National Honour' (Tulika Books, New Delhi 2003) Vol II, 253-54. 
1 2 Indian Constitution art 143: Power of President to consult Supreme Court (1) If at any time it appears to 
the President that a question of law or fact has arisen, or is likely to arise, which is of such a nature and of 
such public importance that it is expedient to obtain the opinion of the Supreme Court upon it, he refers the 
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In the Ismail Faruqui case, Justice Verma stated that there can be no doubt that the Special 
Reference made under Article 143(1) of the Constitution cannot be construed as an 
effective alternate dispute-resolution mechanism to permit substitution of the pending suits 
and legal proceedings. Accordingly sub-section (3) of Section 4 of the Acquisition of 
Certain Lands in the Ayodhya Act, 1993173 was declared unconstitutional. I74 The Court 
also held that 'the best solution in the circumstances, on revival of the suits, is therefore to 
maintain status quo as on 7 January 1993 when the law came into force'. Regarding the 
President's Reference, the Court held that: 
The Special Reference No.1 of 1993 made by the President under Article 143(1) of the 
Constitution of India is superfluous and unnecessary and does not require to be answered. For 
this reason, we very respectfully decline to answer it and return the same. 175 
In pursuance of the Supreme Court judgment on 24 October 1994, proceedings in the High 
Court were re-started in January 1996. Subsequently oral evidence in the suits l76 was 
completed on 30 November 2004. From 01 December 2004, the evidence of the defendants 
was started and is still in progress. 
The BJP union government made efforts to hand over the 67.703 of the 'undisputed land' 
to a trust which was controlled by the VHP to construct a Ram Temple in Ayodhya in 
2002.177 To clear the legal hurdles the union government approached the Supreme Court 
with its plea for lifting the restriction on the 67 acres of land in Ayodhya which it claimed 
as undisputed territory. The Supreme Court, by its order178 on 31 March 2003, clearly 
rejected the union government's application to lift the ban, earlier imposed by the court, 
stating that no religious activity of any kind would be permitted either on the 2.77 acres of 
'disputed land' or the 67 acres of 'undisputed land'. The court further prohibited the union 
question to that Court for consideration and the Court may, after such hearing as it thinks fit, report to the 
President its opinion thereon. 
173 Indira Nehru Gandhi v Raj Narain and another AIR 1975 SC 1590. 
174 The imperative portion of judgement is related to Sub-section (3) of Section 4 which provides for 
abatement of all pending suits and legal proceedings in respect of the right, title and interest relating to any 
rroperty which has vested in the Union Government under Section 3. 
" Judgement on 24 October 1994 in Ismail Faruqui v Union of India and Others AIR 1995 SC 605. 
176 Other Original Suits (ODS) no 4 of 1989; ODS no 5 of 1989; OOS no I of 1989; ODS no 3 of 1989 -
arranged according to the oral evidence of the plaintiffs. 
177 'SC Rejects Centre's Plea to Lift the Ban on Religious Activities' The Hindu (New Delhi 1 April 2(03). 
178 Mohammad Aslam Bhure v Union of India and Others Writ Petition (Civil) no 160 of 2002. 
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government from handing over the acquired land to anyone till the final disposal of the 
suits in the High Court. 
To sum up, the 'Status Quo' order upheld by the courts from 1950 to this day is a clear 
violation of the equality principle granted in the Constitution giving preference for one 
community over the other. It can also be observed at this point that the rise of BlP as a 
ruling party has further pushed the Ayodhya dispute to the centre stage in Indian politics. 
3.4. Role of the Indian state organs 
This section examines the failure of various state organs that allowed the Babri Masjid 
dispute to persist for more than half a century, culminating in its demolition. The threat 
posed by this failure on secularism,179 the federal systeml80 and minority rights are 
reviewed below. 
3.4.1. Local dispute assuming national character 
For thirty five years (1950-1985), the Ayodhya dispute remained a local dispute between a 
few members of two religious communities. It may be ascertained that the judiciary and the 
executive had enough time to settle the dispute amicably if they had acted judiciously. 
However, the failure to apply the provisions of law for a speedy remedy allowed it to 
become a national dispute resulting in nationwide riots and killings. An examination of the 
events occurring during this period seeks to establish the fact that the courts and the 
executive discriminated against the Muslim minority community. 
When the idols were placed inside the mosque, those who were involved in the illegal act l81 
violated the provisions of the Indian Penal Code (IPC)182 sections 295-298 which defined 
the offences relating to religion. Under section 295 of IPC I83, anyone involved in 
destroying, damaging and defiling a sacred site should be punished. The word defile means 
179 The Preamble of the Indian Constitution declares India as a Secular and Democratic Republic. 
180 Articles 245-63 of the Indian Constitution delineate the relations between the Union and the States. 
181 From the First Infonnation Report by Constable Mata Prasad, dated 23 December 1949. 
182 Indian Penal Code (Act No 45/1860) (IPC) 
181 IPC (n 181) s 295: 'whoever destroys, damages, or defiles any place of worship, with the intention of 
inSUlting the religion shall be punished'. 
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those acts that would make an object of worship unclean as a material object, and also 
extends to acts done in relation to the object of worship. 184 
According to Section 297 'whoever with the intention of wounding the feeling of any 
person, or of insulting the religion of any person, commits any trespass in any place of 
worship ... shall be punished'. The few members of the Hindu communal organization, by 
taking the idols inside the mosque to worship, committed trespass under this section. After 
installing the idols, the perpetrators began singing hymns and raising slogans claiming that 
'idols of Ram appeared miraculously'. Those actions violated Section 298, which described 
that whoever with the deliberate intention of wounding the religious feelings of any person 
utters any word or makes any sound in the hearing of the person ... places, shall be 
punished. 
Apart from those religious offences, placing the idols caused great animosity among the 
two communities and threatened public tranquillity in transgression of section 505 of 
IPC. 18S The First Information Report of the police clearly named three people and fifty 
unknown people in connection with the desecration of the mosque. There was no evidence 
to prove that any of those persons were punished or the state authorities took any concrete 
efforts to remove the idols from the mosque immediately. When the above mentioned 
provisions are applied to the Ayodhya dispute, the failure of the state executive authorities 
becomes apparent. 
The dispute arose through the installation of the Hindu deities inside the mosque, and the 
state authorities immediately took possession of the mosque. In this dispute, the law 
provided a clear and speedy remedy for its restoration to the original owners, the Muslims. 
Section 145 of the CrPC 1973 offered a solution for the restoration of property to the 
dispossessed by a Magistrate's order, leaving it to the aggressor to file a civil suit on 
title. 186 In the Ayodhya dispute, however, this provision was used against the Muslims to 
install a Receiver. The Receiver was asked to design a 'scheme of management' which 
1M Kllllichami Moothan v Rama Pallar (1918) 41 Madras 980. 
ISS fPC (n 181) s 505: 'anyone intent to cause or which is likely to cause fear or alann to the public shall be 
punished'. 
186 CrPC (n 103) s 145 (6): If the Magistrate decides that one of the parties was or should under the second 
proviso to sub-section (4) be treated as being in such possession of the said subject he shall issue an order 
declaring such party to be entitled to possession thereof until evicted there from in due course of law ... , may 
restore to possession the party forcibly and wrongfully dispossessed. 
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included the worship to the deities, and the scheme was subsequently endorsed by the 
District Magistrate. 187 
When the Chief Secretary of UP Government, Bhagawan Sahay, wrote to the Faizabad 
District Magistrate (DM), K.K. Nayar, to remove the idols and restore the property to its 
owners, the DM admitted that 'the installation of the idol in the mosque has certainly been 
an illegal act' .188 Knowing that it was an illegal act, the DM allowed the attachment of the 
mosque and permitted the Hindu priests to conduct worship inside the mosque. 
Consequently, the order of the DM was a clear violation of the secular principle enshrined 
in the constitution, which violated the Muslims' right to worship 189 By treating one 
community unequally before the law, 190 it showed discrimination by allowing the Hindu 
priests to worship inside the mosque. 191 From this moment onwards, through the order of 
the state executive authorities, the Muslims were prevented from worshipping in the 
mosque. 
The complicity of the state government is proved from its varying stances in the court in the 
Ayodhya Dispute. 192 Gould highlighted this fact in his book Grass Roots of Politics in 
India when he observed that 'Pandit Pant193 had played politics with the issue in 1948 when 
he visited Faizabad in search of conservative Hindu support for the candidate whom 
congress had put up against N arendra Deva, a socialist candidate' . 194 The state government 
187 AG Noorani (ed), The Babri Masjid Question 1528-2003: A Matter of National Honour (Tulika Books, 
New Delhi 2003) Vol I, 222. 
188 Letter from Deputy Commissioner, Faizabad, to Chief Secretary, Government of UP dated 27 December 
1949. MJ Akhtar, Babri Masjid: A Tale Untold (Genuine, New Delhi 1997) 34-7. 
189 Indian Constitution art 25: Subject to public order, morality and health and to the other provisions of this 
Part. all persons are equally entitled to freedom of conscience and the right freely to profess, practice and 
~ropagate religion. 
90 Indian Constitution art 14: The State shall not deny to any person equality before the law or the equal 
~rotection of the law within the territory of India. 
91 Indian Constitution art 15( I): The State shall not discriminate against any citizen on grounds only of 
religion, race, caste, sex, place of birth or any of them. . . 
192 On behalf of the State of UP and its officers, written statements were filed in some of the mam SUItS. 
Objections were filed against the application for grant of injunction. The order of injunction was modified on 
19 January 1950 at the behest of the District Administration that the idols kept in the Janmabhllmi would ~ot 
be removed, which order was upheld by the High Court. All of a sudden, it distanced itself from the SUitS. 
However, the Receiver appointed by the State Government was still in charge of the mosque. 
19] Pandit Pant was then Chief Minister of Northern Province which later known as the State of UP. 
11M GA Gould, Grass Roots Politics in India: A Century of Political Evoilltion in Fai=ahad District (IBH 
Publishing Co, Oxford 1994)181-86. 
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failed to settle the dispute at its earliest opportunity but rather it adopted a negligent attitude 
in an effort to stay in power. 195 
The first suit was filed in the civil court at Faizabad in 1950. The judiciary, instead of 
correcting the legal errors committed by the District Magistrate, compounded the errors by 
granting an ex parte interim injunction requested by the plaintiffs, an organisation 
consisting of Hindu priests. This interim injunction permanently barred Muslims from the 
Babri Masjid while allowing the Hindu priests to conduct worship of the idols kept inside 
the mosque. 
This stay order was made permanent by the civil judge, Faizabad, in 1951. In this case, the 
arguments on merits were heard by the court on 17 February 1951, and the judgement 
confirming the interim injunction was passed on 3 March 1951. After hearing the 
arguments and in the intervening period of judgement, the judge allowed a few 'affidavits' 
from the defendants. This is a clear violation of the principle of natural justice. This 
judgement permanently stayed the rights of the minority community to worship in the Babri 
Masjid. Another judge ordered the locks to be opened for the Hindus to use the mosque as a 
temple in 1986. This point was clearly highlighted by Ahuja when he stated, 'the present 
turmoil stems from two court decisions, one of 1951 and the second of 1986' . 196 
The appeal went to the High Court on 3 March 1951,197 which had a duty to correct the 
unfair judgements of the lower courts and safeguard the rights of the minorities guaranteed 
by the Constitution. 198 The High Court was entrusted with enough power to rectify the 
failures arising from the lower COurtS. 199 This interference is limited to want of jurisdiction, 
errors of law, perverse findings, and gross violation of natural justice.2°O It was necessary 
that the High Court exercise its power under article 227 if it was shown that grave injustice 
had been done to a party and the case was a fit case as observed by the Supreme Court in 
19S Mohammad Hashim v State of UP and Others Writ Petition no 3540 (MB) of 1991. 
196 GM Ahuja, BJP and the Politics: Policies and Programmes of the Bharathiya Janata Part)' (Ram Co, ~ew 
Delhi 1994) 320. 
197 Suit no 2 of 1950. 
198 BR AgarwaJ~ Our Judiciary (National Book Trust, New Delhi 1993) 83. Under section 397 ( I) the High 
Court has the power of revision over all executive and Judicial Magistrates decisions. Any order made by an 
Executive Magistrate is subject to the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court. . 
199 Indian Constitution art 227(1): Every High Court shall have superintendence over all courts and tnbunals 
throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction. 
200 PM Bakshi. The Constihllion of India (Universal Law Publishing Co, Delhi 2(02) 195. 
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the Mathai case.201 By allowing the idols to remain inside the mosque, the High Court 
approved the forceful appropriation of the mosque by the members of Hindu communal 
groups and the state executive authorities. 
Since the dispute was left to simmer for thirty five years, the VHP gave an ultimatum to the 
government that the locks of the mosque must be opened before 8 March 1986. So far the 
dispute remained as a mosque versus temple and remained religious issue which could not 
generate a movement. When VHP entered the scene, it became a Rama versus Babar issue 
and took a nationalistic overtone?02 A major turning point in the Ayodhya dispute arose 
from the Faizabad civil judge's order 'to open the locks' of the Babri Masjid in 1986. The 
judge in his order stated that 'for the last 35 or 36 years, no member of the other 
community has offered any namaz prayers. They were not allowed to enter the site' .203 
What the judge failed to mention was that the other community, the Muslims, were denied 
its right to worship due to the court order in 1951.204 The order further stated that 'since 
1951 no riot or no law and order problem has arisen at this place'. If that was the case, the 
District Magistrate should have withdrawn the attachment order and restored the property 
to the Muslims once he was satisfied that there was no longer a public order problem.20s 
Another crucial point is that the civil judge made his order while the original title suits in 
the dispute were pending before the High Court. This ostensible injudicious action by the 
judge strongly suggested that political influence was used in making this judgement.206 It 
may not be an exaggeration to state that this order, in essence, communalised the situation 
more than any other dispute in independent India. The protest by the Muslim community 
against the opening up of the locks took the issue further than the limits of UP. 
201 Ouseph Mathai v M Abdul Khadir AIR 2002 SC 110. 
202 Ashutosh Varshney, Ethnic Conflict and Civic Life: Hinduism and Muslims in India (Yale University 
Press, New Haven 2002) 81. 
203 Umesh Pandey v State of UP and Others in Civil Appeal no 66111986. 
204 Ismail Fan/qui and Others v Union of India and Others AIR 1995 SC 605. The justices Barucha ~nd 
Ahmadi observed that: No account is taken of the fact that there is a dispute in respect of the site on whIch 
puja is to be performed; that as stated in the white paper of government of India, until the night of nnd/23rd 
December 1949, when the idols were placed in the disputed structure. it was being used as a mosque and that 
the Muslim community has a claim to offer namaz thereon. 
20S CrPC (n 103) s 146( I). 
206 M Godbole, Unfinished Innings: Recollections and Reflections of a Civil Servant (Orient Longman. New 
Delhi 1996) 334-35. 
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3.4.2. Judicial failure to provide speedy resolution 
As the litigation section indicated, in pre-independent India, the Ayodhya dispute did not 
became a major issue since the suits were disposed of as soon as possible. In post-
independent India the courts enjoyed constitutional status and the independence of the 
judiciary was ensured through various provisions in the Constitution which provided for an 
effective and speedy remedy for all citizens. According to the Constitution, judicial 
decisions should be based on the democratic and secular principles inherent in the 
Constitution.207 However, this was found lacking in the Ayodhya dispute. 
The state government, after thirty-six years of delay, approached the High Court to 
withdraw all the four title suits from the district court for a quick disposal. 208 Though the 
application was filed on 10 November 1987, the hearing of the withdrawal application did 
not take place until 23 February 1989. This demonstrated the negligent attitude of the 
courts in such a sensitive issue as the Ayodhya dispute. 
In 1989 VHP organised the manufacture of so-called Ramshilas (bricks anointed with the 
holy water in the name of Lord Ram) all over India, in the USA, the UK and Canada which 
were to be taken to Ayodhya for the ritual of Shilanyas. The union government tacitly 
supported the Ramshila programmes by allowing the foundation stones for the proposed 
Ram temple to be laid adjacent to the Babri Masjid.209 
The intention of the Sangh Parivar to destroy the mosque was revealed by Ashok 
Singhal210 when he openly declared that the sanctum sanetorum or the garpha griha of the 
proposed temple will remain at the same place where the idol is worshipped at present. In 
response Muslim organizations started legal proceedings to prevent the Shilanyas, and 
thereby to protect the mosque. The Shilanyas campaign led to serious communal conflicts 
which could have been avoided if the courts had prevented the Shilanyas or allowed them 
207 Human Rights Watch, Playing the 'Communal Card': Communal Violence and Human Rights (HRW, 
New York 1995) 19. 
208 CPC (n 114) s 24( I): On the application of any of the parties and after notice to the parties and after 
hearing such of them as desired to be heard, or of its own motion without such notice, the High Court or the 
District Court may at any state - (a) transfer any suit, appeal or other proceeding pending before it for trial or 
disposal to any Court subordinate to it and competent to try or dispose of the same. . 
:!09 PS Ghosh, BJP and the Evolution of Hindu Nationalism: From Periphery to Centre (Manohar, New Delhi 
1999) 93. 
210 Asokh Singhal is the International President of the VHP. 
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to conduct the ceremony in some other suitable place. V.R. Krishna Iyer, a former Supreme 
Court Justice, commented on the judicial failure as it 'will be described as the villain of the 
piece. It lacked the guts to face the issue' .211 
The Shilanyas should have been prevented, because the freedom of religion enshrined in 
Article 25 of the Constitution is not a guarantee in respect of one religion but it covers all 
religions alike.212 The right to worship as guaranteed in the Constitution does not extend to 
the right of worship at any and every place, for the simple reason that a hindrance to 
worship at a particular place, per se, might infringe the religious freedom guaranteed under 
Articles 25 and 26. Therefore, while praying or worshipping is a religious practice, holding 
them at every location would not be an essential and integral part of such religious practice 
protected under Article 25.213 This fundamental freedom must yield to the maintenance of 
public order, morality and health of the people?14 The Shilanyas was an example of an 
abuse of articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution. 
When the UP state government headed by the BJP acquired 2.74 acres of disputed land 
through a notification, it was challenged by various writ petitions both in the Supreme 
Court and the High Court as the acquisition infringed the rights of the minority community. 
The Supreme and the High Courts ordered the state to maintain the status quo. Subsequent 
to the status quo order, the department of tourism demolished several old structures in the 
vicinity, including temples. This action was challenged by Rizvi215 in a contempt petition in 
the Supreme Court. There was no final order until the mosque was demolished on 6 
December 1992. 
The above discussion requires analysis of the problem of delai16 in the Indian courts. This 
may enable an argument over whether the delay was inevitable or it was used tactically to 
postpone the dispute. 
211 The Times of India (New Delhi II November 1989). 
212 Reverend Stanislaus v State of MP AIR 1977 SC 908. 
m Ismail Faroqi v Union of India AIR 1995 SC 605. 
214 Ratila/ v State of Bombay AIR 1954 SC 388. 
21S Acchan RiZl'i V State of Uttar Pradesh and Others Contempt petition no 102 of 1992. 
216 'Delay resulted in demolition' claimed BJP. 'The Role of Law and the Judiciary in the Ayodhya Case' 
<http://www.hvk.org/specia1repoibjpwp/ch9.html> accessed on 3 March 2006. 
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Delay is defmed as the 'pathology of the Indian legal system.2J7 There are several factors 
involved in causing delay in the civil courts. Chodosh highlighted some of the procedural 
causes of delay.2J8The functional and systematic characteristics of the contemporary Indian 
judicial system can be traced back to the adversarial British model of civil justice process 
which consists generally of several stages. The adversarial model appears poorly designed 
to meet the needs of a rural population with widespread poverty, illiteracy and unfamiliarity 
with formal legal procedure since most of it is conducted in the English language.219 The 
very nature of adversarial proceeding is such that the parties are at liberty to exploit the 
technicalities of the procedure for covering up the substantive weakness of their case220 and 
this was used as a cover in the Ayodhya dispute. 
'The real contest is in the court of first appeal ... based on the assumption that the lower 
courts are incompatible to do anything more than prepare a record of evidence' observed 
Gledhill in Some Aspects of Indian Law Today.22J Prolonged cross-examinations, not so 
well-qualified stenographers, and lengthy arguments in the appeal and execution of the 
judgment are some of the reasons for the delay. Indian legal experts have calculated 
estimates of average delays in the civil process of ten to fifteen years.222 From the 
217 a Mendelsohn, 'The Pathology of the Indian Legal System', (1981) 15 Modem Asian Studies 824. 
218 HE Chodosh and others, 'Indian Civil Justice System Reform: Limitation and Preservation of the 
Adversarial Process' (1997-1998) 30 NYU J Int'l L & Poll, 25. Chodosh points out a few reasons for delay 
which include: free access for civil claimants to the courts with incentives for frivolous, party-controlled 
litigation processes (including initiation without cause, extension without excuse, motions without merit), 
discontinuity, repetition and fragmentation of the legal processes without early or accountable judicial 
intervention such as court administration and case management mechanisms, limited opportunity or incentive 
for consensual settlements including limited venues for alternative dispute resolution processes such as 
mediation and systematic causes derived generally from insufficient investments in human and institutional 
resources to perform allocated procedural functions. 
219 Ibid 29. 
220 VS Deshpande, 'Civil Procedure' in J Minattur (ed), The Indian Legal System (Tripati NM, Bombay 1978) 
201. Some of the critical factors involved in delay are: Objections to pecuniary or territorial jurisdiction; 
Applications for transfer; Pleas of facts; Framing of issues; Preparation of decrees; Failure to scrutinise plaint 
and appeal; Revision; Death of defendants or respondents; Filing of suits, and appeals for sole purpose of 
delay; Multiplicity of appeal, and Stays and temporary injunctions. 
2:!1 A Gledhill, The Republic of India: The Development of its Laws and Constitution (Stevens, London 1964) 
238-41. 
222 HE Chodosh and others, 'Indian Civil Justice System Reform: Limitation and Preservation of the 
Adversarial Process' (1997-1998) 30 NYU J Int' I L & Pol I, 29. Chodosh and others indicate the time period 
between the filing of the complaint and the written statement and the framing of the issues by the court 
averages six to nine months, the taking of evidence takes an average of five years. In the case of appeals,.the 
current backlog is twelve years for interim orders and longer for final dispositions. This may add up to a time 
period exceeding twenty years for much litigation. 
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beginning of Indian independence, the issue of delay was addressed by the Law 
Commission. If the problem of delay in the lower courts is huge, it is no less acute when 
one looks at the higher judiciary where cases have been pending for over ten years.223 
A procedural law is void if it does not provide for speedy trial observed the Supreme 
Coutf24 and as such speedy trial is a fundamental constitutional right though it mainly 
applies to criminal cases.225 After thorough research of the Indian legal system, Moog 
argued that 'a series of structural constraints and an imbalance of power between the judges 
and attorneys' exist in the lower COurtS.226 In addition, the lower courts were influenced by 
caste, kinship, and friendship ties. Rudolph points out that 'this is significant in a society 
where corporate identities still playa vital role, loyalty to the group may take precedence 
over loyalty to the legal system' , which often stresses the rights of the individuals.227 
The Civil Justice Committee in 1925 itself noted that the existence of a mass of arrears 
tempted many presiding officers to hold back in settling the more heavily contested suits 
and instead devote their attention to the lighter ones.228 The absence of any monitoring of 
the local judicial process fosters a wilful negligence among some judges which resulted in 
more adjournments and interim injunctions.229 The litigants are also not blameless for 
delays since they go to the court for a variety of reasons other than for rapid resolution, 
providing advocates with a rationale for extending cases.230 
223 M Kachwaha, The Judiciary in India: Determinants of its Independence and Impartiality (Leiden. 
Netherlands 1998) 38. 
224 Hussainara v Home Secretary. State of Bihar AIR 1979 SC 1360; PM Bakshi, The Constitution of India 
(Universal Law Publishing Co, Delhi 2002) 55-6. 
225 Under Article 21 of the Indian Constitution, speedy trial is included as a constitutional right. Common 
Cause Laws v Union of India AIR 1996 SC 1619. 
226 R Moog, 'Delays in the Indian Courts: Why the Judges Don't Take Control' (1992) 16 Just Sys J 19,22. 
227 Ll Rudolph and SH Rudolph. The Modernity of Tradition (University of Chicago, Chicago 1967) 263. 
228 Report of Civil Justice Committee 1925, 21-2 cited in R Moog, 'Delays in the Indian Courts: Why the 
Judges Don't Take Control' (1992) 16 Just Sys J 19.24. . 
229 J Paul. 'Authority and Professional Control of the Subordinate Legal Profession in the Madras PreSidency 
during the Late Nineteenth Century' in Y Malik and OK Vajpeyi (eds), Boeings and Bullock CarIS: Studit's in 
Change and Continuity in Indian Civilization (Chanakya, Delhi 1990) 217. . 
230 Order XVII Rule 1 of CPC (n 114) states that court may grant time and adjourn heanng (1) The court may. 
if sufficient cause is shown, at any stage of the suit grant time to the parties or to any of them. and may from 
time to time adjourn the hearing of the suit for reasons to be recorded in writing: provided that no such 
adjournment shall be granted more than three times to a party during hearing of the suit. 
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Though the higher courts suffer from the same problems, the focus here is mainly on the 
lower courts because it is they who dispense justice at a local level. Regarding the 
importance of the lower courts, the former justice of the Supreme Court Bhagwati 
observed: 
We do not seem to realize that it is subordinate courts which form the basis of the pyramid of 
justice and unless the base is strengthened, the pyramid is bound to crumble. It is often 
forgotten that the contact of the common man with the justice system occurs only at the level 
of the subordinate courts. It is imperative to strengthen the subordinate judiciary to inspire 
confidence in him.231 
Various Law Commission reports and experts have stated the need for judicial reform to 
rescue the judicial system from the clutches of delay and arrears.232 Justice V.D. 
Tulzapurkar of the Supreme Court once commented, 
If an independent judiciary is regarded as the heart of a republic, then the Indian republic is at 
present suffering from serious heart ailment. As an ailing heart cannot ensure vigorous blood 
supply for the sound health of its people, the judiciary is not able to provide speedy remedy to 
the people.233 
It can now be established how delay was used to deny the rights of a minority community. 
Although delay has been an ever present factor in the Indian legal system, it does not 
usually exceed ten to fifteen years. However, in the Ayodhya dispute the delay was 
extended to forty-two years (1950-1992) without even a preliminary trial. This suggests 
that delay became a tool to deny justice to the Muslim community, a direct infringement on 
fundamental human rights. 
Given the pre-existing tension between the Hindu and Muslim communities, the judiciary, 
in such an emotional issue as the Ayodhya dispute, should have foreseen that using 
delaying tactics would result in inter-communal violence. Such a sensitive issue as the 
Ayodhya dispute demanded a speedy resolution because it had the potential to seriously 
weaken the social fabric of the country, resulting in widespread riots and violence. 
231 BR Agarwala, Our Judiciary (National Book Trust, New Delhi 1993) 198. 
232 India Civil Justice Committee (1925) Calcutta, Law Commission Report (1958) Fourteenth Report: The 
Refonn of Judicial Administration, New Delhi: Ministry of law and Justice; Law Commission Report (1978) 
Seventy-Seventh Report: Delay and Arrears in Trial Courts. New Delhi: Ministry of law and Justice; Law 
Commission Report (1979) Seventy-Ninth Report: Delay and Arrears in High Courts and Other Appellate 
Courts. New Delhi: Ministry of law and Justice. 
2.l3 BR Agarwala. Our Judiciary (National Book Trust, New Delhi 1993) 198. 
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Though a cursory study of the cases prove the violation of articles 14, 15 and 25 of the 
Constitution in many instances, the courts, through prevarication, prolonged the dispute. 
This has weakened faith in the courts and undermined democratic values. It has also 
destabilised both the rule of law and the principle of equal rights. 
3.4.3. Failure to protect minority rights 
Preamble of the Indian Constitution defines India as 'a Sovereign, Socialist, Secular, 
Democratic, Republic. ,234 The framers recognised that in a multi-religious, multi-ethnic 
country like India, it was essential for religious harmony and for the social fabric of the 
society that independent India was governed by secular principles. These secular principles 
were the basis on which the fundamental human rights of all Indian citizens were to be 
protected, especially those of the minority groups. 
From the days of independence, two very different understandings of secularism have 
competed for ideological dominance. The first one was 'dharma nirapeksata.' which was 
based on western understanding of secularism, proposing the separation of religion and 
politics. This was supported by lawaharlal Nehru, first Prime Minister of India. The 
second view was 'sarva dharma sambhava " which rejected the idea of the separation of 
religion and politics and was based instead on the principle of the equal respect of all 
religions. This model was supported by Gandhi. It is this Gandhian understanding of 
secularism, that all religions should have equal respect, came to dominate legal and 
political thought in India.235 Radhakrishnan observed that it is important that India remain a 
secular state to play its role within national and internationallife.236 
234 The word 'Secular' was substituted by the Constitution (Forty-second Amendment) Act, 1976. 
23S AA Engineer, 'Secularism in India: Theory and Practice' in RC Heredia and E Mathias (eds), Secularism 
and Liberation (Indian Social Institute, New Delhi 1995) 40. 
236 S Radhakrishnan, Recovery of Faith (George Allen & Unwin, London 1956) 184. Radhakrishnan, the first 
President of India, observed 'When India is said to be a Secular State, it does not mean that we reject the 
reality of an unseen spirit or the relevance of religion to life or that we exalt irreligion. It does not mean that 
secularism itself becomes positive religion or that the State assumes divine prerogatives ... We hold that not 
one religion should be given preferential status ... This view of religious impartiality, or comprehension and 
forbearance. has a prophetic role to play in national and International life' . 
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The meaning of secularism, as contemplated by the Constitution, did not preclude religious 
protection; rather, it provided a sense of religious hannony.237 One distinguishing feature of 
constitutional secularism in India is characterised by the state's promise that it will not 
identify itself with or be controlled by any single religion. In India, affirmative or positive 
discrimination has been written into the Constitution itself because it focuses not only on 
equality as a right available to all citizens, but also emphasises equality as a policy aimed at 
changing the structure of the society?38 lacobsohn defmed Indian secularism as 
'ameliorative secularism' because it tried to heal some of the inequalities existing in Indian 
society.239 
During independence, the framers of the constitution struggled to establish equality among 
their citizens because religious hierarchy was so deeply embedded into the country's social 
fabric. 240 Hence, secularism is established as a basic structure of the Indian Constitution, 
and the courts are empowered to uphold this structure. 
The legal dispute in Ayodhya centred on the question of property rights of the site, and 
became inextricably linked with the differing religious claims which led to continual 
conflict. Parikh observed that the principle of constitutional secularism permeates the 
Ayodhya situation, where the religious dispute culminated in a legal action brought by a 
few Hindus challenging property rights over the disputed site in Ayodhya.241 
Protection of minority rights is embedded in the Constitution and delineated in Articles 
29242 and 30.243 Though the word minority was not defined in the Constitution, the Supreme 
237 MV Pylee, India's Constitution (Asia Publishing House, London 1962) 123. 
238 A Beteille, Society and Politics in India: Essays in a Comparative Perspective (Athlone, London 1991) 
206-7. 
239 GJ Jacobsohn, The Wheel of Law: India's Secularism in Comparative Constitutional Context (Princeton 
University press, Princeton 2003) 94. Jacobsohn defines it as ameliorative since it seeks an amelioration of 
the social conditions of people long burdened by the inequities of religiously based hierarchies, while 
embodying a vision of inter-group comity whose fulfilment necessitates cautious deliberation in the pursuit of 
abstract justice. 
240 G Austin, The Indian Constitution: Cornerstone of a Nation (OUP, Oxford 1966) 50. 
141 S Parikh, 'Enshrining a Secular Idol: A Judicial Response to the Violent Aftermath of Ayodhya' (2005) 37 
Case W Res J InCI L 85, 89. 
242 Indian Constitution art 29: (I) Any section of the citizens residing in the territory of India or any part 
thereof having a distinct language, script of culture of its own shall have the right to conserve the ~~e. (~) 
No citizen shall be denied admission into any educational institution maintained by the State or recel\lng aid 
out of State funds on grounds of religion, race, caste, language or any of them. . 
243 Indian Constitution art 30: All minorities. whether based on religion or language, shall have the nght to 
establish and administer educational institutions of their choice. 
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Court in various cases244 addressed this problem and showed that the protection of 
minorities was supported by the principles of secularism. 
1980s and 1990s represent a new and ever widening ideological polarization within Indian 
Society. From 1984 onwards, it is alleged that the Congress party, in an attempt to remain 
in power, tacitly began to support the agenda of the Sangh Parivar.245 After the 1986 court 
order to open the locks, the Muslim leaders organised a counter to the Sangh Parivar. This 
led to the communalisation of the Indian polity and now Indian state and society are 
witnessing an intense struggle between the bi-polar forces of Indian secularism and Hindu 
nationalism.246 
Similarly, the judiciary also relinquished their responsibility to uphold secularism which is 
shown by their failures to provide speedy remedy to religious disputes, especially in the 
Ayodhya dispute. By allowing the Hindus to worship the idols of Ram inside the Babri 
Masjid, and failing to restore the mosque for the minority community, the courts constantly 
failed to protect secular principles and denied minority rights to own a sacred site and to 
worship in it. 
In the Ayodhya dispute, when the Supreme Court was approached by the Muslims in 1986, 
to suspend the order opening the locks in the Babri Masjid, it declined to intervene and 
asked the parties to maintain the 'status quo'. In 1989 again the Supreme Court failed to 
prevent the Shilanyas, laying foundation for the Ram temple adjacent to the Babri Masjid. 
In November 1992, the court failed to punish the Chief Minister of UP for violating the 
orders of the court in a contempt petition before demolition. 
Subsequent to the Faruqui case,247 the Court failed to strike down section 7 of the 
Acquisition of Certain Lands in Ayodhya Act. The majority of judges in this case rejected 
the argument that Section 7, which in effect permitted the continuance of the puja of the 
idols, revealed favouritism of the Hindu community and was anti-secular. Though the 
majority in the Supreme Court said that the demolition was a 'national shame', it continued 
2 .... In Re Kerala Education Bill AIR 1958 SC 956, 976-7; Shri Krishna v Gujarat University AIR 1962 Guj 
88; DA V College v State of Punjab AIR 1971 SC 1731, 1744. 
245 Human Rights Watch, Playing the "Communal Card",' Communal Violence and Human Rights (HRW. 
New York 1995)21. 
2046 IH Malik. 'Beuond Ayodhya: Implications for Regional Security in South Asia' (1993) 24 Asian Affairs 
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to allow worship in the makeshift temple, which showed that the Supreme Court had acted 
against the interests of minorities. In this case, the minority judgement held that 'to 
condone the acquisition of a place of worship in circumstances in which it was demolished 
is to efface the principle from the Constitution' .248 
In the above case, the Supreme Court noted that 'the perpetrators of this deed, struck not 
only against a place of worship, but also at the principles of secularism, democracy and the 
rule of law enshrined in the Constitution'. 249 Yet, despite this recognition of the damage 
done to secular principles in the Ayodhya dispute, the Supreme Court, or for that matter, 
the High Court, also have failed to restore the site or access to it to the minority Muslim 
community. 
Through repeated court orders to maintain status quo, particularly the 1994 Supreme Court 
order in the Faruqui case, the courts violated the principle of secularism, by allowing the 
Hindus to worship at the makeshift temple. Parikh argued that the court's definition of 
secularism contradicted the Indian definition of secularism as 'treating all religions 
equally' .250 The Supreme Court order failed to acknowledge that the interim injunction in 
1950 and the 1955 High Court order clearly prohibited any form of worship except by the 
Hindu priests at the Babri site. This order was defied by lay Hindus who continued to 
worship there. It is important to understand that the court allowed the Hindu worship to 
continue while precluding Muslim worship near the site. 
McHugh states that the disconnection between the language of secularism set out by the 
Supreme Court and the action actually taken was a result of the court's own biases.2s1 He 
further alleged that 'one aspect of this problem is the continued, practical dominance of 
members of upper castes within the political, social, economic, and legal institutions of 
India' .252 lacobsohn argued in the same manner when he observed 'secularism appears in 
248 AG Noorani (ed), Bahri Masjid Question J 528-2003: A Matter of National Honour (Tulika Books, New 
Delhi 2003) Vol II. 271. 
249 Ismail Faroqui v Union of India and others AIR 1995 SC 605. 
250 S Parikh, 'Enshrining a Secular Idol: A Judicial Response to the Violent Aftennath of Ayodhya' (2005) 37 
Case W Res J Int'I L 85, 98. 
251 JT McHugh, Comparative Constitutional Traditions (Peter Lang, Oxford 2002) 105. 
2S2 Ibid. 
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the fonn of a radical majoritarian in the service of an assimilationist agenda' .253 It may be 
observed that in the Faruqui judgement, supposedly neutral judges fell victim to their 
religious bias when deciding a dispute involving Hindus and Muslims. 
Secularism is a necessity to protect the minority rights in a multi-religious country like 
India. Protection of minorities is the hallmark of a civilised nation. In the words of Lord 
Acton 'the most certain test by which we judge whether a country is really free is the 
amount of security enjoyed by minorities'.254 The special privileges (Article 25-30) given 
to the minorities in the Constitution were opposed by the Sangh Parivar from the early 
days of independence as minority appeasement. Soli Sorabjee, former attorney General of 
India, observed 'these guarantees are essential in a democratic and pluralistic polity' and 
quoted Franklin Roosevelt, stating 'no democracy can long survive which does not accept 
as fundamental to its very existence the recognition of the rights of minorities' .255 
The Supreme Court often stated that upholding minority rights is a sacred obligation of the 
COurtS.256 Yet, some of the judgements restricting the rights of minorities suggest that this 
'sacred obligation' is no longer a constitutional priority of the COurtS.257 Minority rights are 
human rights. Articles 25-30 resemble Article 27 of the ICCPR258 which guarantee 
minority rights and differential treatment. The protection of minorities within a state helps 
to guarantee justice, democracy, stability and peace?59 However, the Ayodhya dispute has 
253 GJ Jacobsohn, The Wheel of Law: India's Secularism in Comparative Constitutional Context (Princeton 
University press, Princeton 2003) 97. 
254 Lord Acton, 'The History of Freedom in Antiquity' cited in IA Ansari (ed), Readings on Minorities 
(Institute of Objective Studies, New Delhi 1996) Vol 1, 165. . 
255 SJ Sorabjee, 'Minorities: National and International Protection' in IA Ansari (ed), Readings on Minorities 
(Institute of Objective Studies, New Delhi 1996) Vol 1, 166. 
256 In Re Kerala Education Bill AIR (1958) SC 956, 986. The Supreme Court observed: Our Constitution has 
guaranteed certain cherished rights of the minorities concerning their religion ... So long as the Constitution 
stands as it is and is not altered, it is the duty of this Court to uphold the fundamental rights and thereby 
honour our sacred obligation to the minority communities who are of our own. 
257 For example, Azeez Basha v Union of India AIR 1968 SC 662 (known as Aligarh Muslim University 
Case); 1663; St Xavier's College v Union of India AIR 1974 SC 1389, 1398; St Stephen's College v Union of 
India AIR 1992 SC 1630; and Rev Stanislaus v State of Madhya Pradesh AIR 1977 SC 908 (known as 
conversion case). 
258 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (adopted 16 December 1966, entered into force 23 
March 1976) 999 UNTS 171 (ICCPR) art 27: In those States in which ethnic, religious, linguistic minorities 
exist, persons belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the right. in community with the oth~r 
members of their group to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practice their own religion or to use theIr 
own language. . . . .. 
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(Institute of Objective Studies, New Delhi 1996) Voll. 175. 
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highlighted the failure of the courts in protecting the rights of the minority and their sacred 
sites. 
3.4.4. Failure to enforce court judgements 
This section examines how the failure by the UP State Executive260 in enforcing the court 
judgements exacerbated the dispute. This will show how the Shilanyas, and the subsequent 
acquiring of the disputed land by the BJP government in UP, was used by the Sangh 
Parivar as an impetus for the destruction of the mosque. 
In 1986, the High Court ordered that the status quo should be maintained in the disputed 
land, and the order covered not only the disputed mosque but also the adjoining land. To 
conduct the Shilanyas ceremony the Sangh Parivar chose the plot next to the Babri Masjid 
in a total defiance of the court order. When the Muslims objected to this move, the Union 
Home Minister Buta Singh came to Lucknow on 8 November 1989 to meet the VHP 
leaders to request that the site be shifted to a different place, but the VHP refused. To 
please the Sangh Parivar, the state and union governments allowed the Shilanyas within 
the disputed area?61 The state government did not stop the ceremony, though it knew that it 
was a clear violation of the court order which prohibited construction activity within a 
disputed area where status quo ought to be maintained. 
In 1991, the BJP government in UP acquired 2.77 acres of land adjacent to Babri Masjid262 
and allowed the Hindu priests and devotees to take charge of it. By allowing the destruction 
of the old structures, including the temples, it failed to implement the High Court order to 
maintain status quo. In February 1992, the lear sevaks began the construction of a wall 
enclosing a large area around the Babri Masjid, including the acquired land, despite the 
High Court order which stated that no permanent structure was to be built on the site.263 
The state government once again failed to stop the construction by remaining silent, though 
VHP and other militant organisations announced that it was a step towards the construction 
260 'State Executive' includes the State Chief Minister, Cabinet, local administration and the police. 
261 AG Noorani (ed), Babri Masjid Question 1528-2003: A Maller of National Honour (Tulika Books. :'\cw 
Delhi 2(03) Vol I, xi. 
262 Vide Notification No 3814IXLI-33-86, dated 7 October 1991 under Sub-section (1) of Section 4 of the 
Land Acquisition Act, 1894. 
26J MJ Akhtar. Babri Masjid: A Tale Untold (Genuine. New Delhi 1997) 24. 
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of the Ram Temple. Besides, despite the repeated requests by the union government to 
make available the development plans for construction work, the state government failed to 
comply.264 
In March 1992, the state government leased out about 42 acres of land in the vicinity of the 
Babri Masjid complex to the Ram Janmabhumi Nyas (Trust), on perpetual lease, for the 
implementation of the Ram Story Park project.265 This was in contravention of the court 
order which stated that the acquired land shall not be transferred or alienated.266 
Notwithstanding the court orders, the VHP and Ramjanmabhumi Nyas started lear seva in 
July 1992. When the construction work was being carried out by the devotees and sadhus, 
the state government disowned responsibility for what had been done and told the High 
Court that it was not aware who was doing the work and who was in charge of it. Given 
that thousands of devotees were working on the disputed site, for approximately a month, it 
was disingenuous of the state government to claim that they had no knowledge of who was 
carrying out the construction. When the High Court intervened to stop the construction, the 
state government on 16 July 1992 filed an affidavit which declared that, 'if the devotees are 
stopped they may cause damage to the mosque. ,267 This would suggest that the state had 
lost its authority to rule because it was not able to protect its people and places of worship. 
Godbole questioned the transparency of the state government in revealing the construction 
plan, either to the High Court or to the Parliamentary Committee or to the Commission 
appointed by the Supreme Court or to the Government of India.268 
The National Integration Council (NI C) and the few members of Parliament who visited 
Ayodhya recommended that the union government should advise the state government not 
to proceed any further in changing the nature of the said property.269 The Commission 
appointed by the Supreme Court submitted its report in September 1992 which remarked 
264 Government of India, White Paper on Ayodhya (GOI, New Delhi 1993) 47. 
265 'The deed of Lease dated 20 March 1992 between the UP Government and the Shri Ramjanmabhumi 
TrusC cited in AG Noorani (ed), Babri Masjid Question 1528-2003: A Matter of National Honour (Tulika 
Books, New Delhi 2003) 352-61. 
266 The Supreme Court order on 15 November 1991 in Writ Petition (C) no 1000/91 with Writ Petition (C) no 
977 and no 972 of 1991. 
267 K Prasad and others, Report: Citi=en 's Tribunal on Ayodhya (The Secretariat, New De~i 1993) 109. , 
268 M Godbole, Unfinished Innings: Recollections and Reflections of a Civil Servant (Onent Longman, ~ew 
Delhi 1996) 338. . . ', . 
269 Government of India, Report of the Delegation of the Members of the Standmg Commlllee oj the ."allo"al 
Integration Council and Members of Parliament to Ayodhya (April 1992) 7. 
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that 'the magnitude of the work is such that it could not have been carried out without the 
use of construction equipment' .270 
When Sangh Parivar declared 6 December 1992 as the day for kar seva, the UP 
government made little effort to arrange security for the disputed site despite the 
overwhelming evidence that attempts to destroy the Masjid would be made on that day. 
There was not much security for the Muslims in Ayodhya and Faizabad.271 According to 
the Citizen's Tribunal report, the one act that most weakened the security of the disputed 
shrine was the state government's decision not to allow the police and paramilitary to use 
force on the kar sevaks under any circumstances. This violated the assurance that the UP 
government had given to the courts. 
In the contempt petition before the Supreme Court in November 1992, the UP government 
in its affidavit of 27 November 1992 affirmed once again that no construction would be 
allowed and the mosque would be protected. But Organise,J-n revealed the strategy of the 
state government by observing that 'it was a strategy that the UP government filed an 
affidavit in the Supreme Court assuring the latter that the government would not allow 
violation of the court orders' .273 After hearing of the assault on the Babri Masjid, the 
Supreme Court issued a suo moto contempt notice and while hearing arguments on an 
application (IA No 5) observed, 
A grave situation has emerged by the developments that have occurred owing to the violations 
of the undertakings and assurances given by the state government to the court. It is a great pity 
that a constitutionally elected government could not discharge its duties in a matter of this 
. . d· d 274 sensItIveness an magmtu e. 
During the demolition, police stood complacent. They did not even make a human chain to 
prevent the few hundred persons who first sought to break the cordon.275 The correspondent 
of The Statesman observed that 'the police stood by, watched and even cheered as the 
270 Report of the Commission Appointed Vide Order of the Supreme Court dated 5 August 1992 on lA no 3 in 
Contempt Petition no 102/92 in Writ Petition (Civil) no 1000191. 
271 Interview with Z lilani, Member of All India Muslim Personal Law Board (AIMPLB). Advocate. 
Lucknow High Court (Lucknow 9 February 2006). 
m Organiser is the weekly published by the RSS from New Delhi. . 
273 AG Noorani (ed). The Bahri Masjid Question 1528-2003: A Matter of National Honour (Tuhka Books. 
New Delhi 2003) Voill. 21-2. 
274 In Contempt Petition no 97 of 1992 in Writ Petition no 977 and no 972 of 1991. 
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mosque came down and so did the leaders of the Bharathiya Janatha Party' .176 The police 
even helped the work of demolition through direct participation, according to a press 
reporter.277 
This pattern was repeated in dealing with incidents of arson, looting and destruction in the 
township.278 It needs to be mentioned that there was no lack of information about the 
developing situation on the ground. Ms Anju Gupta, then additional Superintendent of 
Police, Faizabad, made the statement that 'all police officers on duty in Faizabad and 
Ayodhya during the kar seva of December 1992 were aware of the fact that the disputed 
mosque would be attacked by the kar sevaks, a day before it was demolished'. This she 
stated before the Liberhan Inquiry Commission probing the Babri Masjid demolition 
case?79 The Citizen's Tribunal report points out that' ... the DM was regularly seeking 
instructions from headquarters. A senior official has claimed that the only instruction issued 
from the State Home Department on the afternoon of 6 December, was to maintain peace 
without resort to firing. ,280 
The failure to execute the court orders can clearly be established from the above 
presentation. Had the UP state government stood by the court orders and kept up its 
promise to the courts and to the union government, in all probability, the destruction of the 
disputed sacred site would have been averted and communal harmony in the country would 
not have deteriorated so much. The partisan manner in which the UP government acted and 
connived with the communal forces destroyed not only the mosque but also the rights of the 
minorities so fundamental to the Indian Constitution. 
3.4.5. Failure of the union government to act against the state government 
This section outlines the power of the unIon In protecting the constitutional order 
throughout India. As seen in the second chapter, a defining characteristic of any federal 
system is a hierarchy of governments with a delineated scope of authority between the 
national and sub-national governments, so that each government is autonomous within its 
276 'The Death of a dream' The Statesman (New Delhi 7 December 1992). 
277 The Indian Express (Bombay 6 December 1992). 
278 • Minority desert Ayodhya' The Telegraph (Calcutta 7 December 1992). 
279 The Asicm Age (New Delhi 11 May 1994). . ' 
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own sphere of authority.28I Part of the purpose of federalism in India concerns the problem 
of maintaining harmony among different ethnic and religious groupS.282 India is a pluralist 
country, which has represented within it all of the world's major religions,283 with twenty-
two recognized languages, and countless dialects. Despite this, it was able to develop a 
single national constitution. The Indian model is based upon a strong union government 
with state governments that are not sovereign, but which have constitutionally enumerated 
powers.284 
If the constituent states fail to adhere to the constitutional authority or suffer from internal 
disturbances, the union government is empowered to use its authority to re-establish 
democratic rule within that state under Article 356 of the Constitution?85 Failure of the 
union government in the Ayodhya dispute in enforcing Article 356 can only be properly 
evaluated by understanding how the federal principles work within the relationship between 
the union and state. Before independence, provincial governments functioned with a great 
degree of autonomy from federal control. After independence, India maintained the system 
of federalism, but changed it dramatically by establishing strong union government, in part 
due to concerns over aggrandized political power in the provinces.286 
The union has important unilateral powers with respect to state powers?87 One of the 
reasons that the framers of the Indian Constitution created a strong union was that it could 
protect minority rights and defuse the political and economic tensions that might arise in 
such a heterogeneous nation.288 Horowitz, a political scientist, argues that federalism helps 
281 G Montinola and others 'Federalism, Chinese style: The Political Basis for Economic Success in China' 
(J995) 48 World Pol 50, 55. 
282 S Parikh and BR Weingast, 'A Comparative Theory of Federalism: India' (1997) 83 Va L Rev 1593, 1614. 
283 HG Coward, 'Introduction' in HC Coward (ed), Modern Indian Responses to Religious Pluralism (State 
University of New York Press, New York 1987) ix. 
284 Part XI (Articles 245-263) ofIndian Constitution delineates the relations between the Union and States. 
285 Indian Constitution art 356 confers powers on the President of India to dismiss the duly elected state 
government if he is satisfied 'on receipt of a report from the Governor of a state or otherwise' that there is a 
breakdown of constitutional machinery in that state. In the exercise of the emergency powers, however, the 
role of the governor is crucial. . . 
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avoid conflict in societies that are polarized geographically and provides the protection of 
minorities in divided societies.289 
Under the Indian Constitution, the federal and state governments have enumerated powers. 
While many of the aspects of a strong federal authority are widely accepted as positive 
features of the Indian political structure, certain powers held by the federal government, 
like the use of Article 356, have been questioned and have created controversy. Emergency 
powers granted under article 356 were often used for political reasons by the union 
government, especially when the state government belonged to another political party. 290 
When the state government of UP violated the provisions of the Constitution, especially 
articles 14, 15, and 25, the union government had the power to implement President's Rule 
under Article 356 to maintain public order and restore constitutional democracy which 
includes the rule of law and the protection of secularism. From 1991, the increased 
communal tension resulted in riots which affected the social fabric of the nation.291 
Questions should be raised about why the Union government did not implement article 356 
to protect the principles of secularism and establish the rule of law which were undermined 
in the continual conflicts in UP in 1992. In the Bommai case, the Supreme Court declared 
that the failure to act in accordance with the substantive provisions of the constitution, in 
this case, the commitment to secular rule, was sufficient to trigger the emergency powers of 
the union government.292 
When the BJP state government in UP tried to sabotage the Constitution by extending its 
support to the Sangh Parivar, who pledged to build a Hindu temple after destroying the 
mosque, the union government should have acted to protect the Constitution and the rule of 
law. The state repeatedly failed to adhere to the union government's advice to maintain 
neutrality and instead ignored its advice. Moreover, it failed to implement the highest 
court's order to maintain the status quo in Ayodhya. For instance, the commission 
289 DL Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict (University of California Press, Berkeley 1985) 646-48. 
290 For instance the Janata Government, when it came to power in 1977, dismissed nine Congress state 
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appointed by the Supreme Court to examine the nature of the construction work done in 
Ayodhya submitted its report in September 1992. The commission observed that ·the 
magnitude of the work is such that it could not have been carried out without the use of 
construction equipment such as water tanks, cement concrete mixers, concrete vibrators, 
earth moving equipment, etc. ,293 
Again the Sangh Parivar leaders openly advocated the destruction of the Babri Masjid and 
organized kar sevaks to build a Ram temple in its place. For instance BJP president Advani 
declared on 2 December 1992 that 'all kar sevaks will perform physical activity on the 2.77 
acres and not merely sing hymns'. 294 The Supreme Court during its hearing on 25 
November 1992 clarified that the union government would be quite free to make its own 
assessment and to proceed with whatever action it thought fit in the dispute.295 Godbole 
explained that 'a contingency plan for a take-over of the complex and imposition of 
President's rule was kept ready but there was no clear view within the government on 
whether the union should get fully involved'. 296 This revealed the reluctance of the union 
government to take strong action against the state government which continued to violate 
the constitutional values.297 
As it has been shown, the government had the necessary constitutional measures to take 
over the administration of the state, but it did not demonstrate the political will and 
direction.298 The union government's arguments justifying its decision not to impose 
President's Rule prior to 6 December 1992 were not convincing. The White Paper on 
Ayodhya by the Government of India said that when a state gave assurances before the 
Supreme Court, taking action would not be consistent with the provisions of the 
293 Report of the Commission appointed vide order of the Supreme Court dated 5 August 1992 on lA no 3 in 
Contempt Petition no 102/92 in Writ Petition (civil) no 1000/91. 
294 The Statesman (Calcutta 3 December 1992). 
29S K Prasad and others, Report: Citizen's Tribunal on Ayodhya (The Secretariat, New Delhi 1993) 110. 
296 M Godbole, Unfinished Innings: Recollections and Reflections of a Civil Servant (Orient Longman, New 
Delhi 1996) 347. 
297 Ibid 362. Godbole observes that the contingency plan, both for July and November 1992 contemplated the 
Government of India stepping into the shoes of the state government and taking over the administration. ~ince 
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C . . 299 Th' onstttutton. IS argument was totally unconvincing since the UP government had 
already provided sufficient grounds for its own dismissal under Article 356. 
The inaction on the part of the Government of India indicated a lack of direction, a lack of 
policy and a lack of initiative.3°O When the Ayodhya dispute became a major issue in 1984, 
the union government could have expedited the judicial resolution.30t By not doing this, the 
union government allowed the exacerbation of a problem, with fatal consequences for 
thousands of people, leading to an unprecedented assault on the Constitution, law and 
secular traditions. 
All the union governments after 1986, in an effort to settle the Ayodhya dispute, entered 
into dialogue only with religious organizations like the VHP and the Ramjanmabhumi Nyas 
as representative of the Hindus, and the AIBMAC (All India Babri Masjid Action 
Committee) as representative of the Muslims and not with any secular groups. 
Consequently, this process legitimized the communal organizations, their politics and 
ideology. This had and still has serious repercussions for the secular and democratic 
process in the country. As Budet observed, the possibilities of different voices within the 
communities were silenced by recognising only communal organisations as the sole 
representatives of the respective communities.302 
The Union Government had already got the unequivocal support of all the non-B1P parties 
for the implementation of Article 356. The resolution of the NIC meeting extended 'its 
whole-hearted support and cooperation in whatever step the Prime Minister considers 
essential in upholding the Constitution and the rule of law, and in implementing the Court's 
orders' .303 
Even on 6 December 1992, the unIon government could have acted and averted the 
destruction of the mosque. According to the official account, the Home Ministry received 
299 Government of India White Paper on Ayodhya (GOI, New Delhi 1993) 11. 
300 K Prasad and others, Report: Citizen's Tribunal on Ayodhya (The Secretariat, New Delhi 1993) 80-88. 
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infonnation at 12.00 noon about the attack on the Babri Masjid, yet despite this, a Cabinet 
meeting was only convened at 6.00 pm and President's Rule was proclaimed only at 21.10 
pm.
304 
The delay in convening the Cabinet meeting and taking a decision on imposing 
President's Rule was crucial. The breakdown in the law and order situation allowed for the 
continued assault and destruction of the Masjid, the clearing of its debris, as well as work 
on the building of a platform for the installation of the Ram and other idols. The lear sevaks 
were therefore given vital time to complete their assault on the Babri Masjid and the 
Muslims, and to give a wholly new dimension to the problem by building the foundation of 
the proposed sanctum sanctorum of a Ram Temple. This delay also permitted increased and 
unhindered attacks on minorities and journalists. 
The union government enjoyed enough powers under the Constitution to prevent what 
ultimately happened in Ayodhya. Had it used Article 356, it would definitely have 
strengthened the federal system and averted massive human rights violations. By allowing 
the state government to function, it indirectly provided a free hand to the communal outfits 
to whom the state government of UP was quite sympathetic. 
3.4.6. Failure to punish those responsible for demolition 
The prosecution and conviction of criminal cases raise different issues from those of civil 
cases. Civil wrongs are confined mainly to individuals and seldom affect the community at 
large. That is why, in a criminal case, the state is authorized to pursue offenders on behalf 
of the victims to ensure the rule of law.305 When speedy justice is not meted out to 
offenders in criminal actions, it raises law and order problems and affects the security of the 
people. While making changes in the criminal procedure in 1973, the Indian Parliament 
observed that 'delay in investigation and trial is harmful not only to the individual 
concerned but also to the society. '306 Keeping to this lofty ideal, this section analyses how 
304 K Prasad and others. Report: Citizen's Tribunal on Ayodhya (The Secretariat, New Delhi 1994) 84. 
30S RC Nigam, Law a/Crimes in India (Asia Publishing House. London 1965) 27-8.. .. . 
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the courts failed to punish those responsible for the demolition of the Babri Masjid under 
existing criminal laws. 
The criminal justice system in India is executed by four sub-systems which include the 
police, the prosecution, the courts and the corrective agency. Each of these bodies have 
their own role to play in bringing the accused to trial, and any failure in their responsibility 
can result in a miscarriage of justice which was exemplified in the Ayodhya dispute. In this 
regard, the Constitution clearly states under Article 21 that inordinate delay by the state in 
bringing the accused to trial violates Article 21.307 Assurance of a fair trial is the first 
imperative of the dispensation of justice. 308 
In the Ayodhya dispute, after the demolition, criminal suits were filed against the lear 
sevaks and some of the leaders of the Sangh Parivar. Two First Infonnation Reports (FIRs) 
were filed by the police on the day of demolition. The first FIR in Crime No. 197/92 did 
not name the accused, but it booked 'lakhs309 of unknown lear sevaks' under various 
provisions of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) and the investigation was assigned to the Central 
Bureau of Investigation (CBI) on 13 D~cember 1992.310 Later, another FIR in Crime No. 
198/92 was lodged, naming eight leaders of the Sangh Pariva,J1I as the accused in respect 
of their hate speeches312 on the morning of 6 December 1992, and the investigation was 
assigned to CB-CID/13 the UP state police. Thus, there were, two distinct but related cases 
initiated at one and the same police station in respect of the same offences committed on 
the same day. 
307 State of Maharashtra v Champalal AIR 1981 SC 1675; Rudal Shah v State of Bihar AIR 1983 SC 1096 
308 Police Commissioner, Delhi v Registrar Delhi High Court AIR 1997 SC 95. 
309 One lakh is equivalent to one hundred thousand. 
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311 Eight politicians were named because their identity was well known - LK Advanl. MM Joshi. Cm~ 
Bharathi, Ashok Singhal. Giriraj Kishore, VH Dalmia, Vinay Katiyar and Sadhvi Rithambara. LK Advam 
was President of the BJP party. . . 
312 In Crime no 198 the eight politicians were charged under Section 153 A. Section 1538 (Imputations 
~rejudicial to national integration) and 505 (statements conducing to public mischie~. ., 
13 State Crime Branch Criminal Investigation Department (CB-CID) investigates cnmes wlthm a Statc. 
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On 16 December, after consulting the High Court, the state government set up a Special 
Court of Judicial Magistrate314 to try only the No. 198/92 case. The state police submitted 
to the Special Court a charge-sheet against the eight politicians, on 27 February 1993, and 
the Court took cognizance of the case on 1 March 1993. Later the state requested the union 
government to entrust case No.198 as well as forty-seven other related cases315 to the 
CBI.
316 
Subsequently, the state government established a Special CO~17 for trial in the 
demolition cases in No. 197/92 and the other 47 related cases. The High Court appointed 
Vijay Verma to preside over the Special Court and it was before him that on 5 October 
1993 the CBI filed the consolidated charge-sheee18 against the eight political leaders in 
crime No. 198. 
On 27 August 1994, the Special Judicial Magistrate found that a prima facie case did exist 
against the accused and committed the case319 to the Sessions Court for a full trial. 320 
Against this order, the respondents filed Criminal Revision Petitions in the High Court at 
LucknoW.321 Every single argument against the order for framing charges was rejected by 
314 CrPC (n 103) s 11 empowers the State to set up a special court in respect of 'any particular case or 
particular cases' but only 'after consultation with the High Court'. Its presiding officer is appointed by the 
High Court, not by the State Government. 
315 Forty-seven other cases include 197/92 and forty-six other FIRs with respect to cognizable offences and 
one FIR to non-cognizable offences (NCR no 57 of 1992, under sections 323,427 IPC) were lodged at Police 
Station, Ramjanmabhumi on 6 December 1992. These forty-six cases are related to offences committed 
against media persons. AG Noorani (ed), The Babri Masjid Question 1528-2003: A Matter of National 
Honour (Tulika Books, New Delhi 2003) VollI, 125-27. 
316 CBI Case no 48/93. 
317 The Special Court had to try the offences investigated by the CBI. The schedule listed forty-eight cases 
specifically. They included no 197 and forty-seven other cases, but No 198 was not included though it had 
also been entrusted to the CBI on 26 August. The reason was that this case was pending before the Special 
Judicial Magistrate, at Rae Bareli, UP. 
318 The CBI filed the charge-sheet in the court of Special Magistrate at Lucknow on 5 October 1993. Forty 
persons have been cited as accused in cases involving offences of criminal conspiracy, intentional destruction 
and defiling of a place of worship, promoting enmity between groups on grounds of religion, insulting 
religious feelings. criminal trespass and intimidation of public servants. The charge-sheet concludes th~t 
'from the above mentioned facts and circumstances a prima facie case is made out against accused No 1-40 m 
respect of the offences which were committed in the course of same transaction'. 
ll9 Sessions Case no 344/94 registered vide FIR no 197/92. . 
320 The Additional Sessions Judge JP Srivastava, in his order of 9 September 1997 stated that 'on the baSIS of 
evidence on record, I find a prima facie case to charge the accused persons and I charge them under the 
aforesaid offences. ' 
m Criminal Revision no 199 of 1997, no 20 I of 1997, no 211 of 1997 and no 255 of 1997. 
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Justice Bhalla in the High Court, save the one regarding the careless amendment of 8 
October 1993, adding Case No. 198 to the rest before the Lucknow COurt.322 
On 4 May 2001, as a direct result of the High Court's ruling, the Sessions Judge, Srikanth 
Shukla, dropped further any proceedings against twenty one of the accused, while twenty 
eight other accused were ordered to stand trial. 323 Judge Shukla specifically referred to 
Justice Bhalla's ruling and observed, 'although this _defect in the Notification was curable 
and the state government had opportunity to rectify the same, it had not rectified the said 
mistake in the Notification'. This neglect from the government was deliberate because the 
state government was headed by the UP Chief Minister, Rajnath Singh, (the present 
National President of BJP). 
On 16 June 2001, the CBI requested the UP government to issue a fresh Notification to 
cure the defect, after consulting the High Court. The government neither issued fresh 
Notification nor appealed against the High Court's judgment. Eventually, Special Leave 
Petitions were filed in the Supreme Court by Mohammad Aslam Bhure, Society for Justice, 
and a few concerned citizens. 
In another action, on 30 May 2003, the CBI filed a supplementary charge-sheet against 
Advani and others in case No. 198/92. However, it should be noted that the CBI dropped the 
main charge of conspiracy, which had been levelled against the accused in explicit terms in 
the consolidated charge-sheet of 5 October 1993, which had been filed immediately after 
the demolition of Babri Masjid.324 Also the videos, produced by the CBI in the court, did 
not show any of the inflammatory speeches from the day of demolition.325 
322 Since case no 198 was pending before the Rae Bareli court, the Notification of 9 September had to be 
amended to join this case with the rest. That was done by an amending Notification on 8 October. but, ~is 
time, without consultation with the High Court, which was a careless mistake. On II February 2001, Jusll.ce 
Bhalla of Allahabad High Court struck down this amendment since it did not comply with the essential 
safeguard of consultation with the High Court. Having enforced the law, he repeatedly stres.sed th~t the de~ect 
was 'curable'. Another Notification can be issued by the UP Government after consultation With the High 
Court. 
323 This took place in the cases of Sessions Trial no 344/94 and Sessions Trial no 749/96. 
324 The charge-sheet of 1992 included the grave and crucial charge of conspiracy. A decade later. the same 
investigation and prosecution agency, the CBI excluded it in 2003. On 30_ ~uly 2003, th~ C~I ~reened VIdeo 
films before the court that did not show any of the eight accused, Advanl mcluded, dehvenng mflanunatory 
s~eches at Ayodhya in the morning of the mosque's destruction. 
1 , The Telegraph (Calcutta 30 July 2003). 
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Since the conspiracy charges were dropped, the Special Judicial Magistrate passed an order 
for the discharge of L.K. Advani on 19 September 2003. No revision was filed by the CBI 
against the discharge of L.K. Advani., but the Muslim Personnel Law Board filed a 
Criminal Revision in the High Court against the discharge order. After hearing the 
revisionist's counsel, the judge proceeded to hear the revision on merits and ordered for the 
admission of the revision. Fourteen years after the demolition of the Babri Masjid, the 
criminal cases are still in the preliminary stage and the accused have neither been punished 
nor acquitted. 
The above is a brief chronology of the criminal cases in the Ayodhya dispute. The FIRs 
filed by the police after the demolition named various leaders of the Sangh Pariva?26 for 
inciting the kar sevaks, who were responsible for the criminal acts of destroying the 
mosque and subsequent riots. The punishment for such crimes is clearly mentioned in the 
Criminal Codes of IPC and CrPC. Though abounding evidence existed, the trial remains in 
its preliminary stage, mostly because of the influence of the BJP over the investigative 
agencies, and the negligence of the courts. 
The criminal laws provide the government with the resources to bring the accused to 
speedy trail. But in the case of Ayodhya, a number of the accused became Ministers in the 
union government. For example, L.K. Advani became the Deputy Prime Minister and 
Home Minister. In his capacity as Home Minister, Advani was in charge of the CBI, 
responsible for bringing to justice those accused in the demolition case. But it is alleged 
that Advani made the CBI drop the main charge of conspiracy, and was discharged by the 
court. Until 2004, there was not much improvement in the trial. According to Khaliq 
Ahmad Khan,327 the attitude of the CBI has changed since the fall of the BJP government. 
Now the trial in the demolition case has been adjourned to 29 August 2007.328 
326 Eight leaders were named because their identity was well known - LK Advani, (Fonner HJP Presiden.t) 
MM Joshi (BJP), Uma Bharathi (BJP), Ashok Singhal (President, VHP), Giriraj Kishore, (VHP) VH Dalmla 
(General Secretary, VHP) Vinay Katiyar (President, Bajrang Dal) and Sadhvi Rithambara, leader, Durga 
Vahini a militant Hindu Women's organization. . 
327 Interview with Khaliq Ahmad Khan, Convener of Helal Committee and Chainnan of A~~hya - .Fal~bad 
Study& Research Centre (Faizabad IOFebruary 2006). He infonned about his current negotiatIons WIth Hmdu 
and Muslim leaders to bring out an out of court settlement. 
328 Sify News, 'Ayodhya Case Adjourned till 29 August' <http://sify.comlnewslfullstory.php?id=14512372> 
accessed 18 August 2007. 
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An Enquiry Commission was appointed in 1992 to investigate the demolition and although 
it was expected to submit its report within one year, it has not completed its investigation 
after fourteen years. This delay was caused by some of the accused who, as already noted 
above, became ministers in the BIP union government and apparently failed to co- operate 
with the commission.329 
The failure to punish those involved in the demolition invalidates all the proclamations of 
the Supreme Court about the right to a speedy trial.330 The dispensation of justice based on 
established legal provisions should be impartial. The concept of judicial impartiality was 
seriously damaged by the courts in the Ayodhya dispute. The Supreme Court observed in 
the Chambalal case, 'it is one of the sad and distressing features of our criminal justice 
system that an accused person, resolutely minded to delay the day of reckoning, may quite 
conveniently and comfortably do so' .331 In the Ayodhya dispute, various leaders of the 
Sangh Parivar successfully manoeuvred the process of law to delay their trial. This has 
granted them liberty to threaten public order by their inflammatory speeches, inciting 
further disunity and hatred among the communities in dispute. 
When courts fail to punish the perpetrators of any crime, the confidence the public have in 
the legal institutions may be at stake. In the Ayodhya dispute, the criminal actions of the 
members of the Sangh Parivar were unpunished. Hence, the Ayodhya dispute has turned 
out to be a cause celebre, questioning the rule of law and protection of the minorities in 
India. The inadequacy of the courts naturally warrants an impartial international legal 
intervention to redress the sacred site dispute at Ayodhya. 
3.S. Conclusions 
The case study and the in depth analysis of the Ayodhya dispute brings out the following 
conclusions. Certainly, the conclusions derived from the case study would serve as a useful 
framework for checking and settling similar sacred site disputes, both in India and in other 
parts of the world. 
329 'Uberhan Commission's Tenn Extended by Six Months' Outlook 
<bttp:llwww.outlookindia.comlpti_news.asp?id=395479> accessed 25 October 2006. 
310 Nalla rhombi \' Union of India AIR 1985 SC 1133. 
JJI State of Maharashtra \' Champalal AIR 1981 SC 1675. 
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3.5.1 •. Failure to provide a speedy resolution to sacred site disputes can result in 
exacerbation of communal conflict and denial of human rights. 
Had the Ayodhya dispute been settled in 1950, much of the violence and human rights 
violations would have been averted. The delay by the courts to adjudicate the title suits for 
forty two years has led to the demolition of the mosque. The post-demolition period, 
particularly between 6 and 13 December 1992, witnessed outrageous communal riots, 
which according to the official records has claimed 1,200 lives.332 However, unofficially 
the number should have been much higher. By 7 December 1992, communal riots had 
spread all over UP and Delhi and to the states of Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan, Gujarat, 
Maharashtra, Andhra Pradesh, Kamataka, Punjab, Bihar, Kerala, West Bengal and Assam. 
Communal riots were very common in India. Most telling was the one that immediately 
followed the Partition. It is no exaggeration to say that communal hatred has divided the 
nation ever since the Babri Masjid-Ram Janmabhumi dispute came to the fore, at least from 
1985. M.M. Jacob, then Minister of State for Home, informed the Upper House of 
Parliament that in 1989 and 1990, a total of 2025 people fell victim to communal frenzy in 
sixty-two major riots in the country. That the Minister attributed the communal killings to 
the heightening of tension following the Babri Masjid-Ram Janmabhumi controversy33 is a 
vital point to be underlined. 
The civil suits for title filed in 1950 in the Ayodhya dispute were transferred to the High 
Court in 1989. They still remain at a trial phase. No matter what the High Court decision is 
with regard to the title suits, its verdict is bound to be appealed to the Supreme Court by the 
losing party. So, it may be seen how the adjudication process could be prolonged for many 
more years. Until then the dispute will be alive, which will continue to threaten communal 
harmony. A biased judiciary that remains passive, or delays, will definitely deny justice (as 
was demonstrated in the civil cases in the Ayodhya dispute), and will infringe on 
fundamental rights, and may continue to exacerbate communal conflicts. Domestic case 
law generally remains the formal record and basis for appraisal of application of 
332 C Jaffrelot. The Hindu Nationalist Movement and Politics 1925 to the 1990s (Hurst & Co. London 1996) 
458-64. 
333 MJ Akhtar. Bahri Masjid: A Tale Untold (Genuine. New Delhi 1997) 249. 
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international human rights standards in a state.334 The Ayodhya case study has highlighted 
the failure of Indian courts in applying these standards domestically. 
3.5.2. Legal rights granted to a religious community are insufficient if the state organs 
are unwilling to use their power to enforce them. 
The Indian Constitution grants unambiguous legal rights to religious communities. Articles 
25-30 of the Constitution delineate the rights of religious communities and minority 
communities. Moreover, Sections 295-298 of IPC ensure protection of sacred sites from 
defilement, desecration and destruction. Besides, the 1991 Protection of Places of Worship 
Act extends the protection to all sacred sites in case of dispute. Even though these legal 
rights are available to secure the rights of religious communities, failure of the state organs 
in enforcing them makes the sacred sites vulnerable to attacks and destruction. 
There was only one order from the courts in the Ayodhya dispute, this being to maintain the 
'status quo', and even this was not fully executed by the state organs. In addition, the UP 
state government also defied the orders of the union government to remain neutral in the 
dispute and to increase the security around the Babri Masjid. This establishes the communal 
bias of the state government. 335 
On 6 December 1992, the day of the demolition of the mosque, the Supreme Court itself 
observed that a grave situation had emerged. It is a matter of concern that a constitutionally 
elected government could not discharge sensitive duties in a matter of this magnitude.336 
However, the union government had a duty, as directed by the Supreme Court, to act in a 
proper and permissible way to protect the Babri Masjid.337 The subsequent demolition of 
the mosque and failure to prevent the building of the makeshift temple by the Sangh 
Parivar showed the inefficiency of the union government to enforce its power. The 
statement of V.P. Singh, the former Prime Minister of India, that 'the fall of the three 
l14 M Siraj Sait, 'F oreed Labour in South Asia: An Anatomy of Judicial Interventions' in M Anderson and M 
Happold (eds), Constitutional Human Rights in the Commonwealth (The British Institute of International and 
Comparative Law, London 2003) 63. 
ll5 K Prasad and others, Report: Citizen's Tribunal on Ayodhya (The Secretariat. New Delhi 1994) 72-9. 
116 Legal Correspondent 'UP Government did not discharge its duties' The Hindu (New Delhi 7 December 
1992). 
H7 The Supreme Court order in IA no 5 in Contempt Petition no 97/92 dated on 25 November 1992. 
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domes of the Babri Masjid were in fact the collapse of the three pillars - Legislature, 
J d· . dE' f' 338 U lCtary an xecuttve - 0 Indtan democracy' summarises that legal rights granted to a 
religious community are rendered insufficient if the state organs are unwilling to use their 
power to enforce them. 
3.5.3. Religiously based dispute over a sacred site can be used to mobilise community 
identities for political gains. 
It is obvious from the Ayodhya dispute how communal forces could use a religious dispute 
as a cloak to gain political power, which has been amply demonstrated in the rise to power 
of the BJP in national politics. In pursuance of power, these communal forces have no 
regard for secular values, democratic principles or human rights.339 Mobilisation for 
gaining political power seems to be one and only agenda. 
Contemporary political identity of the Hindu and Muslim communities is built along 
religious lines. Communal violence resulting from the Ayodhya dispute proved to be a 
turning point in Indian politics which has led to each community having deeply entrenched, 
polarised political views. The tragedy of the Ayodhya dispute is that it has eroded the belief 
of communities in the federalist, secular principles enshrined in the Constitution. Also, the 
political confrontation encourages religious-cultural confrontation and that in tum 
strengthens the former. 34o The case study establishes the fact that the use of a sacred site 
dispute helped to politicise communal identities, which in tum helped to strengthen the 
political muscle of the communal forces. 341 
Since sacred sites are tied up with the identity of particular communities, any attack on 
them is seen as an attack on the community and will naturally be defended vigorously. This 
was demonstrated in the ensuing violence that took place all over India after the demolition. 
338 MJ Akhtar, Babri Masjid: A Tale Untold (Genuine, New Delhi 1997) 202. 
339 Aijaz Ahmad, 'Somnath to Gandhinagar: A Night of Long Knives' in KN Panikkar and S Muralidharan 
(eds), Communalism. Civil Society and the State: Reflections on a Decade of Turbulence (SAHMAT. ~ew 
Delhi 2002) 27-9. 
340 AA Engineer (ed), Communalism and communal Violence in India: An Analytical Approach to Hindll-
Muslim Conflict (Ajanta, New Delhi 1989) 94-5. . 
341 For example, BJP which had two Parliamentary seats in 1984, increased to one hundred and twenty In 
1991. It is due to its successful mobilisation of Hindus in the Ayodhya dispute. In another seven years, 8J P 
fonned the Union Government. Its election manifesto shows that its major aims include building a 
'magnificent Ram Temple'. <http://www.bjp.org!> accessed 10 March 2006. 
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Religious disputes have an influence beyond the boundary of a particular country and may 
threaten the peace of a whole region.342 
3.5.4. Undermining of the established secular values leads to the erosion of the 
minority rights. 
From the case study on the Ayodhya dispute, it has been established that the courts 
continued to support the majoritarian religious community by allowing the Hindus to 
worship in the disputed site while excluding the Muslims. Obviously, this was an assault on 
the principles of secularism and equality. Throughout the dispute, the judiciary seems to 
have neglected the principles of secularism and protection of minority rights. 
Minority communities still view secularism as a guarantee to their fundamental right. 
Secularism enshrined in the Constitution is seen as the linchpin that binds together all the 
diverse groups of people within India. Tied up with secularism is the principle of equality. 
Individuals and all religious communities have equal rights, and the state should not 
discriminate among its citizens on the basis of their religion. So, equality along with 
secularism, are essential to protect the rights of minorities, the cornerstones of democracy. 
As secularism is basic to the Constitution, any attack on a sacred place could be construed 
as an attack on secularism as established by the Supreme Court in the Bommai case.343 
Similar opinion was expressed by Justice Sawanth as, 'the concept of secularism as 
religious tolerance and equal treatment of all religious groups includes an assurance of the 
protection of life, property, and places of worship for all religious groups' .344 This may 
establish that if a state subverts a fundamental constitutional principle such as secularism, it 
is impossible for it to run its administration in accordance with the provisions of the 
Constitution. Consequently, as Justice Ramaswamy points out, 'social disunity is bound to 
corrupt leading to national disintegration. ,345 
342 Post-Babri Masjid demolition saw Hindu temples being demolished in Pakistan, Bangladesh and in various 
Arab countries. M Mahmood, 'Backlash to the Destruction at Ayodhya: A View from Pakistan' (1993) 33 
Asian Survey 711-21. 
343 SR Bomma; v Union of India ( 1994) 3 see I. 
3 .... Ibid 149. 
345 Ibid 208. 
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The State and the judiciary are equally guilty of undermining the principles of secularism 
and protection of minority rights, and could be held culpable for all the inter-communal 
strife which has taken place during the last two decades. The union and state governments, 
by their actions and non-actions, have brought down the mosque, observes Brass.346 Hence 
they need to take responsibility to protect secular values, and rights of minority religious 
communities. 
3.6. Concluding Observations 
As a concluding observation of the case study, it is relevant to point out that there were 
individuals, groups and movements who tried to express alternative viewpoints to bring 
about a peaceful settlement to the Ayodhya dispute. When their views and initiatives were 
looked down on with contempt by the communal forces, many broad-minded Hindus 
rallied behind these secular groups. Though their peace marches were physically stopped 
by the state machinery and many were taken into custody before and after the demolition of 
the mosque,347 they still continue to engender public opinion to gather strength for building 
up a civil society. Had they the support of the domestic legal institutions and international 
legal mechanisms then and now, the dispute would have been settled amicably and glaring 
human rights violations would have been avoided. So, even if a particular state fails to 
solve such a sensitive dispute, an impartial international legal body could still intervene to 
provide speedy remedy to prevent inter-communal violence and concomitant violation of 
human rights. Hence, the ensuing chapter looks into the existing international legal 
instruments for settling such sacred site disputes. 
346 PR Brass. 'Secularism Out of Its Place' in Veena Das and others (eds) Tradition. Pluralism and Identity: 
In Honour of TN Madan (Sage, New Delhi 1999) 363. ..'
347 K Prasad and others, Report: Citizen's Tribunal on Ayodhya (The Secretanat, New Delhi 1994) 19. Mulll-
party peace march led by VP Singh, fonner Prime Minister, from Lucknow to Ayodhya was arrested before 
reaching Ayodhya on 5 December 1992. 
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CHAPTER 4 
PROTECTION OF SACRED SITES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 
4.1. Introduction 
The failure of the Indian judiciary and state in protecting the sacred site at Ayodhya has 
been established in the previous chapter. The destruction of the sacred site not only 
endangered the human rights of the minority Muslim community but also provoked 
regional tensions which had international repercussions. Reports of the various national and 
international human rights organisations highlighted the fact that the destruction of this 
sacred site in India is nothing but failure to protect the right to freedom of religion of the 
Muslim community. 
There have been similar incidents in other countries reported by the Special Rapporteur. To 
cite a few as examples, in Nigeria, the authorities warned the Christian community that one 
hundred and fifty buildings used as places of worship could not be used for that purpose. 1 
In Myanmar, Christians in various districts were ordered to stop conducting worship in 
their churches.2 Tajikistan destroyed three non-approved mosques in the Frunze district.3 
Religious militants have destroyed several churches and mosques in Indonesia.4 In Mexico, 
numerous Protestant churches were destroyed by rural leaders.5 A Baptist church in 
Moldova was demolished, allegedly because it had been built illegally. 6 Also in Iraq, 
religious buildings have been at risk of selective destruction.7 In Kyrgyzstan, 1,300 
1 UNCHR 'Report of the Special Rapporteur on Religious Intolerance' (2000) UN Doc ElCN.4/2000/65 20 
F3] (Nigeria). 
UNCHR 'Report of the Special Rapporteur on Religious Intolerance' (2002) UN Doc AJ57/274 9 [40] 
(Myanmar). 
3 UNCHR 'Report of the Special Rapporteur on Religious Intolerance' (2003) UN Doc AJ58/296 16 [92] 
(Tajikistan). 
4 UNCHR 'Report of the Special Rapporteur on Religious Intolerance' (2000) UN Doc EI~~:4/2000/6~ ~49] 
(Indonesia). In Indonesia, several churches and mosques were destroyed due to the activIties of religIOUS 
extremists. 
S UNCHR 'Report of the Special Rapporteur on Religious Intolerance' (2000) UN Doc ElCN A/2000/65 [66] 
1Chiapas, Mexico). . 
UNCHR 'Report of the Special Rapporteur on Religious Intolerance' (2002) UN Doc AJ57;274 [50] 
~Moldova). 
UNCHR 'Report of the Special Rapporteur on Religious Intolerance' (1993) UN Doc ElCN.4/1993/62 [391; 
(2005) UN Doc ElCN .4/20051611 Add.l [144-47] (Iraq). 
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mosques came under the risk of closure when they were subjected to registration 
procedures in 2001.8 This illustrates that state and non-state actors can limit the right to 
freedom of religion through restrictive practices relating to the establishment, maintenance, 
access and protection of sacred sites, which affects free exercise of right to freedom of 
religion. 
Another significant reason for the need to develop international human rights law arises out 
of the failure of the domestic judiciary in sacred sites disputes such as the Ayodhya dispute. 
The International Human Rights treaties guarantee that 'everyone is entitled in full equality 
to a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal in the detennination of 
his rights and obligations,.9 As provided for in the UDHR and the relevant main 
international instruments, it is the judiciary that ensures that 'everyone has the right to an 
effective remedy... for acts violating the fundamental rights granted him by the 
Constitution or by law,.10 First imperative is the independence of the judicial bodies to 
meet the requirements of competence, impartiality and legality so that everyone can 
effectively exercise their right. 
Recently the UN Commission on Human Rights 11 re-examined this question and appointed 
a Special Rapporteur on the independent impartiality of the judiciaryl2 following a study 
already carried out by its sub-commission on this subject. 13 The report of the Special 
Rapporteur indicates a few extreme situations where a case was not heard or examined or 
8 Ibid. 
9 Universal Declaration on Human Rights (adopted 10 December 1948 UNGA Res 217 A(III) (UDHR) art 10 
and International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (adopted 16 December 1966, entered into force 23 
March 1976) 999 UNTS 171 (ICCPR) art 14(1). 
10 UDHR (n 9) art 8; ICCPR (n 9) art 2; ECHR European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms (European Convention on Human Rights, as amended) (adopted 4 November 1950. 
entered into force 3 September 1953) 213 UNTS 221 (ECHR) art 13; American Convention on Human Rights 
(adopted 22 November 1969, entered into force 18 July 1978) OAS Treaty Series No 36 at I (1969) reprinted 
in Basic Documents Pertaining to Human Rights in the Inter-American System OEAlSer L V 111.23 Doc 21 
Rev 6 (1979) (ACHR) art 25 and African (Banjul) Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (adopted 27 ~une 
1981, entered into force 210ctober 1986) OAU Doc CAB/LEG/67/3 Rev 5 (1982) 21 lLM 58 (Afncan 
Charter) art 7. 
II UNGA Res 60/251 (3 April 2006) has abolished Commission on Human Rights and replaced by the Human 
Rights Council. 
12 UNCHR Res 41 (1994) UN Doc FlCN.4/ReslI994/41. 
IJ UNCHR 'Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Question of the Independence of Judges and Lawyers' 
(1999) UN Doc FlCN.4/1999/60. 
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the court acted under external pressure and instructions, or the legal system had been 
largely destroyed in conflicts and confrontation. These are related, for example, to lack of 
human and physical resources, inadequate training for lawyers, the malfunctioning or 
breakdown of systems, the technical complexity of cases, unsuitable procedures and 
violations of the confidentiality of the examination under media pressure. A similar 
situation prevailed in the Ayodhya dispute. 
This chapter examines the extent to which international human rights lawl4 provides 
protection to sacred sites as part of the human right to freedom of religion without any 
unjust interference from state and non-State actors. The first section analyses how 
international human rights law and its mechanisms for enforcement have developed and 
defined the right to freedom of religion to include protection of sacred sites. Section two 
examines the right of religious minority groups to manifest their freedom of religion, with a 
focus on whether such right incorporates protection of their sacred sites. Given that such 
sites tend to have naturally defined territories, it is important to consider how property 
rights under international human rights law facilitate the protection of sacred sites owned 
by the religious communities, and this will be the focus of the third section. Section four 
explores whether the protection given to significant sacred sites as part of cultural rights 
during times of war is sufficient and also whether such protection can be extended to 
protect such sites outside of situations of armed conflict. 
4.2. The right to freedom of religion and protection of sacred sites 
The right to freedom of religion is recognized and guaranteed in many regional as well as in 
key international human rights treaties as a human right. 15 As found in the existing 
provisions of international human rights law, the right to religion positively includes the 
14 International Human Rights Law offers a supervisory framework for the protection of human rights for 
States to protect, fulfil, and promote human rights obligations within their domestic jurisdiction. 
15 UDHR (n 9) art 18; ICCPR (n 9) art 18(3); UN Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance 
and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief UNGA Res 36/55 Doc Al36/51 art I; ECHR (n 10) art 9; 
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe: Document of the Copenhagen Meetin~ of the Confe~nce 
on the Human Dimension (5 June - 29 July 1990) art 9(4); American Declaration of the Rights and D~tJes ~f 
Man, OAS Res XXX adopted by the Ninth International Conference of American States (1948) reprmted m 
Basic Documents Pertaining to Human Rights in the Inter-American System OEAlSer L V 111.82 Doc 6 Rev 1 
at 17 (1992) art 3; ACHR (n 10) art 12; and African Charter (n 10) art 8. 
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right to manifest one's faith in 'worship alone or m community'. In many religions, 
including the two central to the Ayodhya dispute, worship is conducted in a definite place 
which is considered sacred to the adherents of the particular religion. Sacred sites remain 
the perceptible manifestation of religion, and as such they playa pivotal role in the life of a 
religious community. Often sacred sites come under attack, and disputes over them, such as 
the one in the Ayodhya dispute, result in egregious human rights violations. Therefore, it is 
paramount that sacred sites are given sufficient protection from attacks by the State and 
non-State actors as a key component of freedom of religion. 
Three major international human rights instruments set out the rights related to freedom of 
religion or belief. 16 They are the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948 (UDHR), the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966 (ICCPR), and the 1981 UN 
Declaration on·the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on 
Religion or Belief (1981 Declaration on Religious Intolerance). This section argues that the 
provisions in these instruments relating to the right to freedom of religion are too broad, 
they do not cover protection of sacred sites and with the exception of the ICCPR, are 
mostly soft law. 
4.2.1. Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
In 1941, in his message to Congress, the US President, FD Roosevelt, spoke about 'the four 
freedoms,17 which included 'freedom of every person to worship God in his own way and 
everywhere in the world'. 18 It is a fact that these four freedoms played a vital role in 
shaping the future Charter of the UN 19 which among its goals included 'promoting and 
encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all, without 
16 N Lerner, 'Religion and International Human Rights' in L Gearon (ed), Human Rights & Religion: A 
Reader (Sussex Academic Press, Brighton 2002) 44. . 
17 MG Johnson, 'The Contributions of Eleanor and Franklin Roosevelt to the Development of International 
Protection for Human Rights' (1996) 9 HRQ 21-2. Roosevelt stated that 'We look forw~ to a ~orl.d 
founded upon four essential human freedoms including the freedom of every person to worshIp God In hIS 
own way - everywhere in the world. 
18 MR Ishay, The Human rights Reader (Routledge, New York 1997) 403-7. l' •• 
19 United Nations Charter (adopted 26 June 1945, entered into force 24 October 1945) 1 U~TS XVI (UN 
Charter). 
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distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion'. 20 It should be noted that the 
'establishment' of any particular religion, globally, is not emphasised. 
The UDHR, 'the conscience of the world' /1 sets out in a comprehensive manner most of 
the civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights amongst which freedom of religion 
is also included. The Preamble and Articles 1, 2, 16, 26 in UDHR incorporate clauses 
concerning freedom of religion or belief.22 However, the UDHR specifically delineates the 
right to freedom of religion or belief in article 18 which states: 
Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes 
freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with 
others and in public or private, to manifest religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship, 
and observance. 
The UDHR does not defme the terms 'thought', 'conscience', and 'religion,?3 This has led 
to ambiguity in interpreting this freedom. Partsch observes that 'together these terms cover 
all possible attitudes of the individual toward the world, toward society, and toward that 
which determines his fate and the destiny of the world, be it a divinity, some superior being 
or just reason and rationalism, or chance' .24 Regarding the inviolable nature of this freedom 
of religion, Scheinin cogently argues that 'the absolute character of the freedom of an inner 
state of mind was stressed in the drafting of the UDHR' .25 Henkin concludes that 'the 
UO HR provides an essential support for religions' .26 
20 UN Charter (n 19) art 1 (3). 
21 U Haksar, Minority Protection and the International Bill of Rights (Allied Publishers, Bombay 1974) 36. 
22 UNCHR (Sub-Commission), 'Study of Discrimination in the Matter of Religious Rights and Practices by 
Arcot Krishnaswamy' (1960) UN Doc E/CN.4/Sub.2/200/Rev.l, 12. 
23 M Schein in, 'Article 18' in G Alfredsson and A Eide (eds), The Universal Declaration of Human Rights: A 
common Standard of Achievement (Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague 1999) 380. 
24 KJ Partsch, 'Freedom of Conscience and Expression, and Political Freedoms' in L Henkin (ed). The 
International Bill of Rights. The Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Columbia University Press. New 
York 1981) 213. 
2S M Scheinin, 'Article 18' in G Alfredsson and A Eide (eds), The Universal Declaration of Human Rights: A 
common Standard of Achievement (Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague 1999) 382. This view was well supported by 
the French representative to the Third Committee of the General Assembly. Cassin, ~~en he stated th~t 'the 
sacred and inviolable character of the right to freedom of thought, conscience, and rehglOn. was the basiS and 
origin of all other rights and had a metaphysical significance'. See, UN Doc ElCN.4/SR.60. 
26 L Henkin, 'Religion, Religions, and Human Rights' (1998) 26 Journal of Religious Ethics 229.234. 
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The text of Article 18 consists of two parts. The frrst part lays out everyone's right to 
freedom of thought, conscience, and religion and the second part provides a two-pronged 
definition of that right. The first prong, the forum internum, contains the clause 'freedom to 
have and change his religion or belief'. The second prong, the forum externum, includes the 
clause 'freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to 
manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and observance' . 
As seen above, Article 18 of the UDHR has acknowledged the right to worship 'either 
alone or in community'. However, sacred sites, which are a key component of freedom of 
religion and essential to conduct worship in many religions, are not explicitly covered 
under Article 18. One reason for this omission could be the failure to recognise collective 
rights since the general trend existing in the UN at that time was to give more importance to 
individual rights. However, Lerner argues that the reference 'to manifest a religion or belief 
alone or in community with others' in Article 18 makes a mild concession to group 
rights' .27 
Any Declaration from the UN General Assembly is only a 'soft law', and it does not 
present binding obligations for the member states. However, the widespread acceptance of 
the UDHR shows that many of its provisions have achieved the status of international 
customary law.28 For instance, from the repeated invocation of the UDHR by many states, 
regional inter-governmental organisations and the UN itself, using various Resolutions and 
Declarations as evidence, supports this argument. 29 This finds an assertion in Hurst 
Hannum's words that 'The Universal Declaration of Human Rights has been the foundation 
of much of the post-1945 codification of human rights, and ... today exerts a moral, 
political, and legal influence far beyond the hopes of many of its drafters' .30 However, the 
27 N Lerner, 'Religion and International Human Rights' in L Gearon (ed), Human Rights & Religion: A 
Reader (Sussex Academic Press, Brighton 2002) 45. 
28 MG Johnson and J Symonides, The Universal Declaration of Human Rights: A History of its Creation and 
Implementation 1948-1998 (UNESCO, Paris 1998) 67. . 
29 JP Humphrey, Human Rights and the United Nations: A Great Adventure (Dobbs Ferry Translational, New 
York 1984) 75-6 
30 H Hannum 'The Status of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in national and International Law' 
(1995-6) 2 G~orgia Journal of International and Comparative Law 287. 289; M Robinson 'The ~niversal 
Declaration of Human Rights: The International Keystone of Human Dignity' in Barend van der HelJden and 
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rights set out in the UD HR have been legally entrenched in a subsequent binding human 
rights treaty, the ICCPR. 
4.2.2. ICCPR and the Human Rights Committee 
After adopting the UDHR, the UN General Assembly requested the Commission on Human 
Rights, through the ECOSOC, to continue to give priority in its work to the preparation of a 
draft covenant on human rights and draft measures of its implementation.31 Subsequently, 
two covenants, the ICESCR and the ICCPR, together with the Optional Protocol of the 
ICCPR, were adopted by the General Assembly on 16 December 196632 and came into 
force in 1976. The ICCPR is a legally binding human rights treaty. All member states have 
a tripartite obligation to respect, protect and fulfil this right with respect to all individuals 
within their territory and subject to their jurisdiction.33 The supervisory treaty body for the 
ICCPR is the Human Rights Committee (HRC) which was established on 20 September 
1976.34 
Article 18 of the ICCPR defines the right to freedom of religion in four paragraphs, which 
include specific limitation clauses. However, Article 18 of the ICCPR includes two other 
rights 'right to freedom of thought and conscience' together with 'freedom of religion' .35 
Article 18( 1) of the ICCPR protects the individual and collective manifestations of a 
religion, placing particular emphasis on four forms: worship, observance, practice and 
teaching. However, it does not apparently contain a right to establish, maintain and protect 
Bahia Tahzip-Lie (eds), Reflections on the Universal Declaration on Human Rights: A Fiftieth Anniversary 
Anthology (Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague 1998) 254. 
JI UNGA Res 217 E (III) (10 December 1948) UN Doc Al81 O. 
J2 UNGA Res 2200lA (XXI) (16 December 1966). 
JJ ICCPR (n 9) art 2(3)(a)(b) and (c). This aspect is stressed by the Human Rights Committee in Herrera 
Rubio v Columbia, (Communication No 161/1983) UN Doc Supp No 40 (A/43/40) 190 (1988). The HRC 
held 'there is a preventive or positive aspect to the right to life'. 
J4 Human Rights Committee is established in accordance with Articles 28-30 of the ICCPR. The HRC is an 
autonomous treaty-based body and the duty assigned to it is to monitor the States parties' implementation of 
the ICCPR and optional protocols in their domestic jurisdiction. <http://www.ohchr.org/english/bodieslluc/> 
accessed 16 May 2006. 
B M Nowak. UN Covenant on Cil'i/ and Political Rights: CCPR Commentary (NP Engel. Kehl 1993) 320. 
The 'right to freedom of thought and conscience' means the right of everyone to develop autonomously 
thoughts and a conscience free from impennissible external influence. This right to spiritual and moral 
existence is closely associated with the right to privacy in Article 17 of the ICCPR as well as freedom of 
opinion in Article 19 ( I ) in the same Covenant. 
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sacred sites as an essential part of the freedom of religion. Article 18 of the ICCPR 
guarantees freedom of religion to everyone in member states. 
Article 18(1) of the ICCPR has two parts which is a reiteration In slightly different 
language of the concepts signified in Article 18 of the UDHR. Similar to UDHR, the first 
part guarantees everyone's right to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion and the 
second part provides a two-pronged definition of that right. The fIrst prong, the forum 
infernum, contains the clause 'freedom to have or adopt a religion or belief of his choice'. 
The second prong, the forum exfemum, includes the clause 'freedom, either alone or in 
community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in 
teaching, practice, worship and observance'. Unlike the freedom mentioned in the second 
prong, the freedom in the first prong is unconditional in the sense that it may not be 
restricted or be derogated from in any situation, not even in time of public emergency.36 
This follows from the 'derogation' clause in Article 4(2) of ICCPR and as a result, part of 
Article 18 belongs to the realm of 'non-derogable' rights.37 
If freedom to have a religion is considered as 'passive freedom', then freedom to 'manifest' 
the right or to live one's life in accordance with it is an 'active freedom' of the right to 
freedom of religion. 38 Active exercise of this right is usually performed in the outside world 
and thus it is basically subject to limitations.39 Article 18, paragraph 3 of the ICCPR, 
contains a limitation clause which refers only to limitations to be placed on freedom40 to 
manifest one's religion or belief. These limitations may be used by the states to restrict the 
freedom of religion, particularly access and protection to sacred sites, by alleging the 
protection of public safety orland public order as established in the Ayodhya dispute. 
36 BG Tahzip, Freedom of Religion or Belief' Ensuring Effective International Legal Protection (Martinus 
NijhotT, The Hague 1996) 88. 
37 UNCHR 'General Comment 22' in 'Note by the Secretariat, Compilation of General Comments and 
General Recommendations adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies' (2004) UN Doc HRIlGEN/llRev.7. 
38 M Nowak, UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: CCPR Commentary (NP Engel, Kehl 1993) 318. 
39 KJ Partsch, 'Freedom of Conscience and Expression, and Political Freedom' in L Henkin (ed), The 
International Bill of Rights: The Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Columbia University Press, New 
York 1981) 212-3. . . . 
40 ICCPR (n 9) art 18(3): Freedom to manifest one's religion or beliefs may be subject only to such hmltatlons 
as are prescribed by law and are necessary to protect public safety, order, health, or morals or the fundame~tal 
rights and freedoms of others. It is also delineated in the Siracusa Principles on the Limitation and Derogation 
Provisions in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights in UN Doc ElCNA, 1984 4 pt I. 
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The Human Right Committee (HRC) is the treaty-based body which monitors states in 
fulfilling their obligations based on the provisions guaranteed in the ICCPR and its 
Protocols.41 There are three substantive procedures given for the effective observance of the 
rights in ICCPR. They are, firstly, under Article 40 of the ICCPR, a mandatory reporting 
procedure by states on the measures they have adopted to give effect to the rights provided 
in ICCPR and on the progress made in the enjoyment of those rights.42 Secondly, under 
Articles 41 and 42 of ICCPR, there is an optional inter-state complaint procedure43 whereby 
a state issues a complaint when another state party is not fulfilling its obligation under the 
Covenant. Finally, there is an optional individual communications procedure under the First 
Optional Protocol to the Covenant44 whereby the HRC is able to receive and consider 
communications from individuals subject to the jurisdiction of a State party to the First 
Protocol of ICCPR.45 
The role of the HRC, as a human rights mechanism, is important in protecting and 
promoting human rights. With regard to the protection of the right to freedom of religion, 
however, its success is limited. After a detailed examination, Taylor argues that 'out of the 
substantive Articles 1 to 27, issues under Article 18 are relatively low in the priority of 
most members compared to Articles which have general importance (for instance, Articles 
1-10)' .46 One of the reasons attributed to this limited success could be that the guidelines 
offered by the HRC are not sufficient for states to prepare their reports on specific aspects 
of each article.47 This may lead to inappropriate reporting to the HRC in cases where 
41 ICCPR (n 9) art 28-45. 
42 Ibid art 40( 1 ). 
43 Ibid art 41 (1); S Leckie, 'The Inter-State Complaint Procedure in International Law: Hopeful Prospects or 
Wishful Thinking?' (1988) 10 HRQ 249. 
44 Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (adopted 16 December 1966, 
entered into force 23 March 1976) UNGA Res 2200A (XXI) 21 UN Doc AJ6316 (1966) 999 UNTS 302 
~9Ptional Protocol 1) art I. 
S D McGoldrick, The Human Rights Committee: Its Role in the Development of the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights (Clarendon, Oxford 1994) 50-I. . 
46 PM Taylor, Freedom of Religion: UN and European Human Rights Law and Practice (CUP. Cambndge 
2005) 12. 
47 I Boerefijn. The Reporting Procedure under the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: Practice and 
Procedures of the Human Rights Committee (Hart, Oxford 1999) 83. 
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religious freedom is under threat, and especially where many attacks on sacred sites have 
happened, for example, in India. 
HRC admits individual communications.48 Crawford notes that the 'views' of the HRC on 
individual communications are not binding upon the parties.49 In addition, HRC does not 
have any authority to attach sanctions to its decisions. At most, HRC may request a 
respondent state 'to avoid irreparable damage to the victim'. 50 Besides, because HRC does 
not admit communications from any groups, it may deter religious communities from 
making complaints. Also, as a treaty-based body, the HRC places its reliance upon state 
reports which more often than not do not contain any information on attacks on sacred sites. 
The gap in Article 18 of ICCPR relating to sacred sites was addressed, though not fully, 
through General Comment No. 22 which was adopted in the HRC on 20 July 1993.51 In 
paragraph 4 of the General Comment 22, HRC states: 
The concept of worship extends to ritual and ceremonial acts giving direct expression to 
belief, as well as various practices integral to such acts, including the building of places of 
worship, the use of ritual fonnulas and objects, the display of symbols and the observance 
of holidays and days of rest. 
While examining the freedom of religion ensured under Article 18 of the ICCPR, Para 4 of 
the General Comment 22 may be viewed as a development in furtherance of religious 
freedom since it has acknowledged the 'right to build places of worship'. However, if 
freedom to maintain and protect places of worship could have been added, that would have 
strengthened the right to manifest in worship one's faith or belief and, it could have 
necessitated the states to be more accountable in protecting sacred sites. Moreover, there 
are some more rights related to freedom of religion that have not been covered, such as, 
48 Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (adopted 16 December 1966, 
entered into force 23 March 1976) UNGA Res 2200A (XXI) 21 UN Doc A16316 (1966) 999 UNTS 302 
(Optional Protocol 1) art I. 
49 J Crawford, 'The UN Human Rights Treaty System: A System in Crisis' in P Alston and J Crawford (eds). 
The Fuhlre o/UN Human Rights Treaty Monitoring (CUP, Cambridge 2000) 2. 
50 ICCPR (n 9) art 39(2) provides that the Committee shall establish its own Rules of Procedure. Rule 86 of 
the Rules of Procedure provides authority to the Committee before forwarding its views on the 
communication to the relevant State Party to infonn that State 'of its views as to whether interim measures 
may be desirable to avoid irreparable damage to the victim of the alleged violation'. 
51UNCHR 'General Comment 22' in 'Note by the Secretariat, Compilation of General Comments and 
General Recommendations adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies' (2004) UN Doc HRI/GENII/Rev.7. 
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freedom to make pilgrimage to the sacred sites whether inside or outside one's country, and 
equal protection to all cemeteries and burial places.52 These shortcomings in the ICCPR 
necessitated creating a separate human rights instrument to protect the rights of freedom of 
religion or belief which was adopted in 1981. 
4.2.3. 1981 UN Declaration on Religious Intolerance 
A major development in codifying religious rights at international level is the United 
Nations Declaration on the Elimination of all Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination 
Based on Religion or Belief 1981 (1981 Declaration on Religious Intolerance) which 
contains much more unambiguous language, bearing upon the need to protect sacred sites 
as religious properties. In view of the fact that the freedoms of religion or belief are such 
sensitive issues, the 1981 Declaration on Religious Intolerance may be rightly considered 
as an important human rights instrument. As Sullivan remarks, 'against the historical 
backdrop of all conflicts fuelled by religion, the Declaration stands as a milestone in the 
progressive development of human rights norms' .53 
The 1981 Declaration on Religious Intolerance justifies a brief overview to understand why 
the adoption took a long time and why a binding Convention could not be achieved despite 
the fact that religious disputes and religious militancy threaten the peace and safety of the 
world. S4 A proposal was suggested in 1952 in the fifth session of the Sub-Commission on 
the Prevention of Discrimination and the Protection of Minorities5S (the Sub-Commission) 
to conduct a world-wide study of discrimination in the field of religious rights and 
practices.56 To prepare a preliminary report on the proposed study, the Sub-Commission 
appointed Halpern from the United States. Halpern submitted his report to the Sub-
52 BG Tahzip, Freedom of Religion or Beliel Ensuring Effective International Legal Protection (Martin us 
Nijhoff, The Hague 1996) 322. . . . . 
53 OJ Sullivan, • Advancing the Freedom of Religion or Belief through the UN DeclaratIOn on the Ehmmatlon 
of Religious Intolerance and Discrimination' (1998) 82 Am J InCI L 487, 488. . . 
54 For a detailed study, see, BG Tahzip, Freedom of Religion or Beliel Ensuring Effectl\'e InternatIOnal Legal 
Protection (Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague 1996) 122-65. . 
55 At presen~ known as the Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights. 
56 UN Doc ElCN.4/Sub.2/SR.I04 (1952) 6. 
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Commission
57 
and the report insisted there was a need of further study of violations of 
religious freedom. 58 
Based on the examination of this report, the Sub-Commission appointed one of its members 
from India, Krishnaswamy, as its Special Rapporteur to pursue the study59 and he submitted 
his report to the Sub-Commission at its twelfth session in 1960. The report contained three 
parts and sixteen rules. The second part referred to 'freedom to manifest religion or belief 
in which Rules 3, 4 and 6 are important for the purpose of this research because they 
emphasise the reasons for the protection of sacred sites.6o The report delineated the need to 
protect sacred sites in unambiguous terms. 
The study remains an important step in the efforts of the UN to counteract discrimination 
based on religion or belief and it had a substantial impact on the text and the outlook of the 
1981 Declaration on Religious Intolerance.61 The Krishnaswamy study was adopted, with a 
few modifications,62 in the Sub-Commission and transmitted to the Commission on Human 
Rights (CHR)63. Based on this study, in 1962, the ECOSOC was requested by the General 
Assembly, through a resolution,64 to ask the CHR, which is a subsidiary body of the 
S7 UNCHR (Sub-Commission), 'Preliminary Report of the Proposed Study on Discrimination in the Matter of 
Religious Rights and Practices' (1954) UN Doc E/CN.4/Sub.2/162. 
S8 Ibid [S]. Halpern observes 'A study upon this subject by an international body would be particularly 
appropriate because religious affiliations run across national lines and violations of religious freedom in one 
country arouse resentment and antagonism on the part of the co-religionists of the oppressed persons in other 
countries' . 
S9 UN Doc E/CN.4/Sub.2/1956/177 [119]. 
60 UNCHR (Sub-Commission), 'Study of Discrimination in the Matter of Religious Rights and Practices by 
Arcot Krishnaswamy' (1960) UN Doc E/CN.4/Sub.2/200/Rev.1. In this study, Part II - Freedom to Manifest 
Religion or Belief sets out some Basic Rules. Rule 3 states: Everyone should be free to worship in accordance 
with the prescriptions of his religion or belief, either alone or in community with others, and in public or in 
private; Equal protection should be accorded to all forms of worship, places of worship, and objects necessary 
for the perfonnance of rites. Rule 4: The possibility for pilgrims to journey to sacred places such as acts of 
devotion prescribed by their religion or belief, whether inside or outside their own country, should be assured. 
Rule 6 (2): Equal protection against desecration should be afforded to all places for burial, cremation or other 
methods of disposal of dead, as well as to religious and other symbols displayed in these places; and equal 
protection against interference by outsiders should be afforded to funeral or commemorative rites of all 
religions and beliefs. 
61 Theo van Boven, • Advances and Obstacles in Building Understanding and Respect between People of 
Diverse Religions and Beliefs' (1991) 13 HRQ 437-49. 
62 UN Doc ElCN.4/S00; ElCN.4/Sub.2/206 (1960) [51 ]-[ 160]. 
63 GA Res 60/251 (3 April 2006) has abolished Commission on Human Rights and replaced by the Human 
Rights Council. 
64 GA Res 17S0 (XVII) (7 December 1962). 
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ECOSOC, to prepare a draft declaration and a draft convention on the elimination of all 
forms of religious intolerance and to develop the right to religious freedom. 
When a text of the draft convention came before the Third Committee of the General 
Assembly in 1967,65 it received very strong criticism from many countries66 and the 
General Assembly decided to postpone the draft convention and to give priority to the 
completion of the draft declaration.67 In 1974, the CHR set up an informal working group68 
and after a lengthy process in 1981 it presented a draft declaration to the CHR.69 The CHR 
adopted the draft declaration on 10 March 1981 70 and forwarded it to the ECOSOC which 
adopted it without much debate.71 On 25 November 1981, the General Assembly adopted 
the declaration on freedom of religion without voting.72 The length of the process in 
adopting the 1981 Declaration on Religious Intolerance indicates the sensitivity and 
complexity of the issue of freedom of religion or belief.73 
In the 1981 Declaration on Religious Intolerance, the important article for the purpose of 
this research is Article VI which includes the right to worship and assemble, as well as 'to 
establish and maintain places for these purposes'. 74 Liskofsky defines article VI as the 
'most significant in the Declaration' .75 The 1981 Declaration on Religious Intolerance 
makes a significant contribution by listing nine specific illustrations of freedom 
encompassed in the second prong, the forum extemum, of the overall right to freedom of 
65 UN Doc AlC.3/SR.1486-SR.1514 (1967). 
66 Critics include Soviet Union, other communist states, several African and Asian states; Islamic states, the 
Catholic Church and some religious groups opposed the text of the draft convention since the defmition of 
'religion or belief included theistic, non-theistic and atheistic beliefs. BG Tahzip, Freedom of Religion or 
Belief' Ensuring Effective International Legal Protection (Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague 1996) 152. 
67 N Lerner, Group Rights and Discrimination in International Law (Martin us Nijhoff, The Hague 1991) 92. 
68 UN Doc EJ5464, E/CN.4/1154 (1974) [56]. 
69 UN Doc El1981/25, E/CN.4/1475 (1981). 
70 UNCHR Res 20 (XXXVII) 10 March 1981. 
71 ECOSOC 'Project of the Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination 
Based on Religion or Belief Res 1981/36 (8 May 1981). 
72 Declaration on the Elimination of all Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or 
Belief, UNGA Res 36/55 (25 November 1981) UN Doc A/Res/36/55 (1981 Declaration on Religious 
Intolerance). . . 
13 HA Jack, How the UN ReligiOUS Declaration was Unanimously Adopted (World Conference on RehglOn 
and Peace. New York 1982) 1 
74 1981 Declaration on Religious Intolerance (n 72) art VI (a). 
7S S Liskofsky. Eliminating Intolerance and Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief The US Role. 
Reports on the Foreign Scene. No.8 (American Jewish Committee. New York 1968) 468. 
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thought, conscience, and religion. This provision offers adherents of a religion or belief an 
international legal basis to comply with what is prescribed, required, or authorised by their 
religion or belief.76 
Article VI of the 1981 Declaration on Religious Tolerance sets out the list of manifestations 
of religion or belief which is not an exhaustive one.77 Among the nine illustrated freedoms 
in Article VI, freedom to worship or assemble in connection with a religion or belief, and 
'to establish, and maintain places for these purposes', is the first one.78 Article VI( c) is 
intended to cover the contents of religious buildings, asserting the right 'to make, to acquire 
and to use to an adequate extent the necessary articles and materials related to the rites or 
customs of a religion or belief. 79 In addition, the Declaration provides for a right to teach 
religion 'in places suitable for these purposes', which reinforces the right to preserve such 
sites.8o 
One of the limitations of the 1981 Declaration is that it recognises the rights of religious 
communities 'to establish and maintain places to worship or assemble in connection with a 
religion or belief8 ) but has failed to include the protection of places of worship. Although it 
can be argued that the words 'to maintain places of worship' incorporates the idea of 
protection of sacred sites, there is a possible threat that states may give such a narrow 
definition of this clause that protection is denied in times of dispute. To avoid such a 
narrow reading of this provision, more unambiguous coverage is needed to protect sacred 
sites. For instance, the following freedoms could have been included· in the Declaration. 
They are, protection of places of worship especially during times of dispute; to undertake 
76 SG Tahzip, Freedom of Religion or Belief Ensuring Effective International Legal Protection (Martinus 
NijhofT, The Hague 1996) 180. 
77 N Lerner, 'Toward a Draft Declaration against Religious Intolerance and Discrimination' (1981) 11 Israel 
VB Hum Rts 82, 94. Lerner points out that 'the drafters of the Declaration felt that it was necessary to spell 
out some of the many concrete manifestations of the right to freedom of religion or belief, and it would not be 
sufficient to do so in general, abstract tenns'. 
78 1981 Declaration on Religious Intolerance (n 72) art VI(a). 
79 Ibid art VI( c). 
80 Ibid art VI(e). 
81 Ibid art VI(c). 
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pilgrimage to sacred sites whether inside or outside the country; and82 protection of burial 
grounds and cemeteries from desecration. 
Another limitation would be that the 1981 Declaration on Religious Intolerance is a soft 
law, and as such has not developed into customary law status such as the UDHR. Hence, 
states are not bound to observe its provisions. The rights set out in the Declaration are not 
incorporated in a subsequent binding human rights instrument. 
Regarding the benefits of this Declaration, it has elaborated some rights and freedoms, 
general principles, and values previously approved by the member states. Furthermore, it 
has provided a basis for a programme of measures and action within the UN, and various 
governmental and non-governmental organizations.83 It also provides a useful framework 
for the investigation of different manifestations of religion or belief. 
4.2.4. Charter-based bodies 
This sub-section examines the role of the Commission on Human Rights84 (CHR) and the 
Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights85 (the Sub-
Commission) in protecting and promoting the right to freedom of religion. These two 
human rights mechanisms provide a framework through which communications can be 
received from states, individuals and non-governmental organisations about violations of 
human rights, including the right to freedom of religion. The CHR was established under 
Article 68 of the UN Charter, by the ECOSOC, in 1946 as an important UN organ in the 
field of human rights. It had subordinate status as one of several specialized commissions 
82 UNCHR (Sub-Commission), 'Study of Discrimination in the Matter of Religious Rights and Practices by 
Arcot Krishnaswamy' (1960) UN Doc FJCN.4/Sub.2/200/Rev.l, Rule 4. 
83 UNCHR (Sub-Commission) 'Study of the Current Dimensions of the Problems of Intolerance and of 
Discrimination on Grounds of Religion or Belief by Benito Elizabeth Odis' in (1986) UN Doc 
FJCN.4Sub.2/1987/26 [203]. 
114 UNGA Res 60/251 (3 April 2006) has abolished Commission on Human Rights and replaced .by the Hum~ 
Rights Council. However, this section examines the activities of the Commission on Human Rights hence Its 
name is used instead of the Human Rights Council. 
u Unt.iJ 1999 the Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights was known as the Sub-
Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and the Protection of Minorities. 
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answerable to the ECOSOC, and, through it, to the General Assembly.86 Subsequently, the 
CHR established its subsidiary organ, the Sub-Commission, in 1947 with a special purpose 
to conduct studies related to discrimination of minorities in various fields. Consequently it 
became a permanent advisory body for the CHR and established six subsidiary working 
groups including a working group on minorities, and also Special Rapporteurs, to monitor 
human rights situations. 
In 1967, ECOSOC passed Resolution 1235 (XLII) which authorized the CHR and its Sub-
Commission 'to examine information relevant to gross violations of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms'. As part of its remit, Resolution 1235 (XLII) requested the CHR 'to 
examine information ... contained in the communications87 listed by the Secretary-General 
through Resolution 728 F... to make a thorough study of situations which reveal a 
consistent pattern of violations of human rights' .88 
The main weakness of the Resolution 1235 was that procedures adopted in dealing with 
communications were not confidential and were of a public nature. Also it did not permit 
individuals and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) to send communications. 
Furthermore, with regard to the implementation of the recommendations, the CHR was 
dependent upon the cooperation of states and governments, whose mandates are limited to 
reporting to the CHR. As a result, Resolution 1235 did not have the desired effect, although 
it was true that the victims were provided with an opportunity to voice their grievances.89 
So, the Sub-Commission recommended that the CHR develop a confidential procedure to 
consider information from a variety of sources and, accordingly, Resolution 1503 (XLVIII) 
86 P Alston, 'The Commission on Human Rights' in P Alston (ed), The United Nations and Human Rights: A 
Critical Appraisal (Clarendon Press, Oxford 1992) 126. 
17 Communications based on ECOSOC Res 728 F (XXVIII). UN receives numerous communications from 
individuals or groups of persons whose human rights have been violated. See, Theo van Boven. 'The ~~ited 
Nations Commission on Human Rights and Violations of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms m F 
Coomans and others (eds), Human Rights from Exclusion to Inclusion: Principles and Practice (Kluwer Law 
International. The Hague 2000). 
88 ECOSOC Res 1235 (XLII) (6 June 1967). 
B9 United Nations, Sel'enteen Frequently Asked Questions about United Sations Special Rapporteurs: Fa('t 
Sheet No: 27 (United Nations, Geneva 2001) 12-3. 
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was adopted on 27 May 1970.90 Under this Resolution, individuals and NGOs were allowed 
to submit communications.91 All actions under Resolution 1503 'shall remain confidential 
until such time as the CHR may decide to make recommendations to ECOSOC,.92 
However, it should be noted that the communication must be that it reveals a consistent 
pattern of gross violations of human rights. 
With regard to the Charter-based bodies, two main reasons underline the inadequacy of the 
CHR and the Sub-Commission in protecting sacred sites from attacks, as violation of 
human rights. Firstly, the Resolution I(XXIV)93 which is related to the question of 
admissibility of communications94 received by the Secretary General under and In 
accordance with ECOSOC Resolution 1235,95 states that 'the communication must contain 
'" the rights that have been violated,96. As noted by Rehman 'to establish the pattern of 
violations, reliance should be placed on violations of the rights as provided in the UDHR or 
other major human rights treaties' ,97 It is crucial, since protection of sacred sites as a key 
component of freedom of religion does not appear specifically in any of the international 
human rights instruments such as UDHR, ICCPR or the 1981 Declaration, and Charter-
based bodies remain inadequate in providing any remedy for sacred sites disputes. 
Secondly, as these bodies have only recognised individual rights, and not collective rights 
of religious groups, the CHR could not offer effective remedy in protecting sacred sites, 
which fall under the collective rights of a religious community. 
90 ECOSOC Res 1503 (XLVIII) (27 May 1970). Resolution 1503 could be rightly declared as a 'petition-
infonnation' system because the objective is to use complaints as a means by which to assist the CHR in 
identifying situations involving a 'consistent pattern of gross and reliably attested violations'. 
91 ECOSOC Res 2000/3 (16 June 2000) [7](a) and (c). Once the CHR receives those communications, it 
considers particular situations in two separate closed meetings. At the first closed meeting, each country 
concerned would be invited to make opening presentations and a discussion would follow subsequently 
between members of the CHR and the government concerned. At the second meeting, members of the CHR 
would discuss and take action on the draft resolutions or decisions and the Chairperson of the CHR should 
announce in a public meeting which countries had been examined under the 1503 procedure. 
92 ECOSOC Res 1503 (XLVIII) (27 May 1970) [8]. 
93 UNCHR (Sub-Commission) Res 1 (XXIV) (13 August 1971). 
94 ECOSOC Res 728 F (XXVIII) (30 July 1959). 
9S I Brownlie and GS Goodwin-Gill (eds), Basic Documents on Human Rights (51h edn OUP, Oxford 20(6) 
18. 
96 UNCHR (Sub-Commission) Res I (XXIV) (3) (a) (13 August 1971). 
97 J Rehman. International Human Rights Law: A Practical Approach (Pearson, Harlow 2003) 44. 
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The CHR appointed its first Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or BeliefS (the 
Special Rapporteur) in 1986 with a special task 'to examine incidents and governmental 
actions inconsistent with the provisions of the 1981 Declaration on Religious Intolerance 
and to recommend remedial measures for such situations' .99 An appraisal of the role of the 
Special Rapporteur in protecting and promoting the right to freedom of religion is vital 
since hislher reports to the CHR highlight the human rights violations based on religion, 
particularly attacks on sacred sites. 
The reports of the Special Rapporteur are based mainly on the 1981 Declaration on 
Religious Intolerance and General Comment No. 22 issued by the HRC on Article 18 of the 
ICCPR. Although there are many reports by the Special Rapporteurs concerning attacks on 
freedom of religion including sacred sites, the HRC has not received many reports from 
states which mentioned such attacks. tOO The work of the Special Rapporteur remains 
valuable in supplementing some of the deficiencies of ICCPR reporting system. tOt 
Most of the reports of the Special Rapporteurs express grave concern at attacks upon 
religious places, sites and shrines and call upon all states to recognize, as provided in the 
1981 Declaration on Religious Intolerance, the right of all persons to worship or assemble 
in connection with a religion or belief, and to establish and maintain places for those 
purposes. These reports also call upon all states, in accordance with their national 
legislation, to increase efforts to ensure that religious places and shrines are fully respected 
and protected. t 02 
98 The Special Rapporteur on Religious Intolerance is now known as Special Rapporteur on freedom of 
religion or belief. 
99 UNCHR Res 1986/20, UN Doc ElCN.4/1986/6S (1986). The Special Rapporteurs are: Angelo d'Almeida 
Ribeiro (Portugal) 1986-93; Abdelfattah Amor (Tunisia) 1993-2004; and Asma Jahangir (Pakistan) 2004-. 
100 SG Tahzip, Freedom of Religion or Belief" Ensuring Effective International Legal Protection (Martinus 
Nijhoff, The Hague 1996) 269. . 
101 PM Taylor. Freedom of Religion: UN and European Human Rights Law and Practice (CUP. Cambndge 
200S) IS. 
102 UNGA Res 48/128 (20 December 1993) UN Doc AlRes/48/128 para 6-7; UNGA Res 49/188 (23 
December 1994) UN Doc AlRES/49/188; UNGA Res SO/183 (6 March 1996) UN Doc AlRES/50/183: 
UNGA Res S1/93 (28 February 1997) UN Doc AlRES/SI/93; UNGA Res 521122 (12 December 1997) C:" 
Doc AlRES/52/122; UNGA Res 53/140 (I March 1999) UN Doc AlRES/53/140; UNGA Res 54! 149 (22 
February 2000) UN Doc AlRES/S4/159; UNGA Res 56/157 (11 December 2(01) UN Doc AIRES 561157; 
UNCHR Res 23 (199S) UN Doc ElCN.4/RES/1995/23; UNCHR Res ~3 (1996) U!': Doc 
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From the reports, it may be noted that violations of freedom of religion display certain 
characteristics. Policies, practices and acts that impair the freedom to dispose of religious 
property; in the fonn of non-restitution of confiscated religious property; refusal of access 
to places of worship (obstacles to, and even banning of, construction or rental); restrictions 
on the number of followers; attacks against and closure and destruction of places of 
worship, cemeteries and denominational schools, and confiscation of religious property 
(including religious works).103 The reports highlight the restrictions on certain religious 
groups including access to places of worship (Israel) which may also lead to the closing of 
those sacred sites (Bulgaria, China, Lao People's Democratic Republic). Bureaucratic 
obstacles to the acquisition of property by certain religious communities have also been 
reported in Indonesia and Romania. Moreover, places of worship become the target of very 
serious violations, especially arson (Indonesia), desecration (Yemen) and destruction 
(China). 104 
The Special Rapporteurs emphasised that places of worship should be reserved for religious 
rather than political purposes and protected from political tensions and conflicts. This can 
only be assured if states adopt and implement appropriate legislation, provide for the 
neutrality of places of worship and protect them from the vagaries of politics and 
ideological and partisan commitments. lOS The misuse of sacred sites for political purposes 
is well established by the Ayodhya dispute. l06 Furthermore, a report on India details that 
violence against minorities, notably in the states of Gujarat, UP, Bihar, Orissa, Punjab and 
Maharashtra, is reportedly continuing in the form of attacks on places of worship, property, 
churchgoers and clergy. 107 
ElCN.4/RES/1996/23; UNCHR Res 18 (1998) UN Doc ElCN.4IRESIl9981l8; UNCHR Res 39 (1999) UN 
Doc ElCN.4IRES/1999/39; UNCHR Res 82 (1999) UN Doc ElCN.4IRESIl999/82. 
103 UNCHR 'Conclusions and recommendations of the Special Rapporteur on all forms of intolerance and of 
discrimination based on religion or belief (1999) UN Doc ElCN.4/1999/58. ... . 
104 UNCHR 'Interim report of the Special Rapporteur on the elimination of all forms of rehglOus Intolerance 
(1996) UN Doc AlSlIS42 [36]. . . . . 
10' UNGA 'Note by the Secretary-General on the Implementation of the Declaration on the Elimination of All 
Forms of ReJigious Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion o.r Belief 50/440 (1995) UN Doc 
AlSO/440 [78]. 
106 UNCHR Res 91 (1997) UN Doc ElCN.4/1 99719 I/Add.l [93]. . 
107 UNGA 'Report by the Special Rapporteur on the elimination of all forms of Intolerance and of 
discrimination based on religion or belief (23 September 1999) 5~!h Session (1999) L:N Doc Al5~'386 [:?:!]. 
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From 1988 until 2006, most of the reports submitted by the Special Rapporteurs on 
Freedom of Religion or Belief to the CHR and UN General Assembly speak volumes about 
the alleged violations of freedom of religion and particularly, attack on sacred sites. These 
reports highlight that the Rapporteurs have only limited powers and so they only can carry 
out their fact-finding investigations with the support of the governments. But they may not 
be able to provide any protection to sacred sites or victims of sacred sites disputes. 
Moreover, these reports cover the role of the state in limiting right to freedom of religion 
but do not include the role played by non-state actors. This is an important aspect of 
freedom of religion since in many occasions attacks on sacred sites are made by non-state 
actors or other groups as illustrated in the Ayodhya dispute. 
4.2.5. Regional human rights treaties and protection of sacred sites 
The right to freedom of religion is also protected under regional human rights treaties. The 
European, Inter-American and the African regional organisations in their respective 
regional Convention on Human Rights have granted right to freedom of religion. If 
protection of sacred sites is covered by these provisions as part of freedom of religion it is 
also looked in to. 
4.2.5.1. European convention on human rights 
Among the various human rights treaties generated by the Council of Europe, the 
significant one is the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).108 Article 9 of the 
ECHR provides for freedom of thought, conscience and religion. 109 Section II of the ECHR 
details the establishment of the European Court of Human Rights and its procedures. The 
Court held through its jurisprudence that freedom of religion is a substantive fundamental 
human right llO and further delineated this right. I I I For example, the Court reiterated on 
108 ECHR (n 10). It has been. so far, amended through twelve protocols. . . . ., 
109 ECHR (n 10) art 9: Everyone has the right to freedom of thought. cons~lence and ~ehgl~n; thiS right 
includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or m commumty With others and 
in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief. in worship, teaching, practice and obst:r. anc~. 
110 X and Church of Scie1ltology v Sweden (App 7805177) (1979) 16 DR 68. 
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several occaSIons that 'as enshrined in Article 9, freedom of thought, conscience and 
religion is one of the foundations of a 'democratic society' within the meaning of the 
C t " 112 Th'gh . ~ onven Ion. e n t to manhest freedom of religion is also upheld in a number of 
d .. 113 I dd" h eClSlons. n a lhon, t e Court requested states to prevent discriminatory practices 
against some religions. I 14 
Manoussakis and Others v Greece I 15 is one of the important cases with regard to protection 
of sacred sites. In this case, the applicants were prosecuted and convicted for having 
operated a place of worship without fITst obtaining the authorizations required by law. The 
ECHR observed, 
[the] impugned conviction had such a direct effect on the applicants' freedom of religion 
that it cannot be regarded as proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued, nor, accordingly, 
as necessary in a democratic society. The right to freedom of religion guaranteed under the 
Convention excludes any discretion on the part of the State to determine whether religious 
beliefs or the means used to express such beliefs are legitimate. 
In another case, 116 the Court stated that a church or ecclesiastical body may exercise on 
behalf of its adherents the rights guaranteed by Article 9 of the Convention. The Court 
declared that the Government's refusal to recognise the applicant church, upheld by the 
Supreme Court of Justice's decision of 9 December 1997, constituted interference with the 
right of the applicant church and the other applicants to freedom of religion, as guaranteed 
by Article 9 of the ECHR. 
III Kokkinakis v Greece (App no 14307/88) (1993) Series A no 260-A; 17 EHRR 397 [31]; Manoussakis and 
others v Greece (App no 18748/91 (1997) 23 EHRR 387 [44]; and Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia and 
others v Moldova (App no 45701/99) (2002) 35 EHRR 306 [116-119]. 
112 Agga v Greece (App no 50776/99, 52912/99) ECHR 7 October 2002; Buscarini and others \' San Marino 
(App no 24645/94) (2000) 30(2) EHRR 208. 
113 Hasan and Chaush v Bulgaria (App no 30985/96) (2002) 34(6) EHRR 1339; Kalac \' Turkey (App no 
220704/92) (1999) 27 EHRR 552,558; Kokkinakis v Greece (App no 14307/88) (1993) Seri~s A no 260-A; 
Kontinnen v Finland (App no 24949/94) (1996) 87 DR 68; Metropolitan Church of BessarablO and Others \' 
Moldova (App no 45701/99) (2002) 35 EHRR 306. 
114 Metropoliton Church of Bessarabia and Others v Moldom (App no 45701/99) (2002,> 35 EHRR 306; 
Canea Catholic Church v Greece (App no 25528/94) (1999) 27 EHRR 521; Ho~\' Monasteries \' Gret'ce (App 
no 13092/87. 13984/88) (1995) Series A no 30 I. 
115 Manoussakis and others v Greece (App no 18748/91 (1997) 23 EHRR 387 [47]. 
116 Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia and Others \' Moldova (App no 45701199) (2002) 35 EHRR 306 [101). 
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When deciding on the collective right of a religious community, the Court observed in 
Agga v. Greece, 'while religious freedom is primarily a matter of individual conscience. it 
also includes, inter alia, freedom, in community with others and in public, to manifest one's 
religion in worship and teaching' .117 In the same manner, in Cyprus v Turkey,118 the Court 
observed the restrictions placed on the freedom of movement of the Greek-Cypriot 
population considerably curtailed their ability to observe their religious beliefs, in particular 
their access to places of worship outside their villages and their participation in other 
aspects of religious life. 
An important decision in protecting sacred sites came from the Human Rights Chamber for 
Bosnia and Herzegovinal19 in The Islamic Community in Bosnia and Herzegovina v the 
Republika Srpska l20 case. In this case, the Chamber considered the inadequate facilities 
encountered by the Muslims in the Banja Luka region following the destruction of mosques 
and desecration of graveyards during and after the conflict in 1993 and a subsequent ban on 
the reconstruction of those destroyed mosques. The Chamber decided that the ban on the 
rebuilding of the mosques was a violation of Article 9 of the ECHR. With regard to this, 
Taylor observes that 'the Court emphasised far more rigorously than the European 
institutions themselves ever have, the positive obligation on states to protect these rights 
and freedoms by effective, reasonable, and appropriate measures' .121 This assertion by the 
Chamber could be deemed as an improvement in establishing a right to protect sacred sites. 
117Agga v Greece (App no 50776/99,52912/99) ECHR 7 October 2002 [52,53]. 
118 Cypnls v. Turkey (App no 25781/94)(2002) 35 EHRR 731 [246]. 
119 The Hwnan Rights Chamber is a judicial body established under Annex 6 to ~e .General Framework 
Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Dayton Peace Agreement). N~w It IS known as Hu~an 
Rights Commission within the Constitutional Court of Bosma and Herlegovma. 
<http://www.hrc.bal> accessed 10 January 2007. . 
120 The Islamic Community in Bosnia and Herzegovina \. the Repllblika Srpska (Case no CHl96/29) Decided 
on 11 June 1999 (2000) 7(3) IHRR 833. . . . 
III PM Taylor, Freedom of Religion: UN and European Human Rights Law and PracllCt' (Cl P. Cambndge 
2005) 244. 
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4.2.5.2. Inter-American Convention 
Article 12 of the American Convention on Human Rights (ACHR) guarantees the freedom 
of conscience and religion. 122 This includes rights such as 'to maintain, to profess or 
disseminate one's religion or belief 123 but does not include the words worship and sacred 
sites. Several sacred sites disputes involving indigenous people have taken place within 
h· . 124 b . h . t IS regIon, ut nelt er the Inter-Amencan Human Rights Commission nor the Inter-
American Human Rights Court has decided any of such sacred sites disputes in favour of 
the indigenous people. Two important cases related to sacred sites,125 decided by the 
Commission and the Court, were based on property rights rather than on the recognition of 
a right to protect sacred sites as part of freedom of religion. The US Congress passed the 
American Indian Religious Freedom Act 1978 (AIRF A)126 to address the needs of Native 
American religious communities. However, the AIRF A has not been useful in protecting 
the sacred sites of indigenous people.127 
4.2.5.3. African Charter 
Article 8 of the African Charter on Human and People's Rights (ACHPR)128 grants the 
right to freedom of religion.129 However, this right to freedom of religion does not 
manifestly contain a provision to protect sacred sites. The region is known for religious 
122 ACHR (n 10) art 12: Everyone has the right to freedom of conscience and of religion. This right includes 
freedom to maintain or to change one's religion or beliefs, and freedom to profess or disseminate one's 
religion or beliefs, either individually or together with others, in public or in private. 
123 Ibid art 12( I). 
124 PW Edge, Religion and Law: An Introduction (Ashgate, Aldershot 2006) 129. Edge brings out the nature 
of the sacred sites of indigenous people as these sites are not bounded and the religious community is not in 
the traditional relationship with to the land of an owner. 
125 Mayagna (Sumo) Indigenous Community 0/ A was Tingni v Nicaragua 31 August 200 1 Inter-Am Ct HR 
(Ser C) no 79 (2001); and Maya Indigenous Communities o/the Toledo District. Belize Case Case no 12.053 
Report no 40/04, Inter-Am CHR (2004) OEAlSer.LN 111.122 Doc 5 Rev I. 
126 American Indian Religious Freedom Act 1978 (Public Law 95-341.42 USC 1996). 
127 Lyng v Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association 485 US 439 (1988). . 
128 African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (adopted 27 June 1981, entered 1Oto force 21 October 
1986) (1982) OAU Doc CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5; 21 ILM 58 (African Charter). Fifty-three states have so far 
ratified the Charter. 
129 African Charter (n 10) art 8: Freedom of conscience, the profession and free practice of religi,on shall be 
guaranteed. No one may, subject to law and order. be submitted to measures restricting the exercIse of these 
freedoms. <http://wwwl.umn.edulhumanrtslinstree/zlafchar.htm> accessed 13 January 2007. 
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persecutions based on religious differences. 13o The African Commission 131 held in a 
communication against Zaire132 that the harassment of Jehovah's Witnesses through 
arbitrary arrests and appropriation of church property constituted a violation of Article 8. 
The regional organisations have further developed freedom of religion in their respective 
conventions on human rights which have binding obligations on member states. The 
conventions have established regional human rights enforcement mechanisms such as the 
regional human rights commissions and regional human rights courts which have further 
defined the right to freedom of religion through various case-law (apart from Africa which 
has recently established a regional human rights court but it is not yet operational). 
However, the provisions in the conventions guarantee freedom of religion and its 
manifestation but none of them explicitly cover protection of sacred sites as part of the right 
to freedom of religion to a religious community. 
4.2.6. Conclusions 
It may be ascertained that the international and regional human rights instruments do not 
offer any remedy to protect sacred sites by failing to include them as an important element 
of the right to freedom of religion. Given the significance that sacred sites play in the 
manifestation of freedom of religion in worship, protection of sacred sites deserves more 
attention to ensure peace and security. In the contemporary world where attacks on sacred 
sites have become so common, the expected follow up of a convention after the 1981 
Declaration on Religious Intolerance, still remains unfulfilled. 133 In 1988, while submitting 
his second report on religious freedom, the Special Rapporteur, Ribeiro, stated: 
The adoption of a Convention would give a broader and more profound dimension to 
existing concepts by expanding the scope of religious rights and freedoms in their practical 
110 For detailed study, see, J Maxted and A Zegey, 'North Africa, West and the Hom of Africa' in Minority 
Rights Group (ed), World Directory of Minorities (Minority Rights Group, London 1997) 388-463. 
III African Charter (n 10) art 30: An African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights, hereinafter called 
'the Commission', shall be established within the Organization of African Unity to promote human and 
~eoples' rights and ensure their protection in Africa. . . . 
32 Free Legal Assistance Group, Ltffl:l'ers Committee for Human Rights, Union Interafrlcame ~t!'i DrOl~s ~t! 
I'Homme, Les Temoins de Jehovah v Zaire, (Communications 25/89,47/90,56/91 and 100/93) Nmth ActiVIty 
Report Annex VIII (1995-1996) 444. 
III P Alston, 'The Commission on Human Rights' in P Alston (ed). The United Sations and Hllman Rights.' A 
Critical Appraisal (Clarendon. Oxford 1992) 134. 
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manifestations. Moreover, the mandatory nature of the provisions of such an instrument 
would imp~se ?n sta~ partie~ ~ numbe~ of r~quirements, such as the submission of reports 
on the apphcatlOn of Its prOVISIons, whIch mIght encourage greater respect for religious 
rights and freedoms by such states. 134 
Inference, thus, can be made on the need to develop international human rights law to 
include protection of sacred sites, as further developing the right to freedom of religion. 
The inadequacy of existing human rights law and enforcement mechanisms emphasise the 
need for an exclusively binding international treaty to protect sacred sites to ensure the right 
to freedom of religion. 
4.3. Protection of sacred sites as protecting the rights of minorities 
This section argues that minority rights related to religious rights are protected mostly by 
soft law instruments, except the 1995 European Framework Convention, and do not deal 
with protection of sacred sites. As seen, the right to freedom of religion, whether for the 
majority or minority, is granted to everyone in Article 18 of the ICCPR. The inclusion of 
religious rights again in the minority rights section exhibits the vulnerability of religious 
minorities as a community in a pluralistic state. As with any community, religious 
minorities and their sacred sites have been under attack for a very long time and such 
attacks on them are a regular phenomenon from the state, from co-religionists, and non-
state actors as highlighted for the Muslims in the Ayodhya dispute. This section focuses on 
the rights of religious minorities guaranteed in various international and regional human 
rights treaties. The analysis, thus, covers human rights treaties, such as Article 27 of the 
ICCPR, the UN Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, 
Religious and Linguistic Minorities 1992135 (hereafter the 1992 Declaration), the 
Framework European Convention for the Protection of National Minorities 1995 and the 
OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities in protecting the rights of minorities and 
their right to freedom of religion. 
134 UNCHR 'Implementation of the Declaration of the Elimination of all forms of Intolerance and of 
Discrimination Based on Religion or Beliefby Rebeiro' 1988/45 (1988) UN Doc ElCNAi I 98x"45 [55]. 
I3S UNGA Res 47/135 (18 December 1992) UN Doc AlResJ47/135. 
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4.3.1. Definition of the term 'minority' 
Minority groups exist throughout the world. Their status can be defined, for example. by 
ethnic, linguistic, religious, and political groupings.136 Many governments continue to 
refuse to recognise the rights of minorities and use forcible mechanisms of assimilation. 137 
The phrase 'religious minority' applies to any group adhering to a defmed set of religious 
beliefs. 1 38 
Various international human rights instruments, for instance, Article 27 in the ICCPR, the 
1992 Declaration on Minorities and the Council of Europe's Framework Convention for the 
Protection of National Minorities 1995 139 do not contain a definition of who is a 
minority.140 The closest definition and often quoted in international human rights 
instruments comes from the Special Rapporteur, Francesco Capotorti, who defined a 
minority that may include a religious minority as, 
A group numerically inferior to the rest of the population of a state, in a non-dominant 
position, whose members - being nationals of the state - possess ethnic, religious or 
linguistic characteristics differing from those of the rest of the population and show, if only 
implicitly, a sense of solidarity, directed towards preserving their culture, traditions, religion 
or language' .141 
This definition can be applied to the Muslim community in the Ayodhya dispute where 
Muslims are numerically inferior to the majority Hindu community, non-dominant, 
religiously different to the rest of the population and committed to preserving their culture, 
traditions, religion and sacred sites. 
136 P Thornberry, Minorities and Human Rights law (Minority Rights Group, London 1987) 3. 
137 RG Wirsing (ed), 'Protection of Minorities: Comparative Perspective' cited in J Rehman, International 
Human Rights Law: A Practical Approach (Pearson, Harlow 2003) 297. 
138 Y Dinstein, 'Freedom of Religion and the Protection of Religious Minorities' in DA Reidy and MNS 
Sellers (eds), Universal Human Rights: Moral Order in a Divided World (Rowman & Littlefield, New York. 
2005) 147-9. 
139 European Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (signed at Strasbourg 
1.11.1995) ETS no 157 (European Framework Convention). 
<http://conventions.coe.intITreaty/enffreaties/WordlI57.doc> accessed. 13 May 2006.. . 
140 J Packer, 'On the Definition of Minorities' in J Packer and K MynttJ K (eds) The ProtectIOn of Ethmc and 
Linguistic Minorities in Europe (Abo Akademi University, TurkulAbo 1993) 24. . .. 
141 UNCHR (Sub-Commission), 'Study on the Rights of Persons Belonging to EthniC. RehglOus and 
Linguistic Minori ties by Special Rapporteur F Capotorti' (1979) UN Doc E/CN .4/Sub. 2/3 84fRev I: Sales no 
E 78XIV.l (1991)[568]. 
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During the establishment of the League of Nations, minority rights was discussed 
extensively and treaties were imposed on the new or reconfigured states of Central-East 
Europe
l42 
but they mostly failed to provide the desired results due to the weakness inherent 
in the League of Nations. 143 However, after the Second World War, the focus of the UN 
was on individual human rights. Hence a reference to minorities is not found in the UN 
Charter. 144 
4.3.2. Lack of approval to group rights in international law 
UDHR recognised universal human rights and with its adoption, the international 
community formally acknowledged its commitment to worldwide protection of human 
rights. Gobi Annan, former Secretary General of the UN, stated: 
Human rights are foreign to no culture and intrinsic to all nations. They belong not to a 
chosen few, but to all people. It is this universality that endows human rights with the 
power to cross any border and defy any force. 145 
The Preamble of the UDHR says that the purpose behind the creation of international 
human rights law was to bind the states of the world together for the protection of 
individuals globally. 146 However, the regional human rights systems developed 
subsequently took account of the existing socio-cultural characteristics of each region. Now 
international human rights scholars are divided into two ideological camps known as 
universalism and cultural relativism. Universalists assert that a set of legal nonns exists and 
should be applied to all persons. They cannot vary from state to state or individual to 
individual and they are to be applied equally.147 Universalists claim that since rights attach 
142 HJ Steiner and P Alston, International Human Rights in Context: Law, Politics and Morals (2nd edn OUP. 
Oxford 2000) 95. 
14J UNCHR (Sub-Commission), 'Study on the Rights of Persons Belonging to Ethnic, Religious and 
Linguistic Minorities by Special Rapporteur F Capotorti' (1979) UN Doc ElCN A/Sub.2/384/Rev I; Sales no 
E 78XIV.l (1991) [25-6). 
144 A Eide, 'The Non-Inclusion of Minority Rights: Resolution 217C (III)' in G Alfredsson and A Eide (eds), 
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights: A Common Standard of Achievement (Martinus NijhotT. The 
Hague 1999) 723. 
145 K Hastrup, 'The Quest for Universality: An Introduction' in K Hastrup (ed), Human Rights on Common 
fJ:.unds: The Quest for Universality (Kluwer Law International, The Hague 2001) 21. 
46 UDHR (n 9) preamble. . 
147 L Henkin, 'Rights: Here and There' (1981) 81 Colum L Rev 1582, 1582. While defming 'human rights'. 
Louis Henkin observes 'to call them human suggests that they are universal: they are the due of every human 
being in every human society'. 
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to people because they are human, and not because their belonging to particular societies. 
there cannot be any cultural or regional variations between human rights. 148 
In contrast, cultural relativists emphasise that rights are defined by the particular cultural. 
political and social context in which one lives. For them, since there are no universally 
shared cultural values and norms, there are no universal rights. 149 Cultural relativists argue 
that because there are no specific trans-cultural rights or values, no state is justified in 
imposing its cultural ideas of right on any other state.150 Often the universal view of human 
rights is described as a form of 'moral' or 'cultural imperialism' of western states. 151 
Pannikar observes, 'human rights are universal from the vantage point of modem Western 
culture, but not universal from the outside looking in' 152. 
A major point of dispute arising from the debate of universalism versus cultural relativism 
is the question of whether the individual is the fundamental unit of society and the sole 
subject of international human rights law, or whether human rights are enjoyed as collective 
rights by groups. Human rights law presumes that the social, political and legal form of the 
modem nation-state has global legitimacy. Hence the focus of human rights law is 
preserving the rights of the individual against this state. 153 Jack Donnelly observes 
'although ... Universal Declaration models do deny human rights to groups, they assume 
that individuals will exercise many rights as members of 'natural' and voluntary groups'. 154 
148 PD Curran, 'Universalism, Relativism, and Private Enforcement of Customary International Law' (2004) 5 
ChiJInt'IL311,316. . . .. nd 
149 HJ Steiner and P Alston, International Human Rights In Context: Law. Polllles and Morals (2 edn OUP. 
Oxford 2000) 366-67. .. . 
ISO R Klein, 'Cultural Relativism, Economic Development and International Human Rights 10 the ASian 
Context' (2001) 9 Touro Int'l L Rev 1. 6-7. 
lSI G Binder, 'Cultural Relativism and Cultural Imperialism in Human Rights Law' (1999) 5 ButT Hum Rts L 
Rev 21 I. 217. 
IS2 R Pannikar 'Is the Notion of Human Rights a Western Concept?' (1982) 120 Diogenes 76, 94. 
IS3 Dianne Ott~, 'Rethinking Universals: Opening Transformative Possibilities in International Human Rights 
Law' (1997) 18 Australian Yearbook of International Law 1-36, II. . . 
154 J Donnelly. Universal Human Rights in Contemporary Theory and Practice (2nd edn Cornell UOI\e5lty 
Press. Ithaca 2003) 205. 
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In contrast, for many societies, collective or community rights would be preferred to 
individual human rights and the human group takes precedence over the individual. lss 
Many indigenous societies now claim for the recognition of their collective or group rights. 
For instance, subjectivity and identity in the communal traditions of indigenous African 
societies rely on relational concepts. 156 In Asian Confucian societies, the individual has no 
privileged status; rather the human is understood as only one aspect of an interdependent 
cosmos.1S7 
Protection of sacred sites as an important component of freedom of religion falls in the 
category of group rights. As such, the entitlement of religious minority communities to hold 
the rights recognised in the international human rights law is an important question to be 
addressed. Although UDHR, ICCPR and the 1992 Declaration on Protection of Minorities 
recognise the right of members belonging to minority communities to exercise their rights 
in community with the other members of their group, they do not refer to minority groups 
as the formal holders of rights described in those documents. 158 
Rights of the minorities are interrelated and dependent on the rights of the individual, such 
as the right to life and physical existence, the right to non-discrimination, freedom of 
religion, expression and culture and the right to equality.159 It is an established fact that the 
rights of minorities have a collective dimension. 16o It does mean that apart from the 
physical existence of members of a particular minority group, minority rights include a 
cultural, religious, linguistic existence which is vital to the identity and distinctiveness of 
the groUp.161 Moreover, freedom of religion, cultural, linguistic and political autonomy for 
ISS Rhoda Howard, 'Dignity, Community, and Human Rights' in Abdullahi An-Na'im (ed), Human Rights in 
Cross-Cultural Perspectives: A Quest for Consensus (University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia 1992) 81-3. 
156 LA Obiora, 'Feminism, Globalization, and Culture: After Beijing' (1997) 4 Global Legal Studies Journal 
355,397. 
IS7 R Little and W Reed, The Confucian Renaissance (NSW: Federation Press, Annandale 1989) 54-5. 
IS8 F Capotorti, 'Are Minorities Entitled to Collective International Rights?' in Y Dinstein and M Tabory 
(eds), The Protection of Minorities and Human Rights (Martinus Nijhoff, Dordrecht 1992) 507. 
159 J Rehman, Intemational Human Rights Law: A Practical Approach (Pearson, Harlow 2003) 303. 
160 P Thornberry, Intemational Law and Rights of Minorities (Clarendon, Oxford 1991) 57. 
161 Ibid. 
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minorities may lead to self-determination and possibly independent statehood. 162 Most 
often, this becomes a major reason for the suppression of minorities by states. 
Among UN treaties, in recognising rights of groups, the Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, (Genocide Convention)163 is significant as it protects 
religious groups and their right to existence. Under this Genocide Convention, the 
following groups are protected, namely, 'national, ethnic, racial or religious' .164 The 
Genocide Convention is important for its recognition of the right of religious groups to 
exist as such, while most of the human rights treaties grant rights only to individuals. 
4.3.3. Religious minority rights 
The UDHR is keen to promote individual rightS. 165 It covers civil, political, economic, 
social, and cultural rights but does not contain any specific provision of minority rights. It 
does refer to the principle of non-discrimination. 166 A separate part of the resolution in the 
General Assembly noted that 'it was difficult to adopt a uniform solution for this complex 
and delicate question of minorities, which had special aspects in each state in which it 
arose' .167 Subsequently, the General Assembly made a request to the CHR and its Sub-
Commission to prepare a detailed study of the problems of minorities to accord sufficient 
protection in cases of violations of their human rights. As a result, the ICCPR guarantees 
the important rights of minorities in Article 27 which states: 
In those states in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist, persons belonging to 
such minorities shall not be denied the right, in community with other members of their 
group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practise their own religion, or to use their 
own language. 
162 J Rehman, 'Autonomy and the Rights of Minorities in Europe' in S Wheatley and P Cumper (eds), 
Minority Rights in the New Europe (Kluwer Law International, The Hague 1999) 217-31. 
16) Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (adopted 9 December 1948, 
entered into force 12 January 1951) 78 UNTS 277 (Genocide Convention). 
1M Genocide Convention (n 163) art II. 
165 A Eide, 'The Non-inclusion of minority Rights: Resolution 217C (III)' in G Alfredsson and A Eide (eds), 
The Universal Dec/aration of Human Rights: A Common Standard of Achievement (Martinus ~ ijhofT, The 
Hague 1999) 723. .. ., 
166 UDHR (n 9) art 2: Everyone is entitled to the rights and freedoms set forth In thiS Declaration .Wlthout 
distinction of any kind such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political, or other opinion. natIOnal or 
social origin, property, birth or other status. 
167 UNGA Res 217A (III) and 217C (Ill) (10 December 1948). 
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It protects ethnic, religious and linguistic minorities that fulfil the qualities of numerical 
inferiority, weak position, solidarity and stability.168 However, religious minorities are 
those groups that profess and practice a religion that differs from that of the majority of the 
population. Their membership is established by professing their faith, normally a voluntary 
act, which is protected by Article 18(2) of the ICCPRI69. 
Since minority rights are not easily exercised by individuals alone, the expression 'in 
community with the members of their group' was inserted. 170 Capotorti argues that this was 
included in order to 'maintain the idea of a group' .171 Dinstein observes, 'without the 
collective element, the individual's rights could easily become devoid of any substance'. 172 
In contrast to Article 18, Article 27 of the ICCPR does not underline 'individually or in 
community' but members of minorities are guaranteed the rights listed in Article 27 only 
'in community with the other members of the group'. The reference in Article 27 to the 
right of minorities 'to profess and practice their own religion' illustrates the importance 
attached to religious minorities and implies that greater protection should be given to 
religious practices which include worship, either in private or public. 
An important fact in Article 27 is that the state parties have an obligation not to deny 
persons belonging to minorities the common 'enjoyment of their cultural life' , the common 
'practice of their religion' and the common 'use of their language'. The difference between 
Article 18 and Article 27 is that, although the collective practice of religion is guaranteed to 
everyone in Article 18, there are restrictions (Article 18(3)) which are not found in Article 
27. 173 
168 P Thornberry, International Law and Rights of Minorities (Clarendon, Oxford 1991) 158. 
169 ICCPR (n 9) art 18(2): No one shall be subject to coercion which would impair his freedom to have or to 
adopt a religion or belief of his choice. 
170 M Nowak UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: CCPR Commentary (NP Engel. Kehl 1993) 495. 
171 F Capoto~i. Study on the Rights of Persons Belonging to Ethnic. Religious and Linguistic .\/inoril;t'S 
(United Nations. New York 1991) 32. 
172 Y Dinstein. 'Collective Human Rights of Peoples and Minorities' (1976) 25 ICLQ 102. 102. 
173 Text to n 40. below, 
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The case law174 and General Comment provided by the HRC on Article 27 point out the 
existence of a body of jurisprudence which requests the protection of minority identity and 
the valuing of diversity as part of the essential 'fabric' of communities and states. Nowak 
cogently argues that Article 27 provides minorities with a special right to practise their 
religion, publish their own literature, found cultural institutions, which represents lex 
specialis.175 This is proved by the General Comment No 23 issued by the HRC that states: 
Article 27 establishes and recognises a right which is conferred on individuals belonging to 
?Ii~o?ty gr~ups and whic~ is distinct from, and additional to, all other rights which, as 
mdIvIduals 1D common WIth everyone else, they are already entitled to enjoy under the 
ICCPR. The protection of minority rights is directed towards ensuring the survival and 
continued development of the cultural, religious, and social identity of the minorities 
concerned, thus enriching the fabric of society as a whole. 176 
The HRC has established that there are positive obligations on states to secure and 
strengthen the rights of minorities as fundamental rights. However, experiences in states 
with many peoples or with different ethnic or religious groups have shown that minority 
rights can often be threatened by private parties too. When these threats take on a 
proportion endangering the very existence of minorities, an exclusively state-directed, 
negative understanding (shall not be denied the right) of Article 27 would be inadequate. 
The rights recognised by Article 27 are 'conferred on the 'persons belonging to such 
minorities' and not on the 'minority groups as such' .177 This renders Article 27 meaningless 
174 Ballantyne and others v Canada Comm no 359, 385/1989 (5 May 1993) UN Doc 
CCPRlC/47/D/359/1989; Lovelace v Canada Comm no 24/1977 (30 July 1981) UN Doc 
CCPRlC/131D124/1977; Kitok v Sweden Comm no 197/1985 (10 August 1988) UN Doc 
CCPRlC/33/D/197/1985; Mahuika v New Zealand Comm no 547/1993 (15 November 2000) UN Doc 
CCPRlC1701D1547/1993; Diergaardt v Namibia Comm no 760/1997 (30 July 2004) UN Doc CCPRlCo/811 
NAM.; Chie/Ominayak and the Lubikon Lake Band v Canada Comm no 167/1984 (10 May 1990) UN Doc 
CCPRIC/38/D/I67/1984; Malcolm Ross v Canada Comm no 736/1997 (26 October 2000) UN Doc 
CCPRlCI701D1736/1997; Lansman and others v Finland Comm no 671/1995 (30 October 1996) UN Doc 
CCPRlC1581D1671/1995; CLD v France Comm no 228/1987 (18 July 1988) UN Doc Supp no 40 (A/43/40) 
1988; Godefriends Maria Brinkho/ v The Netherlands Comm no 402/1990 (30 July 1993) UN Doc 
CCPRlC/48/D/402/1990; and Jonassen and others v Norway Comm no 942/2000 (9 February 2000) UN Doc 
CCPRlC176/D/942/2oo0. More details, Sarah Joseph and others, The International Covenant on Ci~'il and 
~olitical Rights: Cases, Materials and Commentary (2nd edn OUP, Oxford 2005) 754-93. 
" M Nowak, UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: CCPR Commentary (NP Engel. Kehl 1993) 505. 
176 UNCHR 'General Comment 23' in 'Note by the Secretariat, Compilation of General Comments and 
General Recommendations adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies' (2004) UN Doc HRUGE~Il(Rev.7 [1]. 
In Y Dinstein, 'Freedom of Religion and the Protection of Religious Minorities' in DA Reidy and MSS 
Sellers (eds), Universal Human Rights: Moral Order in a Divided World (Rowman & Littlefield. New York 
2005) 157. 
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since the right 'to profess and practice' one's religion is the essence of freedom of religion 
under Article 18( 1) conferred upon every person whether or not belonging to a minority 
group. If Article 27 is not to be rendered meaningless, it must be interpreted to go beyond 
the ambit of Article 18 to include group rights. This view finds support from Starke, when 
he observes that 'the purpose of Article 27 is to grant collective human rights to the 
members of a religious minority as a group' . 178 
In addition, Article 27 does not require states and governments to provide special facilities 
or positive obligations with respect to minorities. The only obligation of the states is not to 
deprive or deny the members of the minority groups the status which they enjoy already.179 
Likewise, compared to the demands of collective protection of minorities, the specific 
formulation of Article 27 seems to be inadequate. 180 The right guaranteed to religious 
minorities to 'practice their religion' is very broad and it does not delineate the right of 
religious minorities to establish, maintain and protect sacred sites. Accordingly, religious 
minorities, (in that case, any minority group), as collective bodies are not entitled to bring 
actions before the HRC either based on this article or based on Article 1 of the Optional 
Protocol to the ICCPR. 181 This renders Article 27 inadequate in protecting sacred sites 
belonging to religious minority communities in times of dispute. 
4.3.4. UN Declaration on the Rights of Minorities 1992 
The UN Sub-Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities 
(from 1999, UN Sub-Commission on Protection and Promotion of Human Rights) was 
finally able to address some of the issues of minorities in greater depth when its Special 
Rapporteur, Francesco Capotorti, completed his study on discrimination against minorities 
in 1978. Based on his proposals, The Declaration on the Rights of Persons belonging to 
178 JG Starke Introduction to International Law (10th edn Butterworths, London 1989) 372. 
179 UNCHR' (Sub-Commission), 'Study on the Rights of Persons Belonging to Ethnic, Religious and 
Linguistic Minorities by Special Rapporteur F Capotorti' (1979) UN Doc ElCN .4ISub.2/384/Rev I; Sales no 
E 78XIV.I (1991) [361. 
180 Y Dinstein. 'Collective Human Rights of Peoples and Minorities' (1976) 25 ICLQ 102, 118. 
III Optional protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Righ~ (adopted 16 December 1966 
UNGA Res 2200A (XXI). entry into force 23 March 1976) 999 UNTS 302 (OptIOnal Protocol), 
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National or Ethnic, Religious, or Linguistic Minorities (1992 Declaration) was finally 
completed and adopted by the General Assembly in 1992.182 
The 1992 Declaration tries to overcome some of the limitations of Article 27 in the ICCPR. 
While Article 1(1)183 encourages the promotion of minority identity, Article 2(1)184 
prohibits any form of discrimination. Moreover, Article 2(2) provides many participatory 
rights to persons belonging to minorities in 'cultural, religious, social, economic and public 
life'. A major right is prescribed in Article 2(4)185 which authorizes minorities to establish 
and maintain their own associations. Article 3 underpins the collective dimension with 
encouragement of the communal enjoyment of rights without discrimination. 186 Articles 5-7 
are concerned with national and international cooperation in understanding the minority 
question. 
Although the 1992 Declaration elaborates the minority rights further and aims at achieving 
'equality' by prohibiting 'discrimination', as a General Assembly Resolution its impact on 
the development of international law is limited. 187 There exists a risk that states may easily 
curtail the legitimate expression of minorities stating that they are 'incompatible with 
national legislation'. 188 The rights of cultural and linguistic minorities are delineated, 
whereas the rights of the religious minorities are not defmed except for prohibiting 
religious discrimination. By failing to include the right to establish, maintain and protect 
sacred sites of religious minorities, the 1992 Declaration does not set out any new rights 
other than those protected in Article 27 of the ICCPR. 
182 UNGA Res 47/135 (18 December 1992) UN Doc A/Res/47/135. 
183 1992 Declaration (n 181) art 1 (1): States shall protect the existence and the national or ethnic, cultural. 
religious and linguistic identity of minorities within their respective territories, and shall encourage conditions 
for the promotion of the identity. 
184 Ibid art 2( I): Persons belonging to national or ethnic, religious and linguistic minorities have the right to 
enjoy their own culture, to profess and practice their own religion, and to use their own language, in private 
and in public, freely and without interference or any form of discrimination. 
185 Ibid art 2(4): Persons belonging to minorities have the right to establish and maintain their own 
associations. 
186 Ibid art 3( I): Persons belonging to minorities may exercise their rights. including ~ose set f~rth in the 
present Declaration, individually as well as in community with other members of then group Without any 
discrimination. 
187 J Rehman, International Human Rights Law: A Practical Approach (Pearson. Harlow. 2003) 316. 
1118 1992 Declaration (n 181) art 2(3) and 4(2). 
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4.3.5. Minority rights in Europe 
Although the European Convention on Human Rights has incorporated a number of 
provisions on protecting the interests of minorities, only Article 14 refers directly to 
minorities under the non-discrimination provision. 189 The end of the Cold War, followed by 
the break up of the Soviet Union, brought the problems of minorities into prominence. l90 
As the number of minority issues increased, the Council of Europe, in 1995 adopted the 
European Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (European 
Framework Convention), which came into force in February 1998.191 Exclusively focusing 
on minorities, it is a binding human rights instrument among the member states. 
The main aim of this Framework Convention is to protect the minorities and to prohibit 
discrimination on the 'grounds of belonging to a national minority' .192 Parties to this 
convention undertake an obligation 'to promote the conditions ... to maintain and develop 
their culture and to preserve the essential elements of their identity, namely their religion, 
language, traditions and cultural heritage' . 193 The parties also are obliged to take 
appropriate measures 'to protect persons who may be subject to threats or acts of 
discrimination, hostility or violence as a result of their ethnic, cultural, linguistic or 
religious identity' .194 The right to manifest one's religion or belief is stated in Article 8: 
'Parties undertake to recognise that every person belonging to a national minority has the 
right to manifest his or her religion or belief and to establish religious institutions, 
.. d .., 195 
organIzatIons an assocIatIons. 
189 ECHR (n 10) art 14: The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this Convention shall be 
secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language. religion, political or other 
o£inion, national or social origin, association with national minority. property, birth or other status. 
1 H Miall, 'Introduction' in H Miall (ed). Minority Rights in Europe: The Scope/or a Translational Regime 
(Pinter, London 1994) I. 
191 European Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (signed at StrdSbourg 
1.11.1995) ETS no 157. 
192 Ibid art 3 and 4. 
19) Ibid 5( I ). 
194 Ibid 6(2). 
195 Ibid art 8. 
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Yet the Framework Convention is limited in protecting sacred sites since the parties 
undertake only 'to recognise' the right mentioned above and the Article does not include 
the undertaking 'to protect' the religious institutions (places of worship) which often come 
under attack. This lack of protection of places of worship is critical in the context of Article 
6(2) which only protects persons belonging to minorities and not their institutions. l96 
Moreover, the Framework Convention gives enough flexibility for the states to hide behind 
the 'margin of discretion' and to implement their treaty obligation to their convenience. 197 
State parties are required only to submit reports to an advisory committee narrating the 
measures taken to implement the treaty. Finally, the European Convention establishes only 
general principles which are not directly applicable at the domestic level. I98 
Failure to recognise the group rights does not grant the rights of religious minorities to 
establish, maintain, and especially protect their sacred sites when they come under attack. 
The Framework Convention reiterates this point in an explanatory note, while commenting 
that the application of the provisions of the convention 'does not imply the recognition of 
collective rights'. 199 At times the enjoyment of individual human rights is virtually 
impossible unless a collective human right is implemented, for instance, freedom of 
religion.20o 
In addition to the Framework Convention, minority issues are covered under the 
Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). The OSeE appointed a High 
Commissioner for National Minorities to address minority issues in the European region. 
The principal role of the High Commissioner is to respond to the further threat of minority 
conflicts within its region and to minority tensions which may endanger the peace and 
196 Ibid art 6(2): The Parties undertake to take appropriate measures t~ prot~t persons w~o ~ay. be sub~~t to 
threats or acts of discrimination, hostility or violence as a result of thetr ethniC, cultural, hngUlstlc or rehglous 
identity. 
197 AK Meijknecht, Minority Protection: Standards and Reality (TMC Asser, The Hague 2004) 186. 
198 J Rehman, International Human Rights Law: A Practical Approach (Pearson, Harlow 2003) 321. 
199 European Framework Convention (n 190) [13] and [22]. . 
200 Y Dinstein, 'Collective Human Rights of Peoples and Minorities' (1976) 25 The International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly 102, 103. 
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stability in the region.20t Besides, it has a mandate to reduce any tensions which may occur 
at the earliest possible stage to prevent the escalation of the conflict. 202 The main key in the 
arsenal of the High Commissioner is the resolution of disputes through silent diplomacy.203 
He conducts on-site studies to gather information to give an early warning to the states. One 
of the main weaknesses of the High Commission system is that there is no jurisdiction for 
individual complaints which might be received or considered by the Commission.204 
To summarise, the key human rights instruments acknowledge the right to manifest one's 
religious belief in community, but nowhere do they explicitly mention the protection of 
sacred sites as a right to minority religious communities. Despite the fact that the rights of 
religious minorities are ensured in Article 27 of the ICCPR, it does not delineate them to 
include protection of the sacred sites. The 1992 Declaration specifically addresses the rights 
of minorities. Yet, it does not specifically outline any rights of religious minorities, 
including protection of their religious institutions, except prohibiting discrimination based 
on religion. At the regionallevel,205 the European Framework Convention, regardless of its 
recognition of the right to manifest one's religion, does not ensure that the religious 
institutions belonging to religious minorities are protected. Therefore, the provisions 
contained in key international and regional human rights treaties remain inadequate in 
dealing with situations similar to the Ayodhya dispute, which denied a minority community 
the right to manifest its faith in worship, affecting their freedom of religion. 
4.4. Property rights and protection of sacred sites 
Sacred sites are situated in a defined space and have boundaries which mark them. 
amenable within the jurisdiction of law. Though essentially a religious dispute. Ayodhya, 
201 CSCE, Helsinki Document 1992: The Challenge o/Change Decisions 1[23]. 
202 CSCE, Helsinki Document 1992: The Challenge o/Change Decisions II [3] 
<http://www.osce.orgldocumentslmcsl19~2/07/4046_en.~dt> acc~ssed 16 J~nuary.~OO7. ., 
203 M Nowak, Introduction to the InternatIOnal Human rights Regime (Martmus N IJhoff, Boston .. 003) 173. 
2().4 J Rehman, International Human Rights Law: A Practical Approach (Pearson, Harlow 2003) 101-2. . 
20S The American Convention on Human Rights 1969 and the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights 
1981 guarantee rights of non-discrimination and prohibit any discrimination based on religion. ACHR (n 10) 
art 1 and African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights (n 10) art 2. 
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when it started in 1950 was fought as a title dispute between a few people belonging to two 
religious communities, to establish property rights over the sacred site. As property, owners 
may expect to protect sacred sites under property rights. Accordingly, where ownership of 
the site coincides with the religious community - for instance where a property is held in 
trust for the practice of religion - protection of property rights may carry with it protection 
of the interests of that community over the sacred site. This section focuses on positive 
international and regional human rights law concerning property rights, in protecting sacred 
sites owned by the religious communities. 
4.4.1. Global instruments 
From the nineteenth century, any expropriation of alien private property was regarded as a 
clear basis for a claim to be made under international law by the state of the foreigner 
concemed.206 The Permanent Court of International Justice observed in the Chorzow 
Factory case that 'any breach of engagement involves an obligation to make reparation. ,207 
However, the treatment of property rights was seen as an internal matter of the state. 
In general, property rights allow for the acquisition and ownership of private property and 
they protect individuals, alone or in association with others from state encroachment.20s 
After the Second World War, serious attempts were made to promote the right to property 
to the international level. The UDHR is the only major global instrument which contains a 
broad criterion protecting property. The draft for the right to property led to substantial 
debate and finally a formulation drafted by a sub-committee, consisting of the US, UK, 
France and the then USSR, became the final text.209 It was incorporated in the UDHR in 
Article 17: (1) everyone has the right to own property alone as well as in association with 
others; (2) no one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property. 
206 JG Starke, Introduction to International Law (lOth edn Butterworths, London 1989) 298. 
207 Chorzow Factorv Case (1928) PCIJ (Ser A) no t 7 [29]. 
208 C Krause and ci Alfredsson, 'Article 17' in G Alfredsson and A Eide (eds) The Unin'rsal Declaralion of 
Human Rights: A Common Standard of Achievement (Martinus Nijhoff. The Hague 1999) 359. 
209 Theo RG van Banning. The Human Right to Property (INTERSENTIA. Antwerpen 2(02) 37-8. 
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The right to own property as set out in Article 17 of the UDHR prohibits the arbitrary 
deprivation of any property. The language of Article 17 is broad and applies to both 
individual and collective forms of right to property. Article 17(2) points out that property 
rights are not absolute and under certain circumstances this right could be withdrawn, 
though not arbitrarily. Though a reasonable interference is allowed by the states for lawful 
purposes, when such interference or appropriation amounts to 'arbitrary' is not defined in 
the article. 
The right to property is essentially left to the protection of domestic, legal and economic 
apparatus. The Article does not specify what limitations can be imposed on the right to 
property even if the general limitations contained in Article 29 apply to Article 17. 
However, as a UN General Assembly Declaration, there is no binding obligation to the 
UDHR on states. 
Many conventions' and declarations have mentioned the right to property of various 
groupS.21O However, neither the ICCPR nor the ICESCR included this right in their 
documents. The subject was debated at length when the covenants were drafted but there 
was no agreement211 on an acceptable text.212 The significant disagreements during the 
debate led the CHR to finally decide not to include the right to property in the Covenants, 
except in relation to the right to non-discrimination,213 Several complaints of the violation 
of property rights submitted to the HRC have been rejected in the absence of a specific 
article protecting property rights,214 
210 International Convention on the Elimination of All Fonns of Racial Discrimination (adopted 21 December 
1965 UNGA Res 2106(XX), entered into force 4 January 1969) 660 UNTS 195 art 5; Declaration on the 
Elimination of Discrimination against Women (Proclaimed 7 November 1967 UNGA Resolution 2263 (XXII) 
art 6' Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (adopted 18 December , . 
1979, entered into force 3 September 1981) 1249 UNTS 13 art 15 and 16; 1957 IlO Convention (No 107) 
Concerning the Protection and Integration of Indigenous and Other Tribal and S.emi-T~bal Population~ in 
Independent Countries 328 UNTS 247; 1989 IlO Convention (No 169) Concernmg Indigenous and Tnbal 
Peoples in Independent Countries 72 IlO Bulletin 59 ( 1989). 
211 UNGA 'Annotations on the Text of the Draft International Covenants on Human Rights prepared by the 
Secretary-General' (1955) UN Doc Al2929 [65]-[67]. . 
212 N Jayawickrama, The Judicial Application of Human Rights Law: National. Regional and InternatIonal 
Jurisprudence (CPU, Cambridge 2002) 909. 
213 ICCPR (0 9) art 2( 1). 
214 Theo RG van Banning. The Human Right to Property (INTERSE~TIA, Antwerpen 2002) 81. 
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4.4.2. Use of sacred sites as property of religious communities are curtailed by state 
procedures 
States often control the freedom to worship by placing restrictions on sacred sites. Many 
such restrictions are highlighted by the reports of Special Rapporteurs on Freedom of 
Religion or Belief. A common restraint imposed by states includes the repair and 
maintenance of existing buildings. In Egypt, when the Coptic Church applied for 
renovations, there were delays of up to thirty years in granting permission for building or 
renovations and most of the churches were closed in the interim period.215 In Malaysia, the 
granting of permission to construct places of worship was delayed for religions other than 
Islam.216 Yet another method of restricting religious minorities in establishing or utilising 
places of worship is through registration procedures. In many states, the registration 
formalities are frequently used in a discriminatory way. For example, in Russia, authorities 
in the town of Belgorod refused registration of the Catholic community. The authorities 
were afraid that if the Catholic community were registered, then they would claim the 
repatriation of the Catholic buildings which were given to the Russian Orthodox Church by 
the authorities.217 
Apart from these general limitations prescribed in the above mentioned human rights 
instruments, states impose certain restraints which curtail the free exercise of this right to 
freedom of religion, such as restrictions on planning permission and registration of sacred 
sites. This process can be used to deny adherents of a particular religion access to sacred 
sites and may prevent them from establishing and using a sacred site. Moreover, in many 
states these procedures are used to restrict the structural aspects of religious practice.2lS 
215 UNCHR 'Report of the Special Rapporteur on Religious Intolerance' (1990) UN Doc EiCN.4/1990/46 13 
[40]; (1992) UN Doc E/CN.411992/46 15-7 [30]; (1984) UN Doc Al39/40 57 [301] and (2002) UN Doc 
Al57/274 [29] (Egypt). , 
216 UNCHR 'Report of the Special Rapporteur on Religious Intolerance' (1995) UN Doc ECN.4 i I995/91 
{59] (Malaysia). .., ".. 
.17 International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights (lHF), Human RIghts In the OSCE RegIon. Tht 
Balkans. the Caucasus. Europe, Central Asia and North America Report 2000 (IHF, Vienna 2000). . 
218 PM Taylor, Freedom of Religion: UN and European Human Rights Law and Practice (CUP. Camhndge 
2005) 242. 
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Regarding planning permission, the reports of the Special Rapporteur have highlighted the 
exploitation of planning permissions in several states, including Romania, where the 
Baptist church at Comanesti was under threat of demolition because it had been built 
without permission.219 It is difficult for Protestant and Armenian Orthodox churches to get 
a pennit to build places of worship in Georgia;220 Vietnam denied permission to build a 
sacred site and subsequently destroyed;221 Bhutan refused the Seventh Day Adventist 
Church permission to build a church;222 China destroyed several Buddhist institutes on 
health and safety regulations;223 Turkey delivered formal notices to twenty-three 
congregations of Turkish Christians in various cities alleging that their places of worship 
were in violation of municipal building laws.224 In countries like Saudi Arabia, construction 
of churches and temples are allegedly prohibited altogether.225 These examples highlight 
the interference of states in exercising the right to freedom of religion by religious 
communities. 
4.4.3. Regional level human rights treaties and property rights 
The general human rights conventions adopted at regional levels, European, Inter-
American, and African Charter, contain provisions on the right to property. 226 Article 1 in 
Protocol I to the ECHR guarantees the right to property. layawickrama analyses the, article 
and points out three distinct rules which comprise the right. 227 The first, which is of a 
general nature, articulates the principle of peaceful enjoyment of property. The second 
219 UNCHR 'Report of the Special Rapporteur on Religious Intolerance' (1990) UN Doc ElCN.4/1990/46 
r72] (Romania). 
ho UNCHR 'Report of the Special Rapporteur on Religious Intolerance' (2000) UN Doc ElCN.4/2000/65 
r40]; (2004) UN Doc E/CN.4/2004/63/Add.l [46] (Georgia). 
hI UNCHR 'Report of the Special Rapporteur on Religious Intolerance' (2000) UN Doc ElCN.4I2000/65 25 
{99] (Vietnam). 
_22 UNCHR 'Report of the Special Rapporteur on Religious Intolerance' (2001) UN Doc ElCN .4/200 1/63 8 
r 19] (Bhutan). . , ' 
123 UNCHR 'Report of the Special Rapporteur on RebglOus Intolerance (2003) UN Doc ElCNAI2003166 
r21-3] (China). . , ., ~2" UNCHR 'Report of the Special Rapporteur on Rehglous Intolerance (2002) UN Doc N57;'l74 lO [5 .. -3) 
~A~~~HR 'Report of the Special Rapporteur on Religious Intolerance' (1990) UN Doc ~C7'.4/1990146 40 
F4] (Saudi Arabia). 
26 Protocol I ECHR art I, ACHR art 21 and AFCHPR art 14. 
227 Marcia v Belgium (App no 6833174) (1979) 2 ECHR 330. 
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includes deprivation of possessions and prohibits it except in the public interest, and subject 
to 'the conditions provided by law and by the general principles of intemationallaw'. The 
third recognises that the state is entitled to control the use of property in accordance with 
the 'general interest'. When attacks on a sacred site take place, these three rights are 
violated. 
Article 21 of the American Convention on Human Rights states that everyone has the right 
to the use and enjoyment of their property but these can be deprived for reasons of public 
utility or social interests and 'according to the forms established by law. ,228 Many disputes 
of indigenous people's rights to their sacred lands have been recorded from this region. In a 
few cases, the Inter-American Court on Human rights and the Inter-American Commission 
on Human Rights have ensured the rights of indigenous people to claim their property 
rights over sacred lands. For instance, In the Mayagna229 case, the Inter-American Court on 
Human Rights ruled that the state of Nicaragua had violated the right to property as 
expressed in Article 21 of the ACHR by granting logging concessions on the traditional 
lands of the Mayagna (Sumo) community of Awas Tingni. Subsequently, the Court 
required Nicaragua to adopt measures to create an effective mechanism for official 
recognition, demarcation, and titling of the indigenous community's properties. 
In the Maya Indigenous Communities case,230 the Inter-American Commission on Human 
Rights issued a report finding that the state of Belize, by granting logging and oil 
concessions on lands used and occupied by the Maya people in the Toledo District, violated 
the property rights of the Maya people. The Commission ordered Belize to demarcate Maya 
lands in accordance with the Maya custom and in consultation with Maya people, to 
officially recognise the collective property rights and undertake measures to protect them. 
The decision in the Maya case is significant in protecting sacred sites of indigenous people. 
228 ACHR (n 10) art 21(1) Everyone has the right to the use and enjoyment of his pro~rty. Th~ law may 
subordinate such use and enjoyment to the interest of society; (2) No one shall be depnved of hiS property 
except upon payment of just compensation, for reasons of public utility or social i~te~est, and in the cases and 
according to the fonns established by law; (3) Usury and any other fonn of explOitatlon of man by man shall 
be prohibited by law. 
229 Mayagna (Sumo) indigenous Community of A was Tingni v Nicaragua Judgment of 31 August 2001 Inter-
Am Ct HR (Ser C) no 79 (200 1 ). 
no Maya indigenous Communities of the Toledo District v Belize Case no 12.053 Report no 40.'04. Inter-Am 
CHR (12 October 2004) OEAlSer.UV/Il.122 Doc 5 Rev I. 
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In the African region, Article 14 in the AFCHPR guarantees the right to property and 
prohibits any encroachment on the right except 'in the interests of public need or in the 
general interest of the community'. However, there is little evidence to show that 
communications (complaints) are sent from religious groups to protect their sacred sites as 
property rights. 
In the domestic jurisprudence of several countries, property rights enjoy wide and liberal 
• 231 • 1 d 1 . 
meanIng, to Inc u e not on y concrete nghts of property but also abstract rights. It is 
established that the right to property is now recognised as a right at domestic level but they 
are not absolute rights. They are subject to appropriation by states for the general interest 
and it is necessary that the deprivation is reasonably compensated to the value of the 
property, which strikes a balance between the demands of the public interest and the 
individual's fundamental rights.232 
To recap, though UDHR recognises property rights as a human right, as a soft law, it has no 
binding obligations among the member states. Moreover, since property rights are not 
entrenched in the ICCPR or in ICESCR human rights treaties, its effectiveness in protecting 
sacred sites through property rights remains limited. The violation of property rights, in this 
case, the rights of a religious community, results in violation of the protection of the 
interests of the community over the sacred sites. There is a need for adopting a binding 
human rights treaty to protect the rights of religious communities as owners of sacred sites 
within a state. 
4.5. Protection of sacred sites as protecting cultural sites 
UNESCO defines the term culture as "the set of distinctive spiritual, material, intellectual 
and emotional features of a society or social group, encompassing, in addition to art and 
231 Inland Revenue Commissioners v Li/leyman British Caribbean Court of Appeal Guyana (1964) 7 WIR 496. 
232 Sporrong and Lonnroth \' Sweden (App no 7151175 and 7172n5) (1982) 5 EH~R 35; ~e Bahamas 
Dis/rict of the Methodist Church in the Caribbean and the Americas \' Symonelle. Pnvy CounCil on appeal 
from the Supreme Court of the Bahamas (2000) 5 LRC 196. 
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literature, lifestyles, ways of living together, value systems, traditions and beliefs'. 233 
Culture refers to a variety of concepts, and religious affiliation has historically been 
amongst the most powerful of influences.234 In international humanitarian law, places of 
worship are included in the protection of cultural properties during armed conflicts. This 
section examines various international humanitarian law conventions which contain 
provisions related to sacred sites and their protection during war or armed conflicts. 
4.5.1. Hague Convention and protection of sacred sites 
When different cultures come into conflict, religion becomes an easy identifier and 
religious monuments, such as churches, mosques and temples, become easily identifiable 
objects of attacks.235 Most often, sacred sites come under attack because they are a 
reminder of the presence of 'the enemy'. Any attack on such sacred sites curtails the 
freedom of religion guaranteed in key international and regional human rights treaties. 
Hence, the issue of desecrating and destroying sacred sites may be approached not only as 
the removal of enemy sacred sites, but also as disrupting the right to freedom of religion 
expressed through worship 'alone or in community with others who share the faith.' 
Destruction of cultural properties, particularly sacred sites, is not a new phenomenon in 
recorded history.236 The first successful attempt at protecting cultural property, which 
includes places of worship during war, was made in the two international Peace 
Conferences held in 1899 and 1907 in The Hague. Article 5 of the Hague Convention IX 
(1907) states that in bombardments by naval forces all the necessary measures must be 
taken by the commander to spare, as far as possible, sacred edifices, buildings used for 
artistic, scientific purposes, and historical monuments. 
2J3 UNESCO, Report 0/ Export Meeting on Community Involvement in Sa/egll~rding ~ntangible. ClIlhlr~1 
Heritage: Towards the Implementation 0/ the 2003 Convention (UNESCO Intangible Hentage Section. Pans 
2006) 25. <http://www.unesco.orglculturelich> accessed 17 January 2007. ., .. 
114 S Murden, 'Cultural Rights' in J B'!llis and S Smith (eds), The GlobalisatlOn 0/ World Polillcs: An 
Introduction to International Relations (3 edn OUP, Oxford 2005) 540. 
llS GM Mose 'The Destruction of Churches and Mosques in Bosnia-HerLegovina: Seeking a Rights-Based 
Arproach to the Protection of Religious Cultural Property' (1996) 3 Buff J Inf~ L 180. 197. • 
23 J Toman, The Protection o/Culhlral Property in the EWl1t o/Armed ConflIct (Dartmouth. Vcnnont 1996) 
3-4. 
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After the Second World War, however, it became obvious that a complete renegotiation of 
the principles formulated in the above mentioned Conventions was needed and this resulted 
in the 1954 Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of 
Armed Conflict, which expands upon the nonns of the 1907 Hague Conventions, but also 
adds several new features to the law of cultural property. 237 
Article 1 of the Hague Convention, 1954, defmes cultural property as movable or 
immovable property of great importance to the cultural heritage of every people, such as 
monuments of architecture, art or history, whether religious or secular and offers an 
illustrative but non-exclusive list of examples.238 The same article of the 1954 Convention 
requires that parties undertake to prepare a defence in time of peace to safeguard cultural 
property in the event of an anned conflict. Significantly, most of the Convention applies to 
non-international as well as international conflicts. Additionally, the Convention created a 
registe~39 called the 'International Register of Cultural Property under Special Protection' 
on which monuments of particular importance that qualify for special protection can be 
listed. 
Article 8(1) of the 1954 Hague Convention indicates three categories of property to which 
special protection is to be given, namely, a limited number of refuges intended to shelter 
movable cultural property in the event of armed conflict, centres containing monuments, 
and other immovable cultural property of very great importance. These properties can be 
placed under special protection if two conditions are fulfilled and respected. They include 
that the protected property must be situated at an adequate distance240 from any large 
industrial centre or from any important military objective, and the protected property must 
2)7 DA Meyer. 'The 1954 Hague Cultural Property Convention and Its Emergence into Customary 
International Law' (1993) II B U INT'L L J 349, 352. . 
2)8 Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed ConflIct (adopted 14 May 1954, 
entered into force 7 August 1956) 249 UNTS 240 (The Hague Convention 1954) art I. 
239 The Hague Convention 1954 (n 237) art 8. 
240 Ibid art 8( 1 )a. 
not be used for military purposes.241 Unfortunately, 'adequate distance' has not been 
dermed, and Stanislaw Nahlik concludes that it must be assessed on a case-by-case basis.1.$1 
The special protection arrangements have accomplished very little. To date, cultural sites in 
four states, (the Vatican City, 18 January 1960; Austria, 17 November 1967; Gennany. 22 
April 1978; and the Netherlands, 12 May 1969), have been entered in the register at the 
request of those states, a total number of eight refuges as well as the whole of Vatican City 
State?43 The application by the Khmer Republic on 31 March 1972 related to the entry of 
monuments, including temples of Angkor and other cities, was not included due to 
objections by four High Contracting Parties.244 Apart from this political manoeuvring, the 
practical difficulties, such as defining 'adequate distance', may have deterred states from 
registration. Many sacred sites such as Buddhist shrines, Jerusalem, Mecca and other 
important religious sites have not been included, showing the limitations of the register. 
4.5.2. Geneva Conventions IV and Protocols I and II, 1977 
Another area of importance, the Geneva Conventions Relative to the Protection of Civilian 
Persons in Time of War, 1949 (hereafter the Geneva Convention), in particular the IV 
Geneva Convention, had fundamental influence in the drafting of the 1954 Hague 
Convention?45 As such, the 1977 Protocols I, II to the IV Geneva Conventions add several 
important provisions relating to the protection of cultural property. Article 53 of Protocol I, 
1977 states: 
Without prejudice to the provisions of the Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural 
Property in the Event of Anned Conflict of 14 May 1954, and of other relevant 
international instruments, it is prohibited: (a) to commit any acts of hostility directed 
against the historic monuments, works of art or places of worship which constitute the 
241 Ibid art 8(l)b. 
242 SE Nahlik, 'Protection of Cultural Property' in UNESCO, International Dimensions o/Humanitarian Law 
(UNESCO, Paris 1988) 207. 
243 UNESCO, 'International Register of Cultural Property under Special Protection' 
<http://unesdoc.unesco.org/imageslOO14/0014071l40792E.pdf> accessed 17 ~o\'~mber ~OO6 .. 
244 Four High Contracting Parties are Cuba, Egypt, Romania and YugoslaVia. which clalme~ that the 
Application for Registration was not presented by the authority entitled to represent Khm~r R~pubhc (present 
Cambodia). See J Toman, The Protection 0/ Cultural Property in the Event o/Anned Lonfltct (Dartmouth. 
Vennont 1996) 108-9. 
245 Ibid 21. 
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cu1tur~1 or spiritual heritag~ of peop1e~; (b) to use such objects in support of the military 
effort, (c) to make such objects the objects ofreprisals.246 
Paragraph (a) of Article 53 forbids acts of hostility directed at properties which constitute 
the 'cultural or spiritual heritage' of peoples. This is a very significant addition to the 
protection of cultural property which is entirely absent from the 1954 Hague Convention 
and seems to represent some evolution in the law regarding religious cultural property. lor 
The significance of this addition should be noted here as it arguably extends protection to a 
number of sacred sites which would not be covered by the previous 1954 Hague 
Convention on the protection of cultural property during armed conflict. 
The draft article referred specifically to places of worship, but only to cultural and not 
spiritual heritage.248 As there was still disagreement as to whether every place of worship 
was part of the cultural heritage of peoples, the committee deleted reference to places of 
worship from Article 53 and placed it in Article 52 of Additional Protocol I, 1977 as an 
example of property normally committed to civilian use. At the insistence of a large 
number of states however, 'places of worship' was returned and supplemented with the 
current language on 'cultural or spiritual heritage' .249 The ICRC noted that spiritual 
importance may exist even in the absence of cultural importance, and that 'spiritual' was 
written into Protocol I to cover such situations, but not to extend protection to local 
churches or mosques.2SO The Belgian delegate agreed and described this view saying that 
the article referred to 'places of worship so intimately associated with those faiths that, 
more than all the other religious buildings already protected under Article 52, they seemed 
to be their true embodiment on earth'. 251 
246 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of 
Victims of International Anned Conflicts (adopted 8 June 1977, entered into force 7 December 1979) 1977 
UNYB 95; reprinted in 16ILM 1391 (Protocol I to Geneva Conventions). 
247 GM Mose, 'The Destruction of Churches and Mosques in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Seeking a Rights-Based 
1rproach to the Protection of Religious Cultural Property' (1996) 3 Buff J Int'I L 180, 185. 
2 M Bothe and others, New Rules For Victims of Armed Conflicts: Commentary on the Two Protocols 
Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 (Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague 1982) 331. 
249 Ibid 332. A number of Muslim States, along with the Holy See and Italy, insisted on this modification. 
250 International Committee of the Red Cross, Commentary on the Additional Protocols of 8 Jllne J 977 to the 
Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 (lCRC, Geneva 1987) 646. 
m HS Levie. Protection of War Victims: Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva Com'en/ions (Oceana. New York 
1980) 221. 
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Protocol II also covers situations of non-international anned conflict and contains a 
provision on the protection of cultural property. Article 16 prohibits 'any acts of hostility 
directed against historic monuments, works of art or places of worship which constitute the 
cultural or spiritual heritage of peoples, and to use them in support of the military effort'. 252 
The provisions of the two Protocols are important since they have included the 'spiritual' 
aspect of cultural property but they do not cover all protections covered by the 1954 
C . 253 H h onventton. owever, t e1980 Iran-Iraq War, when so many cultural sites came under 
attack by the Iraqi military, exposed the inadequacies of the 1954 Convention, prompting 
UNESCO to convene a meeting of legal experts to discuss the situation created by the Iran-
Iraq War.254 The need to have a fresh look at the 1954 Convention was further advanced by 
the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq in 1990, which witnessed the plunder of Kuwaiti cultural 
institutions. This was followed by the war in Yugoslavia in 1991 in which hundreds of 
mosques and churches were destroyed, especially the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina which 
demonstrated the vulnerability of sacred sites at the close of the twentieth century. 255 
In a subsequent UNESCO conference, it was noted that 'the international system of 
safeguards of the world cultural heritage did not appear to be satisfactory, as indicated by 
the ever-increasing dangers due to anned conflicts' .256 After various meetings and 
discussions lasting a decade, the Second Protocol to The Hague Convention for the 
Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict was adopted.257 The 
'enhanced protection' created in chapter 3 emerged as one of the core rationales of the 
Second Protocol. Unlike the 'special protection' in the 1954 Convention, 'enhanced 
protection' is available for immovable and movable cultural property, and conditions 
252 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of 
Victims of Non-Intemational Armed Conflicts (adopted 8 June 1977, entered into force 7 December 1979) 16 
ILM 1447 (Protocol II to Geneva Conventions) art 16. 
25J GM Mose, 'The Destruction of Churches and Mosques in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Seeking a Rights-Based 
Approach to the Protection of Religious Cultural Property' (1996) 3 Buff J Int'l.L 180,185. . 
2~ UNESCO, Paris Meeting of Legal Experts on the Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property In the 
Event of Anned Conflict (1983) UNESCO Doc CLT.83/CONF.64111. 
25S GM Mose, 'The Destruction of Churches and Mosques in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Seeking a Rights-Based 
Approach to the Protection of Religious Cultural Property' (1996) 3 ButT J Int'I L 180,204. 
25 Roger O'Keefe, The Protection oferl/tural Property in Armed Conflict (CUP, Cambridge 2.006) 23? 
257 The Second Protocol to the Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property In the E'ent of 
Anned Conflict (adopted 26 March 1999 by the Hague Diplomatic Conference) (Second Hague Protocol 
1999) 
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became more realisable since the requirement that the property in question be situated in an 
adequate distance from military objectives is absent in this Protocol. Moreover, Chapter 4, 
the Second Protocol's regime of penal sanctions embodies two war crimes specifically 
relating to cultural property under enhanced protection. One of the important achievements 
of the Second Protocol of the 1954 Convention is the establishment of a twelve-person 
inter-governmental Committee258 for the Protection of Cultural Property in the event of 
Armed Conflict, which is empowered 'to establish, maintain, and promote the List of 
Cultural Property under Enhanced Protection. ,259 
After the destruction of the statues of Buddha in Bamiyan by the Taliban Government of 
Afghanistan in 2001, the General Conference of UNESCO adopted a resolution entitled 
'Acts Constituting a Crime Against the Common Heritage of Humanity,.260 Subsequently, 
the 'UNESCO Declaration Concerning the International Destruction of Cultural Heritage' 
was adopted by the General Conference of UNESCO in 2003.261 These efforts by UNESCO 
have not ensured enough protection to sacred sites which become evident from the reports 
of the ongoing Iraqi War. One reason for this failure is the absence of powerful 
enforcement mechanisms based on the 1954 Hague Convention for the Protection of 
Cultural property in the Event of Armed Conflict. 262 
The specific protection of sacred sites, therefore, appears to be found only in international 
humanitarian law during times of war or armed conflicts, and moreover, these provisions 
are not supported by enforcement mechanisms. Indeed, outside of armed conflicts there is 
no apparent protection for these cultural and spiritually significant places of worship. This 
absence of protection within international human rights law was highlighted when the 
263 . . I d' d d Bamiyan Buddha statues in Afghanistan and the Babn Mosque In n la were estroye . 
These and many other incidents demonstrate the inadequacy of the international law to 
prevent the demolition of these sacred sites. If protection of sacred sites as a cultural right 
258 Second Hague Protocol 1999, Article 24( I). 
2S9 Second Hague Protocol 1999, Article 27(1)(b). 
260 UN ESCO 31 51 Session (2001) 31 ClRes 26. 
261 UNESCO 32nd Session (2003) 32 ClRes 33 Annex. 
262 Roger O'Keefe, The Protection o/ClIlhlral property ill Armed COllflict (CUP. Cambridge 2006) 300. 
26) CNN.ComIWorld, 'Photos document destruction of Afghan Buddhas 12 March 2001' 
<http://archives.cnn.coml2001 /wORLD/asiapcflcentraHB/ 12/afghan.buddha.02! > accessed 12 May 2006. 
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had been included in the ICESCR, it would have developed the right to freedom of religion 
granted in Article 18 of the' ICCPR. This advances the cause for framing a convention 
which specifically sets out the provisions for the protection of sacred sites at all times. 
4.6. Concluding Observations 
From the inception of the UDHR, the right to freedom of religion has been defined and 
developed in international human rights law. Foregoing analysis, however, has noted that 
the freedom of religion has to be developed and expanded to include the protection of 
sacred sites. Despite the recognition of the rights of religious minority groups to exercise 
their freedom of religion, they do not extend to cover protection of sacred sites belonging to 
minority communities and they are mainly soft law instruments. Though property rights are 
recognised as a human right, they are not entrenched in a binding human rights treaty. So, 
religious communities, as owners of sacred sites, may not be able to claim any protection in 
international law when their sacred sites are attacked and destroyed by state and non-state 
actors. Sacred sites, as cultural properties of humankind, are protected in international 
humanitarian law during armed conflicts; however, it does not seem to extend its protection 
outside armed conflicts. 
It has now been established that international human rights law does not provide adequate 
protection to sacred sites. As a supervisory and supplementary level mechanism, it does 
provide a framework and if the gaps identified above are covered by developing new 
provisions of international law, it will effectively protect rights in cases of disputes over 
sacred sites such as the one India encountered in the Ayodhya dispute. 
These findings lay the foundation for enacting further provisions of international human 
rights law to include the development of the right to freedom of religion. Emphasis is made 
here again that a convention will create binding legal obligations on those states that lack 
adequate constitutional or legislative protections for sacred sites. This can further be 
substantiated from the observation of the Special Rapporteur that 'the mandatory nature of 
the provisions of such an instrument (Convention) would impose on states parties a number 
227 
of requirements, such as the submission of reports on the application of its provisions, 
which might encourage greater respect for religious rights and freedoms by such states' . ~~ 
Moreover, in promoting and protecting human rights, regional instruments seem to have an 
edge over international bodies, partly due to the adjudicating power of the regional 
mechanisms such as commissions and regional courts. Their decisions bind states with 
more obligations than international instruments which are limited to monitoring the 
implementation of human rights in member states. Consequently, the next chapter examines 
the possibilities of drafting a regional human rights treaty to protect sacred sites. 
264 UNCHR 'Report of Special Rapporteur Ribeiro' (1988) UN Doc EC~.4!l9881~5 [25]. 
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CHAPTER V 
A DRAFT MODEL FOR REGIONAL CONVENTION 
5.1. Introduction 
The preceding chapter established the fact that although sacred sites fonned vital 
components to freedom of religion, their protection is not adequately covered under 
international human rights law. Similarly, regional human rights conventions, though they 
guarantee the right to worship, do not include protection of the sacred sites. Nonetheless, 
that protection of sacred sites has not been established as a right in any of these regional 
human rights treaties is no clear ground for legal protection when disputes arise over these 
sites. Hence, this chapter develops a draft regional human rights convention for the 
protection of disputed sacred sites like in Ayodhya or any other site similar to it in the 
South Asian region. 
5.2. Benefits of Regional Approach 
This section analyses the general characteristics of regional human rights organisations and 
their advantages over global human rights mechanisms. It will further examine the 
strengths and weaknesses of existing regional human rights organisations and compliance 
mechanisms such as the European, the inter-American and the African human rights 
organisations for the proposed one for the South Asian region. 
5.2.1. Regional human rights organizations 
In the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), l Article 28 proclaims that 
everyone is entitled to a social and an international order2 for which realisation of human 
rights, democracy, the rule of law and international cooperation are necessary. Cooperation 
between states is not a new phenomenon and it has, since the establishment of nation-states, 
become a sine-qua-non of international politics. It shows that the international order is not a 
I Universal Declaration of Hwnan Rights (adopted 10 December 1948) UNGA Res 217 :\(111) (UDHR). 
~ UDHR (n I) art 28: Everyone is entitled to a social and international order in which the rights and freedoms 
set forth in this Declaration can be fully realized. 
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stagnant pattern of interaction among states, but a continuous set of arrangements designed 
for establishing constant interaction within states.3 
In the contemporary world, this interaction among states is better illustrated in their 
regional level cooperation. Verma points out that after the Second World War, the 
phenomenon of international cooperation operating at the regional level has increased.4 
Evidently, Ramcharan argues that regional and international organisations have to 
cooperate together in order to harmonise the work they do to promote human rights. 5 
While comparing the usefulness of existing regional organisations to global human rights 
mechanisms, the inherent weakness of the latter is quite apparent in so many ways. For 
instance, the international community may only take limited action to rectify the failure of 
any given state to file periodic reports about promoting and protecting human rights. 
Moreover, often it is a problem for the international community to reach agreement on the 
range and content of human rights to be protected, owing to the various religious and 
cultural difficulties.6 Strengthening the enforcement mechanism may be another challenge 
in international law.7 A significant limitation at the global level is the absence of a 
permanent human rights court where individuals can file petitions against states for failing 
to protect people from violation of human rights. Initially, the United Nations Charter8 
included development of regional systems aimed at securing the maintenance of peace and 
J P Lyon, 'New States and International Order' in A James (ed), The Bases 0/ International Order: Essays in 
Honour o/CA. W. Manning (OUP, Oxford 1973) 24-5. 
4 SP Verma, 'South Asia As a Region: Problems and Prospects' in SP Verma and KP Misra (eds). Foreign 
Policies in South Asia (Orient Longmans, New Delhi 1969) 345. 
S B Ramcharan, 'Complementarity between Universal and Regional Organisations: Perspectives from the UN 
High Commissioner for Human Rights' (2000) 21 Human Rights Law Journal 324-26. Ramcharan points out 
that regional and international organisations have to cooperate together in order to harmonise .the work. they 
do to promote human rights in the following areas; developing a universal culture of human nghts; natIOnal 
capacity-building; protecting the vulnerable such as minorities, migrants, indigenous populations; the 
implementation of human rights; early warning and conflict prevention; emergency response; and peace 
maJdnglkeepinglbuilding. 
6 RK. Smith, International Human Rights (OUP. Oxford 2003) 83. For instance, it took nearly two decades for 
the UN to finalize and complete the ICCPR and ICESCR due to differences among member states. 
7 0 Shelton, 'The Promise of Regional Human Rights System' in BH Western and SP Marks (eds), The 
Future 0/ International Human Rights (Transnational, New York 1999) 355. . ' ! 
8 United Nations Charter (adopted 26 June 1945. entered into force 24 October 1945) 1 UNTS XVI (lJ~ 
Charter). 
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security under Chapter VII.9 However, in 1977, the General Assembly openly 
acknowledged the benefit of regional human rights systems. 10 
With regard to the advantages of regional human rights systems, it may be noted that in 
many regions, where the legal and social traditions are more similar, it has been easier to 
reach an agreement on a common standard due to its flexibility and ability to change as 
conditions around them change. I I Since fewer states will be involved, reaching political 
consensus becomes easier with regard to agreeing texts and in creating any enforcement 
machinery. Many regions, not all, are also relatively homogeneous with respect to culture, 
religion, language, and tradition which have obvious advantages. 12 The principal regions 
which operate human rights systems are relatively homogeneous in so far as many of their 
states have broadly similar political and cultural histories. 13 
In addition, regional systems develop more geographic and linguistic accessibility to 
people. At the implementation level, familiarity among the states can produce a more 
successful system. The unwillingness on the part of states to bring inter-state complaints 
under international law is improved at the regional level. 14 It is also true that regional 
sanctions can be a very real threat. 15 A significant advantage of regional human rights 
system could be the establishment of regional courts and more detailed procedures for 
hearing complaints of those victims of human rights violations committed by a member 
state and delivering binding decisions. 16 
9 UN Charter (n 8) Article 52(1) states: Nothing in the present Charter precludes the existence of regional 
arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and 
security as are appropriate for regional action provided that such arrangements or agencies and their activities 
are consistent with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations. 
10 UNGA Res 32/127 (16 December 1977) Doc AlRES/32/127. 
<http://www.un.orgldocuments/galres/32/ares32rI27.pdf> accessed 18 August 2006. 
II GW Mugwanya, 'Realizing Universal Human Rights Norms through Regional Human Rights Mechanisms: 
Reinvigorating the African System' (1999) 10 Ind Int'l & Comp L Rev 35, 41-2. 
12 Inis L Claude Jr, Swords into Plowshares: The Problems and Progress of International Organization (3rd 
edn Random House, New York 1964) 95. 
13 BH Weston and others, 'Regional Human Rights Regimes: A Comparison and Appraisal' (1987) 20 Vand J 
Transnat'l L 586, 589-90. 
14 In 1978, Ireland became the first State to bring an inter-State complaint before a regional court for 
adjudication. See, Ireland v United Kingdom (App no 5310171) (1978) 2 EHRR 225. 
I~ RK Smith,lnternational Human Rights (OUP, Oxford 2003) 83-90. 
16 D Shelton, 'The Promise of Regional Human Rights System' in BH \Vestern and SP Marks (OOs), The 
Future of International Human Rights (Transnational. New York 1999) 356-58. 
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One of the criticisms about regional human rights organisations emerges within the context 
of the debate over whether human rights as articulated in the current international legal 
system are universal or culturally relative. From the outset, the UN was gripped by a debate 
over the existence of a universal set of human rights as opposed to different sets of rights 
applicable to the various regional, religious and political backgrounds of the Asian and 
African regions. 17 The regional declarations which insist so much on 'cultural relativism' 
have their opponents. Adamantia Pollis criticizes those states who claim that 'cultural 
relativism' violates their own notions of rights and obligations, while their own elites use 
the leverages of state power and a policy of repression to enhance, consolidate, and 
maintain their power. IS At the same time, cultural relativism has its own supporters who 
acknowledge the universality of human rights principle while insisting that there should be 
'optimal flexibility,19 in respecting diversity. Ghai argues that this relativism is the form 
and not the substance.2o Although, the debate continues still, the 'universality principle' is 
formally agreed with due recognition to regional particularities in the Vienna Declaration.21 
I t declares: 
All human rights are universal, indivisible and interdependent and interrelated. The 
international community must treat human rights globally in a fair and equal manner, on the 
same footing, and with the same emphasis. 22 
However, the problem of national and regional peculiarities is referred to in the declaration 
when it states 'the significance of national and regional particularities and various 
historical, cultural and religious backgrounds must be borne in mind,.23 Although a detailed 
consideration of 'cultural relativism' is not within the scope of the present work, it must be 
considered that regional particularities are now acknowledged. 
17 J Rehman, International Human Rights Law: A Practical Approach (Pearson, Harlow 2003) 5. 
18 A Pollis 'Cultural Relativism Revisited: Through a State Prism' (1996) 18 HRQ 316, 344. 
19 D Duqu~tte, 'Universalism and Relativism in Human rights' in E Srarns (ed), Human Rights: Universality 
and Diversity (Martin us Nijhoff, the Hague 2001) 75. . . 
20 Y Ghai, 'Human Rights Governance: the Asia debate' (2000) I Asia-Pacific Journal on Human Rights and 
the Law 9, 52. 
21 The Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action on Human Rights (adopted 25 June 1993 by the UN 
World Conference on Human Rights) UN Doc AlCONF.157/23 (1993). 
<http://www.unhchr.ch!huridocdalhuridoca.nsf/(Symbol)/ A.CONF.157.23.En?OpenDocument> accessed 23 
November 2006. 
22 Ibid pt I [5]. 
2l Ibid pt 2 [5]. 
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5.2.2. European Regional human rights organizations 
For an effective promotion and protection of human rights in a region, it should flourish 
with democracy, 24 rule of law and independent judiciary which are sine-qua-non. The first 
regional human rights system, considered most effective,25 began in Europe in 1949. 
Among various human rights enforcement mechanisms in the European region, three 
organisations are significant namely, the Council of Europe, The European Union (EU) and 
the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). 
The Council of Europe,26 established in 1949, is an intergovernmental organisation which 
aims at strengthening democracy, human rights and the rule of law among its member 
states.
27 
Initially, the membership was only confined to the European democratic states and 
democracy as an obligation still exists in Europe.28 The Council of Europe has generated 
various important human rights treaties; however, the significant one is the European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)29 which has become an effective human rights treaty 
in the international forum. ECHR guarantees a short list of civil and political rights and the 
list of rights has expanded subsequently by the conclusion of additional protocols. 
A salient feature of the European system is the creation of strong monitoring and 
enforcement mechanisms. Section II of the ECHR describes the establishment of the 
Commission and the Court of Human Rights to ensure the protection of human rights by 
the high contracting parties. In November 1998, Protocol 11 30 abolished the Commission 
and made a full-time court the primary institution, its decisions being legally binding on the 
24 UNCHR 'Interdependence between Democracy and Human Rights' Res 36 (2003) UN Doc ElCN.4/ 
RES/2003/36 [7]. 
25 R Higgins, 'The European Convention of Human Rights' in T Meron (ed), Human Rights in International 
law: Legal and Policy Issues (Clarendon, Oxford 1984) 495. 
26 Statute of the Council of Europe (adopted 5 May 1949, entered into force 3 August 1949) ETS 1. 
27 Statute of the Council of Europe (n 26) art 3: Each member state must accept the principles of rule of law 
and the enjoyment by all persons within its jurisdiction of human rights and fundamental freedoms. 
28 S Wheatley. 'Democracy in International Law: A European Perspective' in R Burchill (ed), Democracy and 
International law (Ashgate. Aldershot 2006) 99. . 
29 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (European ConventIon on 
Human Rights. as amended) (adopted 4 November 1950, entered into force 3 September 1953) 213 UNTS 
221 (ECHR). It has been so far amended through twelve additional protocols. 
30 Protocol No 11 to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms (adopted 11 May 1994, entered into force 1 November 1998) ETS 155 reprinted in 33 ILM 960 
(1994) (Protocolll). 
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parties.31 It is the largest established human rights body in Europe and through its 
consistent case-law has developed a comprehensive jurisprudence on human rights. The 
case-law highlights the interest of the European Court in protecting democracy in the 
member states.32 In the Refa Partisi and Others case, the court held that 'democracy is 
without doubt a fundamental feature of European public order,.33 
The unprecedented formal strengths and completeness of the procedures and the impartial 
application of the procedures as well as their acceptance by member states, have 
contributed to the success of the European system34 although some areas of concern still 
persist.35 An impartial determination of applications alleging violations of human rights and 
redress without delay are important characteristics of an effective human rights system and 
the European system has paid serious attention to this.36 The recognition of the individual's 
right to bring a complaint to the European Court against one's own state represents the 
ongoing development of international/regional law. 37 The significance of the European 
Court of Human Rights can be ascertained from the fact that the organs of the Organisation 
of American States and the Human Rights Committee have considered its jurisprudence, as 
have many national courts worldwide.38 Rhona Smith observes that 'The ECHR has proven 
an effective judicial organ with a high degree of success in the implementation of 
decisions' .39 
31 ECHR (n 29) art 42, 43, 45 and 46 as amended by Protocol 11. 
32 Chassagnou and Others v France (App no 25088/94, 28331195, 28443/95) (2000) 29 EHRR 615 ; Refah 
Partisi and Others v Turkey (App no 41340/98, 41342/98, 41343/98, 41344198) (2003) 37 EHRR 1; Selim 
Sadak and Others v Turkey (App no 25144/94, 26149/95 to 26154/95, 27100195, 27100/95,27101/95) (2003) 
36 EHRR 23; Socialist Party and Others v Turkey (20/1997/804/1007) ECHR 1998-111 139; Stanko ... and the 
United Macedonian Organisation Ilinden v Bulgaria (App no 29221/95,29225195) ECHR 2001-IX 139. 
33 Refah Partisi and others v Turkey (n 32). 
34 J Donnelly, International Human Rights: A Regime Analysis (1986) 40 Infl Org 599~ 621. . 
35 C Tomuchat, 'Quo Vadis, Argentoratim? The Success story of the European ConventIOn on Human Rights 
and a Few Dark Stains' (1992) 13 Hum Rts L J 401-06. 
36 GW Mugwanya, Human Rights in Africa: Enhancing Human Rights through the African Regional Human 
Rights System (Transnational, New York 2003) 39. . 
37 Protocol II to the European Convention on Human Rights (n 30) ~ 3~:. The Co~. may receive 
applications from any person, non-governmental organisation or ~up of mdlvl~uals c1almmg .to be the 
victim of a violation by one of the High Contracting Parties of the nghts set forth m the Co~ventlon ~r the 
protocols thereto. The High Contracting Parties undertake not to hinder in any way the effective exercise of 
this right. 
38 D Shelton, 'The Promise of Regional Human Rights System' in BH Western and SP Marks (cds). 17rt' 
Future of International Human Rights (Transnational, New York 1999) 374. 
39 RK Smith,International Human Rights (OUP, Oxford 2003) 86. 
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In post-war Europe, to find a solution to the ideological and political conflicts, and 
emerging security considerations necessitated the establishment of a strong military alliance 
to establish peace and security in the region. With this purpose in mind, the Conference on 
Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE)40 was established. The origin and development 
of concern for human rights in the CSCE was based on the conference held in Helsinki 
which began in 1973 and concluded in 1975 with the adoption of the Helsinki Final ACt.41 
The system developed by the CSCE is designed to give early warning to states or 
organisations to prevent conflicts and to devise methods with regard to post-conflict 
rehabilitation.
42 
The main job of the experts appointed by the CSCE is to make on-site 
investigations in specific cases and to appoint Rapporteurs to suggest appropriate solutions 
to the conflicts. 
The process of the implementation of human rights was developed further in the 
Copenhagen meeting which resulted in the Copenhagen Document in 1990.43 This was then 
followed by the Paris Charter44 for a New Europe in 1990 which brought about the creation 
of the posts of Secretary General and the High Commissioner for National Minorities, 
which was finally established in 1992.45 
The OSCE and the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, the High 
Commissioner on Human Rights and the European Union have been steadily building up 
their roles in protecting human rights.46 The adoption of the Charter of Fundamental Rights 
of the European Union in 2000 shows the high status given to human rights within the 
40 Until 1995, OSCE was known as CSCE. OSCE is the largest regional security organisation with fifty-six 
~articipating States. <http://www.osce.org/aboutJI3113.hbnl> accessed 3 March 2006. 
I Conference and Security and Cooperation in Europe: Final Act (Helsinki Accord) (adopted 1 August 1975) 
14 ILM 1292. 
42 JO Merrills, International Dispute Settlement (4th edn CUP, Cambridge 2005) 288. 
43 Document of the Copenhagen Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the CSCE (adopted 
29 June 1990) reprinted (1990) 29 ILM 1305. 
44 CSCE Paris Charter for a New Europe (adopted 21 November 1990) reprinted (1991) 30 ILM 190. 
4S CSeE Helsinki Decisions (1992) 35 ILM 1385; A de Zayas, 'The International Judicial Protection of 
Peoples and Minorities' in C Brolmann and others (eds), Peoples and Minorities ill Inlemation(l/ /a\\' 
(Martinus Nijhoff, Dordrecht 1993) 282. . . . 
46 B Ramcharan, 'Complementarity between Universal and Regional Organlzal1ons: Perspectives form the 
United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights' (2000) 21 Human Rights Law JournaI3:!~-:!6. 
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E C . 47 D . uropean ommumty. ue to the complexIty of the European processes and institutions. 
it is structured on the basis of the widely accepted distinction between 'prevention' and 
'post facto techniques' - investigation, redress and sanctions.48 
Europe as a region has established more advanced human rights institutions to protect 
human rights. The right of individual complainants to establish their rights under the 
European Convention are noteworthy.49 The primary responsibility for the implementation 
of the ECHR and judgements of the European Human Rights Court remain with the states. 
In general, the states have complied with their obligation under Article 53 of the convention 
and effected changes of legislation and practice as an element of friendly settlement before 
the Commission (before 1998) or the court. To sum up, the European Convention which is 
inspired by the liberal democratic ideals has been translated into practice by promoting and 
protecting human rights in the European region. 50 
5.2.3. The Inter-American Human Rights System 
The Inter-American system has been helpful in the protection of human rights In the 
Americas. The Inter-American region was known for a long time for gross and massive 
violations of human rights by dictatorial regimes.51 Political turmoil and human rights have 
often been neglected in response to serious problems of political and economic stability.52 
It has also played an important role in promoting democratic government in the region.53 
Similarly the South Asian region is also known for its political and economic instability. 
Therefore in proposing a South Asian Convention for the protection of sacred sites as part 
of protecting and promoting human rights in that region, it may be of benefit to analyze 
closely how the OAS has dealt with human rights issues. 
47 Charter of Fundamental Rights of European Union (adopted at Nice in December 2000). 
<http://www.europarl.europa.eulcharter/pdfltext_en.pdf> accessed 5 May 2006. 
48 M Tardu. 'The European Systems for the Protection of Human Rights' in J Symon ides (ed). Human Rights 
International Protection. Monitoring. Enforcement (Ashgate. Burlington 2003) 138. 
49 AG Mower Jr. Regional Human rights: A Comparatil'e Study of the West European and Inter-American 
Svstems (Greenwood. New York 1991) 166. . 
56 JG Merrills and AH Robertson. Human Rights in Europe: A Shldy of the European ConventIOn on Human 
Rights (4th edn Manchester University Press, Manchester 2001) 326. . ' 
51 GW Mugwanya, Human Rights in Africa: Enhancing Human Rights through the African ReglO"al Hllman 
Rights System (Transnational, New York 2003) 41. ." . . 
S2 OJ Harris, 'Regional Protection of Human Rights: The lnter-Amencan Achievement In OJ Hams and S 
Livingstone, The Inter-American System of Human Rights (Clarendon, Oxford 1998) 2. 
5J Thomas Franck, 'The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance' (1992) 86 Am J Int L 46, 53-5. 
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The Inter-American human rights system functions within the framework of the 
Organization of American States (OAS).54 It attains strength from two legal sources, 
namely, the Charter of the OAS and the American Convention on Human Rights of 1969 
(ACHR)55 . The USA is a member which has signed but not yet ratified the Convention. The 
ACHR guarantees civil and political rights and without detail obligates state parttes to 
realise the rights set forth in the Charter of the ~AS. However, an additional Protocol to the 
ACHR in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights provides the details. 56 
The Inter-American System for the Protection of Human Rights attempts to defend the 
rights of the individual and to establish effective representative democracy in the region. 57 
This basic notion is inscribed in the Charter of the OAS,58 the American Declaration of the 
Rights and Duties of Man,59 the ACHR 196960 and in the Additional Protocol in the Area of 
Economic, Social and Cultural RightS. 61 
The Inter-American system has two specialised supervisory institutions. They are, the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights62 and the Inter-American Court of Human 
54 Charter of the Organization of American States (signed 30 April 1948, entered into force 13 December 
1951) 2 UST 2394, UNTS 48. The OAS is an inter-governmental organization and includes 35 members of 
the Americas. 
55 American Convention on Human Rights (signed 22 November 1969, entered into force 18 July 1978) OAS 
Treaty Series No 36 at I (1969) reprinted in Basic Documents Pertaining to Human Rights in the lnter-
American System OEAlSer LN/II.23 Doc 21 Rev 6 (1979) (ACHR). 
56 Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in the Area of Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (adopted 17 November 1988, entered into force 16 November 1999) OAS Treaty Series 69 
reprinted in 28 ILM 156 (1989) (Protocol of San Salvador). 
57 D Shelton, 'The Promise of Regional Human Rights Systems' in BH Western and SP Marks (eds), The 
Future of International Human Rights (Transnational, New York 1999) 381. 
58 Charter of the Organisation of American States (signed 1948, entered into force 13 December 1951) 33 
ILM 981 (1994) (OAS Charter) Preamble and article 3(d) and (k). 
S9 American Declaration of the Rights and Rights and Duties of Man, OAS Res XXX adopted by the Ninth 
International Conference of American States (1948) reprinted iil Basic Documents Pertaining to Human 
Rights in the Inter-American System OEAlSer L V 111.82 Doc 6 Rev 1 at 17 (1992) article XXVIII. 
60 ACHR (n 55) Preamble and Article 29( d) and 32(r). 
61 Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in the Area of Economic. Social and 
Cultural Rights (entered into force 16 November 1999) OAS Treaty Series No 69 (1988) reprinted in Basic 
Documents Pertaining to Human Rights in the Inter-American System OEAlSer L V 111.82 Doc 6 Rev 1 at 67 
~ 992) (Protocol of San Salvador) Preamble. . 
The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights was established in 1959 through a resolution of 
ministers of foreign affairs of the ~AS. Resolution VIII of the Fifth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of 
Foreign Affairs, Final Act, Santiago, Chile (12-18) August 1959. OAS OfT Rec OEAlSer F '11.5 Doc 89 Rev 2 
(1959) 10-11. 
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Rights
63
• The ACHR empowers the Commission to deal with individual petitions and inter-
. • 64 
state communIcatIons. The Second Special Inter-American Conference, Rio de Janeiro 
1965, approved a resolution strengthening the legal authority of the Commission further.65 
Through this resolution, the Commission developed a new area of competence that of 
acting in individual petitions for alleged violations of some of the human rights, including 
freedom of· religion enumerated in the ACHR. Since then, the examination of individual 
complaints has become one of the Commission's main activities. The Commission has 
documented a number of gross and systematic violations of human rights over the years, 
using the information to pressurise states to redress the situation.66 
When the ACHR came into force, the Commission acquired a new status within the system 
which was further improved with the establishment of a judicial organ, the Inter-American 
Court of Human Rights.67 The Court declared that the intention of all the American states, 
as expressed in the Preamble of the Convention, is to consolidate in the hemisphere within 
the framework of democratic institutions a system of personal liberty and social justice 
based on respect for the essential rights of man.68 The establishment of the Inter-American 
Court, which has both adjudicatory and advisory jurisdiction, which is broader than that of 
the European Court, provided a judicial forum for the determination of individual 
complaints, further developing work of the Commission.69 The Court may issue advisory 
opinions to all member states of the OAS as well as the OAS organs.70 
An evaluation of the Inter-American regional system in the promotion and protection of 
human rights within the Americas highlights the fact that regional institutions can coexist 
with the UN system and improve the efficiency of the protection. Earlier, the region had 
63 ACHR (n 55) art 33(b), 52-69. The Court is situated in San Jose, Costa Rica. 
604 ACHR (n 55) art 44 and 45. . 
65 Second Special Inter- American Conference, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. 17-30 November 1965, Fmal Act OAS 
Res XXII, OEAlSer C/I.13 (English) 32-4 reprinted in 60 AJIL 445 (1966). 
66 J Rehman International Human Rights Law: A practical Approach (Pearson, London 2003) 211. 
67 H Camin~s 'The Inter-American System for the Protection of Human Rights' in J Symon ides (ed). Hllmall 
Rights Intern~tional Protection. Monitoring. Enforcement (Ashgate, Burlington 2003) 193. 
68 ACHR (n 55) Preamble [1]. . 
69 0 Shelton, 'The Promise of Regional Human Rights System' in BH Western and SP Marks (eds), n,t! 
Fllh'I'e of International Human Rights (Transnational, New York 1999) 360. . 
70 CM Quiroga, The Battle of Human Rights: Gross. 5.vstematic Violations and the Inter-Amt!r1can System 
(Netherlands Institute for Social and Economic law Research. Utrecht 1988) 326. 
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witnessed massive violation of human rights under military regimes, and subsequent return 
to democracy in several Latin American states has undoubtedly improved the human rights 
situation in the region.71 The cooperation of member states has been limited and there is 
lack of coordination between the commission and the court. Many parties to the OAS have 
not ratified the ACHR and hence it is beyond the purview of the Inter-American Court to 
deal with human rights violations and to provide legally binding judgements. Although 
non-compliance is a problem in this region, nevertheless, it has remained operational and 
produced some contribution in the field of human rights. 
5.2.4. African Regional human rights regime 
The youngest developed regional system is to be found in Africa. Although Africa has a 
recent history of oppressive regimes and serious systematic violations of human rights, it 
has succeeded in developing a coherent regional system for the protection of human rights. 
On 27 June 1981, the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the OAU at its 
eighteenth assembly adopted the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights 
(AFCHPR).72 AFCHPR has at its core the protection of human rights which means the 
unqualified and universal protection of the dignity of the human person. It became effective 
on the 21 October 1986 and so far fifty-three states have ratified the Charter. The African 
Charter differs from other regional human rights treaties due to inclusion of 'peoples' 
rights' and economic, social and cultural rights.73 
The Charter initially established only an African Commission on Human and People's 
Rights.74 A significant fact about the African system is the participation of NGOs which 
has strengthened7s its human rights mechanism, the African Commission on Human and 
Peoples Rights. The African Commission has received a number of complaints concerning 
71 H Caminos, 'The Inter-American System for the Protection of Human Rights' in J Symonides (ed), Human 
Rights International Protection, Monitoring, Enforcement (Ashgate, Burlington 2003) .199. 
72 The African Charter on Human and peoples' Rights (adopted 27 June 1981, entered mto force 21 October 
1986) OAU Doc CAB/LEO/67/3 Rev 5 (1982) 21 ILM 58 (African Charter). 
<http://www.achpr.orglenglishljnfo/charter_en.htrnl> accessed 10 March 2007. . . 
73 OW Mugwanya, Human Rights in Africa: Enhancing Human Rights through the A/rlcan ReglOnallluman 
Rights System (Transnational, New York 2(03) 47. .., . . . 
74 African Charter (n 72) art 30. The African Conumsslon IS the maIO executive organ m charge of 
implementing the African Charter. . 
75 R Murray, The African Commission on Human and People's Rights and InternatIOnal Law (Hart~ Oxford 
2000) 102. 
239 
grave violation of human rights through the NGOs, which is a rare phenomenon in other 
. I 76 . 
reglona systems. Recent estabhshment of an African Court on Human and Peoples 
Rights is a positive development but its effectiveness remains to be seen.77 
The African human rights system which is mainly based on the African Charter has only 
had limited success in protecting human rights in the African region.78 The weak economic 
and political democracy does not allow the African human rights institutions to function 
effectively.79 The transformation of the Organisation of African Unity into the African 
Union (AU) in 2001 has brought with it much hope in promoting and protecting human 
rights.
80 
However, there is still a lack of political will existing among the political leaders in 
strengthening democracy, rule of law and civil society. As pointed out by Nanchira, it will 
be a difficult task for the African Union to guarantee or ensure the protection of human 
rights unless individual African states do fulfil them in their respective states.81 
5.2.5. Conclusions 
From the above analysis of existing principal regional human rights organs, it can be 
ascertained that if a region is flourishing with democracy, rule of law and independent 
judiciary, as in the European region, the regional human rights system is effective in 
promoting and protecting human rights. 
Another lesson from the analysis shows poor economical growth affects the goal of 
protection of human rights. This again can be proved from the inadequate protection of 
human rights in Americas and Africa whereas protection of human rights has flourished in 
76 Rule 72, Rules of Procedure of the African Commission on Human and People's Rights, Doc 
ACPHRIRPIXIX (1996). <http://www.hrcr.orgidocsiAfrican_Commissionlafrcommrules7 .html> accessed 5 
June 2006. 
77 The 1998 Protocol on the Establishment of an African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights established the 
African Human Rights Court. The Court is located in Arusha, Tanzania. FK Tiba, 'What C~used the 
Multiplicity of the International Courts and Tribunals?' (2006-2007) 10 Gonzaga Journal of International Law 
202, 219-21. 
78 J Rehman,International Human Rights Law: A practical Approach (Pearson. London 2(03) 265. 
79 Daniel DC Don Nanjira, 'The Protection of Human Rights in Africa: The African Charter on Human and 
Peoples' Rights' in J Symonides (ed), Human Rights International Protection, ""fonitoring. E"forcement 
(Ashgate, Burlington 2003) 227. . 
80 R Murray. Hllman Rights in Africa: From the OAU to tire African Union (CUA. Carnbndge 20(4) 267. 
81 Daniel DC Don Nanjira, 'The Protection of Hun1an Rights in Africa: The African Charter on H~man and 
Peoples' Rights' in J Symonides (ed). Human Rights International Protection, Monitori1lg. E,,/orct'nrt.'nt 
(Ashgate. Burlington 2003) 235. 
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the European region owing to its economical growth and stability. This is significant since 
lack of funding for the human rights mechanisms make them ineffective in promoting 
human rights situations. All those factors establish the fact that developing a regional 
human rights system may depend on the existence of democracy, rule of law, independent 
judiciary, political will, economic growth and collective identity among member states and 
these are vital to strengthen regional cooperation. 
Regional systems are essential intermediaries between offensive state institutions and the 
global system that is inadequate to redress all human rights violations. At the regional level, 
states seem more willing to have strong human rights monitoring mechanisms, such as 
commissions with broad mandates and courts with jurisdiction to pass binding and 
enforceable decisions. The habit of obedience to courts among states enhances the 
effectiveness of a regional system in the protection of human rights as seen in the European 
regIon. 
The regional systems have now become part of the universal system for the protection of 
human rights and fundamental freedoms, operating under the limits of international law. 82 It 
can be argued that they are a positive development in the international human rights 
system. The individual human rights now receive more protection due to the enhanced 
arrangements set out by regional human rights courts. The continuing need for regional 
human rights systems arises as national societies produce their own kinds of human rights 
problems, threatening the rights and welfare of individuals and requiring the intervention of 
agencies above the national level. 83 It highlights the fact that the regions that lack human 
rights systems, such as South Asia have to enhance their efforts to create regional human 
rights systems. 
5.3. Characteristics of South Asia 
The Ayodhya case study showed that the demolition of the Babri Masjid provoked inter-
group violence which led to tension in neighbouring countries in the region leading to 
82 0 Shelton, 'The Promise of Regional Human Rights System' in BH Western and SP Marks (eds), The 
Future of International Human Rights (Transnational, New York 1999) 398. . 
8) AG Mower Jr, Regional Human rights: A Comparative Shldy of the West European and /ntc.'r- . .fmerlCtlll 
Systems (Greenwood, New York. 1991) x. 
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attacks on minority communities over their sacred sites. Hence this section examines the 
nature of the South Asian region and explores the reasons for its failure to have a regional 
human rights regime to protect and promote fundamental human rights among its member 
states. Moreover, it becomes necessary to understand the religious dimension of the region 
where religious disputes threaten peace and stability in the region. 
A region possesses certain common characteristics in terms of geography. economy. 
society, culture, and polity. South Asia can be easily identified as a region from its 
geographical continuity as well as geographical compactness. In addition to geographical 
compactness, the common experiences of British colonial rule which has led to the 
development of common political, administrative and legal institutions in these countries,84 
common bonds of religion, language and culture delineate South Asia as a region. The 
South Asian region which is inhabited by one fifth of the total world population and home 
for most poor people in a region, of approximately five hundred million, is 'known for both 
disparities and similarities ,85. Stability and peace in South Asia is threatened by many 
factors such as economic deprivation, socio-religious tensions, mal-governance, internal 
conflicts, and inter-state tensions that lead to social and political collapse that could 
culminate in state failure.86 
India occupies a central place in the region and holds almost seventy percent of the area.87 
Other countries of the region include Pakistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Nepal, Sri Lanka, 
Afghanistan88 and Maldives and may be called peripheral countries from the point of view 
of their geographical location. Pakistan, Nepal, Bhutan, and Bangladesh have land borders 
with India while Sri Lanka and Maldives have sea borders. Against this backdrop, the 
84 BD Jorgensen, 'South Asia: An Anxious Journey towards Regionalization?' in M Schulz and others (eds), 
Regionalization in a Globalizing World: A Comparative Perspectives on Forms, Actors and Processes (led 
Books, London 200 1) 128. 
85 V Narain and Be Upreti, 'Introduction' in V Narain and BC Upreti (eds), SAARC: A Study of Perceptions 
and Policies (South Asian, New Delhi 1991) 3. . . 
86 The Asia Society, South Asia and the United States after the Cold War: A shuiy Mission (ASia Society. 
New York 1994) vii-viii. 
87 JN Dixit. 'South Asian Regional Cooperation: Problems and Prospects' (1994) I South Asian Survey 221. 
224. . d" 
88 During the fourteenth South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (S~RC) Summit. hel In :'\ew 
Delhi, India on 3-4 April 2007, Afghanistan became a new member. 'Declaration of the Fourteenth SAARC 
Summit' <http://www.saarc-sec.orgldatalsummitI4/ss14declaration.htm> accessed 5 ~fay 2007. 
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smaller states of the region have developed a suspicion over the asymmetrical nature of 
India.
89 
It can be stated that inter-state relations in South Asia have been India-centred. 
Most of the states in the region have one or other kind of bilateral problem with India.90 
Moreover, cultural affmities arising from the Indo-centric nature of the religious and ethno-
lingual mosaic of South Asia remain a critical factor in promoting regional cooperation.91 
Muni claims that 'commonalities in South Asia are mostly bilateral between India and each 
of the neighbouring countries separately and individually. All the South Asian countries 
have only one thing in common and that is India' .92 
The need to propose a regional convention to protect sacred sites in the South Asian region 
arises due to the continuation of various religious disputes which affect the regional peace 
and stability. South Asian states are multi-religious, plural societies.93 Most of the major 
and minor religions such as Islam, Hinduism, Christianity, Buddhism, Jainism, and Sikhism 
exist in these countries. Indeed, this is not an exhaustive list and South Asia is home to 
various indigenous beliefs. Two major religions in this region are Islam and Hinduism. A 
strong discord remains between India and Pakistan, two major nuclear powers in the region. 
Jorgensen argues that 'politicized culture, and more specifically religion, is the most potent 
integrating and disintegrating factor in the region'. 94 The important dispute is the India-
89 SA Mujtaba, 'South Asia: Predicament and Prospects in the 2P' Century' in NK Jba (ed), South Asia in 
21st Century: India, Her Neighbors and the Great Powers (South Asian, New Delhi 2003) 65. 
90 For instance, the issue of Kashmir, Wallur Barrage, Sir Creek and Siachen quarrels create bilateral disputes 
between India and Pakistan relations. India and Bangladesh have problems over the issues of Talpaty, New 
Moore Island, illegal migration of Bangladeshis into India, water sharing and insurgency in North-eastem part 
of India. Nepal has problems over trade and transit and over Tnakpur Hydel project with India. India blames 
Nepal for providing shelter to the insurgents who acts against India. Palk-strait, Kacchativu Island and Tamil 
refugees from Sri Lanka due to the ethnic conflict affect the Indo- Sri Lankan bilateral relations. 
91 S Fersh, India and South Asia (The Macmillan, New York 1971) 123. 
92 SD Muni and A Muni, Regional Cooperation in South Asia (National Publishing House, Delhi 1984) 56. 
93 For a detailed account on religious demography in South Asia, See, P Marshall (ed) Religiolls Freedom in 
the World: A global Report on Freedom and Persecution (Broadman & Holman, Nashville ~OOO). In India: 
Hindus 81 %, Muslims 12%, Christians 3%, Sikhs 2% and Buddhists 0.9%; In Pakistan, MusIams 93% (Sunm 
Muslims 73% and Shia Muslims 20%), Ahmadiyas 3%, Hindus 2%, and Christians 2%; In BangladHh. 
Muslims 86.6%, Hindus 12.1 %, Buddhists 0.6% and Christians 0.3%; In Bhutan. Buddhists 50-700/0. Hindus 
2445%, Muslims 5% and Christians I %; In Nepal, Hindus 85%, Buddhists 10%, Muslims 300 and Christians 
2%; and in Sri Lanka, Buddhists 70%, Hindus 15%, Christians 8% and Muslims 70,'0, !\Ialdh'H and 
Afghanistan are two Muslim majority nations while Christians, Hindus and Buddhists are minority 
communities. 
"Ibid 129. 
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Pakistan quarrel over Kashmir which became part of India at Partition.95 Pakistanis regard 
the accession of Kashmir to their country as being natural given that the subcontinent was 
divided on the basis of separate nationhood for the Muslim majority areas in western and 
eastern India.96 In the last fifty years, India and Pakistan have fought three wars over 
Kashmir. 97 
Recently, India and Pakistan have been witnessing the rise of political extremism in both 
countries. In India, the rise of the Hindu religious militant groups known as the Sangh 
Parivar was part of a more general drift to political conservatism that swung electoral 
support to the Hindu nationalist party, the BlP. The Sangh Parivar has generally been 
supportive of a hard stand on relations with Pakistan. The Hindu militant groups call for a 
more proactive policy against Pakistan over Kashmir and it will only increase the dangers 
of confrontations between two countries.98 In addition, if there are terrorist strikes against 
India, as happened a few times in the recent past,99 allegedly by Islamic militant groups or 
groups related to Al Qaeda, the pressures on India to retaliate in some way and the 
provocation would be intense. Recently, any campaign by Hindu militant groups to build a 
temple on the site, where the Babri Mosque stood before its demolition, invokes tension 
among Hindus and Muslims in India. 100 
The Afghan conflict and the rise of the Taliban made Pakistan a home to a more militant 
Islam. 101 Some of these religious extremist groups have focused on the liberation of 
Kashmir from 'Hindu' India. These groups are capable of disrupting any accords with New 
Delhi by raising the level of violence in Kashmir or by accusing Pakistani rulers of 'selling 
95 SA Husain, • Prospects of Peace in South Asia: Politico-Strategic Perspective' (1994) 1 South Asian Survey 
239,240-41. 
96 S Ganguly, The Origins of War in South Asia: Indo-Pakistani Conflicts Since 1947 (Westview. Boulder 
1994) 34. 
97 B Prasad. 'Prospects for Greater Cooperation in South Asia: The Political Dimensions' ~n E Gonsalves and 
N Jetly (eds), The DynamiCS of South Asia: Regional Cooperation and SAARC (~age. Deihl 1999) 63. 
98 PS Ghosh BJP and the Evolution of Hindu Nationalism (Manohar, New Delhi 2000) 319-25. 
99 There we:e terrorist attacks in crowded sacred sites such as Akshardham temple (Gujarat) on 24 Septe~ber 
2002, Raghunath temple (Jammu-Kashmir) on 26 November 2002 and in Ayodhya mosque-temple premises 
on 5 July 2005. 'Id T I' Th H' du (\: 
100 Correspondent. 'BJP Kicks Off Campaign in Uttar Pradesh: Vows to BUI Ram emp e e In . cw 
Delhi 26 March 2(07). 
101 K Bajpai. 'Managing Conflict in South Asia' in PF Diehl and J Lepgold (eds) Regional Conflict 
Management (Rowman & Littlefield, New York 2003) 218. 
t' 102 In th . BId h h . ou . e same way In ang a es , tense of right-wing Islamic parties and groups 
has affected the conduct of both domestic and foreign policies. 103 These developments 
suggest that politico-religious militant groups are particularly effective on matters of South 
Asian relations. 104 The influence of the Islamic right and the military in Pakistan and 
Bangladesh coupled with the Hindu militarization may destabilise the South Asian 
region. 105 
Apart from religious extremism, South Asian societies have a complex and difficult agenda 
as they live in the twenty-first century. They have embraced democracy but it has to be 
made effective down to the grassroots level. Political discord and divergences in the 
political systems are integral aspects of South Asian politics. t06 For instance, a couple of 
democracies (India and Sri Lanka) along with two monarchies (Bhutan and Nepal), two so-
called democracies which are in reality dominated by the armed forces (Bangladesh and 
Pakistan), and one non-party Presidential system (the Maldives) are included in the South 
Asian region highlighting the competing ideologies and conflicting polities. t07 However, 
South Asia has the advantage of civil society networks that can work across borders since 
people in one country are not strangers to the neighbouring country in tenns of language, 
religion and other ethnic characteristics. 108 This emphasizes the need to strengthen 
democracy in the region to enhance the cooperation in South Asia. 
As Mallick observed, history in South Asia has been loaded with severe and deep-rooted 
conflicts between religious and ethnic communities. 109 At present, almost every state in 
102 I Hussain, 'Waiting to Exhale: Pakistan can Pull Back from the Abyss' Times 0/ India (New Delhi 28 
September 200 1 ). 
103 SA Mujtaba, 'South Asia: Predicament and Prospects in the 21 st Century' in NK Jha (ed), South Asia in 
21st Century: India, Her Neighbors and the Great Powers (South Asian, New Delhi 2003) 64. . 
104 K Bajpai, 'Managing Conflict in South Asia' in PF Diehl and J Lepgold (eds) , Regional Conjllct 
Management (Rowman & Littlefield, New York 2003) 232: ., . .,. . , 
lOS Smita Narula, 'Overlooked Danger: The Security and RIghts Imphcahons of Hmdu Nallonahsm tn IndIa 
(2003) 16 Harv Hum Rts J 41, 41. . ' . . . . . 
106 B Prasad, • Prospects for Greater Cooperation in South ASIa: The Pohtlcal DImenSIons ~n E Gonsalves and 
N Jetly (eds), The Dynamics o/South Asia: Regional Cooferation and S1.ARC (Sage, D:I~I 1999) 6? 
107 R Mahan, 'From Sphere of Suspicion to Area of AmIty: A Pers~ctlve on S~C In V Naram and BC 
Upreti (eds), SAARC: A Shldy o/Perceptions and Policies (South ASIan, New ~~lhl 1991) I~. .,. 
loa SHM Kumar. 'Democratic Paralysis in South Asia: Major Issues and India s Concerns (2006) 6_ India 
Quarterly: A Journal of International Affairs 125, 147. . ' 
109 R Mallick, De\'e!opment, Ethnicity and Human Rights in South Asia (Sage. !\cw Delhi 1998) 2S. 
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South Asia is troubled by serious ethnic conflicts. I 10 The fragility of the South Asian region 
has strongly contributed to the internationalisation of ethnic conflicts. The issue of 
refugees, which has been the result of decades of ethnic conflict, has further complicated 
the region and put constraints on the safety and security of states and people. Against this 
backdrop, South Asia 'would clearly be one of the most persistently and seriously 
affected' III regions concerning violations of human rights. Therefore, the peaceful 
existence of South Asia as a region depends upon how these states can settle their disputes 
amicably and protect human rights within their states. 
5.4. Modalities of making a treaty under international law in South Asia 
Previous sections examined the advantages of regional human rights organisations and 
demonstrated the need to develop a human rights mechanism to protect sacred sites as part 
of protecting freedom of religion in South Asia. This section analyses how regional human 
rights systems are established, why states consent to become members of such a regime 
although it constrains their sovereignty and what benefits accrue to these states by 
membership of such a regional human rights organization. The answers to these questions 
come out from three international relation theories namely, the Realist theory, the 
Ideational theory, and the Republican Liberal theory. By examining each of these theories, 
a more finessed approach to proposing a regional human rights convention in the South 
Asian region may be arrived at. 
In various regions, states construct international human rights systems to adjudicate and 
enforce human rights. Moravcsik candidly observes that international human rights 
institutions are 'not designed primarily to regulate policy externalities arising from societal 
interaction across borders, but to hold governments accountable for purely internal 
activities' .112 The regional systems empower the individuals to challenge the domestic 
activities of their own government which has now become a defining characteristic of 
regional human rights systems. Such individual claims are taken up in independent courts 
110 U Phadnis, Ethnicity and Nation-Building in South Asia (Sage, New Delhi 1989) :!43. . 
III SD Muni and LR Baral (eds), Refugees and Regional Security in South Asia (Konark. Delhi 1996) 6. 
112 A Moravcsik, 'The Origins of Human Rights Regimes: Democratic Delegation in Postwar Europe' (2000) 
S4 International Organization 217, 217. 
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d .. 113 . an commISSIons attached to such regIonal systems and they are adjudicated upon as to 
whether the application of domestic rules or legislation violates international commibnents 
and so as to establish the rights of individuals. 
The significant example is the European regional human rights system. The ECHR, 
established under the auspices of the Council of Europe is widely accepted as the 'most 
advanced and effective international regime for formally enforcing human rights in the 
world today' .114 In many cases brought before the ECHR, governments have amended 
legislation, granted administrative remedies, reopened judicial proceedings, or paid 
monetary damages to individuals whose treaty rights were violated. I IS Here, the question 
arises as to why states agree to establish an independent international human rights system, 
which limits their domestic sovereignty. Moravcsik evaluates the existing realist, ideational 
and republican theories and proposes repUblican liberalist theory to explain the emergence 
and expansion of formal human rights systems. I 16 
The first theory is Realist theory which stresses the distribution of inter-state bargaining 
power. Realist theory insists that governments accept international obligations because they 
are compelled to do so by great powers. Establishment of a binding human rights system 
requires a group of great powers willing to coerce or induce disobedient states to accept, 
adjust to and comply with international human rights norms. For instance, Jack Donnelly 
writes of the Inter-American Convention on Human Rights that, 'the United States 
... exercised its hegemonic power to ensure its creation and support its operation' .117 
Another example may be that in cases of many developing countries, the acceptance of 
human rights norms is linked to the pressure by international financial organizations such 
113 In Inter-American system, there is no locus standi for the individual before the .In~er-American ~ourt. 
Individuals are allowed to submit petitions before the Commission and the CommiSSion may submit a case to 
the Court. ACHR (n 55) art 61. 
114 Henkin and others, Human Rights (Foundation. New York 1999) 551. 
liS BE Carter and PR Trimble, InternationallaU': Selected Documents (2nd edn Little. Boston 1995) 309. 
116 A Moravcsik. 'The Origins of Human Rights Regimes: Democratic Delegation in Postwar Europe' (2000) 
54 International Organization 217. 219. . . . 
117 J Donnelly. International Human Rights: A regime Analysis' (1986) .to InternatIOnal Orgamzallon 599. 
637-8. 
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as the World Bank which is mainly controlled by western and developed donor countries. I 18 
In summary, Realist theory proposes that the regional superpowers playa vital role in 
establishing a regional human rights system by pressurising other nations in the region. 
If the Realist theory is applied to South Asia, the two major powers, India and Pakistan 
have not played a major role in establishing the South Asian Association for Regional 
Cooperation (SAARC), but it was proposed by a smaller member, Bangladesh. It is true 
that the protection of human rights is not a stated concern of the SAARC. rather it is a 
political and economical organisation aiming to protect and promote peace and stability in 
the region. Even after twenty years, SAARC could not establish itself as an active regional 
organisation due to the rivalry between India and Pakistan. It shows that in order to 
establish a regional human rights system in South Asia, these two major powers have to 
agree to bury their differences primarily. 
The second theory is the Ideational theory which brings in altruistic motivations and the 
persuasive power of principled ideas to explain the emergence and enforcement of human 
rights regimes. I 19 It is argued that governments accept binding international human rights 
norms because they are persuaded by the overpowering ideological and normative appeal of 
the values lie beneath them. 120 Hence according to Ideational theorists, the motivating 
force behind human rights regimes is not rational adaptation but trans-national 
socialization. 121 Mainly the changes occur through the impact of principled non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) on domestic and trans-national opinion. 122 NGOs and 
118 A 8rysk, The Politics of Human Rights in Argentina: Protest. Change. and Democrati=ation (Stanford 
University Press. California 1994) 51-6. 
119 For a detailed study, ME Keck and K Sikkink Activists beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in 
International Politics (Cornell University Press. Ithaca 1998) chap 1-3. The authors observe that the 
interaction of many non-state actors is structured in terms of networks and they are increasingly visi~le in 
international politics. Some of these are networks of activists. distinguishable largely by the centrJhty of 
r:rincipled ideas or values in motivating their formation. . ' . 
20 J Donnelly. 'International Human Rights: A regime Analysis.' (1986) 40 Internatlon~l Or~anlzatlOn 599. 
638. Donnelly observes that the seemingly inescapable ideological appeal of human nghts In the postwar 
world is an important element in the rise of international hum.an rights r~g.ime. . ., . 
121 M Finnemore and S Sikkink. 'International Norm DynamiCS and Political Change (1998) 5_ International 
Organization 887.902-904. . . 
122 M Finnemore National Interests in International Socif.'ty (Cornell Umverslty Press. Ithaca 1996) 34-5: K 
Sikkink 'The Po~er of Principled Ideas: Human Rights Policies in the L'nited States and W~stem Europe' in J 
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civil society within established democracies set up trans-national networks dedicated to the 
advancement of human rights which in turn mobilises domestic and trans-national civil 
society at home and abroad. 123 
Moreover, domestic democracy and a state's commitment to the 'rule of law' extend the 
support for international human rights. The more democratic they are, the more likely their 
espousal of human rights values. This view is stressed by Kupchan and Kupchan by stating 
that, 'states willing to submit to the rule of law and civil society are more likely to submit 
to their analogues internationally' .124 States observe international law through their 
acceptance of international rules which usually mirrors with domestic values. Moravcsik 
concludes that 'governments promote norms abroad because they are consistent with 
universal ideals to which they adhere; governments accept them at home because they are 
convinced doing so is appropriate' .125 
When Ideational theory is applied to South Asia, it reveals the disadvantages existing in 
that region. Strong democracies and rule of law are sine qua non for the origin of regional 
human rights system. However, in South Asia, although all member states have nominally 
accepted democracy and rule of law, it is not very strong. Except India and Sri Lanka, other 
nations struggle with the democratic system. 126 Against this background, the countries in 
South Asia may not be prepared to establish a human rights system mainly due to lack of 
democracy and rule of law. Positively, in many of these states, civil society and NGOs are 
active and enjoy much mobilising capacity owing to their religio-political affiliations. The 
Goldstein and RO Keohane (eds), Ideas and Foreign Policy: Belief, Institutions, and Political Change 
(Cornell University Press, Ithaca 1993). 
123 ME Keck and K Sikkink, Activists beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics (Cornell 
University Press, Ithaca 1998) 1-38. 
124 CA Kupchan and CA Kupchan, 'Concerts, Collective Security, and the Future of Europe' (1991) 16 
International Security 114, 115-6. 
125 A Moravcsik, 'The Origins of Human Rights Regimes: Democratic Delegation in Postwar Europe' (2000) 
54 International Organization 217, 224. . 
126 Nepal until recently was monarchical, although elections w~re conducted .. occaslo~ally; e~~ted 
governments in Pakistan were toppled by military generals and mostly It was under military ~glme; rehglo~s 
militancy disrupts democracy in Bangladesh; Taliban, a religious militant out~t, ruled Afghamstan for a while 
and now it undergoes internal strife; it is monarchical fonn of government In Bhutan although rece~tly the 
king expressed his ~illingness t~ share power ~ith the people ~~ough el~ted Assembl~;. th~ugh dectlons are 
conducted in MaldIves, predommantly a Muslim country (politIcal parlJes started onl) In _005), for the last 
thirty eight years it has seen only two presidents. 
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economic disparities, illiteracy, ethnic conflicts, however, appear to have prevented the 
NGOs from reaching the grass root of societies and their influence in shaping the society 
for democracy and rule of law is minimal. Ideational theory exposes the weakness of the 
South Asian region and perhaps the time is ripe for these states to restore democracy fully 
in their countries which will pave the way to establish a regional human rights system. 
The third theory called the 'Republican Liberal theory' explains the motivation for 
establishing human rights regimes as resulting from instrumental calculations about 
domestic policies of a state.127 This theory illustrates that states are self-interested and 
rational in their pursuit of underlying national interests which reflect variation in the nature 
of domestic social pressures and representative institutions.128 Hence governments delegate 
power to international and regional human rights systems, to constrain the power of future 
governments. From this perspective, human rights norms are expressions of the self-interest 
of democratic governments in 'locking-in' democratic rule through the enforcement of 
human rights. 129 According to this theory, when states grant power to an international or 
regional body, they seek to achieve two things, firstly, to establish reliable constraints on 
future non-democratic governments and secondly, to prohibit democratically elected 
governments from subverting democracy subsequently. 
An analysis of Republican Liberal theory shows that the strongest support for binding 
human rights systems comes from recently established and potentially unstable 
democracies rather than long established democracies. Often, weak and illegitimate leaders 
of developing countries view internal enemies as more dangerous than external ones and 
are therefore likely to select international alliances that undermine domestic opponents. 130 
127 A Moravcsik. 'The Origins of Human Rights Regimes: Democratic Delegation in Postwar Europe' (2000) 
S4 International Organization 217,225. . . 
1211 MW Doyle. 'Liberalism and World Politics' (1986) 80 A~erican Po~i~ical SCIence Re~'lew.llS 1-~9; . 
J Snyder. Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and InternatIOnal Amblflon (Cornell UniversIty Press. Ithaca 
New York 1991). . .. • ., 
129 A Moravcsik, 'The Origins of Human Rights Regimes: DemocratIc DelegatIOn 10 Postwar Europe (_000) 
S4 International Organization 217. 226. 
DO SR David, 'Explaining Third World Alignment' (1991) 43 World politi(s 233. 236. 
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The established democracies also have a reason to promote such arrangements to strengthen 
the 'democratic peace' in neighbouring countries. I3I 
When this theory is applied to South Asia, there is a hope for establishing a regional human 
rights system. A proposal for regional cooperation did not come from the established 
democracies such as India and Sri Lanka. In the 1970s, the newly established democracy, 
Bangladesh, took the initial step to promote a regional organisation, based on which the 
SAARC was created in 1985. Another example could be the Latin-American states where 
acceptance of compulsory jurisdiction of the Inter-American Court has occurred over the 
past two decades when most of these states turned to democracy. In the South Asian region, 
the two monarchical states, Nepal and Bhutan, have adopted democracy recently and 
Afghanistan, with the support of the western democracies, strives to strengthen democratic 
rule in the society. Recent attempts in Bangladesh to root out religious extremists and 
strengthen democracy by conducting general elections bolster the idea to establish a human 
rights system in the region. 
To summarise, the above analysis points out that the South Asian region has the potential to 
establish its own human rights system. However, states need to develop their bilateral 
relations, strengthen democracy and establish rule of law in their respective countries. By 
adopting a new human rights treaty, SAARC nations may be able to promote and protect 
human rights in the region which will in turn contribute to the promotion of peace, stability 
and economical growth in the region. 
5.5. Nature of South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) 
The Asia-Pacific is the only region of the world without its own regional human rights 
instrument. I32 However, political and economic cooperation is increasing in this region 
namely with groups such as the Association of South East Nations (ASEAN) and the Asia-
Pacific cooperation. In 1997, an Asian Charter on Human Rights was drafted at the behest 
III B Russett, Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles/ora Post-Cold War World (Princeton Cni\ersity 
Press, Princeton 1993) 120-23. " ," . 
IJ2 Femand de Varennes (ed), Asia-Pacific Human Rights Documents and Resorm.:t'S (Martmus ~IJhotT. rhe 
Hague 1998) Vol 1. 3. 
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of the Asian Human Rights Commission (AHRC).133 However, the AHRC is only a non-
governmental organisation and as such the Asian Charter does not have any legal standing 
d · . I h . 134 un er Intematlona uman nghts law. At a 1996 UN sponsored workshop, thirty 
participant states concluded that 'it was premature, at the current stage, to discuss specific 
arrangements relating to the setting up of a formal human rights mechanism in the Asian 
d P 'fi ., 135 Th . an aCI IC region . e mam reason alleged for the lack of interest among the Asian 
states in establishing a regional human rights mechanism is the heterogeneity of the region 
with vast differences in economic, cultural, religious and political status. 136 
In South Asia, the SAARC is a regional organisation whose main function is to maintain 
peace and stability in the region. Since this peace and stability is threatened and 
undermined by religious militants and religious disputes, there is a need to promote 
religious amity and protection of freedom of religion in the region as a prerequisite to 
establishing region-wide peace and stability. Efforts at developing a framework for 
regional cooperation in South Asia started in the 1970s. The deepening economic crisis, 
poverty, border disputes and ethnic conflicts may have compelled these countries to think 
in terms of regional cooperation. Consequently, a concrete proposal for regional 
cooperation in South Asia came from the Bangladesh President, Zia-ur-Rehman, in May 
1980.137 While this proposal was endorsed by the smaller states at once, two major powers 
in the region, India and Pakistan, had initial reservations. Narain and Upreti observed that 
although the idea was acceptable to India, it decided to scrutinize it carefully, while 
Pakistan thought that such an idea would further strengthen the position of India in the 
region. 138 The proposal was finally realised in December 1985 and in spite of their initial 
reservations, India and Pakistan extended their support. 139 
IJ3 Asian Human Rights Commission is a volunteer human rights activists group based in. Hong Kong. 
B4 Human Rights Watch. World Report 2002: Asia Oven'iew <http://hrw.org!wr2k2/asla.html> accessed 10 
May 2007. 
135 Bangkok Declaration on Human Rights 29 March-3 April 1993, UN Doc AlCONF/93. 
136 D Shelton, 'The Promise of Regional Human Rights System' in BH Western and SP Marks (eds), The 
Future of international Human Rights (Transnational, New York ~ 999). 3~. ,. 
Il7 BD Jorgensen, 'South Asia: An Anxious Journey towards ReglonailzatJon? In M Schulz and others (ladS). 
Regionalization in a Globalizing World: A Comparative Perspectives on Forms, Actors and PrOCt'SSt'S (Zed 
Books, London 2001) 138. Bangladesh became a democratic country in 1976. . 
138 V Narain and BC Upreti, 'Introduction' in V Narain and Be Upreti (eds), SAARC: A Study of Perct'pllClfIS 
and Policies (South Asian, New Delhi 1991) 6. , . 
139 R Mallick. Development, Ethnicity and Hllman Rights in Solllh Asia (Sage, :\ew Delhi 199~) 19. 
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From its inception in 1985, SAARC is viewed not only as a mechanism for cooperation in 
various functional and economic areas but also as an instrument of conflict management. 140 
One of the constraints on SAARC is that its Charter specifically bans discussion of bilateral 
and contentious issues. 141 However, the association has provided a venue for bilateral 
diplomacy at the highest political levels. For instance, Indian and Pakistani leaders have 
often convened talks during regional summits. 142 Having said that, the progress in 
cooperation has been really slow and halting while the areas of conflict have multiplied and 
increased in intensity.143 
For SAARC to move from its present position of being an organisation which deals 
primarily with economic and political considerations, it may have to reconsider the very 
principles upon which it was founded such as promoting peace, stability and amity, and 
achieving peace, freedom and social justice among its members. l44 Moreover, for an 
expansion of SAARC activities, it is important to involve the civil societies of South Asia 
to function as an effective pressure groUp.145 Although suspicion and mistrust continues 
among its members as was highlighted by Cherian after the recent SAARC meeting held in 
Delhi in April 2007, 146 on a positive note, cooperation on issues such as cultural tourism, 1 47 
trade agreements, opening borders for trade, and the fight against terrorism shows that there 
has been advancement in mutual understanding and tolerance among the member states. 148 
140 RM Hussain, 'SAARC 1985-1995' in E Gonsalves and N Jetty (eds), The Dynamics of South Asia: 
Regional Cooperation and SAARC (Sage, New Delhi 1999) 27. 
141 SAARC Charter art 10(2): Bilateral and contentious issues shall be excluded from the deliberations. 
'SAARC Charter' <http://www.saarc-sec.orgidatFaidocs/charter.pdf.> accessed 10 May 2007. 
142 K Bajpai, 'Security and SAARC' (1996) 3 South Asian Survey 295-307. 
143 B Prasad, 'Prospects for Greater Cooperation in South Asia: The Political Dimensions' in E Gonsalves and 
N Jetly (eds), The Dynamics of South Asia: Regional Cooperation and SAARC (Sage, Delhi 1999) 63. 
144 The Preamble of the SAARC Charter. 
145 B Singh. 'Regional Cooperation in South Asia: Problems and Prospects' (2005) 12 South Asian Survey 
177, 183-4. 
146 J Cherian, 'Miles to Go' Frontline (New Delhi 7-20 April 2007) 
<http://www.hinduonnet.comlflinelfl2407/storiesl20070420003202700.htm> accessed 15 ~ay 2007 .. 
147 Correspondent. 'India to develop Buddhist tourist circuit' The Hindu (~ew DeIhl 27 Apnl ~(07). 
<http://www.hindu.comlthehindulholnusl002200704271240.htm> accessed 10 May 2007. Recently. India has 
aN!ed to develop a 'Buddhist tourist sites' in South Asia. .. 
I SAARC. 'Declaration of the Fourteenth SAARC Sumnllt 
<http://www.saarc-sec.orgldatalsummitI4/ss14declaration.htm> accessed 18 May 2007. 
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With regard to the role of the international community, in the past, during the Cold-War 
era, the superpowers had no direct interest in the success or failure of SAARC. Subsequent 
to the en~ of the Cold-War, there is now a new realisation and detennination among the 
major powers in the success of SAARC as a regional organisation which may be used to 
resolve growing tensions such as religious terrorism, ethnic conflicts and refugee crisis. 
This is evidenced by the presence of the delegates of 'observer countries' - China, South 
Korea, Japan, the United States and the European Union in the recent meeting held in Delhi 
on 3 and 4 April 2007. 
Calvocoressi observes that 'by their very nature, regional groups are centripetal, fostering a 
sense of belonging, and are likely to increase cooperation within their geographical area,.149 
This aspect is basis for both the foundation of SAARC and for building up confidence 
through dialogue between its members. When SAARC came into being in 1985, one of its 
important objectives was to promote the welfare of the people and to improve their quality 
of life. In trying to achieve this stated objective, it is necessary for the various governments 
to maintain political stability and there has to be a community based on peaceful 
coexistence, economic cooperation, religious tolerance and cultural understanding. 
However, the spill-over effect of domestic conflict to other countries threatens the peace 
and stability of the region. 150 Therefore as a prerequisite of achieving the above goals, the 
various governments of SAARC have to cooperate together to counter the potential threat 
of religious militants who operate within nations and across borders. I 5 I There are common 
commitments among member states to uphold the regional undertakings such as SAARC 
Regional Convention on Suppression of Terrorism (1987), the SAARC Convention on 
Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (1993) and SAARC Law. IS2 
For SAARC to work effectively there has to be the political will to ensure that the core 
principles proposed in its Charter are used to widen its scope to take in the field of human 
149 P Calvocoressi World Order and New States (Chatto and Windus, London 1962) 60-7. 
ISO N Jetly, 'Dem~cratization and Regional Cooperation in South Asia' in ~oo~dinating Gr~up for Studies on 
South Asian Perspectives, Perspectives on South Asian Cooperation (Fnedrich Ebert Shftung, Islamabad 
1994) 97. . " 
lSI KK Bhargava, 'South Asian Regional Cooperation: Vision. Goals, and Strategies ~ 1996-:!OO5).m S. Ghosh 
and S Mukherjee (eds), Emerging South Asian Order: Hopes and Concerns (Media South ASia. Calcutta 
1995) 38. 
152 SD Muni, Responding to Terrorism in South Asia (Manohar. ~ew Delhi 2(06) 17:!. 
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rights.
IS3 
As long as a lack of political will persists, it may not be possible to have even a 
normal level of regional cooperation which one can understand from the experience of the 
Inter-American system until the 1970s. However, recent efforts to improve the bilateral 
relations among member states of SAARC raises optimism, especially, the ongoing 
dialogue between India and Pakistan, wherein remains a sign of hope within the South 
Asian region. IS4 
In summary, SAARC is a regional organisation whose main function is to maintain peace 
and stability in the region. Since this peace and stability is threatened and undermined by 
religious militants and religious disputes, such as the Babri Masjid dispute, there is a need 
to promote religious amity and protection of freedom of religion in the region as a 
prerequisite to establishing region-wide peace and stability. Therefore, a regional 
convention to protect sacred sites as part of freedom of religion is a necessary step towards 
promoting and protecting fundamental human rights in this part of the world. Given the 
widely diverging political, cultural and religious differences, it is to the credit of all the 
members of the SAARC that they have kept the organisation going from its inception in 
1985 till its present day. 
5.6. A draft model of the regional convention for protection of sacred sites with 
justification commentary 
One of the aims of this research is to propose new measures for developing international 
law to protect sacred sites. This model convention is designed to explore how the wall of 
mistrust and suspicion plaguing South Asian states can be replaced by erecting a platform 
for peaceful and mutually advantageous coexistence, how an atmosphere of apprehension 
and hostility can be transformed into an environment of amity and harmony. To achieve 
this, a convention for the protection of sacred sites is a first step. 
UJ 0 Tsering. 'SAARC - A Personal Viewpoint' in S Ghosh and S Mukherjee (eds). Emerging SOlllh Asian 
Order: Hopes and Concerns (Media South Asia. Calcutta 1995) 24. . . ., . . .. 
1S4 B Singh. 'Regional Cooperation in South Asia: Problems and Prospects (2005) L South ASian SUT\c.:~ 
177.185. 
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Every article is followed by a commentary which aims at providing a justification for those 
articles contained in the proposed model convention. The focus of the commentary will be 
on why, and for what purpose, a particular article has been included and will also provide a 
definition of various important terms used. The main sources for the commentary are the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),155 the 1981 UN Declaration 
on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and Discrimination based on Religion or 
Belief56 (1981 UN Declaration on Religious Intolerance) and the European Convention on 
Human Rights (ECHR). 
The ICCPR is an internationally binding treaty which is the reason it has been selected. 
ICCPR has established a treaty-based human rights mechanism, the Human Rights 
Committee which monitors the compliance of the provisions by the state's parties. The 
1981 UN Declaration on Religious Intolerance is the only international instrument for 
protecting freedom of religion although, as a soft law instrument, it does not have binding 
effect. Thus it does not have effective implementing mechanisms. At regional level, the 
basis for the commentary will be the European Convention on Human Rights and cases 
decided by the European Court of Human Rights. ECHR is chosen for the reason that it 
represents a collective guarantee in the European context of a number of principles set out 
in the UDHR, supported by international judicial machinery and its decisions are respected 
by member states. 157 
5.6.1. Preamble 
Recalling that one of the basic principles of the Charter of the United Nations is 
that to promote and encourage universal respect for and observance of human 
rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, 
language or religion, 
ISS International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (adopted 16 December 1966, entered into force :!) 
March 1976) 999 UNTS 171 (ICCPR). 
IS6 UNGA Res 36/55 (25 November 1981) UN Doc A/RES/36/55. . , . 
IS7 JAC Salcedo, 'The Place ofthe European Convention in Internattonalla~ In RStJ .Macdonal~. '"" 
F Matscher and H Petzold (eds), The European S,vstemfor the Protection oj Human Rights (Martlnus ~IJhofT, 
Dordrecht 1993) 16. 
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Recalling that one of the basic principles of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights is that every 
person has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion, and freedom, 
either alone or in community with others, and in public or private to manifest one's 
religion in teaching, practice, worship and observance, 
Considering that freedom of religion, in many countries, is infringed by attacking 
sacred sites belonging to particular religious communities leading to egregious 
human rights violations within states and exacerbates tension and violence in other 
states where the members of the same religious communities live or settled, 
Convinced that disputes over sacred sites and attacks on them destabilize peace 
and security in the region and that it is essential to promote understanding, 
tolerance, and respect in matters relating to freedom of religion so as to foster 
international and regional cooperation among states, 
Concerned by the existence of discrimination in the granting of permission to 
establish, maintain sacred sites belonging to minority religious communities and in 
allowing them to be fully and freely used for religious purposes and concerned at 
the inadequate protection given to such sites, 
Considering that the aim of the regional organisation SAARC is promoting peace, 
stability, amity and progress and such aim has to be pursued in the maintenance 
and further realization of human rights and fundamental freedoms, 
Convinced that it is essential to give particular attention to the protection of sacred 
sites as part of the protection and promotion of rights of freedom of religion and 
also rights of minority religious communities which cannot be disassociated from 
maintaining peace and stability in the South Asian region, 
All Contracting Parties resolve hereby to adopt all necessary measures for the 
protection of sacred sites to protect and promote the human rights and freedoms, 
in particular the right to freedom of religion within their jurisdiction, 
Now I therefore the member states of the SAARC proclaim this regional convention 
on the protection of sacred sites in South Asia. 
Commentary: The preamble delineates the need to develop a convention for protection of 
sacred sites in South Asia. Sacred sites are essential for the full enjoyment of freedom of 
religion and hence are an important focal point in the life of religious communities and 
individual adherents. Within sacred sites, adherents of a religion manifest their faith in 
worship as part of exercising their fundamental religious human rights. Therefore, when 
these sites come under attack or destruction, this may affect the social cohesion of the 
society and in certain occasions may have regional and global implications and/or 
repercussions. For instance, when the Al Aqsa mosque in Jerusalem is attacked, sporadic 
violence erupts in many Muslim countries. A recent attack on the Imam al-Aksari mosque, 
a Shiite shrine known as golden mosque, in Samarra, Iraq led to nationwide sectarian 
attacks 158 and violence broke out in many Muslim countries, including India. Moreover, in 
many sacred site disputes, apart from affecting one's religious rights they also lead to other 
violations of human rights such as right to life, right to peaceful assembly, right to free 
expression, and rights of minorities. 
Many modem states are heterogeneous and include in their populations multiple minority 
religious groups. How a society deals with them indicates how impartially the society 
operates. 159 In general, religious minorities enjoy protection and equality before the law in 
democratic societies. By contrast, the South Asian countries have a far from satisfactory 
record of freedom of religion, particularly with respect to the freedom of religious 
minorities. The exploitation of religious sentiments by religious and political groups is 
ISS 'Shiite Leaders Appeal for Calm after New Shrine Attack' The New York Times (New York 13 June :(07) 
<http://www.nytimes.coml2007/06/13/worldimiddleeastJI3cnd-samarra.html?hp> accessed 13 June :!~!. 
159 UNCHR 'Report of the Secretary-General on Regional Arrangements' (26 January 1996) L~ Doc 
FJCN.4/1996/46. 
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common as an attempt to enhance their political power.l60 Sensitization of any religious 
disputes often leads to the escalation of tension among different religious communities and 
results in attacks on sacred sites belonging to them. Since major religions such as 
Hinduism, Islam, Buddhism and Christianity are represented in almost all countries in the 
South Asian region, the spill-over effect of religious disputes and attacks on minority 
religious communities in one country creates tension in other countries and can lead to 
widespread attacks on sacred sites of other religious communities. 161 Moreover, the recent 
growth of religious extremism in South Asia162 threatens the stability and peace of the 
regIon. 
The following draft articles are based on the international recognition that religion plays a 
special role in many societies which needs to be protected by international law. As 
mentioned in the preamble, these articles are compatible with international human rights 
treaties. 
5.6.2. Article 1 - Right to sacred sites is a fundamental component of the right to 
freedom of religion 
1.1 Every religious group shall have a right to establish sacred sites and to 
manifest therein their faith through worShip, observance, practice and teaching. 
1.2 Every religious individual and group shall have the right to undertake 
pilgrimage to sacred sites both within and outside one's country. 
1.3 Indigenous peoples living within the South Asian region shall have the right to 
their sacred sites, ceremonial objects and the remains of their ancestors. States 
shall undertake special measures and assist indigenous peoples to preserve and 
protect their sacred sites. 
Commentary: Article one articulates that right to sacred sites as part of the fundamental 
right to religion. The reason for looking at protection of sacred sites sterns from the 
160 R Masood Towards a New Regional Order in South Asia {Media House, Delhi 20(4)135-36. 
161 SA MUjtaba, South Asia: Predicament and Prospects in the 21 $I Century' in r\K Jha (ed), South Asia in ! 1" 
Centurv: India. Her Neighbors and the Great Powers (South Asian, New Delhi 2(03) 64-5. . 
162 H Habib, 'Media Meet Vows to Resist Religious Extremism' The Hindu (~ew Delhi 27 May 2007) 
<http://www.hindu.comlthehindul2003/05/27/storiesl2003052704651200.htm> accessed 30 \ tay 2007. 
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importance of religion in global politics. There is a wide religious reinterpretation taking 
place owing to many changes at both national and global level. Religious belief remains 
one of the essential manifestations of cUlture.163 Religion as a cultural phenomenon 
continues to manifest itself as a force for social and political conflicts, violence, and 
repression. For instance, in secular India, the growth of militant Hinduism, which focused 
on the Babri Masjid dispute, transformed the political characteristics in that country.l64 
Moreover, there are socially conservative religious groups, often regionally or nationally 
focussed, working to alter fundamentally the political scene, sometimes by resorting to 
violent tactics, for example, Hindu militant groups in India, Islamic militant groups in 
Pakistan and Bangladesh and Taliban militia in Afghanistan. 165 However, having said that, 
it may not be denied that religions also promote ideals of harmonious living with traditions 
that enrich contemporary understanding of international human rights with models of 
universal respect. 
As noted in the preamble, sacred sites are an essential component in manifesting the 
fundamental right to freedom of religion. This raises the question what is meant by the term 
'religion', and therefore it becomes necessary to explore how a definition of the term could 
be arrived at. 
Shelton and Kiss observed, 'defining religion is probably the most difficult exercise in 
drafting a law for religious liberty' .166 Perhaps this is why a defmition of religion does not 
appear in the UDHR, the ICCPR or in the 1981 United Nations Declaration on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief. 
However, the ICCPR is the only binding international covenant which has decided to leave 
the application and interpretation of relevant law to the definition to its implementation 
mechanism, the Human Rights Committee. The regional human rights systems seems to 
163 J Haynes, 'Religion' in L Gearon (ed), Human Rights & Religion: A Reader (Sussex Academic Press. 
Brighton 2002) 23, Haynes defined that 'culture may mean people's feeling of separateness based on 
ethnicity, nationalism, religion and/or language', 
164 See, Babri Masjid-Ram Janmabhumi case study on chapter 3. . 
165 J Haynes, 'Religion' in L Gearon (ed), Human Rights & Religion: A Reader (Sussex AcademiC Press. 
Brighton 2002) 20. . 
166 0 Shelton and A Kiss, 'A Draft Model Law on Freedom of Religion. With Commentary' 10 Johan D ~'an 
der Vyver and John Witte Jr (eds), Religious Human Rights in Global Perspedi,'e: Legal Per.'i/,c.'dn't'.'i 
(Martinus NijhotT. The Hague 1996) 569, 
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emulate the international law, for instance, the ECHR has left the application and 
interpretation to its organ European Human Rights Court. 
In general, although not exclusively, courts have placed their emphasis on the concept of 
'supernatural' or 'metaphysical reality,167 when defIDing religion. For instance, in the 
Church of the New Faith case, the Australian High Court stated that 'belief in a 
supernatural being, thing or principle and the acceptance of canons of conduct in order to 
give effect to that belief are prerequisites of a religion' .168 Occasionally. the courts have 
widened the definition to include those groups which may not necessarily believe in a 
supernatural being. In the Strayhorn v ESA case,169 the Texas appellate court decided that 
'while worship of a supreme being is an element of religion, it is not a dispositive factor'. 
However, courts may not deal with the metaphysical nature of a religious dispute rather 
they adjudicate on the manifestation of faith or acts performed in/orum extemum. 
The only definition found in international human rights law instruments is given by the UN 
Special Rapporteur Benito who defines religion as, 'an explanation of the meaning of life 
and how to live accordingly. Every religion has at least a creed, a code of action and a 
cult' .170 One of the significant shortcomings of this definition is the failure to include the 
'community element'. This is especially important when addressing the rights of 
indigenous communities. Though all religions have a collective element, for indigenous 
religious groups, it is of prime concern for their practice and manifestation of their faith, 
which is always performed in a community. Hence, any definition of the term 'religion' 
needs to include the community interests of indigenous religions. 
Although this lack of definition in international human rights law may remam as a 
weakness in interpreting and applying law in establishing the rights of religious 
communities, it has some advantages too. Peter Cumper points out that defining religion 
167 PW Edge. Religion and Law: An Introduction (Ashgate, Aldershot 2(06) 32. . 
168 The Church of the New Faith v The Commissioner for Payroll Tax (1983) 15~ CLR 120 (HIgh Court of 
Australia). 
169 Strayhorn v Ethical Society of Austin (2003) 110 SW 3d 458. 463. . ., . 
170 UNCHR 'Study of the Current Dimensions of the Problems of Intolerance and of Dlscnmmatlon on 
Grounds of Religion and Beliefby EO Benito' (1987) UN Doc ElCN.4/Sub.2!l987/26 [4]. 
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would be an onerous task and any such definition would fail to include all the religious 
faiths and beliefs existing in the world and it might be couched in such broad terms that it 
would be difficult to apply in specific cases. Moreover, if the defmition is interpreted too 
restrictively by States, minority faiths may face difficulties on trying to establish 
themselves as a religious group. 171 In addition, religions are creative and constantly 
I · 172 h' h b evo vmg w IC can e seen from the emergence of new beliefs and sects in various parts 
of the globe. Therefore, there exists the danger that any strict definition would not be fluid 
enough to take account of these new religious groups. Thus they might potentially suffer 
non recognition and as a result they might face discrimination and denial of their religious 
rights. 
In considering the above reasons, for the purpose of the proposed Model Convention for the 
protection of sacred sites, a working definition for the term 'religion' is not given, instead it 
will leave the interpretation and application open to the proposed regional court to decide 
on a case by case basis. Thereby, the Model Convention is also in line with the tenor of 
international law concerning religion. 
Another important term in Article One which needs to be defined is 'sacred sites'. This is 
dealt with in detail in the second chapter which sets the research context. For the model 
convention, the term might be defined as follows: sacred site refers to a specific 
geographical area with religiously significant buildings or structures, consecrated and holds 
regular religious and ceremonial functions. 
There are two cat~gories of sacred sites where interaction of law and religion occur in 
different ways. In the first category, buildings are used as sacred sites such as churches. 
mosques and temples. For a building to be identified as a sacred site, it must have a 
pennanent structure within a landscape with clearly demarcated boundary and in many 
cases, owned by a religious community. In the second category, there are sacred sites where 
the boundaries are not well-defined and rather sacredness is attached to an area rather than 
171 PW Edge, Legal Responses to Religious Difference (Klu~\'er law International. The Hague 2001) 6. 
172 Jeff Haynes. Religion in Global Politics (Pearson Education. Harlow 1998) 5. 
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a building, for instance, indigenous sacred sites. These sites are not bounded and are not 
owned by the religious communityl73 that claims it as a sacred site for their worship and 
other religious activities. 174 Although buildings may exist in this area, the worship is not 
confined to the buildings alone and the whole landscape is considered sacred. 
Sacred sites are useful to manifest therein one's faith in different forms such as worship, 
observance, practice and teaching. 175 This manifestation takes place externally and hence is 
considered an active part of the freedom of religion. The term 'worship' may be defined as 
religious practice which exhibits prayer, rituals and preaching. 176 The Human Rights 
Committee has focused on freedom of worship as practised individually and collectively, 
both inside and outside places designated for worship.177 It defines the institutional forms 
of worship as extending 'to ritual and ceremonial acts giving direct expression to belief. as 
well as various practices integral to such acts, including the building of places of 
worship' .178 This 'worship' takes place 'either publicly or privately' .179 The restrictions on 
worship are brought to light by the Special Rapporteur in hislher reports. 180 
The term 'practice' may thus be defined as that conduct obviously related to a religious 
conviction. Article 6 of the 1981 UN Declaration on Religious Intolerance enlists various 
acts including the freedom to establish places of worship. In a relevant case, the European 
Commission on Human Rights even considered the distribution of leaflets as a practice of 
173 There are always competing claims between the religious communities and the government over the 
ownership dispute. In the United States, the government passed the American Indian Religious Freedom ~ct 
1978 to address the needs of American Indian religious communities and this act paved way for enactmg 
more policies which have recognised the importance of Native Indian sacred sites. However, still the 
indigenous religious communities have not been successful in establishing their right over their sacred sites. 
PW Edge, Religion and Law: An Introduction (Ashgate, Aldershot 2006) 129-31. 
174 Ibid 129. 
17S ICCPR (n 155) art 18(1); 1981 UN Declaration on Religious Intolerance (n 156) art I( I) and at the 
regional level, the ECHR (n 29) art 9( 1). The four forms are found in different orders. 
176 M Nowak, UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: CCPR Commentary (NP Engel. Kehll993) 321. 
In UNGA 'Report of the Human Rights Committee' (1983) UN Doc N3K'40 [74]. 
178 UNCHR 'General Comment 22' in 'Note by the Secretariat, Compilation of General Comments and 
General Recommendations adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies' (2004) t;~ Doc HRLGE~,L IfRev.7 
r~]UDHR (n I) art 18; ICCPR (n 155) art 18; and 1981 Declaration on Religious Intolerance (n, 156) art 1. 
180 UNGA 'Report of the Human Rights Committee' (1980) UN Doc A/35/40 [135]; (1984) US Doc A/39/40 
[382]; (1988) UN Doc N43/40 [304]. 
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belief! 8 I 'Observance' means that religious procession, religious clothing,'82 prayers and 
all other customs and rites. Teaching includes communicating matters related to religion in 
religious schools which also includes sacred sites, in public schools through religious 
instruction, by way of non-formal education and through various missionary activities. 
Protection of sacred sites may be essential with respect to another important reason known 
as pilgrimage. Article 1.2 of the model convention covers the right to pilgrimage to sacred 
sites situated within and outside one's country. Pilgrimage is also a fundamental religious 
practice throughout the world. For example, in Islam, all Muslims have the obligation to 
take a Hajj pilgrimage to Mecca during their lifetime. 183 In other religions such as 
Christianity, Hinduism and Buddhism, though it is not obligatory, followers of these 
religions regularly undertake pilgrimages to sacred sites associated with their religious 
beliefs. In South Asia, it is a common feature among various religious people, particularly 
Hindus and Buddhists pilgrims, to travel to shrines to witness places of fundamental 
importance to their religion. 184 Sometimes, states prevent access to pilgrim sites for 
discriminatory reasons. 185 
Among the UN initiatives, the right to undertake pilgrimage to sacred sites is first 
recognised in the Arkot Krishnaswamy Study.186 In his report, Krishnaswamy states: 
When a pilgrimage is an essential part of a faith, any systematic prohibition or curtailment 
of the possibility for pilgrims to leave their own country or to a foreign country where the 
181 Arrowsmith v the United Kingdom (App no 7050175) (1978) 3 EHRR 218. 
182 Singh Bhinder v Canada Comm no 208/1986 (28 November 1989) UN Doc CCPRlCI?71D~~8/1986: In 
this communication, the author, a Sikh by religion claimed that his right to manifes~ hiS re~lglous ~hefs 
(wearing a turban around his head) has been violated by the requirement of Canadian ~ahonal Rall~ay 
Company which made him to wear safety headgear during work .. Howeve~, the Human Rights Committee 
found that this limitation was justified by reference to the grounds laid down In ICC~R art 18(3). . 
183 JE Campo, 'The Mecca Pilgrimage in the Fonnation of Islam in Modem ~~t' In J ~cott an~ p. SI~pson­
Housley (eds), Sacred Places and Profane Spaces: Essays in the GeographiC s of Judaism. Chrlsllanlty. and 
Islam (Greenwood, London 1991) 145-7. .' . 
184 SM Bhardwaj, Hindu Places of Pilgrimage in India: A Study in ClIlhlra/ Geography (Lnl\erslty of 
California Press, Berkeley 1973) 3. . . 
18$ ER Cohen, Human Rights in the Israeli-Occupied Territories: /967-/982 (Manchester Umverslty Press. 
Manchester 1985) 209. . . ' . 
186 UNCHR (Sub-Commission), 'Study of Discrimination in the Matter of Rellgtous RIghts and PractIces hy 
Arcot Krishnaswamy' (1960) UN Doc ElCN .4/Sub.2/200/Rev .1. 
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sacred place is located, would constitute a serious infringement of the right of the' d' 'd I 
t . ~ h' 1" m IVI ua o manhest IS re Iglon or belief. 
Mason points out the various attempts made to attain official recognition of the right to 
make pilgrimages to sacred sites through international agreements. 187 However, this has not 
been incorporated in the 1981 UN Declaration on Religious Intolerance. 188 Consequently. 
there is no recognition for the right to pilgrimage in the international human rights treaties 
hence a right to undertake pilgrimage to sacred sites is included in the proposed model 
convention. 
In South Asia, more than 200 million people belong to the indigenous communities with 
the majority living in India. 189 They have their own sacred sites and methods of worship. 
However, the life and sacred sites of these people are under threat due to the developmental 
projects such as building massive dams, deforestation and developing tourism. 19O Many 
indigenous communities have become internally displaced people and suffer considerable 
human right violations. As a result, many have taken up arms as a means of protecting their 
sacred lands. 191 
Article 1.3 in the model convention declares that 'states shall undertake special measures'. 
Religion and community are always inseparable in indigenous religions and desecration of 
sacred sites makes the existence of both impossible and thus shatters their humanity. The 
special protection to indigenous sacred sites is necessary and it is not against the equality 
principle. 192 As vulnerable religious communities, the indigenous people have a right to be 
187 PW Mason, 'Pilgrimage to Religious Shrines: An Essential Element in the Human Right to Freedom of 
Thought, Conscience and Religion' (1993) 25 Case W Res J InCI L 619, 639. 
188 1981 UN Declaration on Religious Intolerance (n 156). 
189 According to 2001 census, India has approximately 85 million (8.2%) tribaVindigenous people, 
<http://www.censusindia.net> accessed 14 June 2007. , 
190 For a detailed study, RN Pati and J Dash, Tribal and Indigenous People of IndIO: Problems and Prospects 
(APH, New Delhi 2002). 
191 • Naxalism: Biggest Threat to India' The Times of India (New Delhi 18 June ~o.o7)., Na.~alites a~ a.n anllcd 
group based on Communist principle. The name came from the ~asant upnslOg m ,"amlban \IUage m 
DBJjeeling district of West Bengal in May 1967. and the movement IS todaY,a comple~ we~ that covers some 
15 states of India, and with active links to the Maoists of Nepal. They malOly recrUit their cadres from the 
tribal communities and poor people. . . 
192 Richard Herz, 'Legal Protection for Indigenous Cultures: Sacred Sites and Communal Rights (1993) 79 
Virginia Law Review 691, 704. 
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treated specially. The Bagota Conference of 1948 adopted the Inter-American Charter of 
Social Guarantees which states: 
In countries where the problem of an indigenous population exists, the necessary measures 
shall be adopted to give protection and assistance to the Indians, safeguarding their life, 
liberty and property, preventing their extermination, shielding them from oppression and 
exploitation, protecting them from want and furnishing them an adequate education. 193 
As a special measure to protect the interests of the indigenous people, the Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights approved a Proposed American Declaration on the Rights of 
the Indigenous Peoples. 194 Various International Labour Organization (lLO) conventions 
have dealt in detail with the special protection of indigenous people. 19S The United Nations 
Working Group on Indigenous Populations 196 has drawn up a draft Declaration on the 
Rights of Indigenous peoples.197 In the Indian Constitution, it is stated that 'nothing in this 
article ... shall prevent the state from making any special provision for the advancement of 
... Scheduled Tribes'. 198 This justifies the proposed article to protect the sacred sites of 
indigenous people with special measures. 
Since every article in the model convention begins with the inclusive phrase 'every 
religious group', the draft convention has not specifically delineated an article for 
protecting minority religious sites. There may not be a violation of human rights to 
minority religious communities when impartial protection of all sacred sites is provided. 
5.6.3. Article 2 - Protection of sacred sites is a right of religious groups 
2.1 Every religious group has the right to acquire and own property and to own and 
administer such property in accordance with law. 
2.2 Every religious group has the right to establish, maintain, administer and to 
make full use of its sacred sites. 
19) Final Act of the Ninth International Conference, Resolution XXIX, Annals, 129 cited in P Thornberry. 
Indigenous Peoples and Human Rights (Manchester University Press, Manchester 2(02) 267. . 
194 The Proposed American Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (Approved by the IACHR In 
March 1997) 1333rd session, 95 th regular session. 
19S J Rehman International Human Rights Law: A Practical Approach (Pearson. Harlow 2(03) 334-37. 
196 ECOSOC"Establishment of the Working Group on Indigenous Populations' Res 19S2 34 (7 May Il)S2). 
197 SJ Anaya. Indigenous Peoples in International Law (2~ edn OUP. Oxford 2004) 318-27. 
198 Article 15(4) of the Indian Constitution added by the First Amendment Act 1951. 
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2.3 Every religious organisation shall have the right to register their sacred sites 
and shall have the independence to create their own organizational rules and 
internal by-laws, compatible with domestic legislation. 
2.4 Every sacred site shall attain legal personality upon its registration by the 
religious organisations in the corresponding public registry created for this by the 
government. 
2.5 Registration shall be granted to the religious organisation by virtue of an 
application together with an authentic document containing proof of title to the land 
or property involved. 
2.6 The application for registration shall contain proof of the foundation or 
establishment of the organization, declaration of religious purpose, denomination 
and other particulars of identity, rules of procedure, names of representative bodies 
and the powers of such bodies. 
2.7 There shall not be any discrimination in granting registration to any religious 
groups. 
2.8 Registration shall only be cancelled by a commission appointed by the state or 
compliance of a final court verdict or at the request of its representative body. 
2.9 Registered sacred sites shall be entitled to voluntary financial and other 
contributions from individuals and institutions within the state and from abroad. 
2.10 Registered sacred sites shall be protected against unlawful demolition, re-
location or compulsory acquisition. 
Commentary: Article 2 emphasises the rights of religious groups and the role of religious 
organisations in legally exercising those rights. As established from above, sacred sites are 
an essential component of freedom of religion for individuals and communities to manifest 
therein their faith. Although the right to freedom of religion has an individual dimension. 
nevertheless, various human rights treaties bring out the collective dimension in exercising 
this freedom.199 The collective dimension is apparent when adherents of a particular 
religion come together as a group to worship and assemble to manifest their faith in a 
particular sacred site. Many religious practices are fulfilled with fellow religious adherents 
199 ICCPR (n ISS) art 18(1) and ECHR (n 29) 9(1). 
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such as baptism, funeral services, and Friday prayers, to name a few. One of the important 
elements of a religious community is their right to establish sacred sites. 
Recognition of collective religious liberty may require the granting of legal status to 
religious communities.2OO This legal right grants power to the religious groups to own and 
acquire property as a prerequisite for establishing sacred sites. In the Canea Catholic 
Church case/O l the European Court of Human Rights held that the discriminatory denial of 
legal personality to some church communities has denied their power to litigate and 
establish their religious rights. Lekhal suggests that 'legal entity status for religious 
communities is a prerequisite to genuine freedom of conscience'. 202 In Hasan and Chaush \' 
Bulgaria,203 the Grand Chamber of the ECHR considered that religious communities 
traditionally and universally exist in the form of organised structures. Despite their legal 
status, any organisation is a union of individuals. In most religions, an individual member 
cannot afford to own a sacred site and instead will support a religious organisation which 
owns and maintains it. 204 This is found in Article 6 of the 1981 UN Declaration on 
Religious Intolerance which specifies certain freedoms including the right to establish and 
maintain places and right to establish and maintain appropriate charitable and humanitarian 
institutions which are mainly the activities of religious organisations.2os 
There is also a cultural component to the formation of religious organisations. A religious 
adherent may see sharing time and experiences with co-religionists, apart from time spent 
in manifesting their religion, as part of their religious identity. This has been brought out 
succinctly by Knott when he observed that the traditions have centres of places of worship 
200 Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia v Moldova (App no 45701199) (2002) 35 EHRR 306. 
201 Canea Catholic Church v Greece (App no 25528/94) (1999) 27 EHRR 521. 
202 A Lekhal, 'Leveling the Playing Field for Religious . Liberty' in Russia: A Critical Analysis of the 1997 
Law 'on Freedom of Conscience and Religious Associations" (1999) 32 Vand JTL 167, 186. 
203 Hasan and Chaush v Bulgaria (App no 30985/96) (2002) 34(6) EHI~.R 1,339. The Co~ he~d that l~e 
autonomous existence of religious communities is indispensable for plurahsm I~ a democratic society and IS 
thus an issue at the very heart of the protection which Article 9 affords. It d~recl)Y concerns not ~n,ly the 
organisation of the community as such but also the effective enjoymen~ of the nght to freedom ~f rehglon by 
all its active members. Were the organisational life of the commumty not protected by Article 9 of the 
Convention, all other aspects of the individual's freedom of religion would become vulnerable. 
204 PW Edge. Religion and Law: An Introduction (Ashgate, Aldersh~l .2006) 101. 
205 RAhdar and I Leigh, Religious Freedom in the Liberal Stale (OlP, Oxford 2(05) 109. 
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which are used not only for religious purposes but also for social and cultural occasions.106 
This is especially true in India where Hindu temples and Christian churches are used for 
social and cultural functions. 
Whatever rights religious organisations have are claimed on behalf of their members. The 
advantage of letting religious organisations exercise their rights is shown when such rights 
are disputed in the courts. In such a situation religious organisations have the ability to take 
responsibility to defend the alleged violated rights. In the Church of Scientology case, the 
European Commission held, 
When a Church body lodges an application under the Convention, it does so in reality on 
behalf of its members. It should therefore be accepted that a church body is capable of 
possessing and exercising the rights contained in Article 9( 1) in its own capacity as a 
representative of its members. 207 
The importance of religious organizations is brought out clearly in the Hasan and Chaush 
case
208 
where the Court observed: 
The autonomous existence of religious communities is indispensable for pluralism in a 
democratic society and is thus an issue at the very heart of the protection which Article 9 
affords. It directly concerns not only the organisation of the community as such but also the 
effective enjoyment of the right to freedom of religion by all its active members. Were the 
organisational life of the community not protected by Article 9 of the Convention, all other 
aspects of the individual's freedom of religion would become vulnerable.209 
The importance of organisations may be felt among members of unpopular or persecuted 
religious groups to secure their rights, or to provide 'networks and brotherhood, and thus 
emotional and often financial support' .210 Thus it becomes necessary to recognise religious 
organisations and their power to establish and maintain sacred sites on behalf of the 
religious community they represent. Thus Article 2.7 emphasises that there should not be 
206 K Knott, 'Other Major Religious Traditions' in T Thomas (ed), The British: Their Religious Belief" and 
Practices J 800-J 986 (Routledge, London 1988) 148. 
107 Pastor X and Church of Scientology v Sweden (App no 7805n7) (1979) 16 DR 68; ARM Chappell " 
United Kingdom (App no 12587/86) (1987) 53 DR 241 and Finska Forsamlingen i Stockholm and T 
Hautaniemi v Sweden (App no 24019/94) (1996) 85-A DR 94. 
l08 Hasan and Chaush v Bulgaria (App no 30985/96) (2002) 34(6) EHRR 1339. 
l09 Ibid [62]. , , 
210 B Wilson, 'The Flowering and Deflowering of Protestantism' in P Gee and J Fulton (005). Rd'glO" alld 
Power: Decline and Growth (BSA. London 1991) 18. 
:!69 
any discrimination in granting recognition to religious groups who establish, own and 
maintain sacred sites. The right to non-discrimiantion is endowed to the religious groups 
because only the group can defend and protect sacred sites in case of a dispute over them. 
Moreover, any discrimination on the registration directly affects the community' s right to 
sacred sites. 
Another area of state failure is related to recognition of certain religious organisations. The 
reports from the Special Rapporteur for human rights (previously on religious intolerance) 
have focused on discrimination by States in granting recognition to religious 
organisations.211 The decision in the Metropolitan Church case may be considered 
significant in supporting the need to ensure judicial protection to the religious community, 
its members and its assets.212 The HRC has often expressed its concern for minority 
religious groups213 and emphasised the need to grant legal recognition on registration.214 In 
recent years, the OSCE too has stressed the need to officially recognise the religious 
communities.2lS 
5.6.4. Article 3 - Right to Equal treatment of aU sacred sites 
3.1 Every religious group shall have the right to equal treatment to establish, 
maintain and administer sacred sites without any discrimination. 
3.2 For the purpose of the present convention, the expression 'discrimination' shall 
refer to any unreasonable distinction, exclusion, restriction, imposition of condition, 
and abolition of the recognition, enjoyment or exercise of the freedom of religion. 
3.3 There shall not be any arbitrary interference with respect to the right of religious 
groups to establish, preserve and protect sacred sites from any state or non-state 
actors, group of persons or individuals on the ground of religion. 
211 UNCHR 'Report of the Special Rapporteur on Religious Intolerance' (1996) UN Doc ElCN.41l997,91 
[19](b) (Bulgaria); (1998) UN Doc ElCNAIl998/6 [58](b) (Russia); (2000) UN Doc A/5S/280/Add.1 [157]-
fl64] (Turkey). ~12 Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia and Others v Moldova (A.pp no 457?1t<?9) (2002) 3S ElfRR 306 (11 Xl· 
213 UNCHR 'General Comment 23' in 'Note by the Secretanat. Compilation of General Comments and 
General Recommendations adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies' (2004) LN Doc HRI GES I, Rcv.7 
~~PtNGA 'Report of the Human Rights Committee' (1989) UN Doc A53 40; (1990) LS Doc A/4~/40 Vol 
I: (2002) UN Doc AJ57/40 Vol I. . . . .._. . .. 
215 ODIHR 'The Human Dimension Semmar on ConstltutJOnal, Legal and Admmlstratl\c Aspects of the 
Freedom of Religion' Consolidated Summary (16 April 1996) 
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Commentary: The principles of equal treatment and non-discrimination are fundamental 
principles of international human rights law. The UDHR observes that 'all are equal before 
law and are entitled without any discrimination to equal protection of the law'.216 This is 
entrenched in Article 26 of the ICCPR which states 'all persons are equal before the law 
and are entitled without any discrimination to the equal protection of the law'. 217 The 
United Nations, from its inception, has given wider importance to eliminating 
discrimination in every human rights activity. The principle of equality and the prohibition 
of discrimination are the dominant single theme of the ICCPR.218 The ECHR does not 
contain a general right to equality but instead only prohibition of discrimination in Article 
14 of the European Convention on Human Rights219 comparable to article 2(1) of the 
ICCPR. 
Article 3 of the model convention for South Asia is a significant one since there is evidence 
of discriminatory practices of the government and non-state actors, which is illustrated in 
the Ayodhya case study. Among the members of the SAARC regional organisation, 
minority religious groups suffer discrimination and their legal and fundamental rights are 
often violated. For example, Hindus in Bhutan, Christians and Muslims in India, Christians 
and Hindus in Bangladesh, Muslims and Christians in Sri Lanka, Ahmadiyas, Hindus and 
Christians in Pakistan experience discrimination from the governments and from other 
groupS.220 
For the purpose of this model draft convention, the term 'discrimination' is used as given in 
article 2(2) of the 1981 Declaration on Religious Intolerance. Article 2 delineates the non-
216 UDHR (n 1) art 7. 
217 ICCPR (n 155) art 26: All persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to 
the equal protection of the law. In this respect, the law shall prohibit any discrimination and guarantee to all 
persons equal and effective protection against discrimination on any ground such as race, colour. sex. 
language. religion, political or other opinion, national or social ori,gin, property. birth ~r other ,status, , 
218 SO Ramcharan, 'Equality and Non-discrimination' in L Henk10 (ed). The InternatIOnal B,I/ of R'Khts. The 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Columbia University Press, New York 19~ I ) :! .. ~6, , 
219 ECHR (n 29) art 14: The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth 10 th~s ,Conve~t~on shall be 
secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex. race, colour. language, rehglon. politICal or other 
ofninion. national or social origin. association with a natio,nal mino,~ty. pro~~y. ?irth or othc..'f' status, .. 
2.0 SA Mujtaba, 'South Asia: Predicament and Prospects m the 21 C~n~ m:"K ,J~a (ed). Sowh ASia ", 
21st Century: India. Her Neighbors and the Great Powers (South ASian, :"ew Deihl _003) 65, 
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discrimination in the UN Charter. Article 2(1 )221 refers to discrimination while article 
2(2)222 refers to 'intolerance and discrimination'. From this article it becomes clear that the 
injunction against religious discrimination covers not only discriminatory acts by states but 
extends also to any 'institution, group of persons or persons'. 223 In the human rights 
treaties, equality and non-discrimination principles, in general, apply to individuals. 
However, as seen earlier, collective religious rights are recognised in various provisions of 
human rights treaties and as such these principles are applied to collective religious 
organisations in protecting sacred sites. 
At the regional level, the European Court of Human Rights has considered three key 
questions while dealing with violations of article 14 of the ECHR.224 They are, firstly, 
whether the complaint is within the scope of the substantive provisions of the 
convention;225 secondly, whether the applicants can properly compare themselves with a 
class of persons who are treated more favourably;226 and finally, whether the difference in 
treatment can be justified.227 This is very well in tune with the contents of the 1981 UN 
Declaration on the Elimination of all Forms of Intolerance and Discrimination Based on 
Religion or Belief which prohibits all forms of discrimination and calls state parties to 
adopt necessary measures to combat discrimination on the ground of religion or belief.228 
When there is an application complaining of discriminatory treatment, it is the 
responsibility of the respondent government to prove the 'difference of treatment' was 
221 1981 Declaration on Religious Intolerance (n 156) art 2( 1): No one shall be subject to discrimination by 
any State, institution, group of persons, or person on the grounds of religion or other belief. 
222 1981 Declaration on Religious Intolerance (n 156) art 2(2): For the purpose of the present Declaration, the 
Expression 'intolerance and discrimination based on religion or belief means any distinction, exclusion. 
restriction or preference based on religion or belief and having as its purpose or as its effect nullification or 
impainnent of the recognition, enjoyment or exercise of human rights and fundamental freedoms on an equal 
basis. 
223 BG Tahzib, Freedom of Religion or Belief Ensuring Effective International Legal Protection (Martinus 
Nijhoff, The Hague 1996) 171. ., Ib 
224 COvey and R White, Jacobs and White: The European Convention on Human Rights (4 edn OUP. 
Oxford 2006) 413. 
22S Haas v The Netherlands (App no 36983/97) (2004) 39 EHRR 897 [41]. 
226 March v Belgium (App no 6833174) (1979) 2 EHRR 330 [32]. . . 
227 Frette v France (App no 36515197) (2004) 38 EHRR 438 [34]. In thIS ca~e, the Court stated: a ~ltTercnc~ 
in treatment is discriminatory for the purpose of Article 14 if it 'has no objective an~ reas?nable Just1fi~atlo~ . 
that is if it does not pursue a 'legitimate aim' or if there is not a 'reasonable relationship of proportionality 
between the means employed and the aim sought to be realised. 
128 1981 Declaration on Religious Intolerance (n 156) art 2. 3 and 4. 
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necessary to pursue a legitimate aim. In the Lithgow case, the European Court held 'for the 
purposes of Article 14, a difference of treatment is discriminatory if it 'has no objective or 
reasonable justification', that is, if it does not pursue a legitimate aim' .119 The European 
Court has allowed the contracting states a certain margin of appreciation while considering 
the cases of different treatment in law though it will vary according to the circumstances, 
the subject matter and its background.23o The European Court accepts the state's margin of 
appreciation in deciding whether a particular interference is necessary in a democratic 
society. It is apparent from its observation in the Handyside case, where the court held that 
by reason of their direct and continuous contact with the vital forces of their countries, state 
authorities are in principle in a better position than the international judge to give an 
opinion on the exact content of these requirements as well as on the 'necessity' of a 
'restriction' or 'penalty' intended to meet them.231 
Article 3(2) in the model convention prohibits any 'arbitrary interference' with the right to 
establish, preserve and protect sacred sites. The inclusion of the term 'interference' is 
important since states, non-state actors and other groups often interfere in manifesting one's 
right to freedom of religion. In the Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia and others case, the 
European Court held '... the right of believers to freedom of religion, which includes the 
right to manifest one's religion collectively, presupposes that believers may associate 
freely, without arbitrary interference by the state' .232 However, Taylor observes that 'the 
criteria for assessing whether there has been state interference with the manifestation of 
religion or belief are not unduly rigid, at both European and universal level ' .233 
Any interference from the state or non-state actors with the proposed right to establish and 
to protect sacred sites will be considered a violation of fundamental right to freedom of 
religion and states may be held accountable in their failure to ensure protection of the above 
229 Lithgow and others v United Kingdom (App no 9006/80; 9262/81; 9263/81; 9265/81: 9266/81; 9313 81; 
9405/81) (1986) Series A no 102; 8 EHRR 329 [177]. 
2301n-e v Austria (App no 8695179) (1987) 10 EHRR 394 [41]. 
231 H~ndyside v United Kingdom (App no 5493172) (1976) 1 EHRR 737 [48]; Gil/ow \'l./"iled Kingcfo'" (AP.p 
no 9063/80) (1986) Series A no 109: 11 EHRR 355 [56]. The Court hel.d tha! the Gu~msey legislature I~ 
better placed than the international judge to assess the effects of any relaxation of the housmg controls. 
232 Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia and others \. Alo/dom (App ~o 45701199) (2002) ?5 El.j~R 306 [I ! 8]. 
23J PM Taylor, Freedom of Religion: UN and European Human Rights La\\' and Proc:tl(e «(UP. Cambndge 
2005) 222. 
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mentioned right. The above analysis shows that international human rights law clearly 
prohibits any discriminatory practices from the state or its local authorities in denying 
recognition to the religious communities and they are necessary in a pluralistic society to 
maintain peace and public order. 
5.6.5. Article 4 - Legal limitations in protecting sacred sites 
4.1 The right to establish, maintain and administer sacred sites may be subject 
only to such limitations prescribed by law and/or are necessary to protect public 
order, health, morals and the fundamental rights and freedoms of others. 
4.2 The right of religious groups to establish, maintain and administer sacred sites 
shall be subjected to state restrictions necessary on the grounds of planning 
requirements and registration policies, and regulatory provisions. However, such 
policies and regulations shall be formulated and implemented with due respect to 
preserve and to allow coexistence of all sacred sites without any discrimination. 
The limitation provisions contained in the model convention are mostly based on the 
UDHR,234 the ICCPR,235 the 1981 UN Declaration on Religious Intolerance and Article 
9(2) of the ECHR.236 The term 'limitation' is a relative term whose application may vary 
according to different times and cases. In addition this term implicates states, groups and 
individuals. The justification for limitations arises owing to the need to balance the interest 
of the community against the interests of the individuals.237 
234 UDHR (n I) art 29(2): In the exercise of his rights and freedoms, everyone shall be subject only to such 
limitations as are determined by law solely for the purpose of securing due recognition and respect for the 
right and freedoms of others and of meeting the just requirements of morality, public order, and the general 
welfare in a democratic society. 
23S ICCPR (n 155) art 18(3): Freedom to manifest one's religion or beliefs may be subject only to such 
limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary to protect public safety. order. health. or morals or the 
fundamental rights and freedoms of others. . •. . 
236 1981 UN Declaration on Religious Intolerance (n 156) art 1(3): Freedom to mamfest one s religion ~)r 
belief may be subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary to protect public 
safety. order health or morals or the fundamental rights and f!eedorns of others. . 
237 A McHarg 'Reconciling Human Rights and the Public Interest: Conceptual Problems and DoctnnaJ 
Uncertainty in ilie Jurisprudence of the European Court ofHuman.Ri~hts· (1999) 62. ML~ 671. 695. McHarg 
observes that the relationship between human rights and public mterest exceptions 1'\ one of the mo~t 
important issues in contemporary human rights jurisprudence. 
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Article 18(3) of the ICCPR sets out the limitation clauses which are applicable only in 
manifestation of one's right to freedom of religion. From Article 18(3), it is apparent that 
restrictions or limitations are possible only with regard to the active, public freedom of 
religion.
238 
The structure is similar to the other provisions, such as Articles 12(3), 19(3), 21 
and 22(2), of the ICCPR. As with most comparable provisions, limitations under Article 
18(3) must fulfil two conditions, namely, the state action must be 'prescribed by law· 239 and 
'necessary' to achieve the stated aims. The grounds of limitations include public order, 
health, morals and fundamental freedoms and rights of others.24O 
The specification of limitations becomes necessary on account of enforcement organs to 
implement the rights without violating them. In the ECHR, there are two basic principles 
concerning the limitations on the right guaranteed. In The Sunday Times Case,24\ the 
European Court of Human Rights acknowledged these two prerequisites. They are, firstly, 
the law in question must be adequately accessible, and secondly, it must be formulated with 
sufficient precision that the consequences of a given action are foreseeable. 242 In many 
countries, the excessive discretionary power of executives may act against non-state 
religions and denominations. 
The word 'necessary' refers to attainment of any of the purposes listed in the Article. The 
obligation of necessity shows that the limitation must be proportional in protecting the aims 
for which it is imposed and it may not become a rule. The court, if it is satisfied that any 
limitation has a legal basis which meets the requirements of 'law' under the ECHR 
provisions, will consider whether the limitation is necessary to protect one of the specified 
legitimate aims.243 For instance, Article 9(2) of the ECHR mentions 'democratic society' as 
238 KJ Partsch 'Freedom of Conscience and Expression, and Political Freedoms' in L Henkin (ed). The 
International Bill of Rights: The Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Columbia University Press, New 
York 1981) 212. . 
239 UDHR (n 1) art 29(2) states 'determined by law'; ICCPR (n 155) art 18(3) and 1981 Declaration on 
Religious Intolerance (n 156) art 1(3) state 'prescribed by law'. . ' 
240 For a detailed analysis on limitation provisions, see, A Svensson-McCarthy, The InternatIOnal La\\' oj 
Human Rights and States of Exception (Martin us NijhotT. The Hague 19~8). ,. '} 
W The Sunday Times v United Kingdom (App no 6538174) (1979) Senes A no 30 (1979-80) .. bCHR _45 
!~8~M Taylor, Freedom of Religion: UN and Ellropean Hllml.m Rights Law and Practice (CUP, Cambridge 
2005) 294. 
241 Ibid 307-8. 
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fth . . 244 Th one 0 e Important alms. e concept of 'a common democratic standard'24s cannot be 
enforced as an absolute rule, but in any particular situation where the needs of a democratic 
society are balanced against individual or group rights to freedom of religion, the balance 
must be struck in terms of proportionality. 
The model convention in Article 4.1 narrates four grounds for limitations. They are 'to 
protect public order, health, morals and the fundamental freedoms and rights of others'. The 
term public order is imprecise and has to take account of the different time, place and 
circumstances where public order issue takes place. Public order must be consistent with 
the principles and values of a given society thereby meeting the social criteria of the state. 
The ICCPR uses the term 'ordre public' (meaning 'public order') in other Articles as a 
general term to limit the rights guaranteed in the Covenant but in Article 18(3) the term 
'I'ordre' (meaning 'order') is used to narrow the meaning when referring to public order 
limitation. This is a significant difference. It means that right to freedom of religion may 
not be limited for all of the reasons arising to protect public order but only such acts which 
disturb the order. 246 
The limitation 'public order' also appears in Article 9(2) in the ECHR. However, the case 
law on Article 9(2) is not consistent with the narrow sense given to the phrase 'public 
order' in other contexts.247 Article 9(2) of the ECHR refers to 'the protection of public 
order' whereas other provisions such as Articles 8(2), 10(2), and 11(2) use the term 'the 
prevention of disorder'. This difference was clarified by the European Court of Human 
Rights in the Engel case where it stated that 'disorder' covers not only 'public order' but 
also covers the order that must prevail within the confines of a special social group.248 
244 Kokkinakis v Greece (App no 14307/88) (1993) Series A no 260-A; 17 EHRR,397 [31). 
245 M Nowak UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: CCPR Commentary (!'\P Engel. Kehl 1993) 325, 
246 KJ Partsdh, 'Freedom of Conscience and Expression. and Political Freedoms.' in, ~ He~kin (eci). 1!'e 
International Bill of Rights: The COl'enant on Civil and Political Rights (Columbia U01\,erslty Press. ~C\" 
York 1981) 212. 'h'b' ' I _.... B ddh 
24' F I th European Commission on Human RIghts accepted the pro I Itlon p ac~ on a u I~t 
or examp e, e "I d' h' I" 
. fr 'beard and the refusal to provide a prisoner With mea s correspon 109 to IS re li!hH1S pnsoner om growmg a . '
bel' r: P D"k d GJH van Hoof. Theon' and Practice 01 the Europcan Conl't'lIIlOn II" HUMeJII Ie,s. eter van IJ an ,. ' 
Ri his (3rd edn Kluwer Law International. The Hague 1998) 556., .., 
2ugE I AI h l d (A 5100/71·5101nl·51O"'nl·~Vq72·53'U72)(lq76)SencsAno22[98]. nge v Het er an 'S pp no , . ~ . - . . . 
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Based on this ruling of the European Court, it may be observed that 'public order' in article 
9(2) refers to only the concept of 'order in places accessible to everyone' .249 
The second limitation based on health is found in many provisions in the Covenant. 
Conflicts may occur when a state makes a health measure compulsory in protecting public 
health and which may be contrary to the religious convictions of a religious community. 
For instance, the Jehovah's Witnesses refuse all blood transfusions, even if it is the last 
measure to protect a life. 
The third ground for limitation is to protect morals in the state. The term, morals, may be 
defined as a set of principles, which may not be always legally enforceable. The case law of 
the European Court of Human Rights indicate that it is not possible to find a uniform 
European notion of morals.25o However, those principles are widely accepted by a majority 
of citizens for their individual and collective behaviour in a society and as such the state 
enjoys a wide margin of appreciation in enforcing limitations on the ground of protecting 
morals.251 The case law suggests that 'the protection of morals' is usually associated with 
sexual morality.252 This limitation is necessary for South Asia where some temples were 
used for activities such as temple prostitution. 
The fourth ground for enforcing limitation is to protect fundamental rights and freedoms of 
others in the society. It is significant to note that unlike other provisions in the ICCPR, 
Article 18(3) does not authorize limitations for the protection of general rights and 
freedoms but rather only the 'fundamental rights and freedoms of others'. Nowak observes 
that this difference from 'general human rights' to 'fundamental human rights' points 
249 P van Dijk and GJH van Hoof, Theory and Practice o/the European Com'ention on Human Rights (3rd edn 
KJuwer Law International, The Hague 1998) 554. 
2S0 AC Kiss, 'Pennissible Limitations on Rights' in L Henkin (ed), The International Bill of ~i~hlS. nrc 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Columbia University Press, New York 1981) 304. The deciSion of the 
European Court in the Handyside case is particularly relevant here. Hand)'side \. (,'nited Kingdom (App no 
5493172)(1976) Series A no 24 (1976) 1 EHRR 737. . . 
2S1 Wingrove v United Kingdom (App no 17419/90) (1997) 24 EHRR 1 [58]; Ollo-Prt'mmger-Inslllute \. 
Austria (App no 13470/87) (1994) Series A no 295-A [35]. 
252 u ,I., • .J "niled Kingdom (App no 5493172) (1976) 1 EHRR 737; .\fllller and Others \. SWIf:t'rlond 
nanw/slue v v' J I' . d ". _~ (\ (App no 10737/84) (1988) Series A No 133 (1991) 13 EHRR 212: and Dllugeon \' vmte "mguom : pp no 
7525176) (1981) Series A No 45 (1982) 4 EHRR 149. 
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toward some substantive rights which enjoy special remedies in the national law (especially 
a constitution).253 For instance, in India, if fundamental rights guaranteed in Articles 14 to 
30 are violated, the victims have the right to approach the High Court or the Supreme Court 
through various Writ petitions to obtain remedy.254 Since many fundamental human rights 
are set out in two UN human rights Covenants, ICCPR and ICESCR, the freedom of 
religion may be limited to protect one of the fundamental rights of others guaranteed in 
those covenants, hence it has an international dimension. For example, manifestation of 
freedom of religion may be curtailed by a state if a sacred site is used to advocate racial 
hatred, since it violates the prohibition of discrimination under article 26 of the ICCPR. In 
the 1981 UN Declaration on Religious Intolerance, the only reference to 'the fundamental 
rights and freedoms of others' is in Article 1 (3) which is similar to Article 18 of the 
ICCPR .. 
The ECHR refers to 'the rights and freedoms of others' in Article 9. In Kokkinaklcis v 
Greece,255 the European Court observed the need to place restrictions on Article 9 in order 
to reconcile the interests of the various groups and to ensure everyone's beliefs are 
respected. In another case, the court upheld the decision of the Austrian court that the 
showing of a film was considered to violate the right to respect for religious feelings.2s6 In 
the Leyla Sahin case,257 the court accepted the view of the Turkish state and observed that 
where several religions coexist in a state, it may be deemed necessary to place restrictions 
on the manifestation of religious beliefs to protect the interests of different religious groups 
and to ensure everyone's right to freedom of religion is respected. 
253 M Nowak UN Covenant on Cil'il and Political Rights: CCPR Commentary (:\P Engel. Kehl 1993) 319. 
254 PM Bakshi, The Constihltion of India (5th edn Universal law Publishing Co, Delhi 2002) 74-82. 
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Another way of limiting the manifestation of religion is by non recognition of a religious 
group by the state. For instance, in the Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia case.258 
Moldova's refusal to recognise the church was held to have curtailed the community's right 
to manifest its religion?S9 In the same manner in Manoussakis,260 the court indicated that 
intervention in the procedure for authorization of the established church could not be 
reconciled with the provisions in Article 9 (2). In Vergos v Greece, the court observed that 
a specific system for authorisation of the use of premises for religious purposes must be 
distinct or differentiated from more generally applicable legal provisions concemmg 
planning consent which may be easier to curb the religious freedom.161 
5.6.6. Article 5 - Remedies 
5.1 All decisions by the state on demolition, re-Iocation or denial of planning 
permission shall be guided by the principles of transparency, fairness and 
impartiality. The decisions shall be subject to judicial supervision. 
5.2 Defilement, destruction or damage to sacred sites shall be treated as a criminal 
offence, a cultural crime against humanity, and any individual who commits such 
an offence shall be punished in accordance with the domestic law of the state 
where the offence was committed. 
5.3 Any individual or public official who aids and abets the above offences shall be 
punished in accordance with the domestic law of the state where the offence was 
committed. 
5.4 When a state fails to punish those individuals or groups involved in attacks over 
sacred sites, they shall be subjected to regional court when such acts lead to 
egregious violations of human rights. 
5.5 Sacred sites illegally damaged or destroyed shall be repaired or rebuilt at the 
same site or at a suitable alterantive site at the expense of the individuals or 
groups responsible for such crime, but if circumstances arise where this is not 
2S8 Metropolitan Church of Bess arabia v Moldova (App no 4~~01/99) (2002~ ,35 EH~ 306. , , 
2S9 Ibid [118]. In this case, the Court observed that 'smc~ rehglO~ commu~ltJes tradltaon.all~ eX,lst I,n the ro~ 
f . d tru t artl'c)e 9 must be interpreted an the hght of article II of the (on\ entlon. \\ hu.: h o organise s cures. . ' . 
safeguards associative life against unjustified State anterference . 
260 Manoussakis and Others v Greece (App no 18748/91) (1997) 23 EHRR 387. 
261 Vergas v Greece (App no 65501/01) Judgment of 24 June 2004. 
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feasible, the state authorities shall be responsible for rebuilding those sacred sites. 
especially when the state fails in its obligation to protect these sites. 
Commentary: The right to an effective remedy is a key principle of international human 
rights law. Such remedies can help to ensure compliance with human rights obligations. As 
Dinah Shelton observes, 'appropriate remedies can have a dissuasive effect on those who 
would commit violations ... and thus a significant aspect of ensuring the rule of law' .161 
The right to remedy itself is a right granted by key global and regional human rights 
instruments. As such, a wrongdoing state has the primary responsibility to rectify the 
violation and afford redress to the victim. International human rights law provides a 
framework to get redress to obvious violations when a state has failed to provide the 
required relief. 
The UDHR263 sets out the right to remedy in Article 8. The ICCPR has an obligation for the 
state parties to ensure that remedy shall be granted 'notwithstanding that the violation has 
been committed by persons acting in an official capacity' .264 Although the nature of 
remedies is not delineated in the ICCPR, Schachter's list of appropriate remedies include 
undoing, repairing and compensating for violation.265 Significantly, the Convention on the 
Elimination of Racial Discrimination contains broad guarantees of effective remedy. 
Article 6 states: 
State parties shall assure to everyone within their jurisdiction effective protection and 
remedies, through the competent national tribunals and other state institutions against any 
acts of racial discrimination ... as well as the right to seek from such tribunals just and 
adequate reparation or satisfaction for any damage suffered as a result of such 
d . .. . 266 Iscnmmatlon. 
262 0 Shelton. Remedies in International Human Rights Law (2nd edn OUP, Oxford 2(05). 114. . 
263 UDHR (n 1) art 8: Everyone has the right to an efTectiye re~e~y by the competent natlonallnbunals for 
acts violating the fundamental rights granted him by the constitutIOn or laws. 
264 ICCPR (n 155) art 2(3). . . . . . 
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Other international treaties include the Convention on the Elimination of All Fonns of 
Discrimination against Women,267 the United Nations Convention against Torture and 
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment,268 Optional Protocol to the Convention on 
the Rights of the Child on the Sale of Children, Child PrOstitution and Child 
P h 269 I . . f 
omograp y, severa prOVISIons 0 the Convention on the Migrant Workers,270 and 
several treaties adopted by the specialized agencies271 . In addition, the HRC adopted 
General Comment 31 on Article 2 of the ICCPR on 21 April 2004. It imposes both positive 
and negative obligation on states including an obligation to provide redress for violations 
by private parties as well as state agents.272 
At regional level, this right to an effective remedy is guaranteed in Article 13 of the 
ECHR.
273 
However, Article 13 offers a measure of respect for national procedural 
autonomy. This refers to the ability of each contracting state to detennine the fonn of 
remedies offered to meet its obligations under the article. The right to remedy is closely 
linked with the requirement that domestic remedies be exhausted before an individual has 
recourse to the ECHR. This highlights the primary role of national institutions and the 
subsidiary function of the regional court.274 The European Court held in the Klasi 75 case 
that right to remedy is an independent provision which can be violated even if there is no 
violation of another right granted by the ECHR. 
267 Convention on the Elimination of All Fonns of Discrimination against Women (adopted 18 December 
1979, entered into force 3 September 1981) (1980) 19ILM 33 (CEDAW) art 2(c). 
268 Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment (adopted 10 December 
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269 O~tional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Sale of Children. Child Prostitution 
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270 Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members oftheu Families 
(adopted 18 December 1990 UNGA Res 45/158, entered into force 1 July 2003) (Convention on Migrant 
Workers) art 15, 16(9), 18(6) and 83. ..
m For instance, Convention Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples m I~dependent ~ountnes (adopted "27 
June 1989 ILO no 169, entered into force 5 September 1991) 72 lLO Bulletm 59 (1989) _8 ILM 1382. 
272 UNCHR ' General Comment 31' in 'Note by the Secretariat, Compilation of General Comments and 
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74 Akdivar v Turkey (App no 21893/93) (1997) 23 EHRR I·n. 
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In the Inter-American system, Article XVII of the American Declaration of the Rights and 
Duties of Man guarantees every person the right to approach courts to ensure legal rights 
and protection from any violation of fundamental constitutional rights by the authorities of 
a state. Similarly, the American Convention on Human Rights insists that the state parties 
ensure that the competent authorities enforce the remedies granted276 and to guarantee the 
free and full exercise of all rights granted by the convention.277 The African Charter also 
has several provisions, and particularly, Article 21 is significant which refers to 'the right to 
adequate compensation' .278 
Most often attacks upon sacred sites are committed by other religious groups. non-state 
actors and individuals. Consequently, Article 5.4 of this proposed Model Convention 
focuses on the liability of individuals or non-state actors for their crimes and on bringing 
them to justice in the proposed regional court. However, human rights treaties, in general, 
have been drafted in terms of state obligations and duties of non-state actors are seldom 
mentioned. In many disputes, such as Ayodhya, the rights guaranteed by these treaties are 
violated by individuals and non-state actors. The question arises whether there are enough 
provisions under international human rights law for individuals and non-state actors to be 
held accountable for their violation of human rights. 
International protection of human rights is primarily designed to protect human beings 
against their own state and as such could be seen as a supplementary line of defence in case 
national systems fail.279 All civil and political rights granted in the international human 
rights treaties are intended to be directly invoked by individuals and the state parties by 
signing these treaties undertake that they will protect and promote these rights within their 
jurisdiction. For instance, the ECHR declares that the states parties 'shalt secure to 
everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in Section I of this 
Convention' .280 
276 ACHR (n 55) art 25. 
277 ACHR (n 55) art 1(1). 
278 African Charter (72) art 21. ..., 1 
279 C Tomuschat. Human Rights: Between Idealism and Realism (OUP. Oxford ~OO3) X4. 
'80 E C t" Hwnan RI'ghts (adopted 4 November 1950. entered mto force 3 September 1953) 
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213 UNTS 221. art. I. 
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However, bringing individuals and groups to criminal trial has a precedent in international 
criminal law and this has long been recognised for crimes such as war crimes, genocide.2S1 
and crimes against humaniti82• The Statute of the International Criminal Court sets out the 
crimes over which the court has jurisdiction and gives the court jurisdiction to try 
individuals for serious violations of human rights.283 The subject matter of international 
criminal law deals with the liability of individuals irrespective of whether or not they are 
agents of a state. 
Failure to punish those individuals and groups who are involved in crimes against humanity 
results in victims taking the law into their own hands, both to exact retribution and to draw 
attention to the denied historical fact. Nothing emboldens a criminal so much as the 
knowledge that he can get away with a crime.284 If nothing is done to remedy the injustice, 
it festers. Moreover, there are some notable merits in bringing the offenders to justice, 
namely that individual responsibility is established through trials; justice dissipates the call 
for revenge from victims; and a fully reliable record of atrocities is established.28s 
In the above sense, a criminal prosecution to establish justice is vital. Justice is also one of 
various means of achieving peace. Moreover, leaving criminals at large precludes the 
establishment of the rule of law and democracy in many states. Until the persons 
responsible for crimes are brought to book, ethnic and nationalistic hatred, the desire for 
revenge and the seeds for armed violence will survive and threaten internal and 
international peace. Cassese argues that one of the most civilised and constructive response 
to all these threats lies precisely in the dispensation of truly international, truly impartial 
d 1 &'.·· • 286 an tru y laIr JustIce. 
281 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (adopted 9 December 1948 
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282 Statute of the International Criminal Court (adopted 17 July 1998 Rome) UN Doc A/CO~F.183/9 
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Traditionally, State responsibility under international law is separated from the legal 
responsibility of the individual which is a matter of national, not international law. 
Moreover, remedies fall on the state, not on individuals whose acts triggered state 
responsibility. However, this invisibility of the individual in the traditional law of state 
responsibility did have a drawback. Lauerpacht observes that there is cogency in the view 
that unless responsibility is imputed and attached to persons of flesh and blood, it rests with 
no one.
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Currently, a large number of criminal law treaties, prosecutions of individuals in national 
and international courts and the establishment of International Criminal Court have taken 
individuals away from behind the shield of the state.288 International law leaves it no longer 
to the national legal order to determine which individuals are subjected to obligations and 
responsibilities and now confronts individuals directly with the legal consequences of their 
acts.289 The question may arise whether taking the offenders to the regional court will 
amount to double jeopardy which is a widely accepted principle in criminal law. This may 
not amount to the violation of double jeopardy principle because there are certain 
exceptions given in Article 20 of the ICC statute which includes cases where the national 
court proceedings were not independent or impartial; where the original trial was an artifice 
for the prevention of an international criminal trial; or where the case was not prosecuted 
diligently.290 
It may also be noted that a civil remedy alone is not enough and would not excuse the 
failure of the state to prosecute the offenders. Punishment serves as a deterrence for future 
287 H Lauterpacht, International Law and Human Right~ ~Archon Books~ ~~den 1968) 40. . " , , 
288 Andre Nollkeemper, 'Concurrence between IndiVidual ResponSibility and S~ate Res~nslblh,ty an 
International Law' (2003) 52 ICLQ 615. 618. For instance. the :\uremberg Inter:n~l1onal Military T~bu~al 
observed, 'Crimes against international law are c~~mitted ~y men~ not abstract entities ~nd only hy punashang 
individuals who commit such crimes can the proVIsions of anternal1ona~ I~w ~ enforced . 
289 C Scott 'Translating Torture into Trnnsnational Tort: Conceptual DIVides In the Deb~te on Corpordle 
A b'·I·ty r. H RI·ght hanns' in Craig Scott (ed) Torture as Tort: Comparaln'e PerJ,"'Cln'es on ccounta I I lor uman ." .' . 4\ 
the Development o/Transnational Human RIghts L/~lgatlOn (Hart, Oxford ~OOI)~. " '. 
290 Claire de Than and E Shorts, International Crim",al Law and Hilma" Rights (S\\cct & \1a.\\\c11. l.ondon 
2003) 6. 
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occurrences of similar crimes against a religious community.291 In addition, punishing those 
individuals or groups will prevent future attacks over sacred sites. 
A further point to consider is that the role of a state when a complaint is filed in the 
regional court against individual or non-state actors. It is very difficult to apply elements of 
criminal liability such as mens rea to a state. There is also the problem of punishment. 
However, in international criminal law, certain acts can lead both to state responsibility and 
individual responsibility. For instance, after the Second World War, both Germany and 
Japan were declared liable even though the political and military leaders were assumed to 
agents of crimes. Moreover, in Prosecutor v Furundzija, the ICTY said: 'Under current 
international humanitarian law, in addition to individual criminal liability, State 
responsibility may ensue as a result of State officials engaging in torture or failing to 
prevent torture or to punish torturers'. 292 
For this proposed Model Convention, when a state government is found to be actively 
involved in attacks over sacred sites, the members of such a government will also be 
included along with other offenders. States also will be a party to the suit since the 
responsibility of implementing the verdict from the proposed regional court is upon them. 
Having established the need for an effective remedy, it is necessary to consider appropriate 
enforcement mechanisms. 
5.6.7. Article 6 - Enforcement mechanisms 
National level: 
6.1 Every state party to the present convention undertakes to respect and to 
ensure the right to protection of sacred sites to all individuals and to all religious 
groups within its territory through appropriate means including legislation and 
administrative measures. 
291 Robert Cryer and others, An Introduction to International Criminal Law and Proct,dll" (CL"P. Cambridge: 
2007) 20-22. ., 
292 Prosecutor v FlInlndzija Judgement of 10 December 1998. 38 I LM 317 ( I·L). 
6.2 There shall be a Commission in every participant state and membership shall 
include equal number of members of government officials and representatives of 
religious communities in the country. 
6.3 The functions of the Commission shall include making proposals to the 
government to implement the provisions of the convention, reporting of all events in 
the state, reviewing Situations, and trying reconciliatory measures among various 
disputing religious or other groups. 
Regional level: 
6.4 To ensure the observance of the activities undertaken by the contracting 
parties to the convention, there shall be a permanent regional court in the South 
Asian region. 
6.5 The court shall have jurisdiction concerning interpretation and application of the 
convention in protecting sacred sites. 
6.6 Any contracting party may refer to the court any alleged breach of the provisions 
of the convention by another contracting party. 
6.7 The court may receive applications from any person, non-governmental 
organization or group of individuals claiming to be the victim of a violation by one of 
the contracting parties of the rights set forth in the convention. 
6.B The SAARC shall appoint a High Commissioner for protection of sacred sites to 
identify and seek early resolution of religious disputes that might endanger peace, 
stability or friendly relations between SAARC participating states. 
Commentary: A human rights system consists of a list or lists of internationally guaranteed 
human rights, permanent institutions, and enforcement procedures.293 As such. Article 6 in 
the model convention contains enforcement mechanisms for the protection of sacred sites 
and it proposes two levels of enforcement mechanisms. 
291 0 Sh It 'Th Promise of Regional Human Rights System' in BH Western and SP Marks (eds). The 
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To protect and promote human rights, there are many supervisory procedures which 
address gross and systematic violations. The UN Charter based mechanism, the Human 
Rights Council, previously known as the United Nations Commission on Human Rights, 
accepts complaints about human rights abuses. ILO and UNESCO have developed their 
own human rights complaint procedures. These bodies require that local remedies have 
been exhausted before they approach the above-mentioned international institutions. 
Among human rights treaty bodies, the ICCPR, the Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Racial Discrimination, and the Convention against Torture may receive petitions 
within their jurisdictional limits. These international supervisory bodies are generally an 
independent committee or commission which undertakes fact-finding and attempts to 
achieve a friendly settlement of admissible complaints. The process culminates with the 
preparation of a report which may declare a violation has occurred and recommend some 
remedies.294 However, it should be noted that these bodies are non-judicial bodies. 
Regional human rights systems in Europe, the Americas, and Africa allow petitions to be 
filed after all local remedies have been exhausted. Regionally, a case is heard by a 
competent permanent international court and issue binding decisions often including 
remedies. Regional human rights system are analysed in section 5.2 of this chapter. 
After the Second World War, the call for punishing those who are responsible for human 
rights abuses during war resulted in establishing the Charter of the International Military 
Tribunal (lMT) which was adopted on 8 August 1945. In December 1945, the four allied 
powers enacted Control Council Law No. 10 which gave the legal source for a series of 
trials.295 Subsequently various efforts at UN levelled to the adoption of the Convention on 
the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide in the General Assembly in 
1948.296 Article VI of the Genocide Convention291 mentioned about the need of an 
international penal tribunal for the trial for crimes of genocide. Hence. the UN General 
294 0 Shelton Remedies in International Human Rights Law (2nd edn OUP. Oxford 2005) I ?7-7X, 
295 WA SChabas, An Introduction to the International Criminal COllrt (2nd edn CUP. Cambndge 2()()4) 6. 
296 Genocide Convention (n 277). . ' ' 
297 Genocide Convention (n 277) art VI: Persons charged wl,th genocl~e or any o~ the other ads enumerated In 
article III shall be tried by a competent tribunal of the State In the temtory of which the ad _ was comnlltted. or 
by such international penal tribunal as may have jurisdiction with respect to those Contracting PartlCS whICh 
shall have accepted its jurisdiction. 
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Assembly adopted a resolution298 to request the International Law Commission (ILCi99 to 
prepare the statute of the court envisaged by Article VI. After a lengthy process. the ILC 
submitted its fmal version of its draft for an international criminal court draft code to the 
General Assembly in 1994.300 Also, the ILC adopted the final draft of its 'Code of Crimes 
against the Peace and Security of Mankind,301 which defined the crimes and related legal 
principles to the code of crimes. 
Meanwhile the atrocities committed in Yugoslavia necessitated the establishment of an 
international criminal tribunal to prosecute persons responsible for serious human rights 
abuses. In 1993, the UN Secretary-General proposed a draft which was adopted by the 
Security Council and an ad hoc International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia 
(ICTY) was established.302 Again in 1994, the Security Council, on the basis of a request 
from Rwanda, created a second ad hoc tribunal to try the charges of genocide and other 
serious violations of human rights and violation of international humanitarian law in 
Rwanda.303 These two ad hoc tribunals played a vital role in enhancing the efforts of the 
International Criminal Court (ICC) and set a legal precedent for the drafters of the ICC 
statute. For instance, many rulings found a place in the statute of the ICC. Significantly, 
one ruling observed that crimes against humanity could be committed in times of peace and 
not just in wartime. 304 
From 1994, the UN General Assembly accelerated its efforts towards the establishment of 
the ICC and formed an Ad Hoc Committee. On 17 July 1998, the Statute of the ICC was 
adopted in the Rome Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of 
298 UNGA Resolution 260B (III) 9 December 1948 'Study by the International Law Commission of the 
Question of an International Jurisdiction'. . . 
299 International Law Commission is a group of experts selected by the Umted Nations General Assembly to 
codify international law. <http://www.un.orgllaw/i~c/~ accessed 15 May ~006'. .. " ., 
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July 1994) UN Doc A/49/1O ch II [23]-[41]. . 
301 J Allain and John RWD Jones, 'A Patchwork of Norms: A Commentary on the 1996 Draft Code ofCnmes 
Against the Peace and Security of Mankind' (1997) 8 EJIL 100. 
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an International Criminal Court.305 Although many major powers such as the United States, 
China and India have still not extended their cooperation to the ICC, it is perhaps a 
significant development in international law. The creation of the ICC highlights the fact 
that human rights protection has taken centre-stage in the UN system.306 It should be also 
mentioned that the ICC is an independent, global legal personality.307 
From the establishment of the ICC, individual criminal liability came under its jurisdiction 
to try individuals for listed international crimes such as genocide, war crimes and crimes 
against humanity. The aim of international criminal justice is essentially to prevent crime 
and help restore international peace and security by punishing those responsible for 
international crimes. The analysis of growth of international criminal law emphasises that 
the impartial trial and punishment of criminals is significant to the rule of law. 308 The 
model convention proposes a regional human rights court to prevent any disputes at an 
early stage and to act as an impartial body to afford redress to the victims of the sacred sites 
disputes from all over the region. 
The model convention recommends the establishment of a commission at national level. 
The constitution of the recommended commission may include representatives of state 
officials and religious communities. However, there may be a problem in a state which has 
many religions including hundreds of sub-sects or denominations. Hence selection of 
members for the commission shall be the responsibility of the elected government of a 
concerned state. 
The role of the commission is delineated in Article 6.2 of the model convention. In short, 
the commission should function as a para-legal body in implementing the rights granted in 
30S The statute entered into force on I July 2002. . 
306 Article I of the International Criminal Court Statute: An International Criminal Court (the Court) IS hereby 
established. It shall be a permanent institution and shall have the p?wer to ~xercise its jurisdiction over 
persons for the most serious crimes of international co~c~rn .. ~ referred to I~ th!s Statute, and shall be 
complementary to national criminal jurisdictions. The Junsdlctlon and functlOnmg of the C ourt ~hall be 
Roverned by the provisions of this Statute.. .' . . . '. . J 
T07 R Cryer and Nigel D White, 'The Security CounCil and the InternatIOnal Cnmmal Cou~. \\ ho ~ Feehng 
Threatened?' in 0 Bekou and R Cryer (eds) The International COllrt (Ashgate. Aldershot _0(4) S03~. . 
lOll D Shelton (ed).lnternational Crimes. Peace. and Hllman Rights: The Role (lltht' InternatIOnal ( rmwwl 
Court (Transnational, New York 2000) xi. 
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the convention. However, their role in establishing a peaceful pluralistic society is vital in 
settling the religious disputes amicably. This may be achieved through efforts such as 
human rights awareness campaigns, publications, devising reconciliatory measures among 
disputing groups. This may assist in establishing a strong civil society in every state based 
on democratic values which is a necessity for maintaining peace and security in South Asia. 
Article 6.3 recommends a regional human rights court. However. it would be recalled that 
, the region is yet to have a human rights organisation or a regional human rights treaty. 
Hence, the establishment of a South Asian regional human rights court would be an 
achievement in the region as a first step to promote and protect human rights. The European 
regional system was the first to create a regional court for the protection of human rights. 
Now the other two regions, Inter-American and African (created in 2006 and yet to 
functioni09 have established regional human rights courts although the latter is not as 
effective as the European Court of Human Rights. 
Creating a human rights court to protect sacred sites could help to reduce many tensions 
arising out of religious disputes. The court would have the power to receive complaints 
from individuals, groups and non-governmental organisations apart from state parties. 
Since protection of sacred sites is an individual as well as a collective right, the religious 
groups may have the right to establish and the right to claim remedy when the sacred sites 
are attacked. Many minority religious communities may not have enough resources and 
strength to approach a regional level court and in such situations, the non-governmental 
organisations should have the right to approach the court on behalf of the victimised 
religious community. 
One of the important provisions in the model convention is the proposal of appointing a 
SAARC High Commissioner for the protection of sacred sites. This follows the model of 
the High Commissioner for National Minorities (HCNM) established by the OSeE. The 
primary responsibility of HCNM is conflict prevention and he/she is appointed for a period 
309 See n 77. below. 
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of three years, which is renewable.3lo Since hislher appointment, the HCNM has been 
instrumental in reducing ethnic, racial and religious tensions in many parts of Europe. 
Similarly, the SAARC High Commissioner will engage in religious dispute resolutions 
through on-site visits. The High Commissioner's reports may assist the proposed SAARC 
human rights court in settling disputes among states or among religious communities. 
Nevertheless, the reports of the High Commissioner and hislher recommendations could be 
used to settle disputes among SAARC nations and this will promote the aims of SAARC. 
Moreover, the commissioner could be useful to follow up on judgments of the court. 
The Article does not mention the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court (ICC) in 
punishing those who commit cultural crimes against humanity by attacking sacred sites, 
since apart from Bangladesh, no other country in the region has ratified the ICC treaty. If 
the jurisdiction of the ICC is included, that could deter states from signing and ratifying this 
model convention. Moreover, the ICC has adopted the principle of complementarity as an 
essential component which means the ICC can take part in cases where domestic trial 
procedures are unavailable or ineffective. Given that the judiciary fails to function in an 
impartial manner in many South Asian countries, this complementarity principle becomes 
'a wide-open escape clause' .311 
5.6.8. Article 7 - Ratification of the convention 
7.1 This convention shall be open to the signature of the members of the SAARC 
and shall be ratified. Ratifications shall be deposited with the Secretary General of 
the SAARC. 
7.2 The present convention shall come into force after the deposit of five instruments 
of ratification. 
7.3 As regards any signatory ratifying subsequently, the convention shall come into 
force at the date of the deposit of its instrument of ratification. 
7.4 The contracting parties shall not have a right to reserve any provisions of this 
convention. 
)10 CSCE Helsinki Summit Decisions (1992) 35 ILM 1385.. ' ' 
.111 CJ Di~ 'Toward International Human Rights Crimes: As ASian Perspecllve on Human ,Rights and . 
I ,'I C' ' I La "n 0 Shelton (ed) [nternational Crimes. Peace. alld Hilma" R,~lrts: n't' Role oJ nternatlona nmana WI. ~. 
the [nternational Criminal COllrt (Trdllsnational. New York 2000) 40. 
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7.5 The Secretary General shall notify all the members of the SMRC of the entry 
into force of the convention, the names of the contracting parties who have ratified it, 
and the deposit of all instruments of ratification which may be effected subsequently. 
Commentary: Treaties create legal relations between the states by means of their 
agreement. Precisely, this is the reason why protection of sacred sites in South Asia is 
proposed in the fonn of a convention, a multilateral treaty, which creates binding 
obligations among its members and the regional court which enforces the rights granted in 
the model convention. 
In any treaty, the consent of the concerned state is required through a specific process. 
Article 11 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties describes that the consent 
may be given in various fonns. However, two important methods are consent by signature 
and consent by ratification312 which expresses a state's consent to be bound by the treaty 
provisions.313 Basically treaties will become operative as soon as consent to be bound by 
the treaty has been established by all the negotiating states, in the absence of any other 
provision.314 The model convention offers both methods to states to express their consent. 
Article 7.2 states that 'the convention shall come into force after the deposit of five 
instruments of ratification'. In the SAARC organisation, there are eighr 15 member states 
and bilateral relations between India and Pakistan are only improving in the recent years. 
At this given situation, it may not be feasible to get the consent of all the states in the 
region which could invalidate the entire process. Hence the consensus policy may not be 
applied here, rather, ratification of five states will set the treaty into motion. 
312 Vienna Convention on the law of Treaties (adopted 23 May 1969. entered into force 27 Jan~ 1980) 
1154 UNTS 331 (VCl T) art 2( l)b states that 'the inte~ational act so named whereby a state cstabhshes on 
the international plane its consent to be bound by a treaty . 
31) Vienna Convention (n 298) art 14. 
314 Vienna Convention (n 298) Art 24. 
31S Afghanistan became a member of SA ARC in 2007. See n Xl). below. 
292 
Article 7.2 of the model convention illustrates that the provisions of this convention shall 
not allow the contracting parties to make any reservations.316 This ability of a state to make 
reservations to an international or regional treaty is based on the principle of sovereignty of 
states. However, in the model convention the right to make a reservation of a treaty 
provision is removed since the convention deals with a particular right called 'right to 
protection of sacred sites'. Other rights are subsidiary in nature to protect this only right and 
hence it has been considered unnecessary to make reservations while ratifying it. 
5.7. Concluding Observations 
The first section of this chapter examined the benefits and weaknesses of the existing three 
major regional organisations, namely the European, the Inter-American and the African. 
The second section analysed the characteristics of South Asia with a special emphasis on 
how religious disputes damage its regional peace and security. Section three examined 
different theories of establishing a human rights regime and this will be used to create a 
new regional convention in the South Asian region. The fourth section evaluated the merits 
of the existing regional organisation, the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation 
(SAARC), in promoting peace and stability in the South Asian region. It particularly 
considered the possibility of using the SAARC as a facilitator from which a regional 
convention to protect sacred sites to enhance the promotion and protection of freedom of 
religion, may be brought forth. The fifth section developed a draft model for the proposed 
regional convention for protection of sacred sites with a commentary to justify the articles 
proposed in the model convention. 
The model convention for protection of sacred sites in the South Asian region is essential to 
protect the rights of citizens, particularly because of the growth of religious militancy and 
exploitation of sacred site disputes for political gains. Such disputes not only disrupt 
internal peace but also bring discord among the nations; democratic values arc trampled 
upon and innocent lives are constantly under threat in the region. Economic growth. both 
316 Vienna Convention (n 298) art 14 defines 'Reservation' as '3 unilateral stat~ment •... made by a Slate. 
h "" t"fyl"ng acceptl"ng approving or acceding to a trcal\·. whereby It pUfl>Orts to exclude or to w en sIgning. ra I,. . " .'. . 
modify the legal effect of certain provisions of the treaty In their application to lhat State. 
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within and beyond the region stagnates. Trade links and cultural exchange among the 
countries are strained. Communal riots and violence divide the society vertically and 
horizontally leading to violations of human rights. Prolonged religious conflicts polarise the 
civil society and the space for NGOs and human rights activists will fade away. Hence, for 
promoting and protecting human rights and for establishing an authentic democratic civil 
society in the region, the adoption of this model convention is important. 
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CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSION 
The key argument and main findings of the research on the disputed sacred sites and 
international law are summarised in this concluding chapter. The need for ensuring the 
protection of the sacred sites in the South Asian region, as illustrated from the case study on 
Ayodhya, emphasises the urgency for adopting the proposed model convention. 
6.1. Key arguments 
Sacred sites are significant to the right to freedom of religion. Any religious community, 
including minorities, who have organised themselves on the basis of their religion, have 
sacred sites that have tended to become their identity icons. Yet, the ever increasing attacks 
on sacred sites by states as well as non-state actors pose a serious risk to these rights. 
The rights of religious communities who generally own and have placed their faith in the 
sites as sacred symbols are at stake due to attacks. The consequences of such attacks are 
obvious from the case study on the Ayodhya dispute, and protecting the sacred sites from 
attacks is an important component of freedom of religion. The inadequacy of the existing 
legal mechanisms in a particular state warrants intervention from the international 
community and global human rights instruments. This is especially so because attacks on 
sacred sites today cannot but be seen as infringement on the right to freedom of religion and 
there is a need to develop it to include protection of sacred sites. 
6.2. Research questions 
The first question centred on the role of sacred sites in pluralistic India, while the second 
focused on the dispute at Ayodhya, and its relevance to Indian polity. Thirdly, the adequacy 
of the courts and existing legislations provided by the Indian legal system was examined. A 
further question centred round the relevance of international laws in settling regional issues. 
particularly as pertaining to human rights. Finally, the possibility of formulating a regional 
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convention potent enough to settle sacred sites disputes, not just in the South Asian region. 
but in any other region was discussed. 
6.3. Main findings 
The Ayodhya dispute began by the illegal installation of the idols of Hindu deities Ram and 
Sita inside the Babri Masjid in 1950. Subsequently the legal proceeding started to establish 
the right of the property between a few members of the Hindu religious community and the 
Muslim community. After a long legal battle, the militant communal groups from the 
Hindu religious community destroyed the mosque in 1992. Because the dispute has been 
allowed to fester since 1950, it has led to divisive entrenched positions on the part of the 
Hindu and Muslim religious communities leading to a negative mindset in which neither 
community is willing to accept a decision against them. In tum, these entrenched positions 
taken by these religious communities have eroded secular and democratic principles 
guaranteed by the Indian constitution, with the effect that these communities now voice 
their concerns couched in religious terms. Now the dispute is not seen as a legal dispute per 
se, but as a politico-religious dispute affecting the body politic of India. 
After the Ayodhya dispute, there has been a tendency by the Hindu Nationalist political 
parties such as BJP and Shiv Sena to base their political campaign on the religious 
sentiments of their communities. Especially from the 1990s onwards these political 
manoeuvrings surrounding the Ayodhya dispute have led to their enhancing vote share and 
being elected to power in various states and at the national level. Hence a fair and neutral 
resolution on this dispute is unlikely in the near future. 
Since this dispute has divided Indian society vertically along religious lines, any judgement 
will be seen as an injustice to the other community, very likely resulting in more and more 
rel~gious riots. This may lead to egregious human rights abuses of members belonging to 
these religious communities, particularly minority religious communities. ~10reo\'er, a 
judgement if rendered in favour of the majority community, will serve as a precedent for 
the Hindu militants to justify their claims that more than three thousand sacred sites 
belonging to nlinority communities belong to them. Therefore. there is a greater likelihood 
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that the nation will plunge into a spiral of communal violence causing more human rights 
violations. Consequently, a fair legal settlement might be unfeasible in the existing 
situation. 
The second question is answered by the evidence delineated in the case study. It suggests 
that the three organs of the Indian state, the legislative, judiciary and the executive, had 
failed to protect the Babri Masjid from illegal demolition and to prevent the subsequent 
nationwide human rights abuses. The Ayodya dispute has undermined the established 
secular values in the country, and has created apprehension among minority religious 
communities. The subsequent growth of the BJP, a Hindu nationalist party, has threatened 
the secular nature of India and minority religious communities and their sacred sites were 
freely attacked by members of the Sangh Parivar. 1 
Moreover, the federal nature of India was challenged by the state government of UP not 
adhering to the instructions of the union government. By allowing the demolition to take 
place, the state government abdicated from its duty to protect the rights of its citizens. As a 
secular government, it has a responsibility to put law before faith in protecting the rights of 
its citizens. In the Ayodhya dispute, the government gave priority to its religious faith 
ignoring the faith of minority communities and thus undermined the law. This research 
recommends that to maintain the secular, democratic, social fabric of India, state organs 
should give priority to constitution and treat all religions equally in protecting their rights. 
The third question queried the inadequacy of the courts in settling this dispute. Though the 
role of an independent judiciary is vital in settling the dispute and providing remedy to a 
minority community, the lacklustre attitude of the courts has proved inadequate to protect 
the sacred site and protect the victims from subsequent riots and violence. The suits which 
began in 1950 could not get a final verdict until 1992 when the mosque was demolished. 
All these years, the courts requested the parties to maintain the 'status quo' thereby 
ignoring the rights of the minorities in favour of the established religious community. 
Subsequent to the demolition. t.he members belonging to the Sangh Par;\,ar organisations 
I Text to n 83 in chapter 3. 
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hastily built a temporary temple and kept the idols there. Though the courts are aware that 
legally this is not maintainable, they asked to maintain 'status quo' which is a clear 
violation of constitutional provisions.2 
After the demolition, the courts have not been able to punish those who were involved in 
the demolition of the mosque and subsequent riots which claimed thousands of lives.3 The 
delay in bringing those to justice is seen as example of the courts inadequacy in handling 
disputes such as Ayodhya. This delay can be attributed to the political process existing in 
the country. In 1986, the court allowed the opening of the locks of the Babri mosque to the 
Hindus, which was possible only because of the tacit support of the congress government..t 
Although Indian Constitution empowers the courts with enough provisions, the case study 
points out that the courts failed to act impartially and used delay tactics to postpone the 
dispute culminating in the demolition of the Babri mosque. This research proposes that the 
judiciary need to remain independent and impartial in providing speedy justice to the 
victims of human rights which is lacking deeply in the Ayodhya dispute. 
The failure of the domestic legal system leads to the fourth question which is concerned 
with the international human rights law. International law provides a way to redress 
obvious human rights violations when domestic organs fail. There is a necessity, therefore, 
to develop international law to include protection of the sacred sites as it is a significant 
component of freedom of religion. But given its nature, international human rights law 
offers only a supervisory framework for the promotion and protection of human rights. 
However, the member states are obliged to protect, fulfil, and promote human rights within 
their jurisdiction. 
Protection of sacred sites could be covered under four different rights recognised in 
international law. They include the right to freedom of religion, rights of the minorities. 
right to property and protection of cultural rights during armed conflict. The existing 
international law provisions, however. have not included protection of sacred sites as a 
1 Text to n 167 in chapter 3. 
1 Text to n 329 in chapter 3. 
4 Text to n 121 in chapter 3. 
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right to a religious community. An analysis of these rights reveals that international human 
rights law is mainly concerned with individual rights and except for a few rights, such as 
prohibition of genocide, they do not protect collective rights of groups.s Since protection of 
sacred sites falls on collective rights of a religious community, they do not appear, 
apparently, on any of these international law instruments. Moreover, since sacred sites and 
their protection are not recognised as a right, the existing provisions of international law 
and their enforcement mechanisms do not offer any remedy to sacred sites disputes similar 
to that at Ayodhya. This necessitates developing provisions in the existing international law 
to include protection of sacred sites, as developing right to freedom of religion is a 
contribution of this research. 
Regional organisations have promoted human rights protection in their region through 
human rights mechanisms such as human rights commissions and regional human rights 
courts which have complaints mechanisms which allow not only for states but also 
individuals and non-governmental organisations. The European region has by far the most 
advanced system compared to the inter-American and African regional systems. Although 
there is a need to improve their performances in protecting human rights in their region, 
they are more useful and practical than global human rights instruments.6 There is no 
regional human rights system existing in the South-Asian region which could be used to 
redress disputes similar to Ayodhya. 
This leads to the fifth question which is concerned with drafting a model convention for the 
protection of sacred sites in South Asia. The facts provided in the fifth chapter support that 
a model convention thus becomes necessary. Internal security and peace, stability and 
human rights in this region today are primarily threatened by the resurgence of religious 
militancy among the South Asian states.7 The focus of the militant religious groups is often 
on sacred sites belonging to other religious communities. It has been established in the 
Ayodhya dispute that attacks on sacred sites result in human rights violations and threaten 
peace in the region. When the rights of the minorities are violated, civil society is 
S Text to n 153 in chapter 4. 
6 Text to n 11-16 in chapter 5. 
7 Text to n 99-105 in chapter 5. 
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weakened. Secular voices in these countries are slowly losing faith in the law enforcement 
machinery, particularly in the jUdiciary. These reasons necessitate the member states of 
SAARC to adopt a human rights treaty to protect the sacred sites. 
6.4. Draft model for the South Asian Regional Convention for the Protection of Sacred 
Sites 
The proposed model is the first attempt to draft a specialist treaty to protect sacred sites in 
the South Asian region, as a significant component of the right to freedom of religion. 
Moreover, the draft model guarantees the collective right of religious communities to 
establish, maintain, administer and use sacred sites as a fundamental right, however, 
without affecting the rights of other religious communities. The recognition of collective 
rights of religious communities will be a development in international human rights law 
which is mainly concerned with a few exceptions, individual human rights. Once again, this 
is the first draft treaty which supports the right to undertake pilgrimage for the adherents of 
any religion. As the rights of the indigenous people gain momentum, this draft model 
proposes to protect their rights, specifically, to use their sacred sites without unjust 
interference from a state or non-state actors. 
The enforcement mechanisms proposed in Article 6 of the draft Model Convention is the 
first of its kind to address the issues of religious communities. Appointing a High 
Commissioner will be a major step in bringing awareness among the people of this region 
and serves as a useful mechanism to avert major human rights abuses based on religious 
disputes by giving early warning to the member states. The proposed human rights court 
will function as a precursor to a future regional court based on a South Asian Convention 
for human rights. 
The draft model convention, if adopted by the SAARC members. could have long-term 
consequences for establishing peace and security in the South Asian region. This will also 
assist in strengthening the civil society in the region which is sine qua non to cope with the 
growing religious militancy in various states in the region. The model convention if 
adopted and applied in the right spirit will restrain many disputes in the initial stage and 
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states will be able to protect their citizens embroiled in riots and violence. Above all, it will 
promote and protect human rights in the region which is vital for the development of the 
whole Asian region. Eventually, it will also lead to adopt a full-fledged human rights treaty 
for South Asia similar to the European Convention on Human Rights. 
6.S. Reco'mmendations for further research 
The Babri Masjid-Ram Janmabhumi, a sacred site, studied primarily from the legal 
perspective, exposed the inadequacy of the courts in a particular state to remedy a long-
drawn-out row. However, there still are a number of other causes and compulsions such as 
population and caste affiliations which curtail the independence of the jUdiciary. Partiality 
prevalent in the lower level of the judiciary and the impact of local traditions, including 
religious affiliations, need further study. 
Qualitative data and analysis are needed to understand the rise of militant religious groups 
in the region. A holistic approach is vital to tackle growing religious militancy. It cannot 
just be confined to the judiciary. No legal instrument can be effective unless the economic 
issues of the people of this region are tackled. Therefore, for the legal provisions to take 
hold, further study on the nexus between religious militants and members of the judiciary in 
South Asia seems inevitable. 
Countless numbers of sacred sites exist in the South Asian region alone. From the road-side 
tiny shrines to temples, mosques and churches of historical importance abound in this 
region. It is indeed a Himalayan task to separate the sacred sites from the ordinary or the 
less important sites. It is even more cumbersome for any state administration to provide 
protection to all such sites. Hence, further study seems vital to suggest ways and means of 
regularising the sacred sites without discrimination to a particular religious community. 
There is also a need to further research to examine how this proposed model con\'enton 
could be adopted and implemented in South Asian region. 
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APPENDIX 1: LIST OF INTERVIEWEES 
The interviews took place during my frrst trip to India from 1 December 2005 to 28 
February 2006. 
1. Arul Raj, Retired Judge, Civil Court at Chennai (Chennai 20 February 2006). 
2. C. K. Mishra, Correspondent Jan Morcha (Lucknow 10 February 2006). 
3. Dr. Asghar Ali Engineer, Director of Institute of Islamic Studies and Centre for 
Study of Society and Secularism (Mumbai 6 December 2005). 
4. Dr. Balu, Head of the Department for Legal Studies, University of Madras, 
(Chennai 20 Febraury 2006). 
5. Dr. Devasahayam, Chairman of People's Watch - Human Rights Organisation, 
India (Madhurai 20 February 2006). 
6. Dr. John Dayal, President-All India Catholic Union, Secretary General-All India 
Christian Council, Member of National Integration Council (New Delhi 29 January 
2006). 
7. Dr. Nithya, CBCI National Secretary to Justice and Peace Commission (New Delhi 
5 January 2006) 
8. Dr. Raju, Advocate, Supreme Court of India (New Delhi 8 January 2006). 
9. Hon. Sitaram Yechury, Member of Parliament, Communist (Marxist) Party of India 
(New Delhi 22 January 2006). 
10. LB. Singh, Advocate Lucknow High Court, Advocate to Justice Liberhan 
Commission, (Lucknow 9 February 2006). 
11. Khaliq Ahmed Khan, Chairman of 'Ayodhya Faizabad Study & Research Centre' 
Faizabad (Faizabad 10 February 2006) 
12. N. Ram, Editor-in-Chief, The Hindu (Chennai 18 February 2006). 
13. N. Ravi, President of Editors Guild. New Delhi (Chennai 18 February 2006). 
14. Prof. Muhammad Iqbal, Principal of Ambedkar Law College, India (Tiruneivcli, 
India 17 February 2006). 
15. Ram Puniyani, Member of EKT A, Committee for Communal Amity (Mumbai 8 
December 2005). 
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16. Shanna, Inspector General of Central Bureau of Investigation (New Delhi on 28 
January 2006). 
17. Telephonic interview with A.G. Noorani, Advocate, Supreme Court of India and a 
leading Constitutional expert (Mumbai 8 December 2005). 
18. V.V. Augustine, Member of National Minority Commission, Govt of India (New 
Delhi 6 January 2006). 
19. Vincent Chinnadurai, Chainnan of Minority Commission, Tamil Nadu (Chennai 18 
February 2006). 
20. Zafaryab Gilani, Convener of the All India Babri Masjid Action Committee and 
Advocate, Lucknow High court (Lucknow 14 February 2006). 
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APPENDIX 2: SECOND FIELD WORK TRIP 
Second field work trip in India from 1 - 21 July 2007 
During this field work trip, group meetings were arranged to conduct in-depth discussions at 
five places in Tamil Nadu, the home state of the researcher. Scholars, human rights activists. 
lawyers and research students were included, for wider consultation. The outcome of the 
discussions was integrated into the main fmdings of the thesis, especially in chapters 3 and 
5. Preliminary findings were circulated amongst participants, and at the time of the meeting, 
the scholar gave a brief presentation of the objectives and findings of the research. The 
participants then raised their questions, and gave their opinions and suggestions based upon 
their personal reading of the material circulated and also from the presentation. This was 
proved to be very useful, methodologically. The participants, venue and dates of the 
meetings are given below. 
The first group: venue - Chennai 
Date - 4 and 5 July 2007 
Participants: Dr Robin, Registrar of Ambedkar Law University, Chennai, 
Dr Devadoss, Professor at Ambedkar Law University, Chennai, 
Dr Joe Arun (axon), Lecturer, Loyola College, Chennai and 
Dr Patrick, Lecturer, University of Madras, Chennai. 
The second group: venue - Trichy 
Date - 7 and 8 July 2007. 
Participants: Dr V Maria Alphonse, 
Dr D Alphonse, Rector ofSt Paul's Seminary, Trichy, 
Rev Packianathan, Research scholar in Oxford, 
Mrs Banumathi MA, LLM, human rights lawyer, 
Dr A Marx, human rights activist and writer, and 
Dr XD Selvaraj, human rights activist, Bangalorc. 
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Third group: venue - Madurai 
Date - 11 and 12 July 2007 
Participants: Dr Devasahayam, President of People's Watch - a human rights organisation, 
Mr Karunanidhi, advocate and member of People's Watch, 
Dr Xavier, Vice-Principal of De Britto College, Madurai, 
Dr Socrates, Professor, Madurai Kamaraj University and a human rights activist and 
Dr.lmmanuel, Rector of Pillar House and human rights activist. 
Fourth group: venue - Palayamkottai 
Dated - 14 July 2007 
Participants: Dr Britto, Director of Vaanmuhil - a human rights organisation, 
Mr Muhammad Iqbal MA, LLM, Principal of the Government Law College, Tirunelveli, Mr 
Varghese MA, LLM, Professor at Government Law College, Coimabatore and 
Dr Aruldoss, Director, Sivagangai Multi Purpose Society, Tamilnadu. 
Fifth group: venue - Nagercoil 
Date - 15 and 16 July 2007 
Participants: Dr Maria Alphonse, 
Dr William, 
Dr Wilson, 
Dr Hilarius, 
Rev Amirtharaj, Director, St Xavier's Engineering College, Nagercoil. 
The participants are mainly human rights activists involved in building up a strong civil 
society in the southern part of India. All five venues are situated in the state of Tamilnadu. 
India. The group discussions further substantiated the need for promotion and protection of 
human rights in South Asia as well as addressing the protection of sacred sites in a regional 
convention. The researcher expresses his gratitude to these participants for taking part in 
this research. 
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APPENDIX 3: DRAFT MODEL FOR REGIONAL CONVE~TIO~ 
Text of draft model for regional convention for protection of sacred sites 
Preamble 
Recalling that one of the basic principles of the Charter of the United Nations is to promote 
and encourage universal respect for and observance of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion, 
Recalling that one of the basic principles of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights is that every person has the right to 
freedom of thought, conscience and religion, and freedom, either alone or in community 
with others, and in public or private to manifest one's religion in teaching, practice, 
worship and observance, 
Considering that freedom of religion, in many countries, is infringed by attacking sacred 
sites belonging to particular religious communities leading to egregious human rights 
violations within states, and exacerbates tension and violence in other states where the 
members of the same religious communities live or settled, 
Convinced that disputes over sacred sites and attacks on them destabilize peace and 
security in the region and it is essential to promote understanding, tolerance, and respect in 
matters relating to freedom of religion to foster international and regional cooperation 
among states, 
Concerned by the existence of discrimination in the granting of pennission to establish. 
maintain, and fully use for religious purposes. and the inadequate protection given to sacred 
sites belonging to minority religious communities, 
Considering that the aim of the regional organisation SAARC is promoting peace, stability, 
amity and progress and such an aim has to be pursued in the maintenance and further 
realization of human rights and fundamental freedoms, 
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Convinced that it is essential to give particular attention to the protection of sacred sites as 
part of the protection and promotion of rights of freedom of religion and also rights of 
minority religious communities which cannot be disassociated from maintaining peace and 
stability in the South Asian region, 
Resolve hereby that all contracting parties adopt all necessary measures for the protection 
of sacred sites to protect and promote human rights and freedoms, in particular the right to 
freedom of religion within their jurisdiction, 
Now, therefore the member states of the SAARC proclaim this regional convention on the 
protection of sacred sites in South Asia: 
Article 1 - Right to sacred sites is a fundamental component of the right to freedom 
of religion 
1.1. Every religious group shall have a right to establish sacred sites and to manifest therein 
their faith through worship, observance, practice and teaching. 
1.2 Every religious individual and group shall have the right to undertake pilgrimage to 
sacred sites both within and outside one's country. 
1.3 Indigenous peoples living within the South Asian region shall have the right to their 
sacred sites, ceremonial objects and the remains of their ancestors. States shall undertake 
special measures and assist indigenous peoples to preserve and protect their sacred sites. 
Article 2 - Protection of sacred sites is a right of religious groups 
2.1 Every religious group has the right to acquire and own property and to own and 
administer such property in accordance with law. 
2.2 Every religious group has the right to establish, maintain, administer and to make full 
use of its sacred sites. 
2.3 Every religious organisation shall have the right to register their sacred sites and shall 
have the independence to create their own organizational rules and internal by-laws. 
compatible with domestic legislation. 
307 
2.4 Every sacred site shall attain legal personality upon its registration by the religious 
organisations in the corresponding public registry created for this by the government. 
2.5 Registration shall be granted to the religious organisation by virtue of an application 
together with an authentic document containing proof of title to the land or property 
involved. 
2.6 The application for registration shall contain proof of the foundation or establishment of 
the organization, declaration of religious purpose, denomination and other particulars of 
identity, rules of procedure, names of representative bodies and the powers of such bodies. 
2.7 There shall not be any discrimination in granting registration to any religious groups. 
2.8 Registration shall only be cancelled by a commission appointed by the state or 
compliance of a final court verdict or at the request of its representative body. 
2.9 Registered sacred sites shall be entitled to voluntary financial and other contributions 
from individuals and institutions within the state and from abroad. 
2.10 Registered sacred sites shall be protected against unlawful demolition, re-Iocation or 
compulsory acquisition. 
Article 3 - Right to equal treatment of all sacred sites 
3.1 Every religious group shall have the right to equal treatment to establish, maintain and 
administer sacred sites without any discrimination. 
3.2 For the purpose of the present convention, the expression 'discrimination' shall refer to 
any unreasonable distinction, exclusion, restriction, imposition of condition, and abolition 
of the recognition, enjoyment or exercise of the freedom of religion. 
3.3 There shall not be any arbitrary interference with respect to the right of religious groups 
to establish, preserve and protect sacred sites from any state or non-state actors, group of 
persons or individuals on the ground of religion. 
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Article 4 - Legal limitations in protecting sacred sites 
4.1 The right to establish, maintain and administer sacred sites may be subject only to such 
limitations prescribed by law and/or are necessary to protect public order. health. morals 
and the fundamental rights and freedoms of others. 
4.2 The right of religious groups to establish, maintain and administer sacred sites shall be 
subjected to state restrictions necessary on the grounds of planning requirements and 
registration policies, and regulatory provisions. However, such policies and regulations 
shall be formulated and implemented with due respect to preserve and to allow coexistence 
of all sacred sites without any discrimination. 
Article 5 - Remedies 
5.1 All decisions by the state on demolition, re-Iocation or denial of planning pennission 
shall be guided by the principles of transparency, fairness and impartiality. The decisions 
shall be subject to judicial supervision. 
5.2 Defilement, destruction or damage to sacred sites shall be treated as a criminal offence, 
a cultural crime against humanity, and any individual who commits such an offence shall 
be punished in accordance with the domestic law of the state where the offence was 
committed. 
5.3 Any individual or public official who aids and abets the above offences shall be 
punished in accordance with the domestic law of the state where the offence was 
committed. 
5.4 When a state fails to punish those individuals or groups involved in attacks over sacred 
sites, they shall be subjected to regional court when such acts lead to egregious violations 
of human rights. 
5.5 Sacred sites illegally damaged or destroyed shall be repaired or rebuilt at the same site 
or at a suitable alterantive site at the expense of the individuals or groups responsible for 
such crime, but if circumstances arise where this is not feasible, the state authorities shall 
be responsible in rebuilding those sacred sites especially wh~n the state fails in its 
obligation to protect these sites. 
309 
Article 6 - Enforcement mechanisms 
National level: 
6.1 Every state, party to the present convention undertakes to respect and to ensure the right 
to protection of sacred sites to all individuals and to all religious groups within its territory 
through appropriate means including legislation and administrative measures. 
6.2 There shall be a commission in every participant state and membership shall include an 
equal number of members of government officials and representatives of religious 
communities in the country. 
6.3 The functions of the commission shall include making proposals to the government to 
implement the provisions of the convention, reporting of all events in the state, reviewing 
situations, and trying reconciliatory measures among various disputing religious or other 
groups. 
Regional level: 
6.4 To ensure the observance of the activities undertaken by the contracting parties to the 
convention, there shall be a permanent regional court in the South Asian region. 
6.5 The Court shall have jurisdiction concerning interpretation and application of the 
convention in protecting sacred sites. 
6.6 Any contracting party may refer to the court any alleged breach of the provisions of the 
convention by another contracting party. 
6.7 The court may receive applications from any person, non-governmental organization or 
group of individuals claiming to be the victim of a violation by one of the contracting parties 
of the rights set forth in the convention. 
6.8 The SAARC shall appoint a High Commissioner for the protection of sacred sites to 
identify and seek early resolution of religious disputes that might endanger peace, stilbility 
or friendly relations between SAARC participating states. 
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Article 7 - Ratification of the convention 
7.1 This convention shall be open to the signature of the members of the SAARC and shall be 
ratified. Ratifications shall be deposited with the Secretary General of the SAARC. 
7.2 The present convention shall come into force after the deposit of five instruments of 
ratification. 
7.3 As regards any signatory ratifying subsequently, the convention shall come into force at 
the date of the deposit of its instrument of ratification. 
7.4 The contracting parties shall not have a right to reserve any prOVISIons of this 
convention. 
7.5 The Secretary General shall notify all the members of the SAARC of the entry into force 
of the convention, the names of the contracting parties who have ratified it, and the deposit of 
all instruments of ratification which may be effected subsequently. 
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